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Regulation in its generic sense has existed for a very long time in different 
forms, with different aims and different problems of accountability, but the study 
of competition regulation by a Government agency has perhaps become 
fashionable only in recent years. 
This thesis consists of two leading themes. First, it will contend that, whilst the 
market system has been seriously underestimated as a social institution to the 
extent that it should be left to operate and organise itself where that is possible, 
it is at the same time not always self-regulating. Residual intervention by the 
State or its agencies will remain necessary in strategic cases, either to protect 
individual autonomy and choice, or to correct failures of the market system. The 
question is simply more or less regulation. 
Secondly, and on that premise, competition regulation must be distinguished 
into economic regulation and antitrust regulation because the relationship 
between them is inversely proportional: the more intense economic regulation is, 
the less important antitrust regulation becomes. By implication then, economic 
liberalisation or deregulation must be accompanied by a robust framework of 
antitrust regulation to ensure that the conditions of sustainable competition are 
not threatened by anti-competitive practices. Conditions of sustainable 
competition are thus critical for market contestabifity. 
For many years, domestic and international airline competition has been the 
subject of comprehensive regulation. With the passage of time, however, the 
thinking has changed and, no doubt, liberal policies and practicesWill continue 
to find expression in future political and economic sentiments. The responsibility 
for regulating airlines in the United Kingdom falls on the Civil Aviation 
Authority, which has played a formidable role in iransforming the policy of 
heavy regulation into minimal regulation, although much of that regulatory 
landscape has now been altered with the advent of the Single European Aviation 
Market. The experiences of, both, the CAA and the new SEATNI provide an 
illuminating account of the evolutionary process of regulating airfine 
competition, that from economic to antitrust regulation. 
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INTRODUI'CTION 
Administrative regulation is a concept neither new nor novel, As a system of 
regulation, its existence stretches back to the days of the Industrial Revolution 
although the time lapse has produced little in the way of a coherent and 
systematic policy explaining administrative regulation and its use, Much of this 
is evident in the creation of regulatory agencies to oversee the privatised utilities 
sector without a proper understanding of the aims of regulation and the toot 
best suited to the task. Consequently, there is a frequent mismatch betweeh 
regulatory aim and methodology. The study of regulation has only become 
fashionable in the 1980s with the proliferation of regulatory agencies designed 
to regulate the privatised industries and the advent of deregulation. Prior to this 
period, academic attention on public regulation was sporadic; even more so on 
its constitutional and legal implications especially when the use of multi- 
powered administrative agencies gave rise to constitutional questions, crucially 
those on the accountability of regulatory decisions. This was largely due to the 
lack of effort to promote the study of regulation and the law as a distinct 
discipline of study. 
The aim of this thesis is not to develop a new theory of regulation or economic 
regulation. What it seeks to do is to chart the evolutionary process of economic 
regulation within the context of a modem liberal economy, where individualism 
and choice are given emphasis, but where collectivist strategies remain 
necessary to protect such individualism and personal choice. It seeks to test the 
hypothesis that economic regulation is merely a temporary mechanism to 
procure competition in a given sector, and may be abandoned once the 
conditions for sustainable competition have been achieved. The thesis will also 
seek to establish further that any dismantling of an economic regulatory system 
does not eliminate the continuing need for antitrust regulation so as to ensure 
that the conditions for sustainable competition are not threatened. 
Over the past two decades, so much in the way of social and economic 
organisation has changed to such an extent that even the role of the State has 
changed beyond recognition; whether there has been a deliberative process to 
reflect on these changes is another matter. The commitment to a collective 
model of social organisation where planning was centralised no longer seems to 
be as attractive as in the past. Collective strategies such as nationalisation have 
failed to engender continuing support and are rapidly becoming irrelevant in the 
wake of dynamic economic performance in capitalist systems. Equally, 
regulation as a species of centralised command-control procedures is fast losing 
currency as liberalisation and deregulation increasingly come to be accepted as 
the dominant orcranising concept where resource allocation is largely market- 
based. This is not to say that the shift in preference for a different form of social 
and economic organisation signifies a collapse in support or desire for public 
sector provision or intervention. Rather, it is a new political expression and 
commitment to personal autonomy and choice, and to reject producer 
domination as the acceptable balance in the producer-purchaser relationship, 
characteristic of what 'Max Weber calls Gesellkliqf1fich. This thesis will argue 
that residual intervention by the State or its agencies remains necessary in 
strategic cases, primarily to protect individual autonomy and choices, if not to 
correct the failures of the (; e. ve11vc1iqf1 model. Implicit in this contention is that 
markets are not self-regulating, that it sometimes fails to deliver a just 
distribution of goods and services, or social justice. 
Even so, it should be clear from the arguments in the thesis that the market 
system has been seriously underestimated as a social institution, by suggesting 
that the market should be left to operate, organise and regulate itself where that 
is possible. This means that if we set out to regulate a particular sector, there 
may come a point when regulation becomes redundant or may be dismantled. 
Clearly, this requires a number of assumptions. The thesis will argue that 
regulation is a temporary measure where the regulated sector is naturally and 
structurally competitive. This is true and possible where market conditions have 
changed, perhaps with the passage of time, to become more competitive. In 
some cases, however, a given sector may be structurally competitive but 
artificial measures may have been created to prevent the full operation of the 
competitive forces such as privileges or endowments conferred by the State. In 
such cases, the introduction of a policy of economic deregulation, without first 
removing or diminishing the effects of these artificial barriers, would simply 
hasten the need for re-regulation since the conditions for sustainable 
competition will not have been established. By contrast, where the sector is a 
natural monopoly or structurally uncompetitive, economic regulation will 
remain essential to avoid the excesses of dominant market power. 
The abandonment of regulatory controls, either partially or completely, where a 
given sector is naturally and structurafly competitive does not extinguish the 
need for some form of regulation to police the actions and behaviour of the 
participants within the sector. This is known as antitrust regulation, and must be 
distinguished from economic regulation. Economic regulation is essentially 
concerned with the regulation of market access, price and capacity. Thus, 
policies of economic regulation have an instrumental role in determining the 
level of competition through the control of access or capacity as well as the 
profitability of an enterprise through price control. Antitrust regulation on the 
other hand is concerned primarily with the regulation of trading practices of a 
firm, relative to its competitors within the defined market, to determine whether 
they are anti-competitive, or amount to an abuse of market power, or result in 
the elimination of competition. Importantly, antitrust regulation presumes the 
existence of actual or potential competition and aims at safeguarding the 
interests of all competing firms within the relevant market. This implies a belief 
in competitive solutions, though only as a means rather than an end in itself It 
also implies that control of market access will have been liberalised or 
deregulated. This leads to the argument that economic regulation, rather than 
antitrust regulation, is the appropriate form of regulation for natural 
monopolies. 
xvii 
Despite this distinction, there is a considerable degree of overlap between 
economic regulation and antitrust regulation, at least in respect of the way in 
which economic regulation can be put to achieving the aims of antitrust 
regulation. This is possible where, for example, the economic regulator has 
deemed the practice of a firm as anti-competitive or exploitative of its market 
power, and proposes to vary the conditions of the licence granted to that firm. 
Likewise, where two firms within the relevant market propose to merge their 
operations, the economic regulator may propose to vary the terms of their 
licence to ensure that competition is not eliminated. In these cases, the aims of 
the economic regulator are indistinguishable from those of the antitrust 
regulator. What may well differ are the procedures for determining the 
behaviour of the firm and the manner in which the conditions, if any, arq 
imposed. It will be argued in this thesis that in certain industries such as civil 
aviation, or indeed telecommunications where the Office of 
Telecommunications has successfully incorporated fair trading provisions into 
British Telecommunications' licence, antitrust regulation through the 
conditioning of licences by the economic regulator is more effective. Indeed, the 
thesis will conclude with the contention that once economic regulation has 
created an environment of sustainable competition, by implication a structurally 
competitive industry, the regulatory process evolves into antitrust regulation. 
However, liberalisation or deregulation without having created the conditions 
for sustainable competition, supported by a dynamic framework of antitrust 
regulation, would simply precipitate the case for economic re-regulation. 
To chart the evolutionary process from economic regulation to antitrust 
regulation at the practical level, the case of air transport will be examined. 
Although in recent years there has been a proliferation of regulatory agencies, 
not least those created to oversee the privatised utilities sector, one of the 
longest standing regulatory agencies is the Civil Aviation Authority, The CAA 
is the independent Government agency established by the Civil Aviation Act 
1971 with a broad responsibility to regulate the air transport industry. Over this 
period, much has happened and changed in respect of its regulatory methods 
and more importantly of its regulatory policies. This speaks nothing of the 
liberalisation of European air transport and its impact on British air transport, 
and the adequacy of European antitrust laws to protect the conditions for 
sustainable competition. These measures are important and cannot be ignored. 
The remarks of a former Chairman of the CAA, Sir Christopher Chataway, 
encapsulate the very essence of these developments and their effect on British 
air transport: "This endless debate ignores the obvious fact that geography has 
already made the decision for us. "' Thus, in more ways than one, the CAA's 
philosophy and approach to competition regulation provides a very interesting 
case study to support the leading theme of this thesis, which major aim is to 
contribute towards a better understanding of the shift from a command-control 
to a liberal model of regulating air transport competition, from economic 
regulation to liberalisation and antitrust regulation, and accordingly the 
(1995) Horizon: Journal of the OvilAviatjon. luthori(v 2. Forthe sake of simplicity 
and consistency. "European Community" will be used throughout this study to denote 
both the European Community and the European Union. 
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adequacy of the legal institutions designed to secure and protect tile objectives 
of a liberallsed air transport order 
The general themes of regulation will be considered First to establish a 
conceptual framework for the thesis. Chapter I will attempt to construct a 
working definition for the concept of 'regulation' to provide a basis for 
analysing the anatomy of the regulated air transport industry and the reasons 
why an independent regulatory agency has often emerged as the preferred 
institutional form. The aim of examining the anatomy of the regulated air 
transport industry is to identify the 'stakeholders' whose respective interests 
may well be conflicting or compatible with one another. This will be important 
for understanding the role of the regulator, as a principal actor within ihq 
regulatory complex, in reconciling the claims and counter-claims of the 
stakeholders. Chapter 2 will provide a more specific review of the theory of 
regulating competition. This will comprise an analysis of the forms of economic 
organisation and regulation, their rationales and the place of competition 
regulation. The distinction between economic regulation and antitrust regulation 
will also be considered to lay down the foundations for understanding the 
evolutionary process from economic regulation to antitrust regulation, and in 
some extreme cases, to economic re-regulation. This will establish the 
conceptual framework for analysing and understanding the changing role of the 
CAA in air transport competition regulation. 
The suitability of one model rather than another depends on the given set of 
political, economic and social circumstances. Grafting a regulatory approach 
conceived in a different political and economic context onto another is a recipe 
for potential disaster. A specific regulatory approach or strategy cannot be a 
typology of the general industrial policy. The history of events points decidedly 
away from this direction. It is important therefore that a study of this nature 
includes a historical perspective so that in order to move forward we know 
what we have been, what we are, and what we can become. Accordingly 
chapter 3 will aim to provide an historical base for the thesis and to provide a 
review of the regulatory arrangements for air transport prior to the creation of ZD the CAA. 
Chapters 4 to 7 are the empirical evidence to support the leading themes of the 
thesis. Chapter 4 aims to examine the regulatory policies of the CAA and the 
ways in which such policies are formulated and the extent to which their 
emphasis have changed. In particular, it will consider how the change in the 
emphasis of the regulatory policies and aims have had an effect on the role of 
the CAA especially its long-established system of public hearings. Chapters 5 
and 6 examine the manner in which the policies are applied, to procure the 
objectives of the governing statute and regulatory policies. There is an extensive 
analysis of the case-law resulting from the licensing decisions of the CAA to 
lend support to the contention that economic regulation can be abandoned or 
liberalised and consequently take a different regulatory emphasis, that is 
antitrust regulation, provided that the sector is structurally competitive and the 
conditions for sustainable competitive have been established. Chapter 7 is an 
analysis of the liberalisation measures adopted by the European Community and 
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the extent to which they have alTected the regulatory policies and practices of 
the C. AA. 
This thesis would not be complete if it failed to consider the deregulation of the 
airline industry in the United States, not least because they have been widely 
argued to be the pioneers of airline deregulation, This issue will be contested in 
due course. Be that as it may, Chapter 8 provides, first of all, an historical 
analysis of air transport regulation in the US and how it led to a policy of 
deregulation. The rationales for the deregulatory policy will be examined to 
determine whether the reform was based on political motives or economic 
reasoning, or both. More importantly, it is almost 20 years since the 
deregulation which will have in store a catalogue of lessons for a study of ihis 
kind; that is, whether changes to the industry structure is demanding a return to 
economic regulation of the old days, or the system of antitrust regulation simply 
needs to be more strictly enforced. 
Regulation of any form is an act of interference in the activities of another. In its 
generic sense, it represents a form of behavioural control. Thus, whatever may 
be the nature of the behaviour that is subject to such regulatory control, the 
authority to regulate requires two essential characteristics: legitimacy and 
enforceability. The legitimacy of any public act of regulatory intervention stems 
from the assumption that the interference is for public interest ends. 
Nevertheless,, there have been criticisms levelled at some regulatory systems 
which have been accused of pursuing private interest goals and thus leading to 
the capture of the regulatory machinery. Whatever may be the ends pursued by 
the public act of regulation, accountability for the regulator's actions becomes 
an important issue to explain the basis for the interference. Chapter 9 will 
examine these issues as they relate to administrative regulation. Two types of 
accountability will be considered briefly: political and judicial. It will be argued 
that a shffi in the regulatory role of an administrative regulator from economic 
regulation to antitrust regulation need not and should not compromise the end 
objectives as well as the process rights of the participants within the regulatory 
complex. Indeed, to safeguard some of these rights, there is a case for arguing 
that a rigorous system of public interest representation should be introduced. 
The final chapter of the thesis will be an attempt to draw together the issues 
surrounding the leading themes, that is the changing role of the CAA from one 
of economic regulation to antitrust regulation. In particular, they will seek to 
reinforce the contention that competition regulation is comprised of a three 
stage life-cycle. First, the crusade of economic regulation. Secondly, assuming 
that greater competition is a prime objective, economic regulation would either 
be abandoned or liberalised once the conditions of sustainable competition have 
been achieved. In the former case, that will be deregulation, whilst economic 
liberalisation means that there will remain some degree of economic regulatory 
control because the full conditions of sustainable competition cannot be 
achieved given some structural problems. This may be described as "managed 
competition" or "regulated competition". The third stage of the life-cycle is 
econon-dc re-regulation, where this has become necessary either because 
economic deregulation or liberalisation has failed. 
CHAPTER ONE REGULATION: A GENERAL 
ANALYSIS 
In its most basic and general form, 'regulation' has been in existence from early 
times. Its evolution since then has been interestingly varied and deeply 
significant, Over the years, it has become an increasingly contentious issue. 
Yet, the meaning of 'regulation' remains ever elusive. The aim of this thesis is 
not to provide a definitive theory of the concept of regulation. What it aims to 
achieve is to provide an analysis of regulation as a process, and the mannef in 
which one form of regulation evolves into another, depending, first, on the 
objectives of the regulatory system, and secondly whether the conditions for the 
transformation in regulatory form have been established without threatening the 
realisation of the objectives. Regulatory form in this sense is not meant to be 
understood as regulatory institutions or instruments, though the variety of such 
institutions and instruments are important in their own right and will be 
considered accordingly. Rather, the term regulatory form is used here to denote 
the nature or the type of regulation by reference to the substantive policies on 
the regulatory system. This may be competition regulation such as predatory 
practices, social regulation such as health and safety or environmental 
regulation. The regulation of air transport competition in the UK is a mature 
system of regulation which has much to illustrate the leading themes of this 
thesis. Before venturing any further, there needs to be an analysis of the 
regulatory complex of the airline industry so as to provide a basis for 
considering the theory of competition regulation in more detail in the next 
chapter. However, to understand the anatomy of the regulated airline sector and 
the interplay between the 'stakeholders' of the regulatory environment, a 
working definition of 'regulation' needs to be adopted. That is the aim of this 
chapter. 
Regulation: A Working Definition 
As a starting point, regulation in its generic sense represents a form of 
behavioural control. The nature of such behaviour is naturally varied, and may 
be political, economic or social in character, and the nature of the control can be 
manifested in a variety of institutional forms, whether direct statutory 
regulation, regulation by a Government department or an independent 
Government agency, or indeed self-regulation. Whatever may be the nature of 
the behaviour subject to control, the exercise of such control needs to have two 
essential elements: legitimacy and enforceability. Legitimacy is the manifestation 
of an acknowledgement or acceptance that a rule or body is authoritative. This, 
as Hart calls it, is the nile of recognitiom I Through some formal process, a rule 
or body is established and is accepted as the ultimate authority by all or a 
majority of those subject to its jurisdiction. An important assumption in the 
analysis is that the regulatory interference is for public interest ends. The range 
I H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarcridon. Oxford: 196 1), p. 92 et. seq. 
of such public interest justifications for the interference would inevitably be 
considerable and must vary according to the specific political, economic and 
social cultures of the given area to be regulated. These may include market 
failure, information deficits, co-ordination difficulties, national security and so 
on. Even so, there have been criticisms against some regulatory systems which 
have been accused of regulating for private interest gains and thus leading to the 
capture of the regulatory machinery. The argument for legitimacy becomes 
particularly important where the regulation interferes in the activities of private 
individuals or organisations, even if the aim was to secure some public interest 
ends. 2 Accordingly, accountability for the regulator's actions, to explain the 
basis of the interference, assumes considerable significance, These issues. are 
considered in a later chapter. 
The ability to enforce the control requires the support of law or binding rules 
mutually agreed in advance. This implies that regulation must be accompanied 
by penalties or corrective measures in cases where the agreed rules have not 
been complied with. Without legitimacy for such behavioural control and the 
ability to enforce compliance, regulation would mean very little. In essence, 
regulation as a system is a form of control over the behaviour of those it seeks 
to regulate either to procure or to prevent a certain result in the interest of an 
identified set or sets of beneficiarieS. 3 It is a process whereby regulatory 
interventions, or non-interventions, are based on a set of promulgated policies 
which seek to balance the competing interests within the given regulated sector. 
In competition regulation then, the aim can be two-fold: whether regulation 
should lead to greater competition or should be exercised in a manner which 
restricts competition. In both respects, it is an act which affects the activities of 
the private individual or enterprise, either in enabling or prohibiting competitors 
to enter the relevant market, controlling the prices of products and thus 
profitability, or specifying limits to the volume of production. 
More general theories of regulation have also been established by various 
studies, some of which deserve a cursory review so as to present a more 
complete picture of the working definition attempted in this opening section, 
although a detailed examination of the economic and political science literature 
on regulation will not be attempted here. A valiant attempt to construct a 
taxonomy of the regulatory concept was made by Nfitnick in The Political 
Economy of Regulation. He suggests that in what he labels as 'static' 
regulation, there were four definitions. He begins with the idea of deliberate 
interference in the freedom of a party to carry on an activity so that regulation 
becomes an "intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity by an entity 
not directly party to or involved in that activity-14 To narrow the broad 
2 See also A. Ogus. Regulation: Legal Fonn and Econonfic Theofy (Clarendon, 
Oxford: 1994). chs. 3-4. 
3 In its Mder sense. a system of regulation to control the bchaviour of certain persons 
will include criminal law and the regulation of crimes. This is a subject in its own 
right. and is not intended to be part of the definition of regulation adopted in this 
thesis. 
4 B. Mitnick. The Political Econoin 
,v of 
Regulation: Creating, Designing and 
Removing Regulatoty Forms (Columbia University Press. Columbia: 1980). p. 5. 
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definition. 110itnick ar-ues that re(, ulation must be intended for a purpose, but z 
that purpose must be kept in sight. Regulation in the second sense thus 
becomes "the policing, with respect to a goal, of a subject's choice of activity, 
by an entity not directly party to or involved in that activity. " To ensure 
6 consistency of the goal, however, regulation is "policing, according to a rule". 
A fourth, but much more restrictive, definition of regulation consists of 
regulation by "public administrative policing of a private activity with respect to 
a rule prescribed in the public interests. "7 The problem with this definition lies 
with its limited scope. By restricting regulation to "public administrative" 
ignores the possible permutations of regulation by virtue of a legislative 
provision or other forms of regulatory arrangements. Furthermore, as an 
'administrative body' charged with the responsibility of regulating, &rc 
presupposes a 'principal' to whose authority the 'agent' is subject. If, therefore, 
the terms laid down by the principal are other than the "public interest", then 
this definition runs the risk of ignoring more specific and exclusive purposes of 
regulation. Regulation of "a private activity", likewise, excludes the possibility 
of private and public parties performing a similar function but with different 
ends. Prior to the privatisation. of British Airways (BA), the regulated industry 
consisted of a publicly-owned corporation and private entities providing air 
transport services in competition with each other. Regulation, to Nfitnick, is 
also "a process" consisting of the intentional interference with a subject's choice 
of activity. 8 
For Daintith, the idea of regulation in its crudest form consists of four 
dimensions. 9 First, he postulates the general notion of regulation as "the act of 
controlling, directing or governing according to a rule, principle or system". In 
this functional sense, regulation is conceived as "a conscious ordering of 
activity". The second sense of regulation is taken as the process of State 
intervention in the operations of the market place. Third, regulation is a 
facilitative instrument for government policy "often articulated in the form of 
complex schemes of licensing, inspection, performance standards". In this 
respect, it differs from the second sense of regulation in that the former applies 
to all State activities which interfere with the markets whether through the 
provision of subsidies or taxation, while the latter is characterised by a 
'command-and-control' structure. Related to the third sense of regulation is the 
fourth which simply asserts that the command-and-control structure is 
expressed in legal rules and measures. On the other hand, Ogus defines 
regulation in terms of the context within which it exists by reference to its 
characteristics. He argues that in all industrialised orders, two systems of 
5 Ibid, 
6 Ibid, p. 6. 
7 Ibid.. p. 7. 8 Ihid. p. 9. Bernstein tc* argues that regulation is a dynamic process in Nýhich 
outcomes are no pre-detcrmined but are adjusted according to the interests of the 
subjects to be regulated: M. Bcmstein. Regulating Business h. v Independent 
9 
Commission (Princeton Uni, *, crsitv Press. Princeton: 1955). ch. 9. 
T. Daintith, "A Regulatory Space Agency" (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
534. 
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economic organization exist: the market system and the collectivist system. "' 
Under a market system, regulation is characterised by the facilitative role of the 
law, that is, a system in which individuals are left to their own to pursue their 
respective goals and in which obligations are assumed voluntarily. In the latter 
respect, therefore, the absence of directed coercion means that these obligations 
can equally be abandoned by the parties when they deem it to be appropriate. 
Regulation under a collectivist system consist of, first, the idea of control by a 
superior so that non-compliance will be met by sanctions. Second, he argues 
that a collectivist system of regulation is 'public' in nature so that the State or its 
agencies assumes the role of overseeing those obligations that cannot be 
reached by private agreements. Finally, regulation in a collectivist system 
represents a centralised means of administration that is inherent in 'thq 
fundamental role of the State. 
A more recent study into the role of law and regulators of the major privatised 
industries in the United Kingdom by Prosser suggests that regulation in 
functional terms involves three different tasks. " Although he accepts that the 
general definition of regulation may well be "public interventions which affect 
the operator of markets through command and control", he argues that this was 
inadequate as an account of what regulators do. Instead, he submits that the 
first task of regulation is that of monopoly regulation, The responsibility of the 
regulator here is to mimic competition or to act as a surrogate for competition 
by establishing a system of price and service quality control. The second task is 
competition regulation where the regulator would be seeking to create and 
police the conditions of competition. The third task of regulation focuses on 
social issues of the regulated sphere, that is social regulation. This typically 
involves the regulation of environmental issues and also health and safety 
issues. 12 
Regulation of course is not a new-found phenomenon. It is practised virtually in 
all types and at all levels of social organisation so much so that, in its generic 
sense, several common threads are usuaHy apparent. It is a means for 
controlling human or institutional behaviour. Its raison detre is usually derived 
from a superior source, either legal or customary in character, and is typically 
empowered to impose sanctions for non-compliance with a set of promulgated 
rules or practices. This superior authority is referred to as 'The Say' by Karl 
Llewellyn in his law-jobs theory and the imposition of sanctions as the process 
of preventive channelling or re-channelling or behaviour. 13 On the other hand, 
the scope, purposes and forms of regulation will naturally vary from case to 
case. What needs to be regulated and why they need to be regulated are 
questions which must be evaluated within the given political, economic and 
social context. Likewise, the form of regulation can vary from a simple 
legislation, to an independent Government agency and its rules, to a voluntary 
10 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Forin and Economic Theory (Clarendon, Oxford: 1994). 
pp. 1-3. 
11 T. Prosser. Lcnv and the Regulators (Clarendon. Oxford: 1997). 
12 Ibid.. pp. 4-6. 
13 K. Llewellyn. "The Normative, The Legal and The Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic 
Method" (1940) 49 Fale Lmv Journal 1355. 
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body and its code of practice, to customary practices informally accepted by all 
the parties, Whichever form that is deemed to be most effective to achieve that 
purpose must therefore depend on factors which are cultural-specific so that 
regulation can be understood in the wider environment in which it is 
embedded. 14 
In these respects, in all basic forms of social organisation within which 
economic activities take place, the scope and purpose of regulation is typically 
two-fold: economic regulation and social regulation. Broadly speaking, 
economic regulation is concerned with commercial activities and behaviour 
whether in respect of ability to run a business, market entry, price or volume. 
Social regulation, by implication, is concerned with non-economic matters such 
as health and safety, general social welfare, environment and the like. Neither of 
the two, however, can always exist in splendid isolation. It is typical that 
economic regulation can and will have consequences which affect the social 
setting of the regulated sector, and vice versa. A good example is the regulation 
of aircraft noise. The stricter the standards imposed on noise limits of aircraft, 
the greater is the likelihood that airlines will have to invest in new aircraft 
engines which comply with the new standards. Such investment costs can be 
passed on to the traveller in the form of higher air fares or subsidised by 
retrenching the number of markets served. Equally, the objectives of econon-k 
regulation and social regulation do not necessarily overlap, and consequently 
give rise to conflicts. In the case of air transport, for instance, an economic 
objective may be low air fares while a social expectation may be safety in travel. 
Greater safety requirements may result in higher costs which reduces the 
possibility of lower fares. An important aim of regulation is to resolve these 
conflicts either by solutions determined ex ante or by evaluating the competing 
interests within the given context of the objectives. For Llewellyn, this is the 
law-job of disposing "trouble-cases". 15 In this functional respect, regulation is 
necessarily bureaucratic, and acts as a forum for resolving fundamental tensions 
of a socio-economic order. Max Weber refers to these tensions as the contest 
between the 'formal' and substantive rationality of the economy. 16 Weber 
argues that theformal ratiotialify of a modem economy is the extent to which it 
is possible to carry through an accurate rational calculation of the quantities 
involved in economic orientation. A precise value could always be attached to a 
desired item. The basis for this calculation was capital accounting, and hence, 
capitalism. Suhstawive rationality, on the other hand, represents the extent to 
which it is possible to secure what is an adequate provision of a population with 
goods and services and in the process remain in accord with the ethical 
requirements of the system of norms. Whatever may be the given set of 
substantive norms, Weber believes that formal rationality will operate to create 
conditions and stimulate actions which in various ways will come into conflict 
with these substantive norms. This argument is premised on the belief that 
14 M. Fainsod. "Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process" in 
C. J. Fricdrich and E. S. Mason (eds. ). Public Poliqv (Graduate School of Public 
Administration, Harvard: 1940). 
15 Op. cIt. 
16 M. Weber. Ifirtschaft und Gesellschajt. trans. by T. Parsons, The Theor: v of Social 
anti Fcononfic Oqzanisation (Hodge. London: 1947). 
substantive rationality is comprised of an "indefinite plurality" of ultimate ends, 
ývhether they be political, economic, utilitarian, Hedonistic, or social equality. 17 
Capital accounting does not always provide an adequate solution to the 
problems of a given social organisation. It assumes a constant rational 
behaviour and knowledge of all relevant information to arrive at a solution. But 
things are not like that in the real world. The functional aim of bureaucratic 
regulation is therefore to resolve the lack of 'accord' between formal and 
substantive rationality, but the regulatory form must correspond to the given 
political, economic and social circumstances. The indefinite plurality of ends 
that needs to be reconciled with the demands of formal rationality inevitably 
requires their prioritisation. 
Anatomy of the Regulatory Complex 
In 'regulation', there must at least be two sets of participants, the 'regulatoe and 
the 'regulated'. However, implicit in the purpose of regulation which gives rise 
to the 'regulatoe-'regulated' relationship is the 'beneficiary of the regulatory 
process; for if the programme of regulation is not intended to benefit any party, 
then it begs the fundarnental question: why is there a need to regulate? The 
place of the 'beneficiary' and its interests within the regulatory complex is 
crucial to the understanding of regulation since in essence they form the basis 
for the institutional design and the rationale for any regulatory action. To 
describe singularly the "beneficiary as the remaining participant in the regulatory 
complex is also to run the risk of oversimplification. Since regulatory objectives 
in themselves vary, so will the nature and interests of the 'beneficiary'. Some 
may be leading actors in the complex, while others may only have peripheral 
interests. There is, therefore, mileage to be gained in this anatomical approach 
by dismantling the complex of regulation, specifically in relation to air transport 
regulation, if only to identify the different loci of decision-making which are the 
ultimate sources of tension between 'formal' and substantive rationality. Is 
Regulator 
in any system or complex of regulation, the principal actor is the regulator, for 
otherwise it ceases to be 'regulation!. This being so, the fundamental question 
then becomes what institutional form should the regulation take? 
Statutory regulation 
A 'regulator' as such does not need to exist in the institutional sense commonly 
derived from the sort of agency regulation associated with utility regulation; for 
it is possible to regulate directly through the enactment of statutory provisions 
complemented possibly by a system of inspection. For present purposes, this 
will be known as 'statutory regulation'. Health and safety related sectors are 
17 Ibid.. p. 185. 
is This anaton-&al approach has also been adopted by Emmcttc Redford in hcr study of 
commercial aNiation in the US: The Regulatory Process (University of Texas Press, 
Austin: 1969). pp. 9-13. See also a similar idea of -regulatory space" in L. Hancher 
and IviAloran (eds. ). Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (OUP, Oxford: 
1989). 
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perhaps the most common of such a system, Statutory regulation derives its 
legitimacy from the structure of the constitution which will inform the 
'authoritativeness' of the legislation. Hence, the supremacy of primary 
legislation in the United Kingdom is inherent in the constitutional doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy. This is consistent with Hart's ultimate rule of 
recognition. 19 As a form, rather than choice of regulatory framework, statutory 
regulation was much more common-place in the period of the Industrial 
Revolution. Increased economic activities and greater industrialisation resulted 
in consequences that could not be left unattended if the benefits of the industrial 
age were to be appreciated. Legislation had to be enacted to protect those large, 
yet infant, industries against the uncertainties of a growing economic system. 
There were, in particular, several industries which were vital to the nation ýnd 
its security. For instance, the iron and steel industries and the shipbuilding 
industry were an important military asset in times of war since Britain's military 
capacity depended in large measure on her industries being able to supply the 
necessary war equipment. Commenting on the realisation that statutory 
regulation became necessary to ensure continuity, Mathias observed that the 
government's "main role was to institutionalize these underlying social and 
economic forces, to provide security at home and abroad within which market 
and economic forces, social and cultural drives would operate. "20 This would be 
achieved by creating a statutory framework within which the forces may 
interact. As might have been expected, however, industrial expansion and 
societal complexity compounded the difficulties stemming from statutory 
regulation. Pre-determined aims were far from being achieved and inflexibilities 
stultified rapid responses to the exigencies of social and economic 
developments. 21 
Departmental regulation 
A greater degree of flexibility was needed and this was thought to be possible 
by delegating regulatory responsibility to ministerial or departmental units. This 
will be labelled as 'departmental regulation' for present purposes. The railways 
are a classic illustration. Departmental regulation arose from the need to 
preserve the vital communication link with less accessible areas of the country 
as well as transporting raw materials to these areas, and this led to the passing 
of the Railway Regulation Act 1840 which created the Railway Department 
within the Board of Trade. 22 In addition, concerns were beginning to mount 
over the emergence of a monopolistic industry and its ability to ensure a safe 
19 Op. cit. pp. 102-107. 
20 P. Mathias. The First Industrial Nation: An Econoinic History of Britain 1700-1914 
(Metheun, London: 2nd edn., 1983). p. 3 1. 
21 Mathias. pp. 166 et. seq. See also E. J. Evans. The Forging of TheAlodern State: Early 
Industrial Britain 1783-1870 (Longman. London: 1983), ch. 11. 
22 Of course, the railways were also regulated by Parliament and courts during its early 
years. For a history of railway regulation, see H. Parris, Government and The 
Railways in _Vneteenth-Century Britain (Routledge. 
London: 1965). C. D. Foster, 
Privatisation, Public Ownership anti the Regulation of N'atural . 11onopolies 
(Blackavell. 0., dord: 1992). J. Goh. Railiva 
' vs 
Act 1993 (Current Law Statutes 
Annotated, S%vcet & Maxwell. London: 1993), and more recently, T. Prosser, Law 
and the Regulators (Clarendon. Word: 1997), ch. 7. 
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and reliable railway system. Hence, the need to balance these conflicts of 
formal and substantive rationality. 
The absence of any effectual check from the absence of free 
competition on their respective lines [makes] it advisable to 
subject this monopoly to some general superintendence and 
control [which] will be most advantageously entrusted to some 
department of the executive government. ' .3 
The need for delegation was vindicated by the Donoughmore Committee in 
1932 when it stated in the light of growing powers of the administration that, 
I feel that in the conditions of modern state, which not only has 
to undertake immense new social services, but which before long 
may be responsible for the greater part of the industrial and 
commercial activities of the country, the practice of parliament 
delegating legislation and the power to make regulations instead 
of being grudgingly conceded, ought to be extended, and new 
ways devised to facilitate the process. 24 
A similar view prevailed over air transport, though at a much later stage. For 
example, in 1919 the Air Council was established within the Air Ministry to 
oversee civil and military aviation while later in 1945 the Air Registration Board 
was created under the auspices of the Civil Aviation NEnistry to oversee safety 
of British air transportation. 25 
Growh of agency regulation 
Departmental regulation does not, of course, foster apolitical nor independent 
decisions. Neither does it always represent the most appropriate regulatory tool 
for the activity to be regulated. The complexity of the subject-matter to be 
regulated calls for expert skills and specialist knowledge which are not 
necessarily held by ministers and departmental officials; even less so given the 
array of functions required to be performed by them. Such was also the 
conclusions of the Northcote-Trevelyan and Fulton Commissions that more 
accountable and efficient government could be achieved by separating the 
'policy' and 'executive' functions. Moving from a generalist to a specialist 
culture whereby policy-executive functions are separated implies the creation 
and use of specific bodies or units outside the traditional machinery of 
government. These have come to be labelled variously as non-departmental 
public bodies (NDPBs), quasi-autonomous-non-govemmental-bodies 
(QUANGOs) and fiinge bodies. A new species, executive agencies, now exists 
to perform those executive functions which ministers have seen fit to 'hive-off. 
Those responsible for regulation, however, are more specifically referred to as 
regulatory or administrative agencies. In his seminal discussion, James Landis 
explained in 7he Administrative Process that, 
23 Parliamentary Papers (1840). vol. x- 139. 
24 Report ofthe Committee on. 11inisters'Powers (Cmnd. 4060.1932). p. 137. 
25 Air NaNigation Act 1919 and Ministry of Chil Aviation Act 1945. 
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In terms of political theory. the administrative process springs 
from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government to 
deal with modern problems. 26 
Thus, the emergence of 'agency regulation' or otherwise known also as 
'administrative regulation'. But this has only become fashionable in the UK as a 
result of the privatisation programme undertaken by the Conservative 
Government in the 19SOs. Prior to this period, a handful of regulatory agencies 
were sporadically established including the Air Transport Licensing Board 
(ATLB) in 1960 as well as others during the 19th century industrial revolution 
such as the Poor Law Commission of 1834 and the Electricity Commission of 
1919. 
Notwithstanding the popularity of regulatory agencies, little in the way of a 
coherent and systematic strategy for their establishment and use was apparent. 
Some were created for specific reasons, some because they were in vogue, and 
still others were created from experience or influence by practices abroad. It is 
arguable whether the experiences in the US has been a source of influence, 
though the results of the Anglo-American research into the government of 
democratic societies under the sponsorship of the Camegie Corporation may 
have played a part, even if only minor, in shaping the regulatory system in the 
UK. The conclusions of the research offered six justifications for the use of 
administrative agencies as a species of quasi-non-governmental-organisations. 
First, the 'buffer theory' that certain activities would be protected from political 
interference. Second, the 'escape theory' that the conduct of certain activities 
would avoid the weaknesses of traditional constraints. Third, the belief that 
specialisation by vesting the activities in skilled personnel could be achieved. A 
fourth theory of 'pluralism' was also offered in that by resorting to the use of 
such organisations, there is wider participation and more centres of 
responsibility. Fifth, these organisations offered another flexible form of 
instrument for the government. The sixth theory was that of reducing the size 
of government or the number of publicly-employed officials since the employees 
of these organisations need not be classified as govemment-salaried. 27 
However, regulatory commissions in the US have been coming under severe 
scrutiny in recent years as the process of re-inventing government by reducing 
regulatory burdens continues apace. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was 
terminated in 1985 N), ith the advent of airline deregulation, and the "architect of 
modem administrative hearing", the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
abolished in 1994 as a result of budgetary limitations. '8 Be that as it inay, no 
reversal in policy on the use of administrative regulation in the UK seems 
imminent despite these developments in the US. Coupled with the return to 
economic laissez-faire, regulatory agencies remain a popular institutional 
structure to turn to for justifying policies of economic liberalism. 
Administrative regulation would provide those safeguards as are necessary for 
26 J. Landis. The . 4dministrative Process (Yale University Press. New Haven: 
1933), 
P. 1. 
27 B. L. R. Smith and D. C. Hague (cds. ), The Dilemma of Iccountabiliýv in Modern 
Government (Ivlacmillan, London: 1971). pp. 74-75, 
28 Federal Bar Association. .4 dministrative Lmv. Votes. vol. 
14. no. 4. (1995). 
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protection against the might of large, priýate corporations whose capitalistic 
orientations are not necessary in accord with the plurality of societal norms. It 
creates an institutional means for bridging the gap between welfare objectives of 
the State and private economic activities. To embrace an ideology that suggests 
both the dominance of public interest and the superiority of the private sector 
reveals a potential ideological crisis given the possible contradictions between 
these two ideas. The needs of the public for regular and safe air transportation, 
are seldom in tandem with the commercial goals of private enterprises since 
some of these requirements will involve additional costs which they might be 
reluctant to incur. The aim of administrative regulation then is to 
institutionalise and resolve these complex contradictions. At one end of the 
spectrum, this could be achieved by granting operating licences or franchises 
only to companies which can demonstrate compliance with the pre-determined 
standards. Resolution of these contradictions is secured by a method of 
'prescription' orimposition': unless X does Y, its activities will be prohibited or 
limited. At the other end of the spectrum, the resolution of these 'rationality 
tensions' could be achieved by identifying a 'neutral' regulatory space. This 
means finding a common ground between the aims of the regulated and the 
beneficiary. Thus, for instance, the CAA has identified the interests of air 
transport users as the primary concern, of the regulatory process. Suffice it to 
say at this stage that airline operators exist as private entities seeking to 
maxiniise profits from the services which they provide to users. Returns on 
investment therefore depend on the willingness or reluctance of travellers to use 
air transport services and with which operator. If the aims of the users are 
regular, efficient and safe air travel between two places, airline operators win 
need to strive towards these ends to fulfil their aim of maximising profits. In 
this respect, both the regulated and the beneficiary will be oriented towards a 
common set of justifications for their different motives. Admittedly, this will 
not eliminate all tensions, but it will seek to minin-iise them. 29 
Other reasons for the use of administrative regulatory agencies have also been 
identified. Frans Slatter, in his study commissioned by the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, noted one dozen purposes for which administrative 
agencies have been created. His analysis, however, referred to the roles played 
by these agencies. 30 
(i) An assistant to take on the increasing workload of traditional units of 
government. However, instead of vesting in these agencies existing 
duties whkh would relieve the traditional branches, the tendency has 
been to give them new functions. 
(ii) A substantive expert to provide expertise in complex areas in which the 
government had had to become more involved. 
(iii) A procedural expert encompassing speed, economy of operations and 
fostering greater public participation through public hearings. 
(iv) A manager of a specific activity. 
29 See ch. 2. infira. for a more detailed treatment of the thcory of user interests. 
30 F. Slatter. Parliament and A&Wnistrative Agencies (LýNv Reform Comn-dssion of 
Canada, Ontario: 1982), pp. 9-19. 
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(v) An adviser who may be able to collate relevant information more 
eflectively to formulate the advice 
(vi) An adjudicator to resolve conflicts 
(vii) An arbitrator. 
(viii) A decision-maker as distinct from an adjudicator in the sense that the 
decision-maker is not involved in an adversarial process or the 
resolution of disputes. 
(ix) A rule-maker for technical or complex matters. 
(X) A policy-maker. 
(xi) An intermediary between layers of government, which effectively 
constitute another layer of government. 
(xii) An insulator which either protects the government from a sensiiivlý 
matter or the activity from political interference. 
Slatter stresses that not all of these functions, however, are necessarily 
performed by one agency, nor is an agency likely to be vested with only one of 
those roles. 
Whatever may have been the policy reasons or strategy for the use of 
administrative regulatory agencies in the UK, what stands out is the over- 
pragmatic approach to the building of regulatory institutions. As a leading 
commentator has observed in respect of utility regulation, 
There is no tradition that utilities, as natural monopolies, are 
somehow held in common. Regulation was designed to be "'light" 
and "flexible", mimicking what private competition would have 
achieved had the industries not been monopolies. As a regulatory 
concept this is woeful, allowing a wide range of views as to how 
the beast might be shadowed. One regulator may interpret the 
competitive model as an excuse for breaking up the industry into 
smaller competing parts; another for setting maximum rates of 
return; another for regarding pressure for the capital markets as a 
surrogate for competition and allowing the monopoly to remain 
intact. None of them have any clear idea of the national or 
common interest; some may feel that it is naturally achieved by 
competition, others that it has to be asserted. 31 
It is clear that somewhere along the line the regulatory means and ends became 
mismatched and this has now become undeniably apparent. Prosser has this to 
say: 
A regulatory system without a clear rationale and without any 
clear legal structure in which it operates has inevitably assumed 
what is probably the most frequently criticised regulatory 
characteristic in the post-privatisation UK; highly personalised 
regulation. 32 
To a very large extent, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is not immune ffom 
such criticisms. Indeed, as will become apparent in a later chapter, the civil 
31 W. Hutton. The State 11 e're In (Vintage. London: 1995). p. 29 1. 32 T. Prosscr. "Privatisation. Regulation and Public Sen-iccs" (1994) Juridical Review 7. 
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aviation industry was hardly spared the regulatory rod since about the time of 
the First World War Apart from the years %ý, hen the industry was nationalised, 
the notion of freedom from regulation was virtually unheard of until about the 
mid-1970s when the CAA began to introduce more competitive policies. The 
CAA was created in part because of the unsuccessful experiment with the 
ATLB and in part because of the desire to bring about airline regulatory reform. 
Se4-regulation 
Although the use of agency or administrative regulation has grown 
exponentially over the years, a few words must be said of 'self-regulation'. This 
represents a form of regulation which typically falls outside the State structure 
and consists of a regulatory institution voluntarily organised by the participintý 
to be regulated. In this respect, the regulated collectively plays the role of the 
regulator. This has been variously defined as "regulation by peers" and "an 
institutional arrangement whereby an organization regulates the standards of 
behaviour of its members. "33 A number of examples are available: financial 
services (Securities and Investment Board), newspapers (Press Complaints 
Commission) and advertisements (Advertising Standards Authority). Most of 
the rules or codes of practice reflect the understandings, habitual practices and 
mutual respect within the relevant sector. Non-compliance with the agreed rules 
would usually lead to either expulsion from the regulated environment and thus 
the termination of certain benefits or privileges, or the imposition of certain 
penalties. Enforcement within a self-regulatory system is no less important than 
a regulatory system established by the State. Indeed, there are sufficient legal 
authorities to suggest that a system of voluntary self-regulation is equivalent, 
though not identical, to a 'formal', public law-style regulatory structure. 34 
Regulator re-visiled 
The regulator is the principal actor within the regulatory complex, and it can 
take a variety of institutional forms. The aim of this analysis has been to 
establish and examine a number of these and to emphasise the increasing use of 
agency regulation as a preferred institutional form in the modem State. First, 
regulation may be direct statutory regulation such as prohibiting anyone with a 
high alcohol-blood content to be in charge of a motor vehicle" or prol-ýibiting a 
contracting party from excluding its liability for death or personal injury 
resulting from negligence. 36 On the other hand, it may be regulation by a 
Government department such as the approval of citizenship applications or by 
an independent Government agency such as the CAA, OFTEL and a host of 
other regulatory agencies responsible for the utilities sector. At the other 
extreme, it may be a system of regulation consisting of a voluntary body and its 
codes of practice or customary practices such as the Press Complaints 
33 R. Bac, "' tt. "Rcgulatorv Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation" 
(1939) 67 Public. 4dmin. 435. at p. 436. 
34 By a public law regulatory structure. it is meant as a system of regulation subject to 
the principle of judicial review: e. g.. Rv Panel on Take-Overs and. lferýgers ex p 
Datafin [19871 QB 815 and R %, Ackertising Standards. 4uthoritv ex p The Insurance 
I; en-ices [19901 COD 42. 
35 S. 5. Road Traffic Act 1988. 
36 S. 2, Unfair Contract Terms Act 197T 
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Commission. Of these, the rationales for the rise in agency or administrative 
regulation were examined in closer detail on the basis that administrative 
regulation of competition in air transport is the major focus of this thesis. 
Regulated: Airlines 
The complex of regulation would be purposeless without a 'target' to be 
regulated. So would the regulatory strategies. Airlines are operating entities 
which may be privately- or publicly-owned. In either case, the aim is to provide 
air transport services although the justifications and motives need not share any 
similarity. Air transport services which may be the subject of regulation can be 
classified into three headings: scheduled, charter and freight. The ownership 
structure of British air transport industry has been privatised since 087 
although privately-owned airlines operated and competed alongside the publicly 
owned BA in the years preceding. The rationales for regulating are considered 
in more detad later, but it is helpful to note here that, given a structure of 
privatised ownership where two or more entities co-exist, the aims or interests 
of these entities are not likely always to be in accord; even if these aims were 
similar, the means employed may not be so. This may be explained by the 
variation in the norms of any social organisation under Weber's theory of 
substantive rationality. For if these plurality of ends were to be common 
between them, then regulation will become meaningless. Moreover, it would 
suffice simply to postulate the criterion of primacy of user interests, an end to 
which all privately-owned airlines will in any event subscribe. Where this is so, 
the purpose of competition regulation would become substantially concerned 
with policing against unfair trading practices although some residual economic 
regulation would remain where there continues to be structural problems for 
market entry. 
Benericiary: User Interests 
To define user interests is no easy task. To begin with, different users of air 
transport services travel for different reasons. Business travellers travel for 
business purposes and have different expectations from leisure travellers. 
Likewise, users of air freight services. A business user will be concerned with 
speedy and efficient services and will often have an inflexible travelling 
schedule. A leisure traveller, on the other hand, will put less premium on time 
and possibly more on costs. The difficulty is further compounded by what is 
meant as leisure. Travellers for'hybrid' reasons such as emergencies of a non- 
business nature would have little flexibility but would also be constrained by the 
factor of cost. Although s. 4 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 states nevertheless 
that CAA is to secure the provision of air transport services "at the lowest 
charges", it remains true that "lowest charges" must have contextual relevance 
so that lowest in the view of the business user may not necessarily be so for the 
leisure traveller. Whatever maybe the purpose of air travel, airline operators 
exist because of the users-, users do not exist for airlines. Without users willing 
to travel by air, there is little rationality in operating air services. Without 
airlines, however, users have at their disposal other, perhaps slower and 
outdated, forms of transportation. 
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In addition. despite the diversity of expectations of an 'economic' nature, it is 
arguable that whatever the purpose for air travel, safety will prevail as a 
fundamental expectation, This is statutorily reinforced in s. 4 requiring that air 
transport services are provided with "a high standard of safety". Even so, there 
is evidence to suggest that even this expectation varies. Britannia Airways 
argued in its parliamentary testimony to the Transport Select Committee that, 
whilst surveys indicate that the vast majority of the public favour 
increased safety measures and say they will be happy to pay for 
them, in practice price is often the deciding influence, with the 
belief that "it won't happen to me" adopted. 37 
Such is the difficulty that their reconciliation is necessarily complex and 
informed only by broad statutory terms: "satisfy all substantial categories' of 
public demand" and "further the reasonable interests of users". However, 
whether regulatory attempts are necessary to reconcile these differences begs 
the fundamental question of whether regulation is necessary at all. That is one 
of the leading questions of this thesis. Regulation, as has been noted and will be 
noted further, is a relative concept. To address the question of whether 
regulation is necessary, one must first ask in respect of what? This, it is 
submitted, is two-fold: competition and safety in air transport services, Safety, 
for its inherent reasons, is too obvious to merit detailed consideration for 
present purposes, The case for competition regulation, in the forms of 
economic and antitrust regulation, is, however, less clear and subject to various 
schools of thought. These are considered further in subsequent chapters. 
Beneficiary: Public Interest 
The public interest is not synonymous with user interests. To treat them as 
identical will run the risk of ignoring a wider constituency of the regulatory 
complex. Users would include actual and potential users of air transport 
services, but not other sections of the general public who do not use these 
services nor have the desire of doing so. By way of illustration, s. 68(3) of the 
1982 Act requires the CAA when licensing air transport services to have regard 
to the need to minimise any adverse effects on the environment and any 
disturbance to the public as a result of noise, vibration or atmospheric pollution 
arising from the activities of civil aviation. The 'affected' public in this sense is 
not the constituency of users. No doubt, some interests between users and the 
public will conflict and some will overlap. A good example is safety. Residents 
in the vicinity of that busy airport will share the concern of users on the issue of 
safety sternming from air traffic congestion or aircraft taking-off and landing. In 
a wider sense, the public interest will also incorporate the idea that air transport 
is a strategic means of communication. The provision of a vital communication 
link including the protection of national security is a concern extending beyond 
those of the users. 
Peripheral Interests 
In a dynamic regulatory complex, the boundaries of actual And potential 
participants are constantly shifting. Some participants are subject to the direct 
authority of the regulator, while others are affected as a consequence of certain 
37 Aircrarft Cabin Safeýv, HC 27 (1989-90). p. 45. 
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regulatory policies or decisions. Yet the extent to which they are affected is 
sufficiently significant as to merit the consideration of their interests by the 
regulator even if only informally or subconsciously. The interests of airline 
employees is one. In a judgment rejecting an application to overturn the 
decision of the CAA on the licensing of charter services, Roch J. remarked, 
In addition, it may adversely affect the employment of those 
pilots and cabin staff ... 311 
The importance of airline employees' interests within the regulatory complex 
was noted, for instance, in the parliamentary debate during the passage of the 
Civil Aviation Bill 1971. 
1 hope the government will take note of the chapter on human 
relations in our White Paper and that when the Civil Aviation 
Authority is satisfied that an airline has adequate financial 
resources, competent management and the ability to operate 
safely before a licence is granted, it will also be satisfied about 
industrial relations and will not grant a licence unless there are 
also proper negotiating procedures and consultative machinery 
established. 39 
Although it is true that a privatised industry implies that matters of industrial 
relations are the prerogative of the private airline companies, regulatory policies 
of the CAA potentially affect even if only indirectly the position of the 
employees. For instance, a competitive strategy may drive an airline to reduce 
staffing levels in order to achieve greater productivity and consequently 
compromise safety standards. Are pilots and cabin crew subject to longer 
working hours or longer flights? How is the maintenance of aircraft affected? 40 
This issue is now the subject of an extensive study by the European 
Commission, the Social Impact ofLiberalisation. 41 
Another is the case of aircraft manufacturers. Operators of aircraft are required 
to satisfy the safety and technical specifications of the regulator before they will 
be permitted to operate. These requirements in turn become the concern of 
aircraft manufacturers, Consequently, if the policies of the CAA require that all 
Boeing 747s aircraft are fitted with ten doors, such that every passenger will 
have an equal opportunity to exit the aircraft in cases of emergency, then these 
manufacturers will need to ensure that that requirement is met, for otherwise the 
operator will be refused permission to use the aircraft or will seek to purchase 
an aircraft meeting the specifications from another manufacturer. Likewise, in 
the investigation conducted by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) 
38 Rv CAA ex p Ahmqvs International (Cmiru) Ltd [19371 QBD CroNNm Office List 
CO/839/87. 
39 Per Roy Mason. H. C. Debs. 8 14. col. 1195. (March 29,1971). See also Civil Aviation 
Polic 
*v 
(Cmnd. 4213.1969). para. 82 and British Air Transport in the Seventies 
(Cmnd. 4018.1969). 
40 The relationship between the CAA and cabin crew is manifested in the Air 
Operator's Certificate issued by the CAA to airline companies. The requirements as 
to the training of cabin staff on emergency and survival are laid down in the 
Certificate and their compliance arc monitored by Flight Operations Inspectors of the 
CAA. 
41 See CONI(96) 514. p. 2 1. 
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into the NII-Kegworth crash involving a British Midland flight, it found a 
"genuine difficulty in interpreting the readings on the engine instruments" . 42 It 
reconunended that "regulatory requirements concerning the certification of new 
instrument presentation should be amended to include a standardized method of 
assessing the effectiveness of such displays in transmitting the associated 
information to flight crew. "43 No doubt, the manufacture of aircraft in future 
wi]l be affected if these recommendat ions crystallised into mandatory 
requirements. 
Drawing the boundaries of peripheral interests, however, involves a necessary 
degree of arbitrariness. Peripheral participants included within the regulatory 
complex must possess interests that are substantially but indirectly related t6 of 
affected by the policies or decisions of the regulator, This would exclude, say, 
the interests of the taxi-driver who awaits the arriving passengers. 
Concluding Comments 
The interests of these participants should not be seen as isolated, 
compartmentalised sets; they are inter-related and they interact with each other. 
Some may be compatible with one another, others may be fundamentally 
conflictual. The regulatory complex, within which the regulator plays a 
principal role, seeks to rationalise the pluralism of interests, and "to settle 
assorted disputes trivial to society but important to individuals ... to provide legitimate and continuously available arenas for the resolution of such 
conflicts. "44 
Conclusions 
Regulation in its most basic sense dates from early times. Administrative 
regulation is, by comparison, a more recent phenomenon in the UK and has 
gained particular significance only in recent years as a result of the privatisation 
of the utilities sector. Landis contended that this growth of administrative 
regulation was a consequence of the tripartite system of public administration 
failing to meet the demands of a modem and complex economy. In Weber's 
theory of economic rationality, regulatory intervention was necessitated by the 
complexity of the social structure which compounded the tensions of formal and 
substantive rationality. Whatever may be the form of intervention, it needs to 
be related to the ills which it is intended to remedy and to that end, the sources 
of these rationality tensions must first be identified. The aim of this chapter has 
been to set out a working definition for the term 'regulation' and to establish a 
conceptual framework of regulation by reference to the anatomy of the 
regulatory complex. Regulation is a system of control of the behaviour or 
activities of individuals or organisations to achieve a certain end and the non- 
compliance of which can be enforced by way of penalties or exclusion. The 
42 AAIB. Report on the accident to Boeitkq 737-400 G-OBAIE (Kegworth), (S January 
1989). p. 97. 
43 Ibid.. p. 10 1. 
44 T. K. McCraw. Prophets ofRegulation (Belknap Press. Han-ard: 1984). p. 33. 
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administrative regulation of competition is the process whereby an independent 
Government agency is entrusted with the responsibility to o', -ersee competition 
within a given economic sector. This process of regulation takes two forms, that 
is economic regulation and antitrust regulation, Economic res". ulation is 
primarily concerned with the regulation of a sector which typically has 
structural problems such as high barriers to entry and in doing so has the effect 
of determining the competitiveness of the relevant sector, Antitrust regulation 
presumes an underlying preference for competitive solutions to market 
problems, It also assumes that there are no significant structural problems and is 
therefore concerned with policing the fairness of a certain action or behaviour 
relative to the market conditions of the relevant sector. 
An analysis of the anatomy of the regulatory complex is also important for 
considering the accountability issues. Are the decisions of the regulator sound 
and rational? Are reasons provided to examine the bases of the decisions? Were 
the decisions partial such as to lead to claims of the regulator being 'captured' 
by those it is supposed to regulate, an issue which is examined later in the 
thesis? In what manner were the decisions made? Were there consultations or 
public hearings? These are the range of questions commonly associated with 
administrative law and will need to be addressed so that the relationship 
between administrative regulation and public law can be established. 
So far much has been said about the general nature of regulation and its 
conceptual purposes. Without pre-empting more detailed discussion at a later 
stage, however, a few words are in order on the European dimension of air 
transport regulation. It is now no secret that the regulation of British air 
transport is subject to European Community laws and the impact has been 
deeply significant. Consequently, any constitutional analysis of administrative 
agencies and their policies, whether substantive or procedural, must properly 
take account of these developments. The advent of Community laws has no 
doubt been an important land-mark in the history of British air transport 
regulation which is reviewed in chapter 3 and beyond. For now, however, the 
more specific concept of competition regulation has to be considered further to 
establish a framework of rationales for the administrative regulation of 
competition. 
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CHAPTER TWO A THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
I AND ANTITRUST REGLTLATION 
Introduction 
The orientation of a State economy is often seen as one or the other of two 
traditional models. At one extreme, an economic model based on collectivist 
values whilst at the other, a model based on the ideals of a free-market. 
Whichever is the orientation depends on a range of factors, running from. the 
political beliefs of the government of the day through the prevailing soclo. i. 
economic climate. The former is commonly associated with a planned economy 
in the form of State monopolies or publicly-owned industries since these are 
supposed to serve the collective interests of the State. In a free-market model, 
however, the tendency is to associate it with individual laissez-faire in a liberal 
capital-based system and with the belief that the private sector and competition 
is more superior and efficient although it is equally possible for public 
enterprises to achieve competitive efficiency given certain conditions. ' This 
contrasting position was usefully put by Ludwig von Mises in 1962. 
The main issue in present-day political struggles is whether 
society should be organised on the basis of private ownership of 
the means of production (capitalism, the market system) or on 
the basis of public control of the means of production (socialism, 
com. munism, planned economy). Capitalism means free 
enterprise, sovereignty of the consumers in political matters. 
Socialism means full government control of every sphere of the 
individual's life and the unrestricted supremacy of the 
government in its capacity as a central board of production 
management. There is no compromise possible between the two 
systems. 2 
The impossibility of compron-dse is, however, inaccurate. The difference 
between a collectivist model and a free-market model is merely relative. It is a 
continuum on which the two models occupy the opposite ends. Indeed, it is 
impossible today to conceive of a system that subscribes exclusively to either 
the collectivist or free-market model. Features of a free-market model can often 
be found in a collectivist system; likewise the free-market system cannot operate 
devoid of some consideration being given to factors which are commonly held 
to be for the greater good of society such as envirorunental protection and 
better quality of life. To make this submission is also to argue that a variety of 
intermediate models of economic orientation exist along the continuum. These 
are models which emphasise the interdependence of both the State (collectivist 
end) and the private sector (free-market end). That this is not impossible has 
been well encapsulated in a remark by Professor Galbraith. 
C. D. Fostcr, Privatization, Public arnership and the Regulation of Natural 
Afonopolv (Blackivell. Oxford: 1992). ch. 9. 
2 L. von Miscs. Bureaucracy (W. Hodge, Glasgow: 1962), p. 10. 
Those who speak for the unbridgeable gulf that divides the free 
world from the Communist world and free enterprise from 
Communism are protected by an equally ecclesiastical faith that 
whatever the evolution of free enterprise maybe, it cannot 
conceivably come to resemble socialiSM. 3 
The aim of this chapter is to set out a theoretical framework for competition 
regulation, first by reference to the two contrasting economic models and the 
forms of regulation that they represent, and second to develop the theory of 
competition regulation by exploring the intermediate models. These will be 
called regulatecl competition which will enable us to examine further the two- 
fold distinction of econon-dc and antitrust regulation. 
The Collectivist Model: Monopolies 
An economic model of monopolies is essentially anti-competitive. By 
implication, monopolies represent an exclusive right or existence at the expense 
of a competitor. It assumes that the protectionist benefits stemming from 
monopolies and cartels often outweigh an economic model exposed to the 
uncertain forces of market competition. Monopolies can exist by virtue of either 
a legal sanction or through market development. The former shall be called 
'law-monopolies' and the latter 'market-monopolies'. Typically, 'law- 
monopolies' are created exclusively to perform a certain function usually in the 
public interest or to achieve certain social objectives. This exclusivity is usually 
backed by a legal or criminal prohibition against any other operator of that 
function. The programme of nationalisation in the 1940s which led to the 
creation of statutory or law-monopolies amply illustrates this point. Much of 
this reflected the concern over the consequences of the Second World War. 
The then Labour Government believed that a nationalised system of industries 
was more appropriate to look after the well-being of the population and to 
serve the needs of the nation as a whole. Inter alia, it would ensure the 
regularity of employment and the collective protection of employees by 
institutionalising industrial relations. 4 Moreover, certain industries were 
considered inherently important and nationalisation provided a means for 
protecting them as much as it represented an instrument of public policy for 
controlling and directing the activities of the national industries. Thus, when the 
Bank of England was nationalised, it was to reinforce a long-standing desire for 
a stable financial system provided by some centralised control and co- 
ordination. Again, the complexity of the gas and electricity industries required 
some form of central co-ordination that would distribute fuel and energy by 
efficient means. A White Paper in 1961 on nationalised industries also 
identified that, 
The amounts of money needed are much too large to be raised in 
the open market without government support and the industries 
are, of necessity, closely associated in the public mind with the 
3 J. K. Galbraith. The Vew Industrial State (Hamilton. London: 1967). p. 3 9 1. 
4 Sec R. Kelf-Cohen. British Nationalisation: 1945-1973 (Macmillan. London: 1973), 
ch. 10. 
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Government, so that it would be difficult for tile market to 
reuard them as independent financial concerns. 5 
Others had their intrinsic national significance. In the case of air transport for 
example, it provided a vital communication channel with the world and by 
conferring a monopoly status on the publicly-owned enterprises then, the 
legislation nationalising the industry also prohibited others from providing air 
transport services. 6 Indeed, commerce, in the European tradition, has always 
seen monopolies and cartels as a legitimate practice; official approval was wide- 
spread and was therefore not difficult to come by. 7 By contrast, the US has a 
markedly different approach. They have a strong tradition of common law 
hostility to monopolies and cartels and accorded primary importance to the i0ea 
of an autonomous econon-dc system and individual expression of choice. 8 Such 
profound dislike of monopolies and fettered competition is also apparent in the 
renowned Sherman Act 1890 and Clayton Act 1914. Both, and others, are a 
resolute restatement of America's belief in commercial pluralism, economic 
freedom and democracy, as against the enormous powers wielded by 
monopolies. 9 
The aim of establishing these law-monopolies was also to redress the over- 
capacity resulting from excessive competition whilst at the same time providing 
stability to business enterprises that were likely to suffer from the uncertainties 
of a competitive market system. In addition to providing stability to the 
industries, monopolies would ensure that the uncertainties of the market system 
did not operate adversely against the collective needs of the public. Common 
examples can be found in the form of public service obligations or universal 
service obligations. Monopolies also enjoy the advantage of being able to 
concentrate resources and co-ordinate operations so as to reduce wastage or 
duplication. 10 Furthermore, elin-driating duplication would lead to specialisation 
and innovative initiatives. It is therefore possible to make a case for monopolies 
on the basis of efficiency. Such claims are, of course, equally applicable to 
'market-monopolies'. 
Market-monopolies do not have the sanction of law. On the contrary, market- 
monopolies emerge by reason of a significant competitive advantage. This may 
be attributed to substantial efficiencies, or insufficient demand to justify the 
entry of competitors, or a private sector industry such as air transport where 
5 Financial and Economic Obligations of the Xationalised Industries (CmncL1337, 
1961). para. 27. 
6 CiNil Aviation Act 1946. 
7 W. R. Cornish. "Legal Control over Cartels and Monopolization 1880-1914" in 
N. Horn & J. Kocka (eds. ). Law and The Formation of Big Enterprises in the 19th and 
8 
Ear4v 20th Centuries (Vandcnhoeck & Ruprccht. Gottigcn: 1979). 
See e. g. S. Buck. The Granger Movement (University of Nebraska Press. Lincoln: 
1913), US v Trans-Afissouri Freight 166 US 290 [18931, US vAd4vst0n Pipe & Steel 
Co. 175 US 211 [18981. 
9 See e. g. W. Lct%%in. Law and Economic Polic 'v 
in America (Random House, New 
York: 1966)-. H. B. Thorelli. The Federal Anti-Trust Polic 
'v 
(John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore: 1954). H. Georgge. Progress and Poveqv (Hogarth Press, London: 1938). 
10 See e. g. C. D. Ediiards. Maintaining Competition (McGraw-Hill, New York: 1949). 
pp. 110- 120. 
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significant entry barriers can be present as a result of structural problems or 
historical privileges. Such market-monopolies may of course enjJoy the sanction 
of law to the extent that its monopoly or dominant position is exempt from any 
prohibition laid down in law, provided that they comply with the conditions 
stipulated. Exemptions of these nature are characteristic of an antitrust 
regulatory system, which is considered below. Thus, market-monopolies differ 
from law-monopolies on the basis that the latter are expressly created by 
statute. 
In his theory of economic rationality, Weber rqJJects the collectivist model of a 
centrally planned system as intrinsically impossible. For instance, he argues that 
a model which "determined" or "assigned" prices to goods and services was not 
a substitute for prices which were determined by actual market competition. It 
would be too arbitrary. There would be no rationality because the innate lack 
of knowledge to plan in a market economy would inevitably confine decisions 
to shrewd guesses of what might be the responses to or consequences of the 
projected actions. A centrally planned economy would require the planning 
authority to be in possession of such information which Weber moderately 
remarks, "is an enormous task. "" These arguments chime well with the New 
Right philosophy. In a useful analysis by Norman Lewis, he writes that, 
A government committed to choice would produce pluralistic 
and extensive institutions to encourage rational discourse ... 
Quite 
apart from anything else, secretive centralism flies in the face of 
what is part of the hard-core belief of the NR [New Right]; 
namely that government rarely knows best. 12 
According to Adam Smýith in particular, monopolies were a source of 
encouragement for inefficiency and managerial slackness. 13What was required 
in its place was an economic model that would be based on the ideals of the 
laissez-faire doctrine where individual choice triumphs-, an efficient system 
driven by the natural mechanisms of the market place. 
The Free-INIarket Model: Perfect Competition 
The free-market model of economy makes a number of assumptions. First, it 
assumes that competition will exist and function without formal intervention of 
the State. It assumes that competition is perfect, and a means adequate to 
ensure equal economic and social distribution. State intervention is virtually 
absent, except that it will remain responsible for policing against unfair 
behaviour or practices - antitrust regulation. In general, therefore, the 
determination of prices, capacity and entry into the market will be left to the 
demand-and-supply mechanics of the market system. To the extent that these 
economic decisions are not regulated, the relevant sector is said to be 
deregulated. Accordingly, an enterprise is permitted to decide whether to invest 
INIMcber. ITirischaft und Gesellschaji. trans. by T. Parsons, The Theo? y of Social 
and Economic Otyanisation (Hod- c, London: 1947). p. 3 8. t) 12 N. D. Le-vNis, Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics (Buttenvorths. 
London: 1996). p. 19. 
13 A. Smith. 11'ealth ofNations (Bavnes, London: 1776). 
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in tile first place, whether to become a competitor, what to produce, how much 
to produce and what to charge for the product, 
A crucial theoretical assumption of deregulation is that 'perfect competition' in 
the relevant sector is possible. But perfect competition is a notion not 
susceptible to a precise definition because of the difficulty in ascertaining when 
perfect competition has actually been achieved. Its shifting boundaries means it 
is dependent on a host of factors such as the number of competitors and the 
nature of the market in question. 
The extent to which markets adhere to the model of perfect 
competition is not always easily determined and. even more 
problematic, is the hypothesis that markets on the whole tend to 
move away from conditions of full competition. 14 
Be that as it may, perfect competition is usually described as Pareto oplimum. 
The Pareto test holds that maximum efficiency has been achieved in the 
allocation of resources when it becomes impossible to make someone better off 
without at the same time making someone else worse off. This is without 
question a narrow test; for the circumstances in which a transaction would make 
an individual better off, but where no one else loses out, would be extremely 
limited as to make its application near-impossible. 
A more practical appraisal of the notion of perfect competition is to assume that 
the relevant sector enjoys a certain degree of market contestability. While 
market contestability does not mean that competition is perfect, it does 
represent the next best thing. The theory of market contestability has been 
explored by Baumol et. aL who assume that in any given industry, usually one 
which is deregulated or unregulated, their transactions would be organised into 
two principal sets. 15 One was between incumbent firms where there is a fixed 
number of firms so that collectively they constitute 'monopolistic competition'. 16 
The other was between incumbent firms and potential or new entrants. The 
latter is the focus of their analysis. They claim the behaviour of new entrants to 
be founded on the calculation of profits that entry into the market would 
provide. An incumbent who prices his product excessively above costs would 
provoke the entry of competitors who are prepared to under-cut his price by 
narrowing the margin of profit. Baumol et. aL offer the definition of market 
contestability as a market, 
into which entry is completely free, from which exit is costless, 
in which entrants and incumbents compete on completely 
symmetric terms, and entry is not impeded by fear of retaliatory 
price alterations. 17 
14 J-E. Lanc. "Public Policy or Markets? The Demarcation Problem" in J-E. Lane (ed. ), 
State and 7he Alarket (Sage. London: 1985). p. 12. See also j. Robinson, The 
Econoinics oJImperfect Conipetition (Macmillan, London: 1933). 
15 W. Baumol. J. Panzar and R-Willig. Contestable Alarkets and The Iheo? Y oj'Inclustry 
Structure (Harcourt Brace Jovano-, ich, New York: 1982). 
16 On which see E. Chamberlin. The Theoýv of Monopolistic Conipetition (Harvard 
University Press. Mass.: 1933). 
17 Baumol, op. cit.. p. 349. 
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An important assumption of their theory is therefore that entry into the market 
is free so that it "exacts no explicit costs and that entrants suffer from no 
disadvantages in the techniques available to them. "13 Explicit costs are either 
those entry costs which are greater than the costs incurred by the incumbents or 
social costs in the form of undesirable consequences to be borne by society. An 
implied requisite of a perfectly contestable market is that the 'sunk costs' are 
either negligible or non-existent. 19 This assumption of freedom of entry where 
sunk costs are no object, therefore, permits the theory to be equally applicable 
to monopolies as it would to markets which are competitive. Of course, this is 
true only of market-monopolies, not law-monopolies which prohibits entry. 
Their analysis cite the airline markets as "a clear example [ofl small, , and therefore naturally monopolistic" markets, but are nevertheless contestable. By 
a natural monopoly, they meant a market or route where the level of demand 
justifies only one flight per day. It is, however, contestable because entry into 
and out of the market is easy given that "airline equipment (virtually capital on 
wings) is so very freely mobile. ". 0 A new entrant would simply fly into an 
airport and commence services with under-cut prices. If the incumbent 
responds by reducing its price, then they argue that the new entrant "need only 
fly his airplane away to take advantage of some other lucrative option - even if 
he only returns his rented aircraft or resells it in the well-functioning secondary 
aircraft market. " Contestability through the deregulation of entry in particular 
would consequently aim to secure the ideals of perfect competition. 
The virtues of perfect competition are founded principally on the idea of 
unqualified economic liberty, This exercise of liberty is, however, two-fold: by 
providers and by purchasers. Liberty of choice for the providers takes the sense 
of the freedom to decide whether in the first place to invest in the making of a 
product, the quantity of the product, how and at what price to sell it. This is 
consistent with Weber's argument that a centrally planned economy, whether by 
way prescriptive regulation or other methods, would be impeded by the lack of 
adequate knowledge. The arbitrariness of the decision may not be in accord 
with the expectations (demand) of the purchasers. By deregulating, the decision 
of what to provide, how much and at what price would be devolved to those 
whose business is to provide and specialise in providing the 'what'. Implicit in 
the decisions of the providers will be those of the purchasers since perfect 
competition must assume a degree of regular rationality in decisions of 
providing only what the purchasers would accept; if not, decisions of what to 
provide and the like would be arbitrary and perfect competition would only be a 
matter of mere co-incidence. Perfect competition also implies the unfettered 
liberty of choice for the purchasers by having a range of providers from whom 
to obtain the particular product. This is typically couched in the terms of 
"consumer sovereignty", "consumer power" or "consumer choice". However 
this is labelled, such sovereignty in consumer decisions acts as a discipline on 
is Ibid.. p. 4. 
19 'Sunk costs' are costs uhich are unrecoverable in the event that the competitor 
withdraws from the market. 
20 Passim, p. 7. 
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the providers to rise to the needs of the purchasers whether it is low pricing, 
reliability of product. attractiveness of product or simply value for money. '-' 
In economic terms, the devolution of such responsibilities, particularly to the 
private sector, is a means for achieving greater efficiency and optimalising 
scarce resources. Adam Smith was one such proponent. -"- A; one commentator 
has remarked, 
On the familiar long list of the evils of monopoly there figures 
regularly the charge that it is a barrier to economic progress, a 
force making for inefficiency and stagnation. Competition, on the 
other contrary, is usually hailed as a stimulating and invigorating 
force, or even an indispensable spur to the exertion on which 
progress dependS. 23 
More specifically, the traditional economic arguments for a competitive system 
begin first with the notion of allocative efficiency. The argument runs that 
under conditions of perfect competition, consumer welfare is maxin-dsed 
through an optimal allocation of economic resources. These resources would be 
allocated between goods and services in a way which matches precisely the 
quantities desired by consumers, being the price that they are prepared to pay 
on the market. Econornic theories have also argued that competition is the 
foundation ofproductive efficiency. This means that under conditions of perfect 
competition, goods and services will be produced at the lowest cost possible so 
that it also results in less wastage. As little as possible of society's wealth will 
then be expended in the production process. In 6ds way, the combination of 
allocative and productive efficiency will lead to the maximýisatiori of consumer 
welfare and society's wealth, so as to facilitate overall progress. In practice, 
however, the haphazard behaviour of consumers and irrational economic 
actions are a real and serious source of distortions for these theoretical 
assumptions. A model of perfect competition also assumes that consumers have 
access to all material information that enables them to make fully informed 
choices. This is not always possible; often, the cost of gathering all necessary 
information on product or services would outweigh the efficiencies intended by 
competition. Equally, a free-market model can give rise to 'externalities' which 
are costs derived from the activity of the producer and imposed on third parties, 
but whýich are not reflected in the price of the product. Other difficulties of the 
free-market model are discussed further below. 
21 Norman Lewis has argued that the devolution of such responsibilities to choose is 
consistent with the theory of empowerment. In the same breath, it may be said that 
choice constitutes an important prequisite of empowerment which is crl&ddcd in the 
inherent rights of citizenship: Choice and the Legal Order: Rising Above Politics 
(Buttenvorth. London: 1996), pp. 57-59. 
22 OP. Cit 
23 P. Hennipman. "Monopoly: Impediment or Stimulus to Economic Progress? " in 
E. Chamberlin W. ). AlonopoýV and Competition and Their Regulation (Macmillan, 
London: 1954). p. 42 1. 
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The Intermediate Model: Re(gulated Competition and Contestability P-1 
For all the economic and social advantages of the free-market model. there is 
, 
Just as much to be said for a collectivist model. The ultimate end of meeting the 
interests of the public is a constant factor, what differs is the means with which 
the end is achieved. Whether a free-market or collectivist model is the more 
appropriate or preferred means must depend on the political, economic and 
social conditions of the State. The aim of these opening sections has been to 
explore the claims and counterclaims of the opposing models of economic 
organisation and the way in which competition regulation is fashioned, if at all. 
But that discussion merely serves to beg more fundamental questions. of 
economic organisation and regulatory approaches. Can the public policies of a 
collectivist model combine the efficiency aim of the perfect competition model 
, without destroying its raison XetrO How can the incentive structure of a 
market system be secured for a model of collectivism? Conversely, need a free- 
market model of economy necessarily imply the subversion of certain 
collectivist norms? Can the tensions of 'formal' and substantive rationality of 
these models be reconciled, and if so, how? The rest of this chapter is devoted 
to addressing these issues and to construct the arguments that the model of 
regulated competition represents the most satisfactory form of econonýc 
organisation in the modem political economy as well as a satisfactory 
compromise to secure a set of pre-determined objectives. These will be 
considered under two separate headings, econon* and antitrust regulation, 
although their evolutionary relationship will also be charted. 
Economic Regulation 
Economic regulation is a second best enterprise. Having considered the 
arguments for a free-market system based on competitive solutions, it is clear 
that regulation is an article of faith. It represents an interference in the operation 
of the market system, for whatever reason, and at best an exercise to procure a 
result through guess-work. It is a process primarily concerned with the 
economic behaviour of the participants and their consequences; for instance, the 
decision whether to introduce a certain product or service, and if so, how much 
of it and what price to charge for it. Fundamentally, economic regulation is the 
regulation of market entry, capacity and price. Weber describes the control of 
such economic behaviour as the winschaftsregulierender verband in the sense 
that the regulator imposes regulations which represent a set of limitations on a 
pre-supposed existing sphere of economic autonomy of the participants. 24 Even 
so, these are observations which amount to a statement of presumption that the 
free-market system will always provide for results that are fair and rational. In 
the real world, this is not always the case. There will be cases where positive 
interference in the behaviour or activities of individuals or organisations will be 
warranted to secure the realisation of a certain set of objectives, typically the 
public interest. The vague notion of the public interest itself is an attestation to 
the need for regulatory intervention in cases where it needs to be more precisely Z defined. A commonly cited example is the role of regulation in redressing the 
24 NI. Weber. Jf irischafl und GeselIschafl. trans. by T. Parsons, The Theoýv of Social 
and Economic 0, ýizanjsafion (Hodge. London: 1947). p. 182. 
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deficit stemming from the lack of access to all relevant information for the 
public to make informed choices and decisions To consider these claims 
further, the rationales for economic regulation need to be examined. 
Rationalesfor Economic Regulation 
The rationales for economic regulation abound, some of which will account for 
the rise of economic regulation. First of all, it pays to state Kahn's arguments 
that the need for economic regulation depended on the industry or sector to be 
regulated. On a scale of relative importance, the more important the industry 
and the more unique it is as a "prerequisite to economic development", then the 
more pronounced is the rationale for economic regulation. 25 At a npre 
conceptual level of analysis, Weber argues that economic regulation is one of 
many socio-economic models and this institutional ordering rests on one of four 
criteria. 26first, the emanation of economic regulation is attributed to tradition 
in the sense that those regulated economic activities have been traditionally 
accustomed to some sort of limitations. Secondly, he argues that as a matter of 
convention economic regulation represents a collective social disapproval of 
certain economic behaviour as contrary to free competition or price 
detern-dnation. The third criterion for this institutional ordering relates to the 
existence of certain legal requirements or the need to implement certain legal 
requirements. Typically, the system of economic regulation is established by a 
statute which will also stipulate the objectives to be achieved and the criteria to 
be applied. Fourthly, economic regulation may be organised as result of 
voluntary actions that represent a substantive restriction on the market but 
which remains formally free from interventions. The system of self-regulation is 
a good example; so are cartel agreements. 
At this stage, a caveat needs to be added. Economic regulation and its 
objectives need not necessarily be to promote competition, although it will be a 
key assumption in this thesis. On the contrary, economic regulation is a process 
or method which is equafly capable of being applied to reduce competition, 
where this is a reasonable interpretation of the aims of regulation. In this sense, 
economic regulation is a leverage for adjusting the level of competition intended 
to suit the prevailing economic conditions, or indeed to suit the interests of the 
regulated and run the risk of 'regulatory capture'. A crucial issue here is the 
accountability of the regulator whose decisions will need to satisfy the 
requirements of administrative law. This mechanism for checking regulatory 
decisions is important to ensure that they are not arbitrary, perverse nor unfair. 
Amongst other things, the determination of these issues require an 
understanding, albeit briefly, of the rationales for economic regulation. 
(a) Monopolypower 
A key rationale for economic regulation is the need to promote or to substitute 
for competition. Since monopolies present the greatest threat to competition, 
25 A. Kahn. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (Wiley. New 
26 
York: 1970). vol. 1. p, 11. 
M. Weber. IfIrtschaft und Geselischaft. trans. by T. Parsons. The Theolýv of Social 
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the case for the economic regulation of monopolies is particularly acute, In such 
cases, it is presumed that a monopoly is permitted to operate, but will be subject 
to some form of economic regulation, Typically, and in spite of the potential of 
products being overpriced or under-produced, the case permitting a monopoly 
to operate is justified by the lower cost of production to society than would 
otherwise be the case where two or more firms are permitted to compete. 17 On 
this basis, the aim of economic regulation is ultimately to promote competition 
and to control the exercise of monopoly power so that long-term monopoly 
profits are not accrued at the expense of competition. 22' The shortcomings or 
threats of monopolies have already been considered above. The difficulty 
associated with such a task is clearly to prove that the monopoly power has 
been abused or exercised in a predatory manner. This is no easy feat. 
(b) Excessivv Competition 
Breyer and Stewart has argued that a key rationale of economic regulation has 
been to check the worse excesses of competition. " This is in complete contrast 
to a monopoly situation where the rationale was to prevent the abuse of 
monopoly power. Although it is clear that the notion of excessive will defy an 
accurate definition, it may be evaluated against a host of factors such as the 
unreasonable relation between prices and costs, a substantial slack in consumer 
demand or a large number of bankruptcies. In this respect, economic regulation 
has the ultimate aim of moderating excessive or destructive competition to 
prevent the rapid exit of competitors and consequently leaving the remaining 
competitors or producers with the free-hand to exploit the absence of 
competition, 
Kahn adopts a similar line of reasoning. He argues that economic regulation is 
necessitated by the failure of competition in that either competition no longer 
exists or is operating contrary to the public interest. 30 This argument derives its 
support from the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in New State ke V 
Debman on the excessive nature of unregulated competition. 31 Brandeis was a 
renowned critic of unregulated competition. He believed that perfect 
competition was an illusion. It was destructive and a source of irreversible 
damage to economic life. Brandeis held the belief that unfettered competition 
was "competition that kills". 32 In his view, "there must be reasonable 
27 A. Ogus. Regulation: Legal Fonn and Economic Themy (Clarendon, Oxford: 1994), 
p. 30. See also T. Prosser. Law and the Regulators (Clarendon, Oxford: 1997). pp. II- 
12. 
23 Foster, op. cit.. p. 164. 
29 S. Brcvcr and R. Stewart. Administrative Lmv and RegulatorvPolic. v (Little. Brown 
Co, Boston: 3rd cdn.. 1992). pp. 8-9. 
30 A. Kahn. The Economics qf Regulation: Principles and Institutions (New York: 
1970). vol. 1. p. 11. 
31 285 US 262 119321. Other court decisions lending support to the view date back to 
early times: Munn v Illinois 94 US 113 118761 and. Vebbia v New York 291 US 502 
[19341. 
32 See T. K. McCraw. The Prophets of Regulation (Belknap Press. Han-ard: 1984). 
p. 103. 
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restrictions upon competition else we shall see competiti 'on destroyed "" His 
analysis focused very sharply on a particular Supreme Court ruling in Dr Miles 
Atedical ('o. v. John Pat* & Yon. v, 14 where it was held that price-fixing was 
illegal under the common law and the Sherman Act 1893 The decision had the 
effect of opening the way for a price war in the drub, retailing industry by giving 
greater opportunities to carry out price-cutting, regardless of the battle that 
might be between larger and established firms against smaller retailers. As a 
result of this price competition, smaller retailers who could not sustain the battle 
had to be eliminated, The ultimate consequence was simply the reassertion of 
dominance by the more established firms which carried not only economic, but 
constitutional implications as well. Brandeis saw that the real problem in these 
developments was the circuitous and futile route of introducing and re- 
introducing competition for the benefit of the consumers. 
(C) Public Goods 
Anthony Ogus postulates another rationale for economic regulation as the 
distribution of public goodS. 35 The hypothesis is that the market system cannot 
achieve an adequate or efficient allocation of the goods for consumption. He 
cites the example of national security. Here the people of town A may pay the 
requisite taxes for the necessary protection. The inhabitants of town B cannot 
refuse to pay on the ground that they do not wish to receive the necessary 
national defence. To put it another way, a member of town A may refuse to pay 
the taxes and hoping to enjoy the benefit of protection nevertheless. As a 
consequence, the allocation process through the market system breaks down. 
What constitutes public goods is an issue on which opinions will differ. There 
are certain goods which fall into the grey area and may be considered as public 
or 'private' goods. Much depends on one's version of what is meant by public. 
Education and health service is one. It is possible that the market system can be 
applied to these areas for their allocation and consumption, so that the 
purchaser will receive the level of benefit for which he or she has paid. In 
practice, however, this can lead to overpricing or under-production. In such 
cases, the true value of the product may not be reflected in the price paid and 
some regulatory correction becomes necessary. 
In the air transport sector, a useful example can be found in the case of 
commercially unprofitable routes. Assume the travel between two points X-Y. 
Suppose Y is a destination of remote location so that the number of passengers 
travellin between X-Y is never 'big'at any one time. In a commercially rational 
33 Ibid. p. 102. "Competition That Kills" appeared as a series of articles in the Harper's 
Meek4V- (US), November 15,1913, and was intended by Brandeis to educate the 
public. Congress andjudges of the dangers of unfettered competition. The American 
Fair Trade League sponsored an excerpted version of "Competition That Kills" in 
twenty national magazines. McCraw described Brandeis' cfforts in the folloNling 
v, ords: "The text displayed Brandeis at his muckraking best. He brought every 
symbol and ideological appeal to bear. turned every conceivable argument to his 
ach-antage. and invested the whole with his distinctive moral passion": ibid.. p. 103. 34 770 US 373 [19111. 
35 Ogus. OP-Cit., P. 33. 
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, vorld, no airline would serve the route X-N* because it makes little commercial 
sense to transport a small number of passengers and, in any event, at a loss 
unless it decides to charge a premium to cover the costs of operation. The 
community of Y would consequently be deprived of an access facility in the 
form of air transport or would have to pay a great deal for X-Y travel. 
However, imposing what is known as a public Yetnice obligmioti, on an airline 
would ensure the continuity of its provision and provided at an 'affordable' 
price. This requirement may be conditional upon the grant of some other 
benefit elsewhere - cross-subsidisahoit - or an obligation for which proper 
remuneration would be given. Consequently, the behaviour of the airline would 
be regulated to the extent that it is operating or is required to operate between 
X-Y. In this respect, economic regulation has a wider sense than simply to 
achieve a particular 'economic' outcome. 
(d) Extentalifies 
According to Ogus, the false value of products is compounded by the presence 
of externalities. Externalities are defined as the costs imposed on third parties as 
a consequence of the producer's activity, but which are not reflected in the 
prices of the products. Hence, a misallocation of resources. Regulatory action 
becomes necessary to correct the misallocation, for example, by adopting 
measures that would force the producer to 'internalise' such costs or 
compensate for the loss or damage arising from its activities. The most common 
example is that of industrial pollution. A factory plant may be discharging 
chemical wastes into the river which may damage the water drinking system or 
the ecological system. This company may, for example, be required to adopt 
alternative procedures for waste disposal which ultimately add to the cost of 
production. Another example is noise pollution from aircraft or fuel emissions 
from aircraft engines. Noisier aircraft may mean that the quality of life of those 
living under the flight path will deteriorate. Airlines may therefore be required 
to purchase newer and quieter engines or to compensate for the insulation of 
buildingS. 36Without such intervention, these costs may be ignored and in 
certain cases may present a danger to public safety. The only constraint may be 
one of adverse publicity. For example, 
Airlines show a responsible regard for the safety of their aircraft, 
crew and passengers. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result 
in adverse publicity, a lack of confidence by passengers reflected 
in choosing to fly with competitors and the possible closure of 
the airline by the regulatory authorities, 37 
(e) ItIforinational deficit 
The section on the free-market model made it apparent that purchaser or user 
choice lies at the heart of the market system. It is through such choice, the 
choice over a range of producers and products or services, that competition is 
possible. For all its virtues, however, choice is never perfect. This is so for two 
principal reasons. First of all, an important assumption for effective choice is the 
36 See P. Davies and J-Goh. "Air Transport and the EnN ironment: Regulating Aircraft 
Noise" (1993) 18 Air Law 123), 
37 HC 15 (1990-9 1). Appx. 1, p. 1. 
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extent or adequacy of information possessed by the decision-maker to make an 
informed choice between altcrnatives. No doubt, technology and media 
advertising has an important role to play in bringing forth the relevant 
information. Fares for flights to a host of destinations are now commonly 
available in the newspapers, over the radio as well as the 'Internet'. In spite of 
these developments, information is never 'perfect'. In the real world. some 
uncertainty as to facts will always be present. The advertised fares may contain 
restrictions on travel dates or length of stay which a traveller will need to verify 
and compare with the alternatives. This can result in a costly exercise. Thus, it 
may be necessary in certain cases for regulatory intervention to remedy the 
deficit so that more informed choices can be made. The CAA, for instance, 
requires all organisers of holiday packages to declare in the marketing efforts 
that they belong to the Air Transport Organisers Licensing scheme (ATOL). 
ATOL is a system where holiday organisers are required to place a bond in a 
trust set up by the CAA to compensate holiday-makers in the event that they go 
out of business. Holiday-makers would therefore be informed as to whether a 
particular organiser is a member of the scheme and would normally avoid 
dealing with those who do not belong to it. In that sense, ATOL is a centralised 
contract to compensate holiday-makers, a less costly way than having individual 
holiday-makers contract with the holiday organisers or travel agents for a 
simýilar protection. Be that as it may, regulatory measures to plug the 
informational gap does not always guarantee access to or availability of all the 
relevant information. Moreover, the process of gathering this information may 
be prohibitively expensive as to outweigh any public policy justifications for 
intervention. 38 
A second assumption of the market system is that the decision-maker is able to 
process the information received and respond in a rational way that maximises 
his or her choices. This is known as bounded rationality. A passenger may 
decide to travel with a specific airline which need not offer the lowest fare on 
the basis that he intends to 'experiment' with the services of another airline or 
to collect loyalty points in exchange for a variety of gifts under a particular so- 
called frequent flyer programme. This latter issue is taken up in a subsequent 
chapter. 
Regulatory Philosophy 
A few words must be said about the approaches to economic regulation. The 
point has already been made that an economic regulator usually has the 
discretion to use its authority either to promote competition or to adopt a less 
competitive stance, though it was also stated that the scope of this thesis is 
limited to the assumption that economic regulation is designed to promote or 
n-dmic competition. This raises a whole range of questions including those on 
accountability and much else besides. Be that as it may, the aims of the 
regulatory policy, whether to promote competition or to protect the 
incumbents, may be approached by adopting an interventionist or 'minimalist' 
philosophy to regulation. This distinction is clearly relative. Where, perhaps, a 
given sector has structural problems or is a natural monopoly, it may be 
38 Ops. op. cit.. pp. 38-41and Brc%er and Stewart. op. cil.. P. S. 
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necessary to adopt an interventionist approach to maintain prevailing levels of 
competition or to ensure that the monopoly does not exploit its dominant 
power. Attempts to correct market problems are frequent These can take the 
form of pricing review and control, compensation for under-performance 
according to agreed standards, interconnection or access to network 
resolutions, capacity control by fixing the volume of production and the like. In 
the air transport sector, for example, the licensing system which the CAA 
inherited from the ATLB was highly interventionist so that hearings were 
necessary and frequent to determine not only new applications to enter the 
market, but the level of fares and frequency of services of both scheduled and 
charter services. 
On the other hand, a minimalist, or less interventionist, approach was a more 
apparent part of the CAA's philosophy to regulation. As will be seen in due 
course, for example, it believes in leaving market problems to be determined by 
competitive solutions in the first instance rather than regulatory actions. 
Intervention would be necessary only where the need is evident. This is 
consistent with the theory of critical market contestability. Under the CAA's 
responsibility, domestic air fares were freed of any control; so was capacity. As 
a consequence, hearings for licensing cases tended to be few and far between. In 
one sense, a minimalist stance is an expression of confidence in the market 
system to provide adequate solutions. This contrasts with the interventionist 
approach which perhaps is a manifestation of the desire, not so much to 
suppress market forces, but to prevent or overreach the anticipated failures of 
the market system through ex ame actions. 
Methods of economic regulation 
Whether the regulatory philosophy is interventionist or minimalist, the methods 
or means by which the aims of regulation are achieved are equally an important 
consideration. In charting these different methods of economic regulation, it is 
important to be reminded that they are not necessarily separated in a neat 
fashion; there is a considerable degree of resemblance between the various 
methods in as much as it is possible to combine the methods in any one 
approach to economic regulation. First, it will be assumed that the follov'ring 
analysis of the economic regulatory methods is based on the model of 
administrative regulation, that is economic regulation by an independent 
Government agency or public administrative body. 
(a) Licetishig orftaitchisitig 
Although licensing and franchising differ in some respects, their respective aims 
are reasonably comparable. Both are processes of allocation usually in cases 
where the commodity to be allocated or handed-out is in short supply such as 
broadcasting licences or air transport routes. Both also have two-fold meaning. 
First, licensing may take the form of a screening process, that is a system of 
prior approval for 'entry into the profession". This is typically based on criteria 
gerial and financial competence. Likewise, 
franchises are such as fitness. mana,, 
usually awarded only to those bidders who can demonstrate that they have the 
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requis te qualifications as is the case with television and radio broadcasting. 31 
The use of such licences can be found in the case air transport where an 
operator of airline services is required to have been licensed by the CAA as fit 
and proper to perform the task of providing air services. This continues to be 
required even under the liberalised air transport market in the European 
Community (EC) where prospective operators of airline services will need to 
meet the fitness, managerial and financial conditions laid down in Council 
Regulation 2407/92.40 A typical characteristic of such a prior approval system is 
the sanction under criminal law which provides that an unlicensed operator 
would be committing an offence. 
Licensing can also be an instrument for prescribing the conditions of approval 
that relate to prices, quality of services or products, capacity or amount of 
products to be supplied, or indeed the types of goods that can be produced or 
services offered. To avoid confusion from the licensing process concerned with 
screening the fitness of applicants, this second form of licensing will be called 
ecoizomic ficensing. These licences wfll contain specific economic conditions 
such as the RPI-X formula for the utility sectors. The RPI-X formula, in short, 
is a system for regulating the prices that an operator can charge, taking into 
account the capital investments and the need for a reasonable return. 
Additionally, such licences may require certain discounts to be offered such as 
lower tariffs to elderly or disabled users. This form of price control is no longer 
practised in air transport. It was first abandoned by the CAA in 1984 in respect 
of domestic services, and is now expressly prohibited by Council Regulation 
2409/92 on fares. 41 Fares relating to international services beyond the EC 
continue to be regulated in the usual way - through the use of bilateral 
agreements between the relevant countries. 
Licences are also used to set standards with which operators are required to 
comply as a condition of the licence being granted. Such standard setting is 
typical in the case of 'social' obligations such as health and safety, or 
environmental protection, where the market system may be regarded as an 
inadequate corrective mechanism. 
The procedures for issuing licences or franchises are normally governed by 
statute. These processes vary. Licences can be issued after a detailed public 
hearing. The hearing may be adversarial in nature and may require legal 
representation. Where there is no hearing to consider the oral representations of 
the relevant parties, decisions may be taken after having invited written 
submissions. This is evident in the use of the 'without hearing' system by the 
CAA. The procedures have a close resemblance to the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act 1946 where the proposal to issue or indeed to 
revoke a licence is subject to the requirement of inviting comments on the 
proposal within a defined period of time. 42 Invitations to bid or tender is an 
39 Broadcasting Act 1990. 
40 (1992) OJ L240/ 1. 
41 (1992) OJ L240/15. 
42 E. g. s. 8(4) of the Railv. -avs Act 19933. Beyond hearing . the use of written CPS 
submissions is also common in the rcgulation of the privatised utility sectors. 
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alternative procedure, though this is more commonly associated with the award 
of a franchise as in the case of railway franchises. 41 
Although the use of licences has been highly effective in the economic 
res-rulation of air transport, as a means for controlling the intensity of 
competition, their importance will decrease as competition increases. This is so 
because competition is built on a liberal licensing philosophy, which implies a 
less prescriptive approach to regulation. Accordingly, there would be greater 
freedom on the part of the operators to decide the level of fares, the frequency 
of services, the type of aircraft to use and the markets to enter, Until such time, 
of course, when workable competition is deemed, licensing would continue to 
play an important role. This raises the question of whether economic regulation 
is merely a surrogate for competition so that at a certain point, such regulation 
can be abandoned in the knowledge that competitive forces will determine the 
economics of the industry. To put it another way, this means that market 
contestability has been achieved where entry is free to all able and willing 
operators. It may be that such workable competition or contestability may never 
be achieved given the unique structure of the industry. For example, it would 
seem difficult to dismantle the economic regulation of transmission charges for 
electricity or gas, or network charges for telecommunications. These are 
infrastructural charges which need to be regulated because it would be too 
expensive to build another competing network. Airports are similar to 
transmission pipes and lines in every sense of the word, and the charges for 
taking-off and landing will need to be overseen by a regulatory authority, which 
by happenstance is also the task of the CAA. However, the regulation of 
airports will be outside the scope of this work. 
The airline industry is thus a worthy case-study to establish the theory that 
certain upstream or downstream services can be subject to a less prescriptive 
regulatory approach, but only when the structural difficulties of the industry 
have been overcome. This presumption of allowing the competitive forces of 
the market to operate, before the need for regulatory intervention, inevitably 
reduces the significance of the licence as a regulatory instrument. That said, it is 
important at this point to reiterate the important distinction between economic 
regulation and antitrust regulation. This is because while sustainable 
competition may allow for the dismantling of economic regulation, antitrust 
cannot be removed. Indeed, it is a pre-condition for economic liberalisation or 
deregulation to ensure that an effective antitrust framework has been 
established. Without the latter, competition would be jeopardised by the 
possibility of anti-competitive practices or predatory behaviour by a dominant 
firm. This is particularly acute where the industry structure is represented by a 
dominant undertaking which had previously enjoyed a privileged position or 
special fights. The air transport industry is a classic illustration, This concern 
was well manifested in a substantial part of the CAA's report from its study into 
the privatisation of BA. This issue is taken up in a subsequent chapter. 
(h) Rate-makiikz 
43 S. 26. Raili%a)s Act 1993. 
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The system of cost-of-service rate-making involves the regulator setting the 
prices to be charged which the operator would otherwise have set. This is 
common in the case of a natural monopoly where regulatory intervention to 
determine the pricing structure is justified on the ground that the operator may 
exploit its monopoly power. This method will provide for an amount of 
revenue sufficient to meet expenses and a reasonable return on investment. To 
do this, the regulator will need to determine future costs of operation such as 
salaries, depreciation as well as a 'reasonable rate' of return. Information for 
such items may be derived from previous periods of operation. Cost-of-service 
rate-making is more commonly adopted in the US, 44 although there is a degree 
of resemblance with the RPI-X formula adopted for the UK utility sectors. It 
has been argued, however, that the RPI-X formula is significantly different ori 
the basis that it provides an incentive structure for the operator to achieve 
efficiency savings, though this is not to say that the formula is free of difficulties 
when it comes to application. 45 
4- 1 
I ý/ Historicall)-basedprices 
Another method of economic regulation is based on historical prices. This is 
now uncommon although it was widely used in times of war to control prices 
and productive capacity of operators. 46 Quite simply, prices are set by the 
regulator on the basis of the prices charged at certain date and modified 
accordingly to reflect different circumstances. The problem with such a method 
is that it presumes the ability of the regulator to factor the different 
circumstances into the new prices. The longer the time lapse between the 
historic and new prices, the more likely that more different circumstances will 
emerge, thus complicating the process of determining more precise historically- 
based prices. 
(d) Public ownership 
It is a contested issue as to whether public ownership constitutes a method of 
economic regulation. Even so, it is helpful to consider the issues a little further. 
The proponents of public ownership as a form of economic regulation include 
Anthony Ogus, Christopher Foster and Stephen Breyer whose works have been 
widely referred to in this chapter. 
Public ownership is not a direct control of the economic behaviour of private 
actors, but is instead the assumption of proprietary control over the resources of 
the entity. No doubt, any economic regrulatory control can be exercised within 
the ownership structure itself While its most distinct difference from classical 
regulation lies in the institutional structure, the more crucial questions of how 
and whether the public interest is, or can be, served remain fundamentally 
similar. 
44 Breyer and Stewart. op. cit., ch. 4 and see also S. Breyer. Regulation and Its Refor", 
(Han-ard University Press. Mass.: 1982). 
45 See J. Ka) The Future of UK Utility Regulation" in Nl. BccslcNI (cd. ). Regulating the 
Utilities: A Thnefor Chanýizc? (IEA. London: 1996). pp. 153-160. 
46 Breyer and Stewart. op. cit.. ch. 2. 
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The system of public o%ýnership is not alien to the British structure of 
enterprise, nor indeed to the European tradition of economic organisation. 
Public ownership in the UK peaked in the period between 1946-1951 when the 
majority of the major industries were nationaliscd under the auspices of their 
respective statutes. The rationales for public ownership consisted of a 
combination of practical motivations to avoid undue duplications, ideological 
conviction and pre-war policy of centralisation. Where the objective was to 
avoid duplication in the use of resources, the typical consequence would be the 
creation of a monopoly, though it is true that a monopoly can equally be created 
in a private sector entity. The argument runs that, just as much as competitive 
forces can generate efficiencies, a monopoly can achieve efficiencies of a siWar 
magnitude. 
More importantly, however, the golden years of nationalisation was the result of 
the Morrisonian concept of separating the responsibility of policy-making from 
the day-to-day operations of the publicly-owned entity. The lines of 
accountability would therefore clear and comprehensible. Ministers would be 
accountable to Parliament for policy matters. There is much to commend in the 
need for clearer lines of accountability, although in the case of the nationalised 
industries, the willingness of ministers to intervene for political and short-term 
reasons left much to be desired. 47 Such willingness to intervene were seldom 
accompanied by the corresponding willingness to shoulder the blame when 
things went wrong. A study of the National Economic Development Office in 
1976, which failed to be adopted by the governrnent, sheds an illuminating light 
on the peculiarities of the relationship between n-dnisters and nationalised 
industries. Its remarks deserve quoting at length. 
[Sluccessive governments have been reluctant to accept the 
importance of continuity and to recognise that in any large 
industrial organisation, whether in the public or the private 
sector, some assurance of stable objectives and policies is a 
precondition of efficiency ... The problem is a familiar one and 
there is no easy solution for it-, but it cannot simply be brushed 
under the carpet. In all the main nationalized industries, plans 
for investments, technology and manpower have to be made for 
periods which extend well beyond the lifetime of a single 
Parliament. Until a framework is established within which 
management can plan with confidence, the nationalized 
industries will never operate at anything like their full 
potential ... At the same time one must recognise the realities of 
our political system ... Ministers in Britain are continually 
subjected to short term pressures from many quarters and an 
elected government often feels obliged to respond to such 
pressures. 
At first sight there is a good deal of attraction in the concept of a 
completely arm's length relationshýip, in which the difference 
between commercial and social obligations are precisely defined 
47 See T. Prosser. Nationalise(I Inclustries and Pubhc Control (BlackiwIl. Oxford: 1986) 
and Foster. op. cit.. p. 83. 
35 
and the rules for departmental and corporate behaviour are 
neatly codified But the evidence demonstrates convincingly that 
in the real world things would not work out like that, 
It seems to us that the thinking behind the wholly arm's length 
approach is based on a false analogy with the private sector. 
The financial structures and disciplines in the public and private 
sectors are very different-The issues of public policy involved 
are so large and politically sensitive that it is not realistic to 
suppose that they would ever be left for long to management 
alone to determine, subject only to periodic checks on their 
financial performance... 
Boards of most nationalized industries feel strongly that 
governments intervene excessively in areas which boards 
consider to be within their own managerial prerogative. The 
fight of Ministers to issue directions within the terms of the 
statutes is not in question; the problems arises when government 
seeks to influence decisions hy means which are not specýfically 
providedfor in the statutes. From the boards' viewpoint the 
trend towards more frequent and ad hoe interventions has 
delayed decisions, disrupted previously agreed plans, invalidated 
criteria for planning and assessing performance, resulted in 
financial deficits, and damaged the corporate morale of 
management and other employees. The level of decision-making 
tends to be raised with the resultant increased burden on senior 
management. The lack of prior consultation, the inconsistency 
with agreed procedures and guidelines and the apparent 
unwillingness of governments openty to carry the responsibility 
fior their interventions give rise to particular resentment at board 
level. (Emphasis added) Some corporations base their resistance 
to certain types of intervention on constitutional and legal 
grounds, but this has never been put to the test in the courts and 
board members have not carried their resistance to the point of 
resigning their appointments. 
Nfinisters and civil servants would concede that the 
consequences of intervention have often been detrimental, in 
some at least of the above respects, but would justify many of 
them on the ground of the wider benefits to the community at 
large. 48 
Regulated Competition and Critical Market Contestability 
In the opening chapter, an attempt was made to identify the possible sets of 
interests or participants within the regulated airline complex. The three principal 
actors were the regulator, the regulated being the airline and the beneficiary 
being the users. It has also been asserted that an important role of the regulator 
was to harness the interests of these participants and to attempt to reconcile any 
differences. How this may be done depends on whether the regulator adopts an 
48 NEDO-4 Slzuýv of UKA'alionalized Inchisirie-s (MISO. London: 1976). 
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interventionist or minimalist philosophy of regulation, The aim of this section is 
to make an attempt at fashioning a regulatory approach that would seek to 
maximise the interests of the regulated and the beneficiary. This should set the 
agenda for the next section where it vAll be submitted that, given certain 
conditions, economic regulation tend to evolve into antitrust regulation. 
In the history of any economic organization. it is typical that economic 
relationships and transactions have been characterised by the orthodox roles of 
the 'producers' and 'purchasers. 49 While some of the interests of the producers 
will match those of the purchasers, it is also common that there will be 
considerable conflict. As a general submission, the primary aim of producers is 
to maximise their profits and how they achieve that is a matter of detail.. 
Purchasers will tend to have different aims although it is not unfair to assert that 
value for money is a common aim. The economic relationship of the producers 
and purchasers is characterised by the demand and supply formula. Put it 
another way, producers produce what purchasers wish to purchase. Even then, 
Weber has argued in his analysis that the emphasis on production and producers 
has been so fundamentally stated that the significance of purchasers of these 
'products' has been reduced to a group of "alienated purchasers of fetishized 
commodities or simple dupes of advertising and public relations. '150 His analysis 
claims that the neglect has been so pronounced as to deny the authenticity of 
purchaser choice. Notwithstanding that contention, he reasons that there is a 
gradual emergence of a commýitment to individual autonomy and choice in 
consumption which he describes as characteristic of a geselIschaftlicli model of 
social organisation. This need to make a renewed commitment towards 
redressing the imbalance in the producer-purchaser relationship is a reflection of 
the transition towards a liberal democracy. Such a commitment would restore 
the freedom of choice of the purchaser as an elementary right by virtue of his or 
her citizenship. 51 This is also the claim of Lewis who claims that, 
choice is a generic concept which can only attach to basic human 
needs. Those needs are substantially subsumed by the categories 
of fundamental rights which have recommended themselves to 
the world's democracies since at least the end of the Second 
World War. More often than not the expression has been used as 
shorthand for a conviction in the superiority of economic 
markets .... 
52 
The rationale for gesefischaftlich is simply premised on the belief that the 
individual, or purchaser, is the basic unit of an indefinite plurality of interactions 
in any economic organization. In its widest sense, the decisions of this 
individual hold the balance in the political economy, or more narrowly the 
49 The term 'producers' is used in its global sense to denote 'suppliers', 'providers', 
'sellers' and the like. 'Purchasers'. likeMse is used to include 'consumers'. customers, 
and'users'. 
50 R. Holton and B. Turner. Afar Weber on Economy and Socieýv (Routledge, London: 
19S9). p. 3. 
51 E. La-*Nlor. Individual Choice and Ifther Growth (Europcan Commission, Brussels: 
1989). p. 18 
52 Le%Nis. op. cit., p. 4. 
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industry, although it is a supreme irony that the behaviour of this individual is 
necessarily unpredictable If the ultimate balance of the economy is dependent 
on the ways in which the individual exercises his will. it must follow that the 
existence of producers is in turn dependent first, on the existence of the 
individual, and second, on the final act of the individual. Accordingly, 
producers exist because of purchasers. For this argument to stand, however, it 
needs to make one assumption. The first is that there is more than one 
producer who adopts a 'capital accounting' method suggested by Weber. This 
means that competition is possible through the choice that the purchasers are 
able to make. There is contestability in the sector so that no one producer can 
exploit its market power without inviting the competitive response of. its 
competitors. 
This is important because the notions of competition and contestability provides 
an incentive structure from which all parties seek to ma-ximise their gains or 
interests. This is not to deny that a natural monopoly would not act in the 
interest of the purchasers. Indeed, nationalised industries were often charged 
with the task of meeting the public interest, whatever this meant. Even so, a 
crucial difference between a competitive market and a monopoly or nationalised 
industry is the role of or absence of incentives to ensure that the relevant 
producer is appropriately disciplined to perform the function it has been charged 
with. In the case of a monopoly or nationalised industry, an incentive structure 
may be constructed, for example, the RPI-X formula or some other funding 
formula. In the case of a competitive market, however, where entry is generally 
free, it is submitted that the incentive structure is inherent in the relationship 
between the producer and purchaser. Thus, if the aim of producers was to 
maximise profits perhaps through greater market share, and the aim of 
purchasers was value for money expressed either in cheaper prices, greater 
reliability or higher standards of service, then it becomes incumbent upon the 
producers to produce products or services which are cheaper, more reliable or 
of higher standard if their aim of maximising profits is to be realised. In the end 
analysis, producers will have to compete to attract the custom of new 
purchasers or to maintain the loyalty of existing customers by offering what 
they deem is desired by the new purchasers or existing customers. Since the 
producers are acting or competing to meet the interests of the purchasers, so as 
to maximise their own interests, this mutual space or synthesis of interests is 
known as critical market contestability. 
While critical market contestability may be an inherent characteristic of a 
naturally competitive market, structural problems may require deliberate 
regulatory actions to procure a maximum overlap between producer and 
purchaser interests. The aim here would be to correct the imbalance in the 
producer-purchaser relationship as a result of the structural problems. The 
privatised utility and transport sectors are good examples. An entity previously 
in public ownership, but privatised with the privileges and assets intact, or 
indeed liabilities written-off, will undoubtedly have a leading advantage over 
any of its competitors, who more often than not would be 'starting from 
scratch'. Without the regulatory intervention, a monopoly situation may 
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eventually emerize, as a result of which purchaser interests may be subverted or 
ignored throu-, gli the lack of competitive discipline or incentives 
The stage of critical market contestability is as close as one can ever get to 
perfect competition. This implies that regulation can be pitched at its minimum 
and the approach be described as liberal. Although the liberalisation of 
regulatory controls is comparable to the deregulation of the relevant sector, 
they are not identical; liberalisation confers a substantial degree of economic 
freedom to the regulated, but the possibility of regulatory intervention remains 
so that perhaps severe market failures can be rectified. The presumption is that 
producers will be free to choose what it wishes to produce, the quantity. to 
produce and the price to charge on the belief that regulatory intervention would 
not be necessary because the interests of the producers and purchasers will be 
drawn together by the common aim of satisfying or being satisfied by the other. 
Be that as it may, a minimalist approach to competition regulation does not 
entail that the relevant sector is entirely devoid of the need for other forms of 
regulation. Quite apart from social regulation on matters such as safety and 
environmental protection, liberalisation means the relaxation of only economic 
regulatory controls on the one hand, and deregulation means the abandonment 
of only economic regulatory controls on the other. In both instances, antitrust 
regulation remains important and necessary. To this we now turn. 
Antitrust Regulation 
Antitrust regulation is a system or process of regulating against what may be 
described in generic terms as unfair trading practices. The motives for such 
practices abound, although it is typically the desire to gain additional market 
shares that drives such actions. In traditional classifications, these practices 
include anti-competitive practices such as collusion on prices, abuses of a 
dominant position such as predatory practices aimed at driving out other 
competitors, and mergers between entities such as to jeopardise competition 
through substantially enlarged market shares. Hence, the key rationale of 
antitrust regulation is to prevent such practices which have or are likely to have 
an adverse effect on competition, the second key task of regulation identified by 
Prosser. 53 
This rationale is built on two crucial assumptions. 54The first is that a belief in 
competition and competitive solutions forms an explicit part of public policy 
and the prevailing thinking on economic organisation. The justification here is 
to promote and protect the ideals of choice and opportunities in competition. 
The second assumption is that conditions of sustainable competition has been 
established either throuoh the natural process of the market place or through 
deliberate regulatory actions to procure such conditions. A useful illustration of 
a competitive sector arising from the natural process of the market place is the 
53 TProsser. Law and the Rezzdators (Clarendon. Oxford: 1997). p. 5. 
54 It is entirely possible for antitrust rcg-ulation to have non-econon-dc goals. for 
example the intcogration of the European single market or, for example, the 
protection of small business. 
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double-elazin, -, business for doors and windows A firm. X. identifies a demand in the market for building insulation and energy conservation. There is no 
regulation of entry, except perhaps on the standards of glass or materials used in 
accordance with the safety standards of the British Standards Institute, The 
absence of such entry controls thus enables another firm. Y. to compete with X. 
The competitive market arises as a result of some ingenious or innovative 
product developed by the competitor. Here, antitrust regulation becomes an 
important issue since it may be necessary to ensure that X, through the 
advantage it has gained from established clientele and marketing strength, does 
not engage in activities that would adversely affiect Y. Indeed, it becomes an 
important policing process to ensure that X and Y do not merge their 
operations to become a monopoly, and if they are permitted, guarantees or 
undertakings are extracted from them to ensure that their operations do not 
adversely affect competition in the sector. It is possible that economic 
regulation may be introduced on some public interest grounds to deal with 
these shortcomings, but it must be submitted that if no structural problems are 
present to affect entry, pricing and capacity, then it should be avoided. The 
point has already been made that economic regulation is a second best 
enterprise that should only be contemplated where competitive solutions cannot 
otherwise be achieved. 
Not every economic sector is necessarily competitive as a result of the natural 
market process. Certain sectors may have achieved the conditions of sustainable 
competition through the deliberate actions of an economic regulator, though it 
is entirely possible that the sector was once the result of the natural market 
process before economic regulation of some form was imposed by virtue of 
certain public policy objectives. The air transport sector is one good example of 
this development as the following chapter will reveal. The major difficulty of 
this second assumption is clearly defining the conditions of sustainable 
competition and when this has been achieved through the process of economic 
regulation. This task is particularly acute where there continues to be unique 
structural problems. The scarcity of airport slots for the taking-off and landing 
of aircraft, and the historical endowment which remained intact when BA was 
exposed to competition from other airlines, are two of numerous characteristics 
of a structurally imbalanced sector. More often than not, economic regulation 
continues to be necessary and operates alongside a framework of antitrust 
regulation. These problems may or may not be solved which will in turn 
determine the extent to which econon-dc regulation can be liberalised or, in the 
extreme, completely abandoned. Suffice it to say, however, that in general the 
conditions of sustainable competition would have been achieved where 
economic regulation has reached the stage of critical market contestability. This 
is the hypothesis on which the present work will proceed. 55 
55 Prosscr has argued that regulation encapsulates three fundamental tasks. the second 
of which is regulation for competition. to create competition and to ensure that it 
continues to c. xist: Lcnv anti Regulators. op. di. He does not. however, attempt to say 
whether the role of creating competition can be rationally abandoned once the 
conditions for sustainable competition have been created. so that the second task of 
regulation becomes confined to ensuring, the continuity of these. that is antitrust 
regulation. This thesis will argue that the second task of regulation can evolve from 
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It should be added that it is equally possible that the %vork of antitrust regulation 
may be performed by the same body or agency through the mechanisms of 
economic regulation. This may be seen in the case of an economic regulator 
deciding to vary the conditions of the licence awarded to the licensee on the 
ground that the latter was engaging or proposing in unfair trading practices. The 
aim and effect would be much the same, as if it was proposed under antitrust 
laws. The CAA, OFTEL and the Federal Trade Commission in the US are 
useful illustrations. 
Securing the conditions of sustainable competition is not an end in itscM by 
implication, neither is the task of antitrust regulation. Both arc simply the mean's 
for securing the realisation of a set of objectives agreed in advance. These may 
be to promote the interests of the producers, or by contrast, the interests of the 
purchasers expressed in terms of their reasonable expectations. It is therefore 
imperative that the philosophy of antitrust regulation matches the aim or aims to 
be secured. It is also to ensure that, where the conditions of sustainable 
competition were brought about by economic regulatory actions, that work is 
not destroyed. This is especially relevant in sectors such as air transport where a 
major aim of economic regulation is to deal with the structural problems of the 
sector and their ramifications for competition. The approach to antitrust 
regulation may be based on a philosophy of liberal or rigorous enforcement 
depending on which is most suited to the circumstances, though it is evident 
that an economic sector 'with unique structural problems usually requires an 
austere approach to enforcement to ensure that the propensities of the sector do 
not lead to a situation which both economic and antitrust regulation were 
designed to prevent. Indeed, to store up for later development, the liberalisation 
of air transport within the EC has presented a long list of questions on the 
adequacy of the antitrust machinery to deal with some persistent structural 
problems, as well as questions on the absence of taking possible economic 
regulatory actions except in very specific circumstances. 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by postulating two models of economic organization: 
collectivist and free-market. A collectivist model was presented as a system 
where central planning, of the economy dominated; monopolies were the 
preferred institutional form for the various economic sectors. A free-market 
model on the other hand was characterised by the notion of perfect competition 
where formal regulatory actions were virtually absent. It was contested that 
since perfect competition was not a concept open to a precise definition, a 
variant had to be constructed to establish a basis upon which the rest of the 
work can be built. This was the theory of market contestability. It was also 
argued that under this model of economic orientation, a greater emphasis was 
put on choice as a tool of empowerment. It would facilitate the process of 
creating to policing competition Miere there are no structural barriers for creating 
the conditions of sustainablc competition. 
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renewing the commitment to purchaser interests, a characteristic of the n 
gesell5clicifilich model of social organisation. 
It is clear, however, that whichever model of economic organisation is more 
suited must necessarily depend on the political, economic, social and 
constitutional conditions. It is simply an impossible task to convert one 
particular form of orientation into another without having regard to these 
culturally-specific factors. Be that as it may, most models of economic 
organisation in the modern state combine the characteristics of these extreme, 
traditional positions. For the purposes of this thesis, the model adopted was 
regulated competition. A crucial assumption of this model is the belief that 
market problems would be determined in the first instance by competitivý 
solutions and regulatory intervention to correct market failures would arise only 
when the need was evident - the minimalist approach. In particular, this would 
be aimed at correcting the imbalance in the producer-purchaser relationship. 
Competition regulation, it was submitted, is almost always a second best 
enterprise and at any rate a public act of management. In this respect, 
accountability for any regulatory actions becomes an important part of the legal 
analysis. Moreover, in order to appraise the issue of accountability, the 
rationales for competition regulation must be understood, and to that end, the 
works of Anthony Ogus, Christopher Foster, Stephen Breyer and Tony Prosser 
were an important source of reference. Much of what they have submitted on 
the rationales for economic regulation point to the correction of market or 
competition failures, whether the lack or excess of it. 
A leading theme of this thesis is the evolution of economic regulation into 
antitrust regulation in the process of competition regulation. The nature of both 
were examined, and it bears repeating that they are by no means mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, it was submitted that in most major economic 
sectors, it is imperative to have economic regulation alongside antitrust 
regulation, and vice iersa, if the public policy aims of competition are to be 
realised. This is so because of the assumption that economic regulation can only 
be liberalised or abandoned when the conditions of sustainable competition has 
been secured. This was described as critical market contestability. The appraisal 
of these theoretical assumptions in competition regulation will form the basis 
upon which the empirical evidence in subsequent chapters can be examined to 
lend support to the contentions of this thesis. 
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CHAPTERTHREE THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE 
REGULATION: 
SEARCHING FOR A DESTINY 
The present institutional structure for regulating air transport competition has 
not come about overnight. It has evolved from the birth of the industry. The 
purpose of this chapter is to chart the development of competition regulation in 
respect of air transport in the UK. Regulation of aviation, in the broader sensý 
of the word, however, appeared much earlier than economýic regulation. The 
concern at the beginning of the century was attributed to the concept of national 
defence (which still prevails today), and hence the control over all forms of air 
navigation, there was little surprise in the emphasis placed on the military aspect 
of aviation regulation in the light of the First World War. But as shall be noted 
below, the emergence of economic regulation followed not too long after the 
end of the War. And thus the regulation of aviation in the UK assumed a two- 
fold dimension: n-fflitary and commercial. 
Little distinction could be drawn between the two at the outset which meant 
that a separate regulatory framework for each would have been unjustified. The 
division of responsibility was nevertheless due at some future point to reflect the 
expansion in commercial aviation although the economic regulation of civil 
aviation at the beginning was no more than patchy with frequent transfers of 
that responsibility between institutions. Yet, these transfers and the creation of 
new institutions for that purpose were often not accompanied by consistent 
reasoning to support the exercise. In spite of that, a common theme was 
detectable: the prima facie case that economic regulation of air transport was 
indispensable. This historical analysis will address the latter point further by 
examining how economic regulation of air transport first became necessary and 
how subsequent developments made it difficulty to dismantle a system once 
installed. 
The history of regulating air transport competition in the UK can be examined 
in seven sections encapsulating the land-mark developments between the years 
of 19 10 to 1993. 
1910 to 1924: The introduction of the first commercial air service and the 
subsequent emergence of other operators to mark the birth of a 
new industry. 
1924 to 1946: A number of mergers were effected to re-organise the industry 
which resulted principally in the creation of Imperial Airways 
Ltd, British Airways Ltd, and British Overseas Air Corporation. 
1944: At the instigation of the UK, and with the support of the US 
Government, a conference was held in Chicago from which came 
the International Civil Aviation Convention. also known as the 
Chicago Convention. 
1946 to 1960: The civil aviation industry was taken into public ownership with 
the nationalisation statute of 1946, with the notion of regulated 
competition by licensing emerging by 1960. 
1960 to 1971: A framework of licensing was established which was to become 
the responsibility of an independent authority. 
From 1971: The licensing system was reformed and a new regulatory propess 
was set in motion. Subject to the changes under European 
Community law on air transport, it is the form of economic 
regulation which exists today. 
From 1987: The arrival of EC law on air transport liberalisation and 
regulation. 
The Pioneering Years to 1924 
The first commercial air service was an airmail flight from Blackpool to 
Southport on the 10th of August 1910, provided by Holt Thomas and Graham- 
White. Regular air services, however, did not appear until after the First World 
War when in 1919 AN. Roe and Company Ltd undertook the first passenger 
service between Manchester, Southport, and Blackpool. This was followed 
subsequently by the air services of Bournemouth Aviation Company for travel 
between Bournemouth and Cricklewood in London. But it was not until 
August of the same year when another land-mark in civil aviation was made by 
Holt Thomas for the first regular international service between London and 
Paris, and it was this development which moulded the civil aviation industry in 
the UK, and indeed the world. I 
This international service provided by Aircraft Transport and Travel Ltd 
(AMT) was unsubsidised by the Government. With the introduction of air 
services on the same route by the French Compagnie des IvIessageries Aeriennes 
in September that year, 2 that meant AT&T had to compete with the French 
Company for revenue from services. But the position was distorted by the 
heavy subsidy given to the French carrier by its Government. Despite the 
introduction of fUrther services from London to Amsterdam and Brussels, the 
Government showed little interest in civil aviation. The concern at that time 
was very much with the defence and safety of the realm, and this was evident 
from the emphasis of the Aerial Navigation Acts of 1911 and 1913. Although 
the 1911 Act empowered the Secretary of State for Air to prohibit the 
navigation of all aircraft over prescribed areas for the protection of the public by 
A more detailed analysis is pro%ided in the comparative Nvork of D. Corbett. Politics 
'16-32. and the Airlines (Allen & Umin, London: 1965). pp.. 
2 Ibid. 
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issuing an order, the legislation -, vas rooted in the military aspect of aviation 
rather than commercial. As a result of this policy orientation, the Government 
was therefore unperturbed by the competition in commercial air service between 
AT&T and the French carrier 
Immediately following the introduction of the French services, another 
unsubsidised passenger, mail and freight service was commenced between 
Cricklewood in London and Paris by Handley Page Transport Ltd, which was 
to play an equally instrumental role in the subsequent development of British 
civil aviation. Like AT&T, it went on to develop services between London and 
Amsterdam, and Brussels. In October 1919, Instone Air Line Company. Ltd 
was conceived and began commercial air services between London and Paris. 
Given the popularity of the London-Paris route, another airline company, Air 
Post of Banks plunged into the civil aviation market to compete for a share of 
the revenue fTom services on that route. 3 
Competition between unsubsidised and subsidised air services was potentially 
unsustainable, and this was proven so when the unsubsidised services of AT&T, 
Handley Page Transport and Instone Air Line ran into severe economic 
difficulties. Subsidised air services could be provided at below the rate of 
return whilst unsubsidised undertakings had to justify its existence by making a 
positive rate of return. In spite of these difficulties, the Government remained 
impervious to the desperate economic conditions, preferring to adhere to its "fly 
by themselves" policy. The closest to any interest which the Government had 
shown in the matter was represented by the reconunendation of an Advisory 
Committee set up by the Secretary of State for Air, Winston Churchill, that 
these airlines should be given governmental assistance in the form of subsidies 
to compete with their rivals; but that was to fall on deaf ears as the Secretary of 
State insisted that they should not be seeking subsidies. As R. E. G. Davies 
described, this was "one of the most short-sighted decisions this great statesman 
was to make". 4 The state of helplessness led to further financial difficulties, and 
AT&T, Handley Page Transport and Instone Air Line were driven to withdraw 
the services in 1921 which they had been proNiding in the face of direct 
competition with heavily subsidised services. The collapse of the British civil 
aviation became a contemplated prospect. 
This prompted the constitution of a committee under the chairmanship of Lord 
Londonderry which recommended a temporary scheme of subsidy to air 
services to restore the plight of British civil aviation. Handley Page Transport 
and Instone Air Line availed themselves to the assistance for services on the 
London-Paris route, whereas AT&T had by then ceased operating. These 
subsidies from the Government also represented an attraction for other airline 
operators who were previously fearful of the distorted competition between 
subsidised and unsubsidised services. Daimler I-Ere Ltd. began to fly the 
London-Paris route while British Marine Air Navigation (BNLAN) was 
3 Memorandum of the Air Ministry to the Cadman Committee of Inquiry into Civil 
Aviation. (Cmnd. 5685.1938). Appendix B. Secinfra. 
4 R. E. G. Davics.. I Hisloty of Me World's. -Urfines (OUP. London: 1964). p. 17. 
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subsidised for services to the Channel Islands and Cherbourg in France. The 
scheme of subsidies was, however, lacking in direction. Three airline companies 
were subsidised for services which were virtually identical in character and 
which operated on the same route. It was not long before the Government 
realised that this arrangement was highly uneconomical since competition was 
unnecessarily duplicated between British airline companies in receipt of 
Government subsidies. New service agreements were therefore entered into 
with Handley Page Transport for the provision of services from London to 
Paris, with Instone Air Line on the London-Brussels and London-Cologne 
routes, with Daimler Hire on the Nlanchester-London-Amsterdam-Hamburg- 
Berlin route, and with BNIAN on the S out hampton-C herbou rg-Havre-Chaýnel 
Islands route. 5 The die was cast. 
These arrangements, although spurred on by unfortunate developments, marked 
the turning point for British civil aviation. Government involvement in the 
industry on a wider scale was clearly becoming imperative since the provision of 
subsidies inevitably required the imposition of conditions and control either 
directly through a Government department or indirectly through an 
administrative body. Re-organising the provision of European air transport 
services to avoid the duplication of services was a step forward to establish an 
integrated air transport network that would protect not only the public interest, 
but also the wider economic interests of the nation. The temporary collapse of 
the industry in February 1921 Wowing the defeat by French airline companies, 
albeit a blessing in disguise, put Britain behind other countries in the likes of the 
United States, Germany and The Netherlands which had or were beginning to 
enter the world of civil aviation. In order, therefore, to ensure that no further 
time was lost, and that the UK was able to provide sustained competition 
against these new competitors, the Government had to intervene to provide 
assistance to British airfine companies. 
The re-distribution of services between Handley Page Transport, Instone Air 
Line, Daimler Ere and BNLkN was, however, far from satisfactory. In January 
1923, the Secretary of State for Air constituted a committee to investigate into 
the operation of the subsidy scheme and to recommend on the future shape of 
the scheme. This committee came to be known as the Hambling Committee 
which recommendations were responsible for the first of a series of 
amalgamation of British airline companies. 
The Amalgamated Years 1924-1946 
Imperial Airways: A Chosen Instrument 
The Report of the Hambling Conunittee attributed the difficulties experienced 
by British airline companies chiefly to the heavily subsidised form of 
competition provided by the French Government to its airlines. By implication, 
however, that observation reflected on the lack of assistance on the part of the 
Supra. n. 3. 
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British Government in respect of its airlines, The Committee went on to state 
that 
commercial civil aviation has, in fact, made little progress 
towards being able to "fly by itself' without financial assistance 
from the Government, 6 
This view underlined the recommendations first made by the Advisory 
Committee to the Secretary of State for Air on the need to subsidise the airlines, 
a view which was also taken up by the Londonderry Committee which led to 
the temporary subsidy scheme. On the strength of these recommendations for 
governmental involvement, it would have been a perverse decision if the 
industry was further neglected. The Goverm-nent had to become involved and 
the view of the Hambling Committee of this role was to set in place a monoýoly 
by creating a new "Corporation or Company administered under Government 
control, but of a commercial organisation run entirely on business lines with a 
privileged position with regard to air transport services". 7 It found that the 
subsidy scheme in operation then provided little incentives for the subsidised 
companies to seek improvements and to provide services beyond the level 
agreed. To avoid this difficulty, it recommended that subsidies to the new 
Corporation or Company had to be accompanied by the condition of "requiring 
the Company to perform services in connection with the operation and 
development of commercial air transport. " 
Although the new Company was to be run on commercial lines, the Committee 
highlighted that the Government would need to maintain a degree of control 
over the Company through the appointment of Directors and "for the purpose 
of such checking as may be necessary to determine the amount of subsidy 
payable [and] for such control as may from time to time be exercised by the 
Government through the Civil Aviation Department over all civil flying in the 
country. " The provision for appointing Directors of the Company provided the 
Government with a strategic tool to implement its civil aviation policy which 
had been lacking previously. The advantage was two-fold: on the one hand, the 
Government would continue to exercise control over the military aspects of 
aviation by directing the Company through the Directors when necessary, and 
on the other hand, to control the general direction of the civil aviation industry. 
A new Company in the form of Imperial Airways Ltd was eventually created in 
1924 by the Government in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Hambling Committee. Imperial Airways was an amalgamation of the four 
airline companies: Handley Page Transport, Instone Air Line, Daimler Hire and 
BMAN. The new Company was to operate air services as a "chosen 
instrument" of Government policy. 10 The services provided by Imperial 
Airways initially emphasised on European services, but in 1926, there was a 
marked shift in policy over the emphasis of services provided by Imperial 
6 Government Financial Assistance to Civil Air Transport Companies (CmncL IS 11. 
1923). para. 27. 
7 Para. 4 1. 
8 Para. 44(c). 
9 Para. 44(d). 
I Specific responsibility for civil a%iation Nias to be vested in the Air Ministry. 
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Airways, The new airline company %vas to be given a new direction and to 
focus its services on routes within the British empire Tills was evident from the 
level of subsidies given to the airline for European and Empire services, In 
1926, the subsidy for European services was L137,000 while 130,000 was 
provided for Empire services. By 1930, the amount of subsidy for the former 
had declined to L 125,000 while the subsidy for Empire services had increased to 
1303,000. The stark difference appeared in the subsidies for 1935 where 
European services were provided with 180,000 while those on the Empire 
routes received 050,000 1' Nevertheless, Imperial Airways was to dominate 
British civil aviation up to 1935 when yet another land-mark in British civil 
aviation was recorded. 
British Airways: A Second Chosen Instrument 
Being the sole British carrier of passengers, mail and freight, it soon became 
clear that the magnitude of the task to be undertaken by Imperial Airways was 
proving difficult. Furthermore, with the limitation of finance as a result of the 
recommendations of the May Committee on National Expenditure in 1931,12 
the Air Nfinistry and Imperial Airways were restricted in making further 
commitments, particularly in respect of European services where competition 
was increasing from heavily subsidised airline companies. 
At about the same time, a number of companies were attempting to introduce 
unsubsidised passenger and freight services, the most significant and ambitious 
was perhaps Milman Airways Ltd. In 1935, the Government set up a Standing 
Inter-Departmental Committee on International Air Communications, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Warren Fisher. One of its first tasks was to consider the 
state of affairs relating to European air services. The Standing Committee 
recommended to the Government that the situation no longer justified the 
provision of subsidies exclusively to Imperial Airways on European services. 
Instead, the government should be giving subsidies to other airline companies 
for a more effective use of the subsidies since Imperial Airways was 
experiencing difficulties in meeting its tasks. Partly on the basis of this 
recommendation, and partly on the enthusiasm of the Air Ministry for a second 
British carrier to provide European services, 11illman Airways amalgamated 
with United Airways Ltd, Spartan Air Lines Ltd, British Continental Airways 
Ltd, and named themselves British Airways Ltd (BA). 
With the support of the Air Ministry and the circumstances prevailing at that 
time in relation to European services, it was not difficult for BA to gain favour 
with the Government. In addition, it possessed sufficient "elements of air 
operating experience, coupled with business and financial experience". " A 
combination of these factors led to BA becoming the second "chosen 
instrument" of Government policy on civil aviation. Although BA was seen as a 
potential competitor to Imperial Airways, little competition existed between 
them. BA was required by the Air Ministry to operate services on routes which 
11 Memorandum of Air Ministry to the Cadman Committee. supra. n. 3. 
12 (Cmnd. 3920.193 1). 
13 Memorandum of Air Ministry to the Cadman Committee. supra. n. 3. 
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Imperial Airways had found difficult to do so, and at any rate, BA was only 
concerned with European services at that time while the policy shift since 1926 
focused the services of Imperial Airways on Empire routes. Any competition 
that existed between them was limited to such indirect competition for the 
provision of new monopoly services and hence Government subsidy. But there 
was no direct competition between them on a same route which the Hambling 
Committee had suggested in 1924 as wasteful competition. 
In spite of all these efforts to re-organise the civil aviation industry either on a 
competitive or non-competitive basis, the situation was not as favourable as it 
could have been. Competition from European airlines posed the single nýost 
serious threat to the success of British airline companies, as they were given an 
upper-hand by generous subsidies from their respective Governments. In its 
memorandum to the Cadman Committee, the Air Nfinistry observed that, 
If British services are to secure an equal footing within the 
already closely knit Continental air system, the Government is 
still faced with the position resulting from the heavy subsidies 
which foreign Governments grant to their national companies. 
Taking every mitigating factor into account, it seems unlikely 
that the remedy for this situation could be found without a 
substantial increase in Government subsidies. 14 
Air Transport Licensing Authority: A Glimpse of Licensing 
In the meantime, an important legislative development was taking place. The 
Govermnent enacted the Air Navigation Act 1936 to make several amendments 
relating to civil aviation in particular the payment of subsidies and the 
appointment by the Secretary of State of one or more directors of the airline 
company receiving subsidy. 15 For present purposes, the notable feature of the 
statute was the provision for the making of an Order in Council prohibiting any 
carriage of passengers or goods by air for hire or reward unless a licence had 
been granted by the licensing authority. 16 The Under-Secretary of State for Air 
explained that the section provided for "the setting up (as and when 
circumstances require it) of a licensing system in respect of air transport 
services, as distinct from the licensing of flying personnel and the certification of 
aircraft as airworthy. 1117 It also set out the circumstances to which the licensing 
authority must have regard in granting, refusing, revoking or suspending a 
licence to carry passengers or goods by air for reward. The decision of the 
authority could be challenged through an appellate process to the Secretary of 
State. Where a licence was granted, the licensing authority was empowered to 
attach conditions to it. The power to create this licensing authority was, 
however, not exercised until two years later following the report of the 
Maybury Committee in 1937. 
14 Ibid. 
15 S. I (I) and (3). 
16 S. 5(l). Thiswas later rc-enacted as s. 7 of the Civil A,. iation Act 1949. 
17 H. C. Debs. 3 10. col. 1700 (3 )0 March 1936). 
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The %Ilaybury Committee was set up in 19336 to inquire into the development of 
domestic civil aviation within the UK. "' The Committee considered itself 
"forced to the conclusion that if air transport is to become fully self-supporting, 
it is a pre-requisite that cut-throat competition must be eliminated and that some 
measure of restriction must be applied to avoid indiscriminate multiplication of 
services. "19 The way in which the measure of restriction might be achieved was 
by instituting "a provisional regulation of selected route" under the provisions of 
the Air Navigation Act 1936.20 
The following year, another Committee of Inquiry was constituted by the 
Government to look into the state of British civil aviation following a detailed 
debate in the House of Commons. The Committee, which came to be known as 
the Cadman Committee, was not given any official terms of reference by the 
Government, but the Under-Secretary of State for Air stated in the course of 
the debate that, 
In view of the specific allegations that have been made, the 
Secretary of State will, in fairness to both sides, set up a 
Departmental inquiry into the charges of inefficiency made 
during the Debate ... There will be no inquiry into matters already dealt with very recently by the Maybury Committee, the 
Government's decisions on which were announced to and 
approved by the House. 21 
When the constitution of the Committee was announced, its scope of inquiry 
was expanded by a further statement from the Under-Secretary of State. 
[My Noble Friend] would, therefore, welcome the Committee 
dealing with questions not specifically raised in the Debate, 
provided that they had not already been settled by existing 
Cabinet decisions. 22 
The Committee therefore interpreted its terms of reference as including the 
charges of inefficiency in the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways, the present 
state of British civil aviation, the system of industrial relations within Imperial 
Airways, and other matters not raised during the debate. Findings of the inquiry 
led to a highly scathing report of the organisation and management of the civil 
aviation industry and in particular the incoherence of governmental policy and 
direction. 23 It observed that if the creation of Imperial Airways in 1924 was a 
necessary response the Goverrmient had to make "to secure the establishment 
and progressive development of British air services in Europe", 24 having then 
created and vested it with monopoly rights, little, if anything, was done 
subsequently to encourage the development of British civil aviation by taking 
advantage of the progress that was being made in civil aviation and other 
18 Maybury Conunittee. The Development of Civil Aviation in the 1-nited Kingelon, 
(Cmnd. 5351.1937). 
19 Para. 125. 
20 Paras. Iý '16-7. 
21 H. C. Debs. 329. col. 479 (17 November 1937). 
22 H. C. Debs. 329. col. 1218 (24 November 1937). 
23 Cadman Committee. Committee of lnquiýv into Ovil. 4 viation (Cmnd. 5685.1938). 
24 Para. 13. 
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cognate areas. Nor was there a well-thought through policy that would map 
out the future shape of the industry. 25 The Committee stated. 
If,. thc Government desire this country to take a leading place in 
civil aviation, much reorganisation and additional expenditure of 
public money will be necessary. 26 
In addition, it emphasised that the Government would need to play a more 
active role in developing the industry rather than adopting an attitude of 
indifference to commercial aviation which led to the painful collapse of the 
industry in 1921. This, it recommended, could be achieved by 
initiating policy, taking a forward view, considering the 
international implications of civil aviation, promoting the 
establishment of airlines and civil flying, stimulating the 
development and production of aircraft, conducting the 
necessary international and inter-Imperial negotiations, and 
exercising such control as will safeguard the public. 27 
This recommendation represented a very comprehensive role for the 
Government in relation to civil aviation which was then very much alien to the 
practices of the Government in this sector previously. 
These two reports were published amidst a torrent of criticisms against Imperial 
Airways from a number of quarters, particularly in respect of its system of 
management. One specific aspect of its management which the Cadman 
Committee found highly unsatisfactory was its relationship with the Air 
Ministry. There was a lack of communication and co-operation between the 
two sides. 28 It also found that a part-time chairman in Imperial Airways was 
not justified given the importance of the airline and the magnitude of the task 
that it was undertaking. 29 
The Committee found further that the system of industrial relations within 
Imperial Airways was open to criticisms and this was particularly true in the 
context of its approach to collective representation over employment matterS. 30 
Perhaps the most vulnerable aspect of Imperial Airways opened to attack was 
the level of director fees and shareholder dividends it had been paying. The 
Cadman Committee found that in 1937 "Imperial Airways not only cut the 
salaries of its pilots [threatening a strike], but increased its dividend from 8 per 
cent to 9 per cent, and more or less doubled its Directors' fees. "31 
In the light of these criticisms and recommendations of both the Maybury and 
Cadman Committees, the Government took steps to address them which 
resulted in two important developments. First, as the Maybury Committee had 
already recommended, the Government enacted a system of licensing regular 
25 Paras. 14-16. 
26 Para. 7. 
27 Para. 17(a). 
28 Para. 46. 
29 Paras. 46-7. Sir Eric Geddes was the chairman of Imperial Ainvays at the time. and 
he also held the chairmansMp of Dunlop Rubber Company. 
30 Paras. 103-5. 
31 Para. 107. 
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services in November 193 )8 by setting up the Air Transport Licensing Authority 
(ATLA) 3. The new licensing authority would operate as an independent 
tribunal responsible for the licensing of air transport services. Little public 
debate was entered into for the creation of the ATLA notwithstanding the 
Special Orders Committee of the House of Lords report that the Draft Order 
establishing the ATLA raised important questions of policy and principles which 
were unprecedented. 33 But the absence of lengthy debates was no surprise 
since the ATLA represented an overdue measure, and which happily was also in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Maybury Committee for the 
rationalisation of air transport services. 
I The exercise of its powers to license proposed air transport services requireO 
the ATLA to consider the matters which the Order had specifically laid down. 
Generally, it was to have regard to the overall development of British civil 
aviation such that the most effective and efficient air services may be provided 
for the public. The Order also required the ATLA to have a special regard to a 
number of more specific matters including, for example, existing air services in 
the light of the proposed service, degree of efficiency and regularity of existing 
services, financial competence of applicant, and objections or representations 
made in respect of the application. 34 
The advent of the Second World War proved fatal to the fate of the ATLA and 
the experimental licensing system. As would be expected, in times of war or 
emergency, the Government would acquire the control of all navigational 
activities whether military or commercial for the safety of the realm. In a way, 
there was no surprise that the ATLA was ushered to the side. As conditions 
returned to normal, commercial air transport services resumed, but the ATLA 
did not. The experiences of the War in relation to civil aviation and the political 
complexion of the succeeding Government clearly suggested that the ATLA 
was no longer required. 35 
British Overseas Air Corporation: A Monopoly 
A second development which took place was the amalgamation of Imperial 
Airways with British Airways creating the British Overseas Air Corporation 
(BOAC) based in large measure on the Cadman Report. 36 BOAC was to be a 
publicly-owned corporation which meant exclusive Government control. Its 
terms of reference was to secure the fullest development consistent with the 
economy and efficiency of overseas air transport services rather than to require 
it to achieve a self-supporting status, as was required of Imperial Airways. It 
was duly recognised that "in no country in the world today is aviation within 
measurable distance of paying for itself "37 The creation of BOAC was the 
first, but important, step towards the nationalisation of the civil aviation 
32 Air. Vcwigation (Licensing ofPublic Transport) Order 1938. SI 1938/613. 
33 H. L. Debs. 109. col. 458 (24 May 1938). 
34 Art. 11. 
35 Air XmIgation (Licensing q tf Public Transport) Order 1938 (Revocation) Order 
1939. SI 1939/1588. 
36 British Overseas Air Corporation Act 1939. 
37 H. C. Debs. 349. col. 1833 (19 JuIv 1939). 
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industry It is worth noting that the amalgamation was initiated by a 
Conservative Government, and this measure would seem to represent a 
significant departure from its political ideology on private enterprises and 
competitiveness. But it is submitted that the importance of civil aviation as a 
strategic national tool posed too great an asset to be sacrificed on the altar of 
political ideologies. The importance attached to civil aviation was also apparent 
in a departmental organisation of 1945 where the functions of the Secretary of 
State for Air and Air Ministry were transferred to the newly created Minister of 
Civil Aviation. 38 The statute creating the new Ministry charged the Minister 
with "the general duty of organizing, carrying out and encouraging measures for 
the development of civil aviation, the designing, development and production of 
civil aircraft, for the promotion of safety and efficiency- and for research 'into 
questions relating to air navigation. "39 This legislation, however, was not 
enacted until after the Second World War which had severely disrupted the 
progress of British civil aviation, and indeed international civil aviation. 
Nevertheless, suffice it to say here that the discussion so far is illustrative of the 
constant re-organisation and adaptations to reflect new developments or the 
findings of Conunittees of Inquiry given what is arguably a short period of time 
since air transport services were regularised. Inherent in these re-organisations, 
however, was the point made earlier on the inevitability of Government 
involvement. 
A Land-mark Intervention: Chicago Convention 1944 
While efforts were being consolidated to develop a more coherent policy 
framework for British civil aviation, a parallel development was taking place in 
relation to international civil aviation: the Chicago Conference of 1944. This 
development is worthy of a brief note here given the instrumental role of the 
UK which also indicated the changing attitude of her Government towards civil 
aviation. The Chicago Conference was convened at the instigation of the UK 
with support coming from the US in response to post-war civil aviation. It was 
felt at the time that international commercial aviation was advancing at a very 
rapid speed and for the prevention of aviation accidents, an international effort 
to lay down safety standards had to be made to avoid them. The increase in 
international civil aviation activities was very much due to the surplus aircraft 
that was available after the War and which were put to commercial use. 
Although no multilateral agreement was achieved at Chicago in the context of 
economic regulation, the end-result, which was the International Civil Aviation 
Convention, represented a highly important document for the future of civil 
aviation as a whole. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
which has its permanent seat in Montreal, Canada, was constituted under the 
Convention. 40 
38 Nlinister of Civil Aviation Act 1945. 
39 
40 A more detailed account of the ICAO and the provisions of the Chicago Convention 
is inappropriate here. but see B. Cheng. The Law of International Air Transport 
(Stevens. London: 1962). More of the issues raised by the international air transport 
system and airline competition are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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The involvement of the LTK leading, to the Chicago Convention marked an 
obvious shift in the interest of the UK Government in civil aviation. It was a 
safe assumption to make that the importance of the industry was being 
recognised by the Government increasingly, and in particular, it was essential, as 
the Cadman Committee had advocated. for the UK "to take a leading place in 
civil aviation". 41 
The Nationalised Years 1946-1960 
The first step towards the nationalisation of British civil aviation was takeii ill 
1939 when the Conservative Government amalgamated Imperial Airways and 
British Airways. The principal reason for doing so was financial and related in 
particular to the criticisms against the airlines for the high levels of director fees 
and dividends, as the Cadman Committee had noted. Sir Kingsley Wood, the 
then Secretary of State for Air remarked, 
Another important aspect of the financial side of the matter was 
referred to by the Cadman Committee, who expressed the 
opinion that the subsidies granted to air transport companies 
should not be used for raising dividends to undue levelS. 42 
In addition, Wood referred to the inherent economic difficulties of operating air 
transport services. Profit margins were either low or non-existent especially 
with the stiff competition from foreign airlines which, as before, were heavily 
subsidised by their Govermnents. The Secretary of State explained that by 
merging the two carriers, efforts could be concentrated in one organisation 
rather than a number which, in the past, had led to wasteful competition 
between airlines receiving Government subsidies. Pooling their experience and 
knowledge would also have the advantage of putting national interests first. 
More importantly, by merging the two airlines and bringing them under public 
ownership would, on the one hand, give the Secretary of State important and 
strategic powers over the new Corporation such as the appointment of directors 
of the board and the supervision of its expenditure while at the same time giving 
the management of the Corporation "full independence and freedom of action in 
all day-to-day affairs of the Corporation". 43 
The amalgamation provided a very fertile ground for the Labour Government 
which came into power in 1945 to take the process further by creating a 
publicly-owned monopoly under the terms of the Civil Aviation Act 1946. The 
1946 legislation nationalisedýBOAC and created a monopolistic environment 
not only for BOAC, but also , two new corporations, British European Air 
Corporation (BEAC) and British South American Air Corporation (BSAAC). I 
This measure effectively ended the era of airline competition which had existed 
since Holt Thomas brought about a revolution in travel and communications; 
41 Supra. n. 27. 
42 H. C. Debs. 349. col. 1833 (10 July 1939). 
43 H. C. Debs 349. cols. 1842-1843'(10 July 1939). 
44 S. 1(1) and s. 23. BSAAC was subscquently absorbcd into BOAC: Air Corporations 
Act 1949. 
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consequently, any residual competition would only come from foreign airlines 
-, with one of the corporations on a particular route. competing( 
Given the significance of this nationalisation exercise, it was no surprise that the 
Government had to make a cogent case for its acceptance. During the Second 
Reading debate of the Bill, Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, 
put forward several reasons which he thought justified the cause. First, he 
argued that public ownership provided the advantage of using or ensuring that 
subsidies given will be more purposeful and specific to the task which was not 
readily achieved with pfivately-owned airlines. His speech is worth quoting at 
length here to shed some light on the rationale of this point. 
Public ownership means that the substantial public subsidies 
which will to a greater or lesser extent, and in some way or 
another, go into this great public utility service will, rightly, be 
accompanied by efforts to ensure that the subsidy is adequate but 
not excessive and that it is used in the fight way, for it is far 
easier for the Exchequer to subsidise a public concern and give it 
reasonable elbow room than to do the same thing for a private 
concern. Parliament itself will be more considerate in the 
extension of subsidies to concerns which are conducted in the 
public interest, and not for private profit than they would be in 
putting the subsidies into a private concern. 45 
Inherent in the latter part of his speech was the concession that effective control 
must be maintained over the civil aviation industry rather than leaving it to the 
mercy of the market system which at any rate would lead to wasteful 
competition. It was also implicit in his speech that civil aviation was a "public 
service utility" and therefore had to exist for the benefit of the public instead of 
a small group of private investors and shareholders. In other words, the public 
interest had to be given priority, and to be protected against any potential abuse 
in the market place by privately-owned airlines. 
Secondly, it was argued that public ownership provided the freedom to co- 
ordinate the provision of air transport services in the absence of private sector 
interests. Morrison pointed out that "under comprehensive public ownership 
and public enterprise, we can have sweep and boldness in our civil aviation 
policy. "-16 Morrison also thought that public ownership of the airlines would 
secure a clearer direction in policy decision-making and particularly in providing 
greater accountability for the decisions taken and for the performance of a 
public service utflity function. His third argument for public ownership of the 
airlines, therefore, rested on the case that, 
Parliament can have a more effective say in the general policy 
which should govern our civil aviation policy. If we have a 
series of private concems... Parhament will always be in a 
dilemma in discussing their policies and development ... Under 
this new dispensation, the right dispensation, Parliament will 
have every right to discuss the broad and general policy of civil 
45 H. C. Debs. 422. cols. 602-603 (6 May 1946). 
46 Ibid. col. 603. 
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aviation, and to bring the Ministry of Civil Aviation to book if 
Parliament is not satisfied with what is being done . 47 Two points emerge from this argument. It was clear from what Morrison had 
been arguing that to ensure coherence and structure for British civil aviation, 
the airlines must be directed against the wider background of national economic 
policy. The importance of civil aviation as a contributor to the national 
economy was becoming more obvious and the history of neglect up until then 
could only have been a hard lesson to learn, Its importance related not only to 
the fact of being a public service, but also to the broader role of the UK in the 
international order. The Industrial Revolution gave the UK the leadership of 
the world, and somehow, that dominance, in so far as it related to civil aviati. on, 
had to be re-asserted. According to Morrison, nationalisation was the solutiom 
A second, but related, point arises from his argument for greater control, and 
hence accountability. He argued that privately-owned airlines could not be 
effectively controlled because of the potential conflict of interest, and this 
difficulty would not be readily obviated whatever organisational form the 
control took. 
Morrison argued further that public ownership provided the perceived 
advantage of giving to the employees of the public corporations "a better 
status" than would be the case with privately-owned airlines. 48 And finally, he 
argued that the concept of public ownership would introduce a commercial 
novelty by combining "modern business management with a proper degree of 
public accountability. "49 
The irony of the Second Reading debate was the omýission of any reference to 
the ATLA and its function as a licensing body responsible for approving or 
refusing air transport services prior to this Act. The central thrust of the debate 
focused on the issue of private and public enterprises. Little discussion, if any, 
went into the possibility of delegating to the ATLA the task of implementing 
Government policy on civil aviation through the licensing process. No doubt, 
the need for a licensing authority would be redundant if the airlines were 
publicly-owned, but that does not also detract from the need at least to consider 
the merits of an alternative system which had existed previously. The ATLA 
may have been short-lived, but its abandonment was brought about by the 
unfortunate intervention of the Second World War. At the end of the War, the 
new NEnistry of Civil Aviation was created instead, and under the 
nationalisation statute, a different authority known as the Air Transport 
Advisory Council (ATAC) was also constituted. 
S. 36 of the Civil Aviation Act 1946 made provision for the creation of the 
ATAC50 and required it "to consider any representation ... with respect to the 
adequacy of the facilities provided by any of the three corporations, or with 
respect to the charges for any such facilities. " The ATAC was given the 
47 Ibid. cols. 603-604. 
48 Ibid, col. 604. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The ATAC was brought into being by the Civil Aviation (4ir TransportAaUsory 
Council) Order 1947. SR &0 1947/1224. 
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discretion to refuse the consideration of any representation which appeared to it 
to be frivolous or vexatious, or to be a matter considered previously, or to be a 
matter involving an international agreement between the UK Government and 
another. Its principal role was to represent the public interest in relation to air 
transport services and charges. To that end, the legislation required the ATAC 
to ensure fairness in its proceedings by disqualifying any member of the ATAC 
who had any special interest in the representation. 51 Furthermore, expert 
assessors may be appointed to advise the ATAC on "matters affecting the 
interests of persons who use air transport services, "52 As its name would 
suggest, the ATAC was also under a duty to provide the Minister of Civil 
Aviation with advice on questions that might be referred to it by him on the 
"facilities for transport by air or any part of the world, or relating to the chaiges 
for such facilities" or questions which in the opinion of the Minister required 
consideration with a view to the improvement of air transport services. 53 
Although the role of the ATAC was by no means unimportant, it was merely an 
advisory body whose independent decisions would not necessarily shape the 
civil aviation industry since the responsibility over civil aviation remained with 
the NEnister. During the Second Reading debate of the 1946 Bill, Nfr Alan 
Lennox-Boyd in the Opposition criticised the proposal for an ATAC as a 
"complete illusion". He argued that British civil aviation needed an independent 
body that would have the trappings of a court of law and the responsibility for 
licensing air transport services. A useffil. example, he thought, could be drawn 
from the US. 
[T]here should be an executive council, and organisation similar 
to that in operation in the United States where the Civil 
Aeronautics Board have continued to give competition and 
service within the framework of a general Government 
supervision. We favour an independent tribunal to which any 
independent operator can apply in regard to routes at home or 
overseas. If the tribunal is satisfied that there is inadequate 
service, or no service at the moment, on a particular route and 
the tribunal is also satisfied as to the financial soundness of the 
proposal and the technical ability of the people concerned, they 
would have power to grant a licence to operate over that 
route. 54 
Furthermore, Lennox-Boyd thought the ATAC to be highly deficient in that it 
lacked any authority but would merely function in an advisory capacity. To that 
extent, therefore, British civil aviation would remain completely in the hands of 
politicians. He set out 1ýs argument with the following points. 
The body has no power to alter facilities or fares, however 
inadequate the facilities or excessive the fares. If the tribunal 
really believes that a route should be made by some 
independent operator, or even by one of the Corporations, it 
has no power to insist on this being done ... We hold that the 
51 S. 36(6). 
52 S. 36(5). 
53 S. 36(3). 
54 H. C. Debs. 422. col. 604 (6 May 1946). 
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only real remedy for bad services is the right of the tribunal to 
be able, as in the United States, to license a second operator. 35 
His arguments have been worth quoting at length at this stage because they 
were instrumental to subsequent developments which are considered below. 
Even if they had failed to influence the 1946 legislation, they provided a 
valuable insight for British civil aviation as to what was in store in the not too 
distant future. 
A final note on the nationalisation period is in order here before considering the 
independent licensing body which Lennox-Boyd had forcefully argued for. 
Under the nationalisation statute of 1946, s. 14(4) enabled charter services tQ be 
provided by private independent companies as "associates" of the 
Corporations56 which, by virtue of the exclusive right conferred on the public 
Corporations, were not permitted to operate scheduled services. 17 But these 
private companies were more ambitious than merely providing charter and 
seasonal services. They lobbied the Government for permission to operate 
scheduled services. But if these private airline companies were permitted to 
operate scheduled services, there were difficulties, including legal ones, which 
had to be overcome. First, it would have meant amending or repealing the 1946 
legislation and therefore removing the monopoly of the Corporations. Second, 
still labouring under the fear of wasteful competition from the duplication of 
services, the Government had to find an institutional and procedural means for 
avoiding that. 
It decided to set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Douglas of 
Kirtleside to review the provision of charter services by private airline 
companies and the expansion of their functions to scheduled services. 58 The 
subsequent report, which was not pubfished, made two principal 
recommendations. First, it found that there was a justifiable demand for charter 
services to continue to be provided as scheduled services. This could be 
achieved by requiring the private airline companies to become "associates" of 
the Corporation, namely BEAC (since it was primarily European services which 
attracted the interest of these companies). That being so, the burden that might 
be placed on BEAC would be alleviated to a considerable extent although 
BEAC was still engaged in the expansion of its services. Furthermore, if BEAC 
was asked to meet the demand there would also be an unjustifiable burden on 
the tax-payer. The second recommendation dealt with the procedures for 
operating scheduled services. Applications to operate such senices should be 
made to the ATAC which decision would form the basis of its advice to the 
55 Ibid, col. 623. 56 An "associate" is defined as "any subsidiary of the Corporation, or any undertaldng 
which (a) is constituted for the purpose of pro%idin., air transport scniccs or of 
engaging in any other acthitics of a Idnd which the 
Corporation have power to carry 
on. and (b) is associated with the Corporation under the terms of any agreement 
fýr 
the time being approved by the Minister as being an arrangement calculated to 
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further the efficient discharge of the functions of the 
Corporation. " 
They continued. however. to carry troops. to provide aerial photography scnices and 
58 other 
irregular sen-iccs. 
See H. L. Debs. 157. col. 1117 (21 July 1948). 
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Minister-, to facilitate this process, a directive would need to be issued to the 
ATAC to ensure that its advice was in accordance with the policy of the 
Government. The Minister remain the responsible authority for approving such 
applications. " 
A directive was duly issued to require the Corporations to appoint the private 
airline companies as "associates" under s. t4(4) of the Civil Aviation Act 1946 
to assist them in the performance of their functions. That would, however, be 
restricted to certain classes of services and there was to be no overlap with the 
existing or planned services of the Corporations. Those services were internal 
"ferry" and "cross-country" services including internal seasonal services , 
to 
holiday resorts where no services were being provided by the Corporations or 
where there was an excess demand over the capacity of the Corporations to 
provide these services. It would be an exception for an "associate agreement" 
to be approved for scheduled services other than the above. No subsidies, 
however, would be available to these private companies. In accordance with 
the Douglas recommendation, applications to operate such services would, in 
the first instance, be subn-dtted to the ATAC which would then be required to 
take into account, inter alia, the cost of supplying ground and navigational 
facilities, if not already available. As a matter of practice, it should avoid 
recommendations which would involve new expenditure of this character. In 
addition, it should not recommend the approval of an "associate agreement" 
where it would hamper the planned developments of the Corporation. Other 
powers of the ATAC included the imposition of maximum fares and freight 
rates of services, but in any case, they were not to be less than those charged by 
the Corporations. "Associate agreements" would be approved for a period of 
two years subject to termination by the Minister if safety or other conditions 
were not being met. 
While the permission to enable private airline companies to operate regular 
scheduled services seemed innocuous to the Corporations at first sight, these 
opportunities provided them with the basis to develop more services in pursuit 
of their ambitions which by 1960 had grown into a force to be reckoned with by 
the Corporations. The concept of "associated companies" made an important 
in-road to competition in civil aviation, 60 and in particular, it gave the ATAC a 
new dimension to its role which was to become responsible for the changes 
made in 1960 on the regulation of British civil aviation. 
In 195 1, when the Conservative Government came into power again, Lennox- 
Boyd, who became the Minister of Civil Aviation, seized the opportunity to 
bring his vision outlined in 1946 into reality. I-fis cause was very much driven 
by other prevailing factors at the time. As Baldwin noted, the constraints 
imposed on the private airline companies by "associate agreements" to operate 
services which were not otherwise provided by the Corporations became 
increasingly unjustifiable, and "operators had been hindered in attempts to 
59 H, L. Dcbs. 160. col. 350 (26 January 1949). 
60 Corbc-tt describes the "associate agreements" as "hunting licences" for these private 
airline companies: op. cit.. p. 153, 
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create networks of routes" 1,1 In a succession of ministerial statements given to 
the House of Commons. Lennox-Boyd gradually removed the privilege 
accorded to the Corporations, particularly that of BEAC He stated on May 27, 
1952, 
(W]e seek to improve the position of the independent 
companies, which with few exceptions lack long-term security 
and opportunities of expansion. They cannot establish their 
position if they cannot plan firmly ahead. We therefore intend to 
give them more scope and security ... the 
development of new 
overseas scheduled services shall be open to the Corporations 
and independent companies alike... Associate agreements for new 
routes will normally be granted for seven-year periods with 
extension to ten years in special cases. 62 
This statement clearly constituted a considerable expansion not only with 
respect to the role of the private airlines companies, but also the role of the 
ATAC which would continue to receive applications and "administer a 
procedure on licensing lines". 63 
No more than two months later, Lennox-Boyd made yet another statement of 
policy on the provision of scheduled services by private airline companies. 
[T]he existing international passenger services run by the 
Corporations will be preserved, but the Corporations will no 
longer be protected against competition over what might be 
called their planned routes, but only over their existing routes... it 
is also proposed that in future the Corporations, while preserved 
in their first and tourist class activities, shall have to apply to the 
ATAC for any extension of their services outside this field. On 
all new routes outside their preserved sphere they will be on the 
same terms as private operators. 64 
It is evident from his statements that the monopoly of the Corporations would 
be gradually dismantled, and a greater degree of competition injected into the 
provision of scheduled services. Security would be given to the independent 
airline companies by extending the two-year "associate agreements" to seven- 
year agreements. The class of services were also expanded considerably leaving 
the corporations a residual protection in respect of their existing services. 
These arrangements could only have given the private airline companies more 
encouragement to introduce new services and to make further in-roads into the 
dominance of the Corporations. 
The implications for the ATAC were equally important. It was beginning to 
assume a changing role from what was merely an advisory body to a quasi- 
licensing authority. Increasingly, it was given responsibilities which were not 
envisaged by the founders of the 1946 Act. The changing circumstances and 
the pressing need for more competition had led to two successive policy 
61 R. Baldwin. Regulating the. 4irlines (OUP, Oxford: 1935). p, 22. 
62 H. C. Debs. 50 1. cot. 1152 (27 Mav 1952). 
63 Ibid. 
64 H. C. Dcbs. 503. cols. 2181-2182 (16 July 1952). 
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statements which revised its terms of reference The only question that 
remained was how long before the ATAC would become ovemhelmcd by the 
magnitude of its task. 
The Competition Years 1960-1971 
Air Transport Licensing Board: A Lesson 
For almost eight years, the ATAC was left to its own devices without any 
substantial interventions by the Government, but it was becoming clear from the 
developments which were taking place vis-d-vis the role of the private airline 
companies and the expanded role of the ATAC that British civil aviation was 
heading in a new direction. Not only had the privileged position of the 
Corporations been gradually eroded, but there was a notable shift in the way in 
which the industry was being regulated. The original purpose of the ATAC was 
to provide advice to the Minister who retained the authority to approve services 
and to act as the representative body of consumer interests. It was a matter of 
time before the already detectable wind of change would sweep across the 
existing institutional structure of the civil aviation industry. 
It will be remembered that during the passage of the nationalisation statute, the 
then opposition set out what they would have done with the civil aviation 
industry had they been the Government: to set up an independent tribunal which 
would license air transport services. And towards the late 1960s, that vision of 
Lennox-Boyd gradually became a reality. Ffis mission was also given support 
by the increasing discomfort that was being felt with the existing institutional 
structure. The de facto role of the ATAC to act as a licensing authority 
especially in relation to the private airline companies had to be put on a more 
formal basis. As he explained, 
with the rapid growth of air transport, it would clearly not be 
right to rely indefinitely upon these somewhat makeshift 
arrangements. 15 
Of course that was not an attack on the ATAC and its role. Those "makeshift 
arran, ( gements" were a consequence of the ad hoccery in civil aviation regulation 
as evidenced by the Douglas report and the successive ministerial statements of 
policy which expanded the role of the ATAC. 
"Associate agreements" were also beginning to take their toll. There was a 
mutual dislike for them by the Corporations and the private airline companies. 
For the former, it was a complete farce that they had to enter into an agreement 
which would subject themselves to competition that was not particularly 
welcomed. For the latter, the "associate agreements" provided little room for 
innovation. The ideological basis for change, however, was not without 
relevance. The Government had a dislike for public monopolies which repeal 
would seek to provide greater efficiency and higher standards. 
65 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Bill 1960. H. C. Debs. 6 IS. col. 1227 (2 March 1960). 
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These developments provided an ideal setting for Lennox-Boyd. with the 
support of the Government, to bring the changes he had advocated In his 
opening speech on the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Bill 1960, he stated that the 
legislation constituted two main purposes 
First, to ensure that all who provide public transport by air shall 
be required to maintain proper standards of safety Secondly, to 
establish an independent authority to whom all airline operators 
can apply on an equal footing for licences to run regular air 
services'66 
The equality of treatment necessarily required the abolition of the monopoly 
position which the corporations had enjoyed since the nationalisation statute of 
1946. 
The independent authority was to be known as the Air Transport Licensing 
Board (ATLB). Its functions were essentially those previously performed by 
the ATAC, that is, the granting, revocation or suspension of licences for air 
transport services. S. 2(.,. ') of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960 provided 
for the considerations which the ATLB had to have regard to when deciding a 
licence application. But apart from these, the ATLB was given little guidance 
as to the way in which its discretion ought to be exercised, or the emphasis to 
be given to a particular consideration at a particular point in time. There was, 
however, a procedure for appeal to the Minister against the decision of the 
ATLB. It was stated during the debate on the Bill that an appeal to thel"VIinister 
was more appropriate than an independent tribunal since air transport licensing 
would inevitably involve issues of Government policy and public poliCy. 67 The 
irony in this statement lies of course with the lack of any direction to the ATLB 
as to the policy being adopted by the Government since it was the first port of 
call for air transport licensing. 68 Nonetheless, the Minister was confident that a 
set of consistent principles would eventually be formed upon which future 
decisions of the ATLB would be based. 
The future pattern of British aviation will emerge progressively 
from the decisions of the Board and from the results of appeals 
to the Minister. A kind of case law will gradually be built Up. 69 
Although the ATLB was created as an independent licensing authority to 
regulate an expanded and competitive civil aviation industry comprised of public 
and private airline operators, a large measure of protection would continue to 
be given to the corporations including their "associate agreements". But clearly, 
the extent to which that protection would be given would differ from whence 
they were a public monopoly. The Minister referred to the need for stability in 
British civil aviation as the principal basis for this approach. 
The last thing any of them wants is to compete free-for-all. 
Nobody is prepared to put up the large sums of money required 
for the purchase of modern aircraft and the setting up of 
maintenance basis and sales organisations without some measure 
66 Ibid. col. 1225. 
67 Ibid. col. 1223. 
68 See generally. Baldwin. op. cit. pp. 71-72. 
69 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Bill 1960. H. C. Debs. 6 IS. col. 1231 (2 March 1960). 
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of security They naturally wish to be assured that. having built 
up custorn on a particular route. they will be given some 
reasonable protection against interlopers who seek to reap where 
others have so-, vn.,? O 
The system of public hearings, licensing by the ATLB and appeals to the 
Minister under the 1960 Act was by any measure the most comprehensive that 
British civil aviation was to have had up until then, Credit must be given for an 
ambitious and courageous attempt to deal with the pressing issues of 
commercial aviation which had become a relatively permanent feature of the 
industry. A major transport industry was itself transported up and down the 
scales of success and depression of which the Governments' different poliýical 
complexions must take their share of the blame. If anything was to be learnt at 
this stage, it was surely the dynamism of the industry which called for flexible 
and, more importantly, prompt responses. Setting up the ATLB was a major 
step towards a sustainable framework of air transport competition between 
private and public operators while at the same time ensuring the necessary 
degree of resilience to adapt to the conditions of an industry encapsulated in 
what is very much an erratic market. 
The Edwards Committee: A Timely Saviour? 
Barely ten years later, British civil aviation was once more bracing itself for 
another major re-organisation. And the root cause of this was perhaps the lack 
of foresight on the part of the sponsors of the 1960 legislation. They failed to 
see that the newly created ATLB was only given the bare-bones of a licensing 
systýrn expecting it to carry out its tasks with the vigour and effectiveness 
which the legislation had envisaged. It was clearly an overstated ambition to 
see a newly bom creature to walk on its own when it was barely able to stand. 
There was no ministerial power to issue directions to the ATLB to guide its 
exercise of discretion, a point raised in the House of Commons. 71 The need for 
such a measure gradually became apparent as the ATLB was confronted with 
issues of some difficulty, from the speed with which it ought to be disposing 
licensing applications to the imposition of frequency limits on services as a 
condition of the licence. 72 
At the same time, criticisms were beginning to mount which did little justice to 
the ATLB and its role because they were largely misdirected. In particular, the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries published a report in 1967 
criticising the licensing machinery of the ATLB. 73 Amidst some severe 
criticisms, which in all fairness were related to the procedural aspects of the 
licensing system, the President of the Board of Trade decided to launch an 
inquiry in the hope that any uncertainty in the civil aviation industry would be 
promptly resolved. He conceded the fact that the importance of the industry 
stemmed from its potential contributions to the national economy and an urgent 
70 Ibid. cot. 1233. 
71 Ibid. cols. 1236-1233. 
72 See H. C. Debs. 740. cot. 1642 and H. C. Debs. 745. cot. 1573. 
73 British EuropeanAini-qvs HC 673 (1966-67). 
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review %,,,, as therefore in order 74 A Committee of Inquiry was hence appointed 
under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald Edwards, 
To inquire into the economic and financial situation and 
prospects of the British civil air transport industry and into the 
methods of regulating competition and licensing currently 
employed-, and to propose with due attention to other forms of 
transport in this country what changes may be desirable to enable 
the industry to make its full contribution to the development of 
the economy and to the service and safety of the travelling 
public. 
The subsequent report of the Committee75 became the basis for major changes 
to the regulatory structure of the industry. A number of its findings and 
recommendations are both interesting and appropriate for consideration in some 
detail here, not least because it represents the most comprehensive review of air 
transport regulatory policy since the industry was founded. 
From the terms of reference of the Committee, it was evident that some form of 
regulatory control was essential to avoid wasteful provisions of air transport 
services that would fail to make positive contributions to the economy as a 
whole, and it was equally apparent that the Governrnent was then committed to 
licensing as the form of regulation although the organisational features for that 
regulatory form was yet to be unresolved. But these points underscore very 
much the proposition that governmental regulation, either directly through a 
Government department or indirectly through an administrative agency, remains 
an inevitable fact of the civil aviation industry. 
The Committee first undertook to examine the place and relevance of regulation 
to British civil aviation, and gave almost instant recognition to the inevitable 
fact of regulation referred to above. It made the following observation. 
The structure of world civil aviation has been fashioned by many 
forces amongst which economic logic has played only a modest 
part. There has rarely been a time in the short history of air 
transport when governments have not taken a hand, for better or 
worse, in determining the way in which air services should be 
developed ... Almost universally governments have regarded air 
transport as an industry to be regulated. 76 
Accordino, to the Committee there were a number of cogent reasons for 
governments to show an interest in civil aviation including air space 
sovereignty, maintenance of a strategic reserve of aircraft in times of war, 
safety, and the major political, economic and social implications which transport 
systems gave rise to. 
Looking at the systems which obtained in other countries such as Australia, 
Canada and the US (which had not been deregulated then), the Committee 
argued that an important objective of pro-viding some governmental control was 
74 H. C. Debs. 75 1. col. 641 (26 July 1967). 
75 British Air Transport in the Seventies (Cmnd. 4018.1969). (The "Edwards Report"). 
76 Ibid. para. 13. 
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to secure stability in the civil aviation sector by ensuring its protection against 
the exploitative forces of an economic system. 
[I]t has become accepted in practice in world civil aviation that 
the operator of regular services needs and is entitled to some 
degree of protection against the operator who threatens to cream 
of traffic in periods of high traffic demand and thus to undermine 
the basis of the regular operator's planning- completely free 
competition is Out. 07 
It also referred to a further point for consideration in examining the place of 
regulation within thewider socio-econon-k setting. Civil aviation was a part of 
the system of domestic transportation which must therefore be assessed in. the 
light of other transport sectors which were then regulated or subsidised. 
A regulatory process, however, could not exist in a vacuum; it had to be 
justified by, and to function for, a set of objectives. The Committee therefore 
explored several objectives relevant to the civil aviation industry and sought to 
explain the method it felt appropriate to adopt to pursue those objectives. 71 
(i) To satisfy the customers. 
(ii) To create conditions for achieving profits by airlines which were 
efficient. 
(iii) To hold a fair balance between customer groups. 
(iv) To achieve safe operations. 
(v) To improve the balance of payments. 
(vi) To create opportunity for employees. 
(vii) To create opportunity for enterprise. 
(viii) To improve internal communications. 
(ix) To maintain external strategic communications. 
(X) To support British aircraft industry. 
Some of these objectives were mutually conflicting, while some were in tandem. 
It would therefore be inappropriate, the Comn-dttee argued, if their prioritisation 
was left solely to the airline companies which operations were often dictated by 
market forces. Instead, these airlines should be charged, either directly by the 
Government or indirectly through other regulatory controls, to achieve those 
objectives in accordance with the policy of the Government on civil aviation at 
the time. 
[I]t is not enough merely to enact a list of objectives including 
every desirable end, some perhaps, mutually incompatible, and 
then expect others to determine the right balance. 79 
Achieving a satisfactory balance between those objectives implied independence 
of assessment. And this independence would be vested in, and exercised by, a 
regulatory authority. The Committee set out a number of further advantages g- 
that a regulatory authority and a regulated system would provide, In relation to 
the degree of protection that airlines should have in the interests of the industry 
as a whole rather than the microcosmic interests of a particular airline company, 
a regulatory system could keep traffic requirements under review and could 
77 Aid. para. 21. 
78 ]bid. paras. 46-67. 
79 lbid. para. 70. 
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therefore modiý., the degree of protection to accord %vith the changing market 
circumstances. The Committee reported that the number of air services being 
provided by the multitude of airline companies, as a result of their new found 
freedom in the 1950s, %vere in excess of what the market made it possible to 
achieve an optimum level of efficiency. They had to be rationalised, but only 
within a framework that would give sufficient flexibility to reverse the trend if 
changes in the market place permitted As the Committee said, they were 
"totally convinced of the need for a structure which can be adapted to meet the 
changing needs. "80 
In a regulated system, the regulatory and licensing body would be able 
* 
to 
"maintain a check on the efficiency of airlines which have been granted the 
protection of a licence. "81 The competition which may (or may not) exist 
between the licensed airlines "provides the regulatory authority with yard-sticks 
for wNch it is extremely difficult to find alternatives" to measure their efficiency 
levels. 82 This would then become matters for consideration by the regulatory 
authority in dealing with a licence application, or indeed revocation. 
It is evident from the Edwards Report that British civil aviation required a 
system of regulation that would both rationalise air transport services and 
provide for a sound development of the industry. The ATLB had not managed 
to achieve them, although in respect of the former, it needs to be remembered 
that the ATLB was created at a time when enthusiasm for expanding air 
transport services was running high on all sides. Having therefore considered 
the place of regulation in British civil aviation, the Committee examined the 
failure of the system set up by the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960. 
As noted earlier, one reason for this Commýittee of Inquiry was the mounting 
criticisms that were being made against the ATLB and the system. Prime 
among those criticisms was the lack of any licensing policy or statement leaving 
a high degree of uncertainty within the industry. The fundamental problem, 
according to the Committee, was the process of formulating policies itself 
which was lacking in this case. It identified three features of the system as 
illustrative of this basic problem. 83 
(i) Lack of ministerial power to issue directions on policy which meant 
there was uncertainty as to the approach that would be adopted in 
licensing. 
(ii) Lack of procedure to bring a matter of policy arising from a particular 
case to the Minister except by way of an appeal initiated by one of the 
parties to the case. 
(iii) Lack of a system of binding precedent which meant that the ATLB was 
not compelled to follow a decision of the Nfinister. 
On the basis of these, the Committee made a preliminary conclusion that there 
was "an imperative need for future licensing policy to incorporate provisions by 
so Ibid. para. 453. See also ch. II of the Report on the role of the private airlines. 
81 The Edwards Report. para. 294. 
82 Ibid. 
83 IML para. 639. See also Baldwin. op. cit.. ch. 7. 
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which all statements of policy are formulated by the Government rrom time to 
time and are published in a statutory instrument as the legally-binding guidelines 
upon which licensing policy should be based "" 
The appeals procedure, although initially seen as a process to facilitate the 
injection of Government policy into the civil aviation industry, overwhelmed the 
entire system of licensing but at the same time leaving rather ironically the 
industry without any clear guidance as to the policy of the Government. " The 
Committee thought the system of appeals had come to operate in a way which 
greatly undermined the authority of the ATLB as the licensing authority under 
the 1960 Act. It was clearly not the intention of Parliament at the time to all 
' 
ow 
the gradual erosion of its authority nor was it the intention that the appeals 
procedure should have operated in the way it had. The cause of this state of 
affairs was in part attributable to the unrestricted grounds for appeal, and in part 
to the lack of limitation on the evidence that may be presented on appeal. Thus, 
an appellant was entitled to appeal without any restrictions on the basis of the 
appeal and to reserve evidence for the purposes of such an appeal. The ATLB 
procedure therefore became "no more than the preliminary round in a major 
case. "86 The solutions to this difficulty were fairly obvious: (i) specified or 
restricted grounds for appeal and (ii) limited circumstances for the admission of 
new evidence on appeal. 
It should be said, however, that the majority of the criticisms was against the 
ýystem of liceitsing itself rather than against the ATLB as a licensing authority. 
Nevertheless, in the light of this experience, the Committee was of the opinion 
that a new institution would be necessary in the future for the regulation of 
British air transport services. Its functions would include several specific, 
economic regulatory functions, in addition to its general duties. 87 As to the 
form of the new institution, the Committee set out four options, each worthy of 
a brief consideration here. 
A strengthenedAMB, 18 
This would entail a more strategic role for the ATLB particularly in the 
formulation and execution of policies. More importantly, the strengthened 
ATLB should be authoritative and independent to attract the confidence of the 
airline companies which it had lost. While this option would require minimal 
organisational change, and constitutional difficulties, there would continue to be 
a division of economic and technical regulatory responsibilities between the 
ATLB, the Air Registration Board (ARB) and the Board of Trade (BoT) which 
the Committee had found not to be the most satisfactory of arrangements. 
Two regulatory authorities" 
84 Ibid, para. 640. 
85 See also Baldwin. op. cit.. pp. 41-47. 
86 Ibid. para. 646. 
87 Ibid. para. 654. 
88 Paras. 991-996. 
89 Paras. 997-1000. 
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The essence of this option would resemble the first where the ATLB %wuld 
have a strengthened character for economic regulation, while a new, but 
separate, body to be known as the Air Safety Board (ASB), would assume the 
merged functions of the ARB and the BoT on technical regulation The 
obvious advantage would be the rationalisation of technical functions. The 
Committee felt, however, that there would continue to be two separate bodies 
whose functions may overlap. As an economic regulator, the ATLB would take 
into account indirectly the safety competence of an applicant for an air service 
hence, for instance, by assessing his experience, financial resources, equipment, 
organisation and staffing arrangements. By the same token, it ran the risk of 
missing certain matters altogether. 
A Govennnent departmen190 
Although there was an advantage in vesting the economic and technical 
regulatory functions in a single Government department, in that effective policy 
co-ordination could be achieved, there was also a fear that such an arrangement 
would not guarantee the regulatory independence needed to command the 
confidence of airline companies (other than perhaps the publicly-owned 
Corporations). 
A new Civil Aviation A uthority9l 
This was the favoured option of the Committee for a number of reasons. First, 
it would remove the dichotomy of economic and technical regulatory functions. 
Second, it would require the Goverrunent to work closely with the new 
authority and to issue a statement of policy that would guide the authority in 
performing its functions. In this way, policies on civil aviation would be known 
in advance thereby opening them to public debate and scrutiny while 
maintaining an oversight of the policies through the parliamentary process. 
Third, the independence of the new authority would represent the interests of 
air transport users and equally those of the airline companies more effectively 
than would, say, a Government department. 
A Constitutional Innovation: 1971 
Civil Aviation Authority: The Way Fonvard 
In response to the Edwards Report, the Government published a White Paper 
indicating its intention to implement the recommendations contained in the 
Report. 92 According to the Government, the White Paper was to be "a new 
charter for the industry". 91 It set out the principal objectives of civil aviation as 
being, 
the provision of air services by British carriers, in satisfaction of 
all substantial categories of demand, at the lowest levels of 
charges consistent with a high standard of safety, an economic 
90 Paras. 100 1- 1002. 
91 Paras. 1003-1019. 
92 Civil. 4viation Policy (Cmnd. 4213,1969). 
93 lbid. para. 8. 
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return on investment and the stability and development of the 
industry -'-' 
These objectives %vould be set out subsequently in a policy statement which in 
accordance with the Edwards recommendation would bind the new regulatory 
authority. In that respect, therefore. the Government indicated in the White 
Paper that a Civil Aviation Authority would be established under a forthcoming 
legislation. 
The essential feature of the relationship between the Government and the CAA 
would be the separation between policy formulation and the detailed application 
of policy. 95 But a sufficiently wide degree of discretion would be given to the 
CAA for the implementation of those policies. As an economic regulator, it , would act positively in pursuit of Government policies and objectives set out in 
the policy statement. More importantly, however, the CAA, unlike its 
predecessor, would be given the discretion "to take the initiative rather than just 
to respond to the initiatives of the applicant airlines". 96 It would also have to 
shape route networks and to take measures to strengthen the structure of the 
industry within the terms of the declared policy so as to ensure that excess 
capacity would not result. Where circumstances so dictate, the CAA may 
require the protection of certain routes against competition from new entrants, 
or to encourage or discourage the diversification of air transport services. 91 
The CAA would further engage in "more purposive regulation of the industry 
than the present legislation and licensing system permits. "98 By purposive 
regulation, it meant that the CAA would have to adopt a broader approach to 
its tasks by considering issues arising from the interrelationship between 
economic, operational and technical regulation. This would facilitate the CAA 
gaining as much knowledge as possible about civil aviation activities. This line 
of approach is consistent with the idea already discussed previously; that 
economic regulation functions as a leverage for either promoting or 
discouraging competition in accordance with a certain set of objectives or 
purposes, and emphasises also the proposition that economic regulation is an 
indispensable mechanism to pursue wider objectives within the band of 
discretion the responsible authority would have been given. 
The White Paper also provided for a re-organised system of appeals from the 
decisions of the CAA. For the review of CAA decisions, the matter may be 
brought before a court of law on grounds of ultra vires or procedural defect. 
But an appeal against the decision on the basis that it represented a departure 
from the declared policy should not lie to the court. As the White Paper stated, 
The formal policy statement, being concerned with essentially 
economic criteria, is unlikely to be expressed in terms lending 
themselves to judicial interpretation. " 
94 Ibid. para. 10. 
95 Ibid. para. 12 1. 
96 Ibid. para. 87. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. para. 15 
99 Ibid.. para. 104. 
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In such cases. tile appeal should be judged by the BoT But an appeal could be 
brought only on the ground that "the decision cannot reasonably be brought 
within the terms of the Government statement of policy " That meant the 
discretion of the BoT to interfere with the decision would be limited to cases 
where they deemed there had been an inconsistency, "I" 
It also became clear during the parliamentary debates leading up to the creation 
of the CAA that, an independent regulatory agency implied not only operational 
autonomy but also financial independence. Putting the responsibility of 
regulating a major industry in the hands of a regulatory agency provides the 
government with the opportunity to remove itself from the costs of industrial 
regulation. During the second reading of the Civil Aviation Bill 1971, Nlicfiae) 
Noble, the Minister for Trade, spelt out the envisaged financial position of the 
CAA as follows: 
The functions which the Authofity %vill assume are not at present 
financially self-supporting, but the intention is that they should 
become so, so that the annual grant in aid can be progressively 
reduced and finally dispensed %ith. This means that the 
Authofity will be required in due course to recover from the 
airlines and other users the full cost of navigational and ground 
services it provides. 101 
The CAA is now statutorily required to "conduct its affairs as to secure that its 
revenue is not less than sufficient to meet charges properly chargeable to 
revenue account". 102 This will be achieved by imposing a levy on the industry. 
The significance of this financial independence is to limit the leverage for any 
short-term political interference. 
A final feature of the NVIýite Paper that must be noted here was the creation of a 
"second force" carrier, an idea first conceived by the Edwards Committee. 103 
This airline would be established through a process of encouragement to private 
airline companies to amalgamate. Being the second flag carrier on international 
routes, it would be given preference in the allocation of licences. Clearly, 
however, the place of this airline in British civil aviation must depend on the 
capacity of the market to allow for double-designation (alongside the Air 
Corporations which would merge into a national carrier to be known as British 
Airways Board), and on the terms of an international air service agreement. 
The Government, however, was keen to ensure that the formation of this 
"second force" airline was not conditional upon an assurance to transfer a 
significant number of routes operated by the Air Corporations then. Although 
the setting up of a "second force" airline was to strengthen British civil aviation, 
it will be seen below that it contributed indirectly to a legal challenge that 
resulted in the demise of the policy guidance system which both the Edwards 
Comn-dttee and the White Paper had advocated for. 
100 Ibid. para. 105. It is worthy of note that during the parliamentary Ckbatcs on the 
legislation to establish the CAA. appeals to the Minister would not be rcstrictcd to 
cases of inconsistency: H. C. Dcbs. 814. col. 1174 (29 March 1971). 
101 HC Dcbs. 3 14. col. 1178. (29 March 197 1) 
102 S. S. Civil Aviation Act 1982. 
103 Edwards Report, paras. 38-42. 
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The White Paper proposals which reflected the recommendations of the 
Edwards Committee were subsequently enacted in the Civil Aviation Act 1971 
(as consolidated in Civil Aviation Act 1982) The legislation comprised of two 
main parts: (i) the setting up of the CAA, described as "a constitutional 
innovation"104 and (ii) the creation of British Airways Board (BAB) from the 
merger of BOAC and BEAC. The functions of the CAA were two-fold: 
economic and safety regulation. 103 
The Policy Guidance: An Unhappy Ending 
As promised in the White Paper, the 1971 legislation made provision for the 
issuing of a written guidance through which the policy of the Governnient 
would be communicated to the CAA. Among other things, it was stated in 
Parliament that the guidance would "apply to the granting of air transport 
licences and the regulation of fares and charges". 106 The first guidance was 
published in 1972 and it set out three broad objectives for the CAA. 107 Four 
issues were involved in the first objective: satisfying all substantial categories of 
the market, securing low fares, securing a high standard of safety, and ensuring 
an economic return for investment to obtain a sound industry. The second 
objective related to the opportunities for the "second force" airline, but the 
preference in the allocation of licences to it would not be automatic. In other 
words, a case had still to be made to demonstrate that it was deserving of the 
designation. 108 The third objective related to the balance of payments and the 
contributions to the national economy. This merely gave recognition to the 
major economic asset in a civil aviation industry, and it was therefore essential 
for the CAA to have regard to this fact when performing its function as an 
economic regulator. 
A second policy guidance was issued in 1976, prompted in large measure by the 
depression into which the industry had been plunged as a result of the oil crisis 
of the 1970s, and by the consequential decline in demand for air transport 
services. 101 The guidance addressed these difficulties by referring to the 
concept of double-designation and its increasing inappropriateness in an 
industry plagued by the oil crisis and the inevitable contraction of opportunities 
for double-designation as foreign governments attempted to protect their 
national carriers. More particularly, British Caledonian Airways (B. Cal), as the 
second force airline, had failed to establish itself as a strong carrier in the North 
Atlantic market, perhaps because of the decline in air travel on that route. In 
the light of the severe oil crisis and the decline in demand, it was difficult to see 
how double-designation could be justified on a major long-haul route unless the 
104 H. C. Dcbs. 8 14. col. 1173 (29 March 197 1). 
105 S. 3 of the 1971 Act and s. 4 of the 1982 Act. 
106 kid. col. 1175. 
107 Civil. 4viation Polic 
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Guidance (Cmnd. 4899.1972). For the parliamentary dcbates 
20 et. seq, on this guidance, see H. C. Dcbs. 833. col. 1. 
103 The "second force" airline emerged as a result of an amalgamation bct,. %, ccn 
Caledonian Ainvays and British United Airways. later to be kno%%n as British 
Caledonian Ainvays. 
109 Future 001.4viation PolicY (Cmnd. 6400.1976). 
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Government was prepared to face the consequence of having to reduce the 
capacity of the national carrier, BA. Therefore, it was decided that "in future it 
should be the general policy not to permit competition between British airlines 
on long-haul scheduled services and therefore not to license more than one 
British airline on any given long-haul route. "110 Exceptions, however. would 
still apply. The CAA was thus under a requirement to license air transport 
services by having regard to this shift in the policy. No doubt, this policy 
affected the services of B. Cal on major long-haul routes. Likewise, it affected 
the "Skytrain Services" that had been proposed by Laker Airways between 
London and New York. Its earlier designation as a scheduled operator would 
therefore be withdrawn. 111 Minor, as the decision to withdraw may have 
seemed, the legal consequence was enormous. 112 When eventually the Civil 
Aviation Act 19821 was enacted to consolidate the law relating to civil aviation, 
the provision for issuing a written guidance was omitted. If double-designation 
had been permitted as a general policy, excess capacity would probably have 
been the result -a phenomenon which the Edwards Committee had laboured at 
length for its avoidance by a process of ratio nalisation. The issuing of this 
second guidance was an illustration of the rationalisation exercise and the 
flexibility in responding to market changes which, prior to the guidance system, 
had been found wanting. 
Notwithstanding that the system of written guidance was omitted in 1982, the 
CAA continued with a positive approach to the development of policies and a 
procedural framework for airline licensing that was transparent. These issues 
and more recent history of the CAA's role in the regulation of airline 
competition are developed in later, substantive, chapters, including also the 
arrival of the liberalisation measures to create the Single European Aviation 
Market in 1987. 
European Community And Liberalisation: 1987-1992 
Although the European Economic Community (now the EC), was first 
conceived in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome and membership of the UK did not 
happen until the passing of the European Community Act 1972, rules governing 
air transport did not emerge until 1987 when following a series of European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions, the Council of Ministers found their inaction 
increasingly indefensible. Much of this was due to the lack of political will and 
compromise, made worse by the fact that the powers of the Council on air 
transport were fashioned in highly discretionary terms in the Treaty. Article 
84(2) states that, 
The Council may [acting by a qualified majority] decide whether, 
to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions 
may be laid down for.. -air transport. ' 13 
110 Md, para. 7. See also H. C. Debs. 396. col. 1502 (19 July 1975). III Ibid. paras. 14-15. 112 See ch. 4. infra and R. Baldwin, "A Quango Unleashed: The Abolition of Policy 
Guidance in Civil ANiation Licensing" (1980) 58 Pubfic. I&nin. 287, 
113 Majority voting was introduced by the Single European Act 1985. 
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tlo%vever, in Europeaii 11arhainew v (7owicil. 114 the European Parliament 
initiated action under Article 175 against the Council for failing to introduce a 
common transport policy, in spite of 16 Commission proposals to that effect, 
and which therefore amounted to an infringement of the Treaty, specifically on 
the introduction of the freedom to provide transport services. Institutionally, 
this decision is significant because it clarified the position of the European 
Parliament on the initiation of an action under Article 175. On the substantive 
issues, the ECJ ruled that although the Council retained the discretion to adopt 
a common position on transport, that discretion was limited by the requirement 
to establish a common transport market and by the Ifine period within which it 
was required to achieve that common position. The margin of discretion was 
only in relation to the objectives and the means of achieving a coriuýorl 
transport policy. The real significance of this decision ties in the argument that 
political, technical or economic difficulties could not constitute an excuse for 
inaction nor failure to perform Treaty obligations. The decision provoked a 
response from the Council whose statement indicated that it regarded the 
decision as "very important and providing an impetus for progress in the 
development of the common transport policy. "H$ For air transport specifically, 
the land-mark took the form of a subsequent ECJ decision inMinisNre Public v 
Asjes which concerned the application of Community competition laws to air 
transport. 116 This latter decision revealed a serious crack in Community air 
transport policy, and together with the combined pressures of the Commission 
and its policy proposal, propelled the Council into action. The end result was 
the adoption of the first of three liberalisation "packages" in 1987 designed to 
introduce more competition into Community air transport. This was followed 
by the second package in 1990 and the third in 1992, all of which are 
considered in depth in a later chapter. 
Conclusions 
This chapter set out with the aim of showing how the events of the past have 
shaped the regulatory structure and approach that presently exists. It started 
with a persistent, but unfortunate, neglect until the collapse of the civil aviation 
industry in 1921 when a shift in attitude became detectable. Since then, there 
was no turning back on the role of the Government in the civil aviation industry 
which so many different committees, and indeed events, have suggested as the 
quintessence for success, if not for survival. Ownership of the industry had 
swung from private hands, when no government subsidies would be given, to 
public hands, where monopoly privileges were conferred, then to a mixture of 
both, and now back to where it began - private ownership. 117The changes in 
the ownership structure also resulted in seismic changes to the economic 
orientation of the industry where unregulated competition was replaced by 
public monopolies, though they were subsequently to face a revival of the 
114 Case 13182. [1986] 1 CNELR 138, 
115 See Bull. EC 5/S5. p. S. 
116 Case 209/84.1198613 CINULR 173. 
117 BA was privatised in 1987, 
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competitive spirit from the efforts of their very own 'associates' A kcv issue in 
this historical analysis is the shaping of the industry structure %vhere a dominant 
carrier, BA, was eventually exposed to competition and transferred into private 
sector hands lock, stock and barrel with the privileges and assets it had inherited 
from its monopoly position This has a direct bearing on a leading contention of 
this thesis, that is economic regulation tends to evolve into antitrust regulation 
when the conditions of critical market contestability have been secured, Tile 
way in which BA was privatised and the responses of the CAA are examined in 
the following chapter, but suffice it to add that privatising BA with its 
dominance intact, even if this may be regarded as promoting the industry, meant 
that the task of promoting competition within the industry was made all the 
more difficult. The barriers derived from the structural imbalance impinges upory 
the ability of the regulatory agency to abandon the role of economýic regulation 
and to confine itself to the task of antitrust regulation. Conditions for 
competition are less likely to be sustainable without continuing regulation over 
entry, price and capacity. The history of airline competition discussed in this 
chapter is ample evidence of the difficulty in abandoning the task of economic 
regulation, typically licensing, where the constraints from structural imbalance 
exist. 
Apart from the varied experience in relation to the ownership of the industry, 
more remarkably the industry has seen a plethora of regulatory bodies of 
different forms. Some were short-lived, others were blessed with longevity. 
There was nevertheless a conspicuous lack of a structured strategy and 
regulatory philosophy,, little thought seemed to have gone into the design of the 
regulatory system, and the objectives which it was intended to achieve. Be that 
as it may,, they aH had an important function to perform: the regulation of air 
transport services. The most common approach adopted in the past was by 
licensing the airline companies, and this was particularly true in respect of the 
ATAC which advisory role was greatly expanded to embrace quasi-licensing 
functions. It is also true to say that it was the experience with the quasi- 
licensing role of the ATAC which gave further credibility to the approach itself 
and it became readily accepted that a licensing system provided a useful and 
strategic instrument to achieve wider objectives of the national economy 
including the balance of payments. 
The licensing system which obtains today is vested in the regulatory authority 
first conceived by the Edwards Committee, the CAA. Its terms of reference are 
essentially two-pronged: economic and safety regulation. The consolidating 
Civil Aviation Act 1982 vests in the CAA a large measure of discretion to 
perform the two functions. Amongst other things, the CAA has taken on for 
some time, particularly since the abolition of the written guidance system, a role 
of positively developing strategic policies on air transport competition, and it is 
to this that the following chapters will focus. Nevertheless, its function of 
economic regulation has been affected in many ways, both in width and depth, 
with the advent of EC liberalisation measures on air transport, and the 
implications must be examined accordingly. 
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CHAPTER FOUR POLICY FOWNIULATION": 
THE ROLE OF TI IE CAA AND 
GOVERNMENT 
It should be clear from the foregoing chapter that, whatever, the political 
complexion of the Government, economic regulation of air transport in the UK 
seems to be an indispensable requirement and arguably an irresistible fact. It 
should also be apparent that the history of air transport regulation in the UK 
suggests that the realisation and co-ordination of public interest objectives 
cannot be left solely to the participants in the industry. If this argument holds, 
then issue becomes one of more or less regulation, not whether to regulate or 
deregulate. But it should also have been clear that this presumption of the need 
to regulate stems from the inherent characteristics of the structure of the 
industry in the UK. The role of the Government and the exclusive privileges 
which it conferred on British carriers meant that when competition was 
introduced and the last airline monopoly, BA, was privatised, the industry had 
inherited a dominant incumbent, and consequently a less-than-level playing field. 
So to ensure that competition is preserved, and choice and equality of 
opportunities are given to new airlines, regulatory intervention must remain 
possible to counter any anti-competitive practices or abuses of market power by 
the dominant incumbent. To subn-dt this is not to argue that economic 
regulation of airline competition is the first order of solutions to market 
problems. The opening chapters have already established that where possible, 
competitive solutions should be preferred over regulatory interventions. This 
means that economic regulation can be minimal. Indeed, where the conditions of 
sustainable competition have been secured, that is critical market contestability, 
economic regulation may be liberalised or, in the extreme, abandoned 
altogether. At this point, however, antitrust regulation of airline competition 
begins to assume a much greater significance. Whether these assumptions are 
applicable to British air transport, taking into account the effects of European 
legislation, will be the subject of the analysis in the rest of this thesis. In the 
following chapters, the empirical evidence will address the questions of 
whether, on balance, the model of regulated competition constructed in chapter 
two is a more effective machinery than the two extreme alternatives of 
monopolies and unfettered competition for achieving the objectives of the 
airline industry Nvithin the context of a gesellscliaftlicll model of social 
organisation, that is, to acknowledge the commitment towards autonomy and 
individual choice and a paradigm shift from the primacy of producer interests to 
user interests. . 
The aims of this chapter are to examine the role of the CAA in formulating air 
transport competition policies, and also the role of the Government in providing 
a general policy framework. It %%ill begin with an examination of the statutory 
provisions governing the licensing and policy-making role of the CAA since 
licensing decisions and policies are likely to have a direct effect on each other. 
More specifically, in discussing the development of air transport competition 
policies, it will also be important to consider the issues of consultation and 
participation by the actors within the regulatory complex, and their role in 
shaping the policies This chapter will also be concerned with the contributions 
of the CAA to the formulation of broader Government policies on air transport 
competition, in particular its role in the privatisation of BA. It should be noted 
that EC law and policy has changed the face of licensing air transport 
competition considerably following the adoption of three sets of measures 
aimed at introducing more competition to air transport. To that extent. it will be 
necessary to mention briefly the effect of EC law on the role of the CAA and 
the Government in policy-making. The chapter should provide an understanding 
of the extent to which the principles and policies of air transport competition 
and regulation have changed over the years since the CAA was created, and 
provide the background for examining the empirical evidence in the following 
chapters. More importantly, perhaps, this chapter should provide the basis for 
understanding the relationship between procedures and substance, and the 
extent to which substantive changes in policies can, unwittingly, affect and 
change established procedures, an issue which will be taken up in more detail in 
the next chapter. I 
The Policy Framework of Economic Regulation 
Statutory Objectives 
Administrative regulation in the sense captured in the opening chapter, implies 
the delegation of a certain regulatory task to a subordinate body or agent. As 
noted hitherto, the task of regulating for airline competition in the UK is now 
the responsibility of the CAA which was created by the Civil Aviation Act 1971 
following the far-reaching report of the Edwards Committee. The governing 
" charges the CAA by virtue of s. 4 with a two- statute of Civil Aviation Act 198. 
fold statutory objective to lead the industry by positive action: 
(i) to secure the provision of air transport services by British airlines which 
satisfy all substantial categories of public demand which provides the 
lowest charges consistent . Nith: 
"a high standard of safety 
" an economic return to efficient operators 
" securing a sound development of the British civil air transport industry; 
(ii) to ffirther the reasonable interests of users of air transport services. 
These objectives have been laid out in a slightly different manner from the way 
in which they have been arranged in the statute to appreciate the interpretation 
given to them by the CAA. The Director of Economic Regulation pointed out 
that the statute made the interests of users paramount, all other objectives were 
subsidiary or incidental to the aim of satis5, ing all substantial categories of 
public demand and furthering the reasonable interests of users. 2 This provision 
is significant given that it represents a departure from the practice under past 
See J. Goh, -Airline Deregulation and Representation: Public Hearings and Tile 
Changing Nature of Regulation" (1998) 27Anýizlo-. Imerican Lmv Review 87. "0 2 InterN iew %ý ith the author. 8 November 1994. 
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legislation where the interests of airlines were accorded priority consideration. 
not least because they were either statutory monopolies under the 
nationalisation statutes or given special privilege over user interests as set out in 
the 1971 Act. 3 S. 3 of the 1971 Act, for example, stated that the CA. -k was to 
secure the provision of air transport services by British airlines and "subject to 
the preceding paragraphs, to further the reasonable interests of users". To the 
extent that the emphasis on user interests is a derivative of a renewed 
conunitment towards individual autonomy and choice, that is consistent with the 
idea of gesellscliqftlicli in Weber's theory on economy and society. 4 
Statutory Criteria 
Both the substantive and procedural duties of the CAA in respect ot air 
transport licensing and policy formulation are set out in ss. 64-69 of the 1982 
Act and which main features are inter alia the grant, refusal, revocation or 
variation of an air transport licence application, the broad criteria of competence 
and financial fitness to be applied, and the publication of a statement of licensing 
policies by the CAA. A background understanding of these provisions is 
necessary to better appreciate the underlying basis of past and present licensing 
policies. 
S. 64 sets out the scope of the licensing framework, first of all, by prohibiting 
any carriage by air of passengers or cargo unless the operator of the aircraft is 
licensed by the CAA as well as having complied and is complying with terms of 
the licence. That prohibition is applicable "to any flight in any part of the world 
by an aircraft registered in the United Kingdom and to any flight beginning or 
ending in the United Kingdom by an aircraft registered in a relevant overseas 
territory or an associated state". The categories of flight excepted from the 
section are: 
(i) a flight of a description specified in an instrument made by the CAA, 
which takes effect only when it is published in the prescribed manner; 
(ii) a particular flight or series of flight specified in an instrument made by 
the CAA, who has a duty to publish the instrument forthwith in the 
prescribed manner; 
(iii) a flight by an aircraft operated by the CAA, 
(iv) a flight for which a valid operating licence issued in accordance with the 
Council Regulation on licensing of air carriers is required. 5 
The provisions of s. 65 deal with the grant or refusal of an air transport licence 
application. Under this section, the CAA is under a mandatory obligation to 
refuse an application where it is not satisfied that the applicant has met the 
criteria laid down in sub-s. (2). The criteria for the grant of an air transport 
licence are detailed and complex, reflecting very clearly the public interest 
3 The Government has also explicitly rccogniscd this change in its White Paper of 
1985 that "the interests of the air transport users were put on equal footing as those 
of the airlines". para. 7.. 4irline Competition Policv (Cmnd. 9366.1984). 
4 See NI. Weber. If irtschaft und GeselIschaft. trans. 'b% T. Parsons. The 7beorv ofSocial 
and Economic Organisation (Hodge. London: 1947). 
5 This paragraph was inserted by Licensing o of Air Carriers Rejgulations 1992. SI 
1992/2992. reg. 20. 
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element in a highly important public economic service attended by high 
expectations of safety. First. the applicant must demonstrate that he is "a fit 
person" to be licensed to operate aircraft In deciding whether or not the 
applicant is such a fit person, the CAA will assess the experience of the 
applicant and his employees, or that of the persons appearing to the CAA to be 
controlling a body corporate, in the field of aviation. This assessment extends 
to past activities of the applicant, his employees and the persons deemed to be 
in control of the corporation. Secondly, the applicant must be able to satisfy the 
CAA that he has adequate resources, including financial arrangements, to 
discharge his actual and potential obligations related to any business activities 
he is engaged in and those arising from any aviation activities in which he 
, 
may 
be engaged as a result of the licence being granted. Thirdly, and furthermorý, 
the CAA must be satisfied that the applicant is either a UK national or, in the 
case of a body incorporated in the UK, a relevant overseas territory or an 
associated state, is controlled by UK nationals. The importance of this latter 
criteria is magnified still by the role of the Secretary of State in having the 
authority to consent to an application from a person or body not meeting the 
"nationality" criteria. Sub-s. (4), however, vests in the CAA an overriding 
discretion to turn down, an application which is not prejudiced by the foregoing 
criteria to refuse an air transport licence. 
Provision is made under s. 66 of the Act for the CAA to revoke, suspend or vary 
an air transport licence. The power to do so may arise in three situations. First, 
"a person of a prescribed description" may apply at any time to the CAA to 
revoke, suspend or vary an air transport ficence. The application may 
therefore relate to the licence held by another operator other than the applicant. 
The locits classicus to which we shall be returning is the application by Virgin 
Airways in 1990 to vary the London-Tokyo licence held by BA. Secondly, the 
CAA is empowered to revoke, suspend or vary an air transport licence 
independently of any application "if it considers it appropriate to do S04.6 This 
discretion has been invoked on a number of occasions including the difficult 
case involving BA and Virgin on the London-Tokyo(Narita) route. But the use 
of this discretion is rare and often limited to instances where special 
circumstances dictate such as restrictions arising from bilateral agreements. 
S. 66(3) on the other hand makes it a duty, rather than a discretion, of the CAA 
to revoke, suspend or vary an air transport licence if it is no longer satisfied as 
to either of the following two matters. 
(i) The licence holder in question is no longer a fit person to operate 
aircraft, taking into account those matters specified in s. 65(2)(a). 
(ii) The licence holder is not longer financially able to discharge his actual or 
potential obligations. 
Where the CAA is no longer satisfied that the licence holder meets the 
nationality criteria, it is under a statutory obligation to inform the Secretary of 
State who is empowered to make a determination as to whether or not the CAA 
should be directed to revoke the licence. 
6 S. 660) and (2). 
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Procedurally. the CAA is required by s 67 to furnish a statement of reasons for 
its decisions relating to an application for, or revocation, suspension or 
variation, of an air transport licence A party which has submitted an objection 
to a particular case is similarly entitled to a statement of reasons, as is anyone 
who has requested for such a statement The obvious implication of this 
requirement is the transparency of the decisions of the CAA that could be 
regarded as "a principle of good administration". This duty. however, is subject 
to a number of exceptions. In particular, the CAA has to refer to the Secretary 
of State for determination a case in which it reasonably believes that furnishing 
that statement of reasons "might be contrary to the interests of national security 
or might affect adversely the relations of the United Kingdom with another 
country or territory". Furthermore, the CAA has the discretion either to retrai ,n from furnishing such a statement to any party or to exclude from such a 
statement matters which relate to the "commercial or financial affairs of another 
person and cannot be disclosed ... without 
disadvantage" to the person 
concerned. 7 
S. 67(5) further provides that the Secretary of State may establish by regulations 
an appeal procedure from any decision of the CAA to the Secretary of State but 
only in respect of decisions relating to an application for air transport licence. 9 
Under such regulations, the Secretary of State may direct the CAA to reverse or 
vary its decision in question, but successive Secretaries of State have given an 
undertaking that the discretion to reverse or vary will be exercised only 
sparingly such that to overturn a decision of the CAA would require nothing 
short of a clearly justified case. 9 This latter provision is interesting in a number 
of respects, particularly the findings of Baldwin relating to the exercise of a 
similar discretion under the previous regime. It will be recalled that the Civil 
Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960 provided for an appeal from the decision of the 
ATLB to the Secretary of State. Baldwin noted that, 
If there was a single reason why the ATLB system of licensing 
was eventually perceived to have failed it was the manner in 
which appeals were decided. This power allowed Nfinisters to 
review not only politicafly significant decisions but also issues of 
Board judgement. 10 
The readiness with which the appeal system was opened to discredit was 
apparent since the regular overturning of the Board's decisions was tantamount 
to the rejection of a specialist body established by Parliament. When the 
Edwards Committee came to its conclusions, it reported that the absence of 
restrictions barrina the introduction of new evidence at appeals or restrictions 
on the grounds for appeals enabled airlines to come to regard the ATLB 
hearings as nothing more than "a preliminary round in any major case". II 
7 See s. 670). 
8 See Civil. lviation. luthori(V Regulations 1991, SI 1991,11672. 
9 See flic two policy guidances issued in 1972 (para. 17) and 1976 (para. 17) and the 
White Paper. Airline Competition Policy (Cmnd. 9366.1984). para. 33. 
10 R. Bald%%in. Regulating the. 4irlines (OUP. O\ford: 1985), p. 4 1. 
II BritishAir Transport in the Seventies (Cinnd. 4018.1969), para. 646. 
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S 6S has two parts cur ircvi. %: 1)ort hce)wes and route heeitces The provisions 
for both types of licences are identical except that an air transport licence is 
granted to airlines based outside the EC but whose aircrall are registered in the 
UK for the provision of services anywhere in the world, while a route licence is 
granted to airlines already holding operahikiz hceitces to enable them to serve 
routes outside the EC. Under Council Regulation 2407/92 on common criteria 
for licensing air carriers, these operating licences are granted to airlines whose 
principal place of business and registered office is in the UK and which are 
owned and effectively controlled by 'Member States or their nationals. '*- This is 
the freedom to establish within the EC. In accordance with this Regulation, the 
CAA grants two classes of operating licences, Type A for operators of larger 
aircraft and Type B for those of smaller aircraft. For routes within the lEC, 
Council Regulation 2408/92 confers a general right of entry to all Community 
carriers, and thus rendering a route licence from the CAA redundant. 13 
The provisions of s. 68 make it a duty of the CAA when licensing airlines to 
ensure that British airlines compete effectively with other airlines on 
international routes, and to pay particular attention to : 
(i) any advice from the Secretary of State in relation to the likely outcome 
of bilateral negotiations with the government of a foreign country, 
(ii) the need to secure the most effective use of airports within the UK 
Furthermore, in deciding whether or not to grant an air transport or route 
ficence, the CAA is required to have regard to a number of other matters. First, 
to consider the effect that any newly licensed air transport services may have on 
existing services. Secondly, where the proposed services are similar to an 
existing service in terms of the route served, it is to assess the benefits which 
may accrue from enabling two or more airlines to compete among themselves to 
provide those services. Thirdly, the CAA is to have regard to need to minimise 
so far as reasonably practicable any adverse effects on the environment and 
disturbance to the public as result of noise, vibration or atmospheric pollution 
from air transport activities. Fourthly, it is instructed to impose minimum 
regulatory burden on the air transport industry as a whole and the pro-vision of 
air transport services. The latter is particularly significant in the CAA's efforts 
to develop a system of minimal regulation, and indeed to refrain from positive 
interventions in matters which the market is the better judge such as the levels 
of fares and frequency of services. The next chapter will chart the initiatives of 
the CAA in eliminating to the maximum extent possible the regulatory controls 
pertaining to airline competition. 
CAA and Policy-'Mak-ing 
The role and process of policy formulation by the CAA are governed by the 
Civil Aviation Act 1982. The CAA is charged with the duty set out in s. 69 of 
the Act to "publish from time to time a statement of the policies it intends to 
adopt" in performing its licensing functions. How policy statements are 
published is a matter for the CAA to decide, and its practice has been to issue 
Civil Miation Policy statements, known as CAPs, and appropriately numbered. 
12 OJ [19921 L240/1. 
13 See cli. 7. infra. 
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Before the publication of such a statement. the CAA is also requircd by s 69 to 
"consult such persons as appear to it to be representative respectively (a) of the 
civil air transport industry of the United Kingdom, and (b) of users of air 
transport services. " This is in contrast with the position under tile common law 
where no general duty exists to rdquire public decision-making bodies to 
consult. Be that as it may, two issues arising from the s. 6() provision require 
further consideration: the consultation procedures and the persons to be 
consulted 
Policy Development: Procedures 
First, while the statutory provision requires the CAA to "consult ýuch 
persons... ", there is a considerable latitude of discretion as to the method of 
consultation which consequently will have a bearing on the range of persons 
who will be consulted ultimately. Furthermore, the scope of s. 69 on the 
publication of policy statements and the a priori requirement of consultation is 
limited to the functions of the CAA under ss. 64-63 of the Act which are 
provisions dealing with the licensing of air transport services. In the context of 
rule-making by regulatory agencies today, it is generally accepted that three 
different procedures are possible. 14 First, the traditional trial-type procedure or 
rule-making by adjudication, and second, rule-mak-ing by written 
representations. A third methodology combines both the oral procedures with 
written representations, which is also known as the 'hybrid procedure'. 
Although the trial-type procedure is more common in the US, it is one which 
the CAA has adopted in respect of its licensing cases. The use of written 
representations are becoming more common in British administrative practice 
including the regulation of the utility sectors. 15 The CAA has construed the 
procedure of consultation with considerable width so that on certain policy 
issues it would for instance adopt the written subn-dssion procedure while on 
others it would adopt the much formal procedure of adjudication. To these we 
now turn. 
In the years of its existence, the CAA has developed a commendable 
methodology in the development of its regulatory policies. A review of its 
policy-making procedures will reveal a gradual evolution of procedural variety, 
adapted to suit the nature of the policies to be formulated and the circumstances 
in which the policies are to be formulated, such as for instance the degree of 
controversy likely to be involved or the sig gnificance of the proposed policy to 
the industry. On the other hand, its predecessor, the ATLB, was deeply reliant 
on the trial-type procedure, one of which consequences was the inflexibility in 
and the resultant bureaucratic dominance of administrative rule-mak-ing, 
contrary to one of the principal ideas behind the growth of administrative 
agencies. Policy development thus depended on case-law and that in turn 
14 1 make no attempt here to distinguish bet,. %-ccn formal and informal rule-making. In 
practice. the use of informal rales and rule-making processes is extensive. though it 
is not suggested that these should not be subject at least to the same degree of 
scrutiny and control as formal rules and rules-making processes. For the distinction. 
see D. Galligan. Due Process and Fair Procedures (OUP. Oxford: 1996). ch. 16. 
15 Telecommunications Act 1984. s. 8(5)-. Gas Act 1936. s. 7(4). Water Act 1989. 
s. 13(2). Electricity Act 1999, s. 6(4)-. Railways Act 1993. s. 8(4). 
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depended on the frequency of cases brought before the agency for 
determination As a result, policies were often developed by accident It is. 
however, true to state that in its initial years. the CAA tended to adopt 
procedures that were trial-type oriented, Policies would be evolved on a 
gradual basis during licensing hearings. But as it began to develop a 
considerable body of licensing principles, hearings from which licensing policies 
would evolve became less significant. No doubt, there will be occasions when 
novel policy issues will arise during a licensing hearing which will need to be 
addressed. The system of hearings as a whole, however, is becomýing less 
significant and rare. 
The procedure of policy-making by adjudication is highly formalistic and 
bureaucratic. It is generally legalistic and confrontational. As the CAA is a 
quasi-judicial body for the purposes of its licensing functions, it comes within 
the supervisory jurisdiction of the Council of Tribunals. 16 Legal representation 
is permitted in hearings and top litigation counsel are sometimes engaged by the 
parties. This can have the effect of turning the proceedings into a show-case for 
counsel who seek to persuade the panel by performance rather than substance; 
it is not suggested that the panel attaches any great value to it. Policy-making 
by a procedure of written representations, otherwise more commonly known as 
the notice-and-comment procedure is on the other hand less formal and 
probably more effective; less confrontational, more consensual. In 1979, for 
instance, the CAA, as part of its continuous process of reviewing domestic air 
fares, published the Domestic Air Fares: A Review of Regulatory Policy 17 and it 
stated that the aim of the document was to "stimulate discussion" on the issue 
of regulation and deregulation of domestic services through a process of 
consultation in which written comments could be submitted. The discussion 
and submissions would eventually form the basis for "definitive proposals for 
change". 18 In a similar way, the most recent Statemem of Policies oil Rollie 
andAir Transport Licensing of 1993 was adopted following the publication of 
a draft proposal to amend the previous Statement in the light of the 
developments in European air transport policies. 19 Respondents to the 
consultative exercise were varied and naturally the responses varied 
considerably. The significance of this divergence represents a counter-claim to 
the notion of "regulatory capture" since the CAA would not have confined itself 
solely to the views of a particular party or set of interests. Wile it may be a 
relative truth that the public is not likely to be concerned with making 
representations to a policy proposal, the opportunity to do so by a less 
expensive and rule-bound means contrasts markedly with the trial-type 
alternative. The issues of time and expense are dominant considerations even 
for those whose interests are affected. 
The latitude to adopt a notice-and-comment procedure constitutes an important 
device for the efforts of the CAA in developing its policies. In particular, it 
16 See s. I and Sch. I of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. 
17 CAP 420 (1979). 
is Mitt. para. 1.4. 
19 CAP 620 (1993). 
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enables the CAA to initiate policy proposals which could subsequently be 
subject to consultation or hearings without being constrained by the pre- 
condition of having a case or dispute brought before it as an opportunity to 
announce its policies. In an important sense. this provided the CAA with a 
procedural device to lead the industry by positive action by seizing the initiative 
for policy development, an initiative which emerged in the early 1970s not long 
after its creation, More importantly, participants of the industry would know in 
advance what to expect. 
While it is arguable that procedural variety in the formulation of policies by the 
CAA may lead to inconsistency and lack of procedural coherence including the 
systematic consideration of affected interests, the flexibility of procedural choice 
has also enabled the CAA to exercise its discretion on policy-making 
procedures in a more effective and efficient manner. Indeed, the experience of 
the CAA suggests that its procedural discretion has been exercised in a coherent 
and structured manner. The obvious importance of such flexibility is the ability 
of the CAA to focus on the substance of the policy proposal as a determinant of 
the appropriate procedure rather than to be unduly concerned with the 
procedure without regard to the ends with which the procedure is designed to 
achýieve. Regulatory capture which results from a narrow representation of 
interests might be avoided by tailoring procedure to the possible range of 
interests likely to be affected. 
Policy Development: Participation 
Paradoxically, the requirement of consulting representatives of the air transport 
industry and users is both sufficiently precise and vague. The CAA is required, 
on the one hand, to consult such persons who represent the air transport 
industry and users of air transport services, but on the other hand, only in 
respect of such persons which appear to the CAA to be so representative. 
Although in practice it is difficult, nor desirable, to define such representatives, 
the CAA generally adopts the view that an intrinsic value of consultation is to 
consult widely. Persons who are directly involved or affected will be sent a 
draft copy of the policy proposal clearly because their rights or obligations may 
be the subject of the proposal or that certain conditions vest in them a legitimate 
expectation to be notified of the proposal. ^. " In addition, a press notice is made 
to inform others who may wish to respond to the policy proposal. In fact, just 
about anyone who is interested will be given an opportunity to respond. The 
main difficulty affecting the CAA is not so much as to invile responses, but to 
obtain responses from the parties. 21 Participation is accordingly liable to be 
limited to those with a significant degree of interest. 
From an analysis of the primary documents concerning a selected number of 
consultation exercises, it is apparent that parties which respond to the call for 
submission of opinions vary from individuals to large airline companies. 
20 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (19S41 3 All ER 
935. 
21 Director of Economic Regulation. CAA: Intcnicw i%ith the author, 8 November 
1994. 
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Invariably though. the majority of these respondents -were airline operators 
whether British-registered or foreign This is hardly surprising Representation 
of air transport users often takes the form of the Air Transport Users Council, 
Submissions from individuals, often experts in the field of civil aviation, were 
common. With the new liberalisation measures adopted by the EC in 1992. 
several amendments to the 1988 version of the Vwteineitl qf 11olicies on Air 
Traiisporl LiceitshW22 became necessary in order to incorporate the new 
licensing regime. The CAA initiated a consultation exercise to review its civil 
aviation policy in the light this development by publishing a draft Statement of 
Policies ott Route atidAir Tratisporl Liceiish? g. Interested parties were invited 
to submit written representations within a period. A detailed list of respond. ents 
is unnecessary, but suffice it to add that the representations were invariably 
lengthy and comprehensive, some of which contained highly innovative 
submissions. The CAA is clearly concerned to ensure that its consultation 
exercises are not simply symbolic gestures, but rather a genuine invitation for 
the submission of representations and their proper consideration. The problem 
of regulatory capture, although very real in a regulatory setting where the 
statutory objectives have been interpreted as giving priority to user interests, 
does not appear to have affected the CAk to any objectionable extent in its 
consultation exercises. On the contrary, it takes the view that a comprehensive 
consultation framework is an important requisite for the avoidance of regulatory 
capture in policy-making. 
The Competition Policies 
The analysis of British air transport competition policies should begin with the 
Goverm-nent's White Paper of 1984 which sought to re-affirm the statutory 
criteria and to give direction to the industry. 23 It reinforced the prevailing view 
of the Goverm-nent, and existing regulatory policies, that economic decisions of 
air transport services, whether the pattern of route network or the level of fares 
charged, should be determined by market forces while at the same time ensuring 
that airlines are "continuously open to challenge by competitors". Its 
importance stems from the need to ensure that "the barriers to new services and 
airlines who can provide a safe and reliable service should be JOW. "24 Five 
general objectives were set out in the White Paper. 
(i) To maintain high standards of safety. 
(ii) To encourage a sound and competitive multi-airline industry with a 
variety of airlines of different characteristics serving the whole range of 
travellers' needs and sufficiently strong to compete aggressively against 
foreign airlines. 
(iii) To promote competition in all markets. In international civil aviation, 
the Government aims to reduce restrictions on services to enable easier 
access to the market by competitors while reducing any control on the 
introduction of new services, level of fares charged and capacity in 
relation to domestic civil aviation. 
22 CAP 539 (1988). 
23 Airline Competition PolicY (CnincL9366.1984). 
24 Ibid.. para. 2. 
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6v) To ensure adequate safeguards against anti-competitive or predatory 
behaviour This ,,, ould be secured through a competitive industry which 
in turn would protect the long-term interests of the public 
(V) To transfer tile ownership of British ýýjrways into the hands of the 
private sector This objective is now academic since British Airways 
was privatised in 1987 The aim of this exercise was to remove the 
restrictions and protection commonly associated with State ownership, 
but little relation was made to the ways in which the "pfivatisation" 
would promote competition nor develop further a multi-airline industry 
(given at that time a number of independent airlines were already 
existing and competing with British Airways). 
The Government recognised in this policy paper that while a shift in policy 
emphasis itself towards more competition was a simple enough task, its 
execution was a much more difficult task. Certain inherent characteristics of the 
air transport industry tended to inhibit the cultivation of competition on a major 
scale. In particular, the level of competition was dependent on market capacity 
which could not always produce sufficient demand to attract competitors and 
new services. On certain routes it was unlikely that more than one carrier 
would be operating the services although that did not necessarily mean "the 
entrenched positions of inefficient operators will be preserved". 25 Competition, 
therefore, would be stimulated by the threal of compefitioit rather than actual 
competition. This is a variant of the contestability theory, although economic 
regulation would remain an implied necessity. This was further marked out in 
the White Paper where the Government stated, 
Nor will it be possible to deregulate domestic services 
completely, given that there cannot free access to all UKs 
airports. The Civil Aviation Authority will need to continue 
regulating entry to many of the routes airlines wish to fly. 26 
Although it is true that certain economic characteristics unique to air transport 
may impede the realisation of a fully competitive industry, a major factor 
affecting the policy aims of establishing a multi-airline industry that would lead 
to sustainable competition is the very structure of the industry which the 
excesses of a once dominant carrier can still be felt across the spectrum of 
competing airlines. This has a direct bearing on a key contention of this thesis, 
that is econornic regulation tends to evolve into antitrust regulation when the 
conditions of sustainable competition have been achieved. 
International air transport competition, on the other hand, takes a different 
dimension. This was duly recognised in the White Paper. There is a much 
greater degree of uncertainty as to how and the extent to which competition 
might be introduced, for the basic reason that international air transport services 
involve carriers and governments of other countries and agreements for those 
services would therefore require their consent. Hence, whether or not 
competition will prevail under a particular air service agreement cannot be 
determined on a unilateral basis. Economic regulation of international air 
25 NJ. para. S. 
26 Ibid.. para. 30. 
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transport semices is too sensitive a matter to be resolved readily This 
observation, however, does not preclude the theory of contestability from being 
applied to British carriers engaged in international services where an inefficient 
carrier may be substituted. The only difficulty surrounding this approach, that is 
designating a different carrier, is the approval required from the opposite 
country who is party to the agreement since almost every international air 
service agreement would have designated a particular airline or airlines to serve 
on the route concerned. Any proposal to modify that designation will often 
involve a similar attempt by the opposite party to extract concessions or to 
secure maximum advantage for its airline or airlines before granting the 
approval. The protracted negotiations between the US Government and. the 
UK Government over the request by the former to designate United Airlines 
and American Airlines in the place of Pan Am and Trans World Airlines under 
the "Bermuda Agreement" is a classic case in point. 27 Where this has not been 
specified, a general clause will provide some latitude for one party to apply the 
contestability theory and to determine if a more deserving carrier should be 
awarded the fight to provide the services set out the bilateral agreement. Even 
so, unless and until the protectionist tradition in international air transport 
competition is abandoned, competition on a wide-scale will remain very much 
an unlikely reality and deeply uncertain. 28 
Although the involvement of the CAA in providing advice to the Government is 
characteristic of the policy formation process, there are nevertheless limits. The 
White Paper is essentially a political document. It would be inappropriate for 
the CAA to be involved in the final stages of the process when political 
considerations begin to dominate the policy. Nor do they wish to be involved. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the need for White Papers as an instrument of re- 
stating the policies of the Government is becoming, if it has not already become, 
unnecessary. It is evident from the regulatory policies and practices that the 
CAA can do without the White Paper if the Government can. Unlike the 
Airports Act of 1986, the Civil Aviation Act 1982 recognises the need for 
competition in air transport. An analysis of past legislation on air transport 
licensing adequately reveals an incremental move towards more competition in 
the sector, and this has been duty interpreted by the CAA in its series of 
licensing statements. Indeed, the White Paper of 1984 was itself a significant 
departure from previous national policies on air transport competition. With the 
inception of the new regulatory system in 1971, the Government had at the fore 
of its mind a much more restrictive regime where protection would be given to 
the interests of airlines, even if this was at the expense of user interests. This 
was set out in s. 3 of the Civil Aviation Act 1971 where the CAA was required 
principally to secure the provision of air transport services by British airlines in 
accordance with public demand, and to secure opportunities for another airline 
other than BA to provide such services. However, the CAA was only required, 
"subject to the preceding paragraphs, to further the reasonable interests of 
27 See Independent on Sundav-Business Supplement (17 Fcbruarv 199 1) for an account 
of the negotiations. 
28 See ch. 6. infira. 
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users of air transport smices", tile "preceding paragraphs- being those 
conferring a preference on airline interests. 
Competition and the Policy Guidance System 
A most obvious testimony to this development remains. týhat is still the cause 
celebr6 of air transport politics, the Laker Airways litiyation over the legality of 
the policy guidance issued in 1976. '. 9 The policy guidance system. as noted in 
the previous chapter, provides the mechanism for ensuring maximum 
compatibility between national economic policies and air transport regulatory 
policies as developed by the CAA. The system was the result of a number of 
recommendations presented by the Edwards Committee to empower. the 
Secretary of State to "give guidance to the Authority in writing with respect to 
the performance of the functions conferred on it otherwise than by this 
subsection, and it shall be the duty of the Authority to perform those functions 
in such manner as it considers is in accordance with the guidance". 30 This was 
then considered a "constitutional innovation" in public administration. 31 Two 
, 
32 the second of such policy guidances were issued pursuant to that provision . 
which led to Laker Airvrays v Board of Trade and eventually the writing of its 
obituary. 
Inter alia, the first policy guidance provided for a large measure of competition 
in air transport. It stated that activities which had the effect of restraining 
competition or innovation in air transport should only be accepted by the CAA 
if they contributed to the attainment of the statutory objectives. To that end 
also, the CAA "should not reserve any particular type of operation exclusively 
to public or private enterprises by reason of their being publicly or privately 
owned or impose any particular balance as between public and private 
enterprises. '133 However, that did not mean the CAA should license liberally. 
British Caledonian Airways (B. Cal), the "second force" airline as envisaged by 
the Edwards Committee, had to be given "a measure of preference over other 
airlines in allocating licences for new scheduled service routes" at the expense 
of granting to other independent airlines licences to serve additional 
international scheduled routes. 34 Any competition envisaged in the guidance 
was effectively between B. Cal and its principal rival, BA. Nevertheless, the 
notion of according a special measure of preference to B. Cal underlines the 
restrictive or protective approach contemplated under the 1971 legislation. 
The second policy guidance was the product of a review of the civil aviation 
policy in 1974 under the chairmanship of Peter Shore, then the Labour 
Secretary of State for Trade - this was widely known as the Shore Review of 
Civil A viation Policy. Although the contents of the policy guidance were largely 
similar to the first guidance, they differed in a number of significant respects 
29 Future of CivilAviation Policv (CnincL6400.1976). 
30 S. 3(2). Civil A%iation Act 1971. 
31 H. C. Dcbs. 814. col. 1173 (29 March 197 1). 
32 CivilAvialion Pofi, ýv Guidance (Cnind4399.1972)-. Future of OvilAviation PolicY 
(Cmnd. 6400.1976). 
33 CivilAviation Policy Guidance (Cmnd. 4899.1972). para. 13. 
34 Ibid.. paras. 15 & 17. 
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worthy of note here First, the second guidance introduced a "no-competition" 
policy for long-haul services Paragraph 7 required the CAA to license no more 
than one British airline to operate a same long-haul route, thereby reversing 
substantially the provision in the first guidance "hich provided some 
competition between BA. B. Cal and other independent airlines. Routes of 
B. Cal were reorganised into its "sphere of interest" while BA became the 
preferred airline for all other long-haul routes, The licensing of other airlines to 
operate long-haul routes was restricted to "exceptional circumstances". Before 
such licensing, it required the CAA to be satisfied that a substantial demand 
existed, that the service could be operated profitably, that the preferred airline 
(whether BA or B. Cal) would not be likely to introduce an adequate service 
within a reasonable period, and that it would not conflict with the objective of 
maintaining and developing a viable network for scheduled services. Secondly, 
it required the CAA to make public any factors it had taken into account when 
applying the international short-haul competition policy. 35 A third feature of the 
guidance was the instruction given to the CAA to revoke the licence previously 
granted to Laker Airways to operate its "Skytrain" services on the busy trans- 
Atlantic routes. 36 These instructions, taken collectively, amounted not only to a 
substantial departure from the original thinking that the policy guidance was to 
be in general terms although economic issues would remain the prime 
consideration, 37 but also a radical shift in the emphasis of British air transport 
competition policy. One of the first responses to the second guidance was a 
letter from Lord Boyd-Carpenter (CAA! s first chairman) to the Secretary of 
State, amplifying the importance with which the CAA regarded its regulatory 
independence. 
The Authority dissents from the provisions ... of the draft of the 
new guidance insofar as they are intended to and would have the 
effect of inhibiting the Authority from granting, even in the most 
exceptional circumstances an air transport licence to more than 
one airline on the same route. This would severely limit the use 
of the licensing system to secure improvements in air services 
over the main air routes othemise than at the discretion of the 
monopoly carrier. It would also inhibit, inter alia, the licensing 
of experimental services such as "Skytrain", and remove the 
possibility of the Authority using its licensing powers to deal 
effectively with circumstances at present unforeseen unless and 
untH further amendments were made in the guidance. 39 
The latter point is particularly significant since it effectively amounted to a 
revocation of the licence held by Laker Airways if the instruction in the 
guidance was executed. Both, the instruction to revoke and the decision to 
withdraw its traffic rights, prompted Laker Airways to seek judicial redress. 39 
35 Future of Civil Aviation Polic *v (Cmnd. 
6400.1976). para. 9. 36 Ibid.. para. 15. In addition. the Secretary of State also %%ithdrcw the UK/US traffic 
rights for Laker Ainvays. %NWch %vere necessary to operate the international scr%icc. 
37 H. C. Debs. 814. col. 1174 (29 March 1971). 
38 The letter subsequently appeared as a parliamentary witten answcr. H. C. Debs-905/6. 
col. 107 (23 February 1976). 
39 LakerAinvqvs Ltd v Department oJ'Trade (1977) 2 All ER 182. 
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It applied for judicial review seeking a declaration to tile effect that the (then) 
Department of Trade, not the CAA, was not entitled to withdraw its 
designation. The Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of Nilocatta J., ruled 
that a policy guidance can be used to explain or supplement statutory 
objectives, but it could not contradict or reverse them because to do so would 
be ullra Wres. Lord Denning went on to state, 
So long as the "guidance" given by the Secretary of State keeps 
within the due bounds of guidance, the authority is under a duty 
to follow his guidance ... But, if the Secretary of State goes beyond the bounds of "guidance", he exceeds his powers, and 
the authority is under no obligation to obey him. 411 
The court held that paragraphs 7 and 8, which constituted the revocative effect, 
were more akin to "directions" rather than "guidance" because in the opinion of 
Roskill LJ, 
... guidance 
is assistance in reaching a decision proffered to him 
who has to make the decision, but that guidance does not 
compel any particular decision. Direction on the other hand ... is 
compulsive in character. It requires the person to whom the 
direction is given to decide as directed. It deprives him of any 
freedom of decision, of any power to make his own decision as 
opposed to that which he is directed to make. 41 
Although the decision was addressed only to the relevant provisions, it 
nevertheless called into question the credibility of the policy guidance system 
and its use. When the Civil Aviation Act 1982 was passed, the provision for a 
policy guidance was ornitted. Hence, what was heralded as the constitutional 
innovation to British public administration, had to have its obituary written in 
just a little over ten years. It was not the system itself, however, which was at 
fault. 42 A number of other significant, albeit gradual, developments were also 
responsible for the eventual decision to abandon the policy guidance system. In 
particular, the CAA was beginning to formulate and publish policies more 
frequently and on a level which was capable of achieving far greater precision 
than a policy guidance could. Furthermore, these policies were the product of 
wide-ranging consultation with the industry and the representative bodies of air 
transport users. Since 1979 the CAA has been publishing a statement of its 
regulatory philosophy and its licensing criteria which sought to give more clarity 
to its air transport licensing functions. The most recent of these is the 
Statemew of Policies on Route and Air Transport Licensing of 1993 marking 
yet another step towards more liberal licensing. 43 
In spite of the abolition of the policy guidance system, it is still the case that 
national air transport policies can be communicated through White Papers and 
for more specific or exigent matters, through the use of statutory directions 
40 Ibid.. p. 188. 
41 Ibid- p. 199. 
42 See BaIdMn. op. cit, p. 233. More recently. the use of the policy guidance system has 
been revived under the Railwaý s Act 1993: s. 4(5). 
43 CAP 620. This is considered further in the follo%%ing two, chapters. 
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ý, Nhich the Secretarv of State is empowered to issue Howcver. these are limitcd 
to a number of areas. 
(i) national security, 
60 international relations and oblitzations. 
(iii) enabling the UK to become a member of an intcrnational organisation or 
agreement. 
(iv) noise, vibration. pollution or other disturbance 44 
In addition, s. 72 of the Act empowers the Secretary of State to issue directions, 
after consulting the CAA, in relation to air navigation services, These 
directions, however, "have been given sparingly"ý aril if given. are published 
in the Annual Reports of the CAA. 
Policy-Making and Competition: The Privatisation of British Ainvays 
The emergence of a structured policy-making process and the opportunities for 
participation by those involved necessarily meant that the policies adopted were 
more acceptable than it would have been otherwise. It was therefore 
sufficiently clear that the CAA need not necessarily be in complete reliance on a 
policy guidance system to structure the exercise of its discretion. As Baldwin 
puts it, "the guidance had served its purpose and had to be dismantled". 46 The 
system of guidance was no more than an opportunity for the Govemment to re- 
state its policies with greater detail and to provide "a better idea to the CAA of 
the policy to be pursued". 47 Its abandonment could only be for the better 
because it removed an instrument by which ministerial intervention in the 
operations of the CAA was carried out. However, such interventions would be 
less objectionable if glory and blame were equally accepted by ministers for 
success and failure. 48 Consequently, in the absence of an explicit mechanism for 
providing guidance to the CAA, Government policies on air transport continue 
to be published in White Papers as part of its overall national economic policy. 
As has been noted, although limited in its own way, the CAA plays an 
instrumental role in its provision of advice and policy formulation. For 
example, prior to the publication of the White Paper in 1985, the CAA was 
instructed to initiate "a review of civil aviation policy and the structure of the 
British aviation industry to explore all opportunities for increasing competition 
and fairness. "49 The findings of the CAA are set out in Airline Compethion 
Polic 
. 
50 Among the issues discussed, two appeared to be most prominent. The Y 
first related structural imbalance of the industry and the competition 
consequences flowing from it. As a publicly-ovned corporation, BA enjoyed all n 
the advantages of size, strength and economies of operation. Its privatisation as 
a whole enterprise would do no more than to preserve the monolithic structure 
44 S. 6(2), Civil Aviation Act 1982. 
45 R. J. Britton. Secretary and Lc, -,, al Ad%iscr to the CAA. Letter to author (12 February 
1991). 
46 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 243. 
47 A member of the CAA in an interview with the author. 8 November 1994. 
48 Thds has most recentlv been borne by the debacle over the Prison Service and the 
dismissal of its first Chief Executive. Derek LcANis: see Independent (17 October 
1995). 
49 H. C. Dcbs. 62. col. 597 (22 June 1984). 
50 CAP 500 (1984). 
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of the once nationalised industry and present a great potential for market abuse 
and anti-competitive practices For instance, the size of its aircraft fleet, the 
network of routes and the possession of scarce airport slots would vest in it 
such strength and power that any competitor was not likely to be able to sustain 
competition for any length of time with BA. At any rate, as the CAA noted, 
granted these "many advantages that British Airways has been endo%ved with, 
the country might willy-nilly find itself with one privately-owned but less than 
efficient monolith at the end of the day, "51 In more than one respect then, this 
would be a drawback from the competitive policies of the Government and the 
CAA which have evolved over time. If British air transport was effectively 
represented by a single major carrier, particularly in international air transpo. rt,, 52 
the CAA felt that it would no Ionizer be possible for the objectives of its 
competition and licensing policies to be realised because, 
it would be the more difficult for this Authority to bring effective 
pressures to bear upon it to remain efficient while the 
Government, havýing no other voice to listen to, would have little 
choice but to reinforce the protected position of the airline in 
dealing with governments of other countries. 53 
At a time when there was a deliberate policy to expand the then B. Cal as well as 
to develop London(Gatwick) airport into a viable competitor with 
London(Heathrow) and other European airports, the CAA argued for the need 
of "some reduction in the relative size of British Airways so that other airlines 
have adequate opportunity to develop and prosper. "54 This would be achieved 
by a rational transfer of certain routes from BA to B. Call. For instance, services 
operated by BA to Harare would be transferred to B. Call as part of its existing 
services to Lusaka from its base at (London)Gatwick. However, the CAA 
recognised that BA was by any standard of measure a strong and competitive 
airline in international air transport. It remarked, 
If one were to ignore the external dimension - the question of the 
United Kingdom's competitive strength vis a vis foreign airlines - 
it might well be argued that these recommendations do no go far 
enough to create a fair competitive balance between British 
Airways and other British airlines. It is essentially the external 
dimension, the consideration of the United Kingdom's 
competitive strength in the world at large, which determines that 
British Airways should not be broken up and that no greater 
reduction in the scale of British Airways should take place. 55 
Thus, to ensure that the interests of the UK were adequately protected, there 
cannot be a substantial diminution of BA! s competitive edge over foreign 
airlines. In the end, the recommendations of the CA. A, were not adopted by the 
Government56 and BA was privatised urith relatively few changes to structure of 
51 Ibid.. para. 9 
52 See infra. ch. 6. 
53 CAP 500. Para. 7. 
54 Ibid.. p. 2 1. 
55 Ibid.. para. 81. 
56 Airline Competition Policy (Cmn&9366.1984). See also J. Gol'L Regulating Air 
Transport Competition in the UK and the EC (Fundaci6n de Estudios de Rcgulaci6n. 
Spain: 1998). and the audit rcport by the Comptroller and Auditor Gencral: National 
91 
the industry due in large measure to the lobbvinu mitiati-, es of Lord King, tile 
chairman of BA at the time 
The second, but related, consideration was concerned with the relationship 
between competition policy and airports policy, The pursuit of air transport 
competition, even by way of liberal licensing, is only one part of the equation 
because the other half is the capacity of the airport at which air transport 
services begin or terminate. Where, therefore, the maximum capacity of an 
airport has been reached, whatever licence to operate would only remain as a 
licence to operate, as opposed to the actual delivery of services. Such is the 
case with congested airports where demand is high, but where capacity is 
limited by reason of infrastructural, environmental or other social 
considerations. Accordingly, competition at such airports would be limited. 
These infrastructural constraints on air transport and the regulatory responses 
are considered in more detail in chapter six. However, suffice it to say at this 
stage that the London airport system, comprising of Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted and Luton airports, is subject to such airports policies as are published 
from time to time, typically dealing with the ways in which air traffic should be 
distributed between them against the backdrop a wider policy on airports 
development such as that noted above. 
The findings and recommendations of the CAA for a more liberal approach to 
air transport competition reflect its regulatory philosophy that competitive 
solutions should be the preferred method of regulation as set out in successive 
policy statements, of which the most recent was published in 1993, and 
evidenced by the body of case-law on licensing. To this extent, it is also 
possible to detect a large measure of parity with the aims of Community policy 
on air transport competition. Without pre-empting more detailed discussion in 
chapter seven, suffice it to state that Community policy is comprised of "three 
phases" of liberalisation measures. The first were adopted in 1987, the second 
in 1990 and the third in 1992. These measures, however, were preceded by two 
memoranda from the Commission to the Council setting out the crucial need for 
a common air transport policy which until 1987 was desperately lacking for a 
variety of reasons. The first of these memoranda was published in 1979 in 
which the Commission, although fully aware of the delicate nature of the 
industry, argued the importance of the role of air transport in contributing to the 
harmonious development of the Community. " It identified four operational 
objectives as comprising of 
(i) a network of efficient air transport services unhampered by national 
barriers which would serve the needs of users; 
(ii) conditions of financial soundness for airlines through the diminution of 
costs and increase in productivity; 
(iii) a system of safeguards for airline workers; 
(iv) improved conditions of life for the general public. 
Audit Officc. Sale of Government Shareholding in British. timays p1c HC 37 (1987- 
88). 
57 The Observer (19 July 1937)ý 
58 Contribution of the European Communities to the Development oj*. 4ir Transport 
Services. Bull. EC Supp. 5/79), 
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These policy aims %,, ere reiterated in a second memorandurn of 1984, in vVhich 
the Commission provided an analysis of the progress made towards a common 
air transport policy in the light of new economic and regulatorN conditions, " 
Mthough some air transport measures were adopted in the period between 1979 
and 1934, most had little to do with competition. 61' In one respect then. the 
second memorandum was a manifestation of the delay on the part of the 
Council to adopt air transport competition legislation. The innnobi 11slyle was, in 
large measure, attributable to the highly ýliscretionary Treaty provision of 
Article 84(2) on air transport. 
The success of an air transport proposal depends on the voting within thýe 
Council, as the principal legislative body. Article 84(2) states that 
The Council may [acting by a qualified majority] decide whether, 
to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions 
may be laid down for sea and air transport. 
The qualified majority requirement was inserted by the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986 to amend the previous requirement of a unanimous vote. It is 
evident from the provision that a large measure of discretion has been entrusted 
to the Council which simply reflects the special characteristics of air transport 
and the need for cautious actions. By the same token, the vulnerability of the 
sector to such political 'horse-trading' and difficulty of securing consensus is 
clear. This is well illustrated by the supreme reluctance of the Council to adopt 
a common air transport policy, despite persistent communications from the 
Commission, until some 30 years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome6l 
and also the difficulty in agreeing to an external relations poUCy. 62 In one sense, 
therefore, the insertion of majority voting, as opposed to unanimous voting, has 
served to limit the breadth of the Council's discretion. 
The process of policy-mak-ing at the Community level is necessarily complex 
and lengthy. Granted that consensus is often achieved at the end of the day, it 
comes not without protracted and difficult negotiations. The dominance of 
political characteristics in air transport makes the problem of achieving 
consensus between Member States particularly acute. No secret can be made of 
the fact that tension exists between 'Member States in formulating air transport 
policies; while some Xlember States are in favour of a liberal approach, others 
may be less convinced of the virtues of abandoning interventionist practices. 
The arrival of the principle of subsidiarity is likely to magnify the complications. 
This is already evident in the dispute over external air transport competence. 63 
59 Progress Toivar&v The Developinent of .1 
Conununiýv Air Transport PolicY. 
COM(84) 72. 
60 For instance, aircraft noise, See P. Davics and J. Goh. "EC Law on Aircraft Noise: 
Recent Developments" (199-3 )) European Environinental LMv Review 229. 
61 This discussion has been made elsewhere. See I. Goh. "Regulating The Skies of 
Europe: Air Transport Competition" (1992) 27 European Transport Lms, 272. 
62 See J. Goh. **E. \tcrnal Relations in Community Air Transport: A Policy Analysis" 
(1996) 2 European Public Lmv 453. 
63 Ibid. 
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Government and the Development or Air Trinsport Policies 
It should now be taken as read that governmental involvement in air transport is 
an inescapable feature. Its role in shaping and directing the industry stems from 
the strategic importance of air transportation as a means for communications 
and speedy transactions. Its potential contfibution to the economy as a whole is 
indisputably significant, as s. 3(l)(c) of the Civil Aviation Act 1971 had 
expressly recognised. Consequently, there can be little surprise that air transport 
is frequently charged with political overtones. These observations are 
applicable whether in respect of domestic or international air transport. In 
respect of the latter, the need to protect a nation's air space and territ6ri4i 
sovereignty is regarded as quintessential and more often than not the primary 
source from which restrictive practices emanate. The rules governing 
international air transport ensure the centrality of the government intervention in 
the form of bilateral negotiations and any eventual conclusion of air service 
agreements. The need for protection has further extended the role of 
governments to other areas such as the control of foreign investment in a 
domestic carfier, and the resolution of differences between airlines in the 
provision of air services. To a certain extent, the international air transport 
policy of the UK, and of other member countfies of the EC, will be subject to 
the policy of the EC on external relations in air transport by virtue of their 
membership of the EC when such a policy is eventually adopted. 64 
Primary responsibility for the formulation of air transport policies in the UK 
rests with the government, and specifically the Department of Transport (now 
the Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions). But the 
involvement of other Departments is inevitable and policies are often formulated 
under an inter-departmental network of committees. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office is frequently asked for its ad-vice on international aspects 
of air transport treaties and the like. The need for or the purpose of specific 
governmental policies stems from what is often only a broad legislative 
definition of the regulatory objectives on a particular issue. These provisions 
seldom provide a sufficiently precise guidance of the rernit of the agency vested 
with the regulatory responsibility, and arguably therefore governmental policies 
are designed to structure the (political) width of discretion entrusted to the 
agency. Thus, in many ways, the system of policy guidance was a manifestation 
of an industry often characterised by political considerations, whether they be 
national security, or factors of social or economic kind such as employment and 
industrial investment. 
Although the charge has been frequently made that consultation for public 
decision-making is far from systematic, and indeed that there is no general duty 
64 For a discussion of the external relations policy. see I. Goh. "External Relations in 
Community Air Transport: A Policy Analysis- (1996) 2 European Public LMv 453 
and -Turbulence in the Skies of Europe" 0995) l45. VLI 1665. 
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in law requiring public agencies to consult prior to decision-making. 0 this is not 
borne out by the record of the C. k-k and the Government in the formulation of 
air transport policies. The previous chapter, in particular. has shown that 
historically the Government relied on committees of inquiry to assess the 
direction in which the nation's air transport should take, and whose 
recommendations would often form the basis for government policies Beyond 
the use of these committees, such as the Maybury, Cadman and Edwards 
committees, the Government would often consult the CAA for advice, Thus, in 
1984, the CAA published its report into the likely impact of BA's privatisation 
on airline competition poliCy. 66 Indeed, the Civil Aviation Act 1982 empowers 
the Secretary of State to require the CAA to provide assistance either in. the 
form of advice or material information held by the CAA. On the giving of 
advice, s. 16 of the Act empowers the Secretary of State to require from the 
CAA "such assistance and advice" for the purposes of his civil aviation 
functions. S. 17 on the other hand, imposes a duty on the CAA to supply the 
Secretary of State with "such information as he may specify' provided it is 
information already held by the CAA or can reasonably be expected to obtain. 
This section further requires the CAA to notify the Secretary of State of any 
proposal by an air transport licence holder to merge with another body, or any 
matter which affects international relations or the environment. 
Furthermore, and in spite of there being no general legal duty to consult on the 
part of public agencies, the courts have gradually begun to construct a 
jurisprudence for participation. They have recognised that in certain 
circumstances consultation may be a legitimate expectation of the affected party 
or parties so that a failure to consult may either render the administrative act 
invalid or non-applicable in respect of the complainant by a process of 
severance. 67 Legitimate expectation is a concept first coined by Lord Denning in 
the case of Schmidt v Secretary of Statefor Home Affairs in which his Lordship 
said, 
The speeches in Ridge v Bah1win show that an administrative 
body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is 
affected by their decision an opportunity of making 
representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or 
interest or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it 
would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to 
say. 68 
65 P. Craig. Administrative Lem (S%Ncct & London: 3rd cdn.. 1994). 
P. Birkinshaw. Grievances, Reme&es and the State (S%N-ect & Nia. \Nvcll. London: 2nd 
edn.. 1994). 
66 CAP 500 (1984). 
67 For the idea of sc%-erance. see c. g. DPP v Hutchinson [ 199012 AC 783. 
68 196912 Ch 149, at p. 170. See also Ridge v Balths-in 1196312 All ER 66-. Re HK 
196712 QB 617. Re Liverpool Taxi Ou-nersAssociation [ 197212 All ER 589. Rv 
Secretary of State jbr Health ex p US Tobacco International 1199211 All ER 212. R 
v British Coal Corporation ex pI arqv f 19931 IRLR 104-. Rv Secretary oj'Stale for 
Transport ex p Richmond-upon-Thames LBC 1199411 All ER 577. 
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That view was later affirmed by Lord Diplock in the leading case of (; CHQ 69 
In seeking to explain the concept of legitimate expectation. his Lordship stated 
that a decision qualified for judicial review if its consequences affected some 
person by depriving that person of some benefit or advantage which he was 
permitted to enjoy in the past before rational grounds and an opportunity to 
comment had been given for its withdrawal, or by depriving him of some benefit 
or advantage on which he was assured of an opportunity to make 
representations before it was withdrawn. 70 The formulation seems concerned 
with the conduct of the decision-maker which gives rise to the expectation, and 
not on the expectation per se that it is an inherent expectation of a person 
affected by the decision of a public authority 71 
Be that as it may, effective participation requires also transparency in decision- 
making. That is to say, for participants to make informed contributions, all 
relevant information must be forthcoming and that none is hidden or tempered 
with. Free-willing dialogue cannot be possible if deceit or entrapment is 
intended. This is perhaps consistent with Habermas' idea of the "ideal-speech 
situation". 72 Although the CAA is committed to consultation and openness, in 
particular by virtue of its system of public hearings and publication of reasons 
for its decisions, the same cannot always be said of the Government and its 
process of framing wider air transport policy objectives. There remains a 
detectable degree of unevenness in terms of access to the policy formulation 
machinery as borne out by the lobbying tactics of BA's chairman prior to its 
privatisation. It is possible that the proposal to enact a Freedom of Information 
legislation would do much to redress the deficit on the transparency of decision- 
making by the Government. 73 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter which charted the history of regulation in British air 
transport made it clear that the industry structure which emerged as a result of 
Government policies over the years made it necessary also to establish and 
maintain an economic regulatory framework when the industry was eventually 
exposed to competition, and particularly when BA was transferred to private 
sector with virtually all its privileges and assets intact. These included not only 
the fleet of aircraft, but also the priceless airport slots at London(Heathrow) 
airport which it inherited from its monopoly years. Accordingly, policies to deal 
with potential problems arising from these disparities have had to be formulated. 
This chapter was a combined attempt to examine the role of the CAA and the 
69 Council of Civil Service Unions v Aftnister for the Civil Service [ 19341 3 All ER 
935. 
70 Ibid.. p. 949. 
71 See now Rv Secretarv of State fi)r Transport ex p Richmond-upon-Thames LBC 
[199411 All ER 577. 
72 J. Habermas. Communication and the Evolution of Sociqv (Heincmann. London: 
1979). 
73 Your Right To Know: 7he Government's Proposalfor a Freedom of InjbrillationAct 
(Cni. 3818.1997) 
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Government in formulating air transport competition policies generally and the 
extent to which these policies have had to change over time to reflect new 
developments, including the EC developments. Since the arrival of EC measures 
on air transport, policy formulation both by the Government and the CAA 
cannot now take place in splendid isolation. Indeed, regulatory policies of the 
CAA have been amended to the extent that they now reflect Community policy 
on air transport competition. Of course, membership of the EC and tile legal 
effect of Community legislation and decisions have much to do with it although 
these will not be rehearsed here. 74 
in terms of their role in policy formulation, there is a large degree of 
' 
co- 
operation between the CAA and the relevant government department, 
particularly in the form of assistance and advice given by the CAA to the 
Secretary of State. The impact of privatising BA lock, stock and barrel on the 
competition policies was an instance of the instrumental role expected of the 
CAA, even though its recommendations in respect of slimming down the size of 
BA before its privatisation were not taken up. The relationship between the 
Government and the CAA has clearly changed over the years, and more so since 
the abandonment of the policy guidance system which in fairness had its 
purpose. But the maturity of that relationship had to be recognised, as must the 
maturity of the CAA itself in terms of its ability to develop coherent and 
structured procedures. Indeed, it will become apparent in the following chapters 
that the abandonment of the system of statutory policy guidance has not halted 
the progression with which the airline industry has been led by positive action 
by the CAA. Policy initiatives have been taken by the CAA, and subjected to 
wide consultative procedures much akin to the US administrative rule-making 
procedures under the federal Administrative Procedure Act 1946. This 
development alone, if not others, has brought credibility to the process of 
economic regulation in civil aviation by an administrative agency in the UK. It is 
axiomatic that a highly developed set of procedures for policy-making is both 
desirable to justify the existence of the regulatory system as well as important to 
give legitimacy to the policies which will ultimately have to be interpreted by 
the regulatory agency in fulfilling its functions. 
It should also be clear from this chapter that over time, and through a change in 
the instincts of the authorities, there was a detectable paradigm shift from an 
emphasis on airline interests to user interests, It is submitted that this is a pre- 
condition for critical market contestability because unless a substantial mutuality 
between the interests of the producers and purchasers can be found, economic 
regulation will continue to be necessary until it is deemed that the conditions of 
sustainable competition have been achieved. This shift has no doubt led to 
significant changes in the substantive policies of the CAA, which the empirical 
evidence in the following chapters will demonstrate, can affect, even if only 
74 See generally. DACIrcestone and J. S. Da%idson. The Institutional Framework of 
the European Communities (Croom Helm. London: 1938) and leadin-g. cases of Case 
26/62. X. 1. ALizemene Transport En Expedite Onderneining Van Gend En Loos v 
Nederlandse Tarieficonunisie [19631 CNILR 103-. Case 6164, Costa 1, ENEL [19641 
CNILR 425-, Case 22 1/89 Factortaine v Secretaýv of Statefor Transport [199113 All 
ER 769. 
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unwittingly, the established procedures of the regulatory agency. for example, 
lesser of use of the public hearings system. To that extent, this chapter has 
sought to provide the background for understanding the relationship between 
procedures and substance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE REGULATIN,, G CUMPETITION 
AND ITS CHANGING NATURE 
I will not speak to you about yeslerdqv because I was not the saine person 
(Ahce in Illoniferland) 
Economic regulation of air transport entails the regulation of economic 
activities performed by an air transport operator. These include decisions 
whether to commence services on a particular route, decisions on the frequency 
of services which consequently determines the number of seats to oiTcr over a 
period of time, ' and decisions on the fares to be charged to users of the 
services. By implication, economic deregulation means the freeing of such 
decisions from control. If competition for custom is determined by these 
economic decisions, that is where one could fly to, the choice of schedule or of 
fares, then economic regulation or deregulation represents two extreme 
methods of determining how much competition there will be in air transport 
services. And because regulation is a relative concept, then so must 
competition. The latter is likely to be absent if regulation was absolute and 
prescriptive, approximating a structure of law-monopolies by virtue of the 
regulatory authorisation. This is possible even if there were two or more 
operators providing services on the same routes. If their decisions on frequency 
or fares were determined by the regulator, there is then no freedom of decision- 
making; by setting a fare which had not been previously authorised by the 
regulator would probably incur a penalty of some kind. Nor is there likely to be 
the incentive to compete, for example, by providing a more superior quality of 
service if such regulation amounted virtually to a protection of revenue. 
In chapter two, regulated competition was argued as an approach which aims to 
provide the combination of regulation on the one hand, and freedom in 
decision-making on the other hand. In such an instance, some economic aspects 
of air transport continue to be regulated by the public regulatory authority while 
some others are free to be determined by the operators according to the forces 
of the market place. What, and how much of it, should be regulated is a matter 
of degree which must depend on a number of variables. Political 
considerations, amongst others, is often a dominating factor. Economic 
conditions and international relations are equally influential as to the level at 
which airline competition should be pitched. Domestic air fares, for example, 
have been deregulated and that entails the level of fares are decided by airline 
operators according to what they judge users are prepared to pay. However, 
some public regulation of fares continue to exists. The CAA, for instance, 
continues to ensure that airline operators do not set predatory fares so as to 
drive out other competitors who cannot pro'%ide sustained competition at that 
level of fares. More recently, the introduction of air transport liberalisation 
measures by the EC requires the CAA to abandon, inter alia, the regulation of 
Both the ftequency of services and the nmnb,., r of total seats is also referred to as the 
locapacity". 
access to the market by airline operators from Member States since that would 
be contrary to the right to establish and pro%ide services as recounised by the 
Treaty of Rome. These are considered in due course Regulated competition is 
therefore a regulatory process demanding a delicate balance to be struck 
between, on the one hand. economic regulation to ensure that a certain 
ob 
' 
iective, for example the public interest, is not prejIudiced, and on the other 
hand, sufficient economic autonomy enabling decisions to be made on a purely 
commercial basis. Regulated competition entails a framework %vithin which 
boundaries for competition between airline operators are set and to be 
observed, so that an infraction of these framework rules may lead to sanctions 
of one form or another. 
How the routes, fares and capacity of an airline operator are regulated varies, 
and it varies according to the regulatory system. In the case of a statutory 
monopoly, and therefore the existence of no more than one airline operator, this 
may be achieved by a system of statutory regulation. Routes could be 
prescribed in statutory provisions; so could the level of fares to be charged for 
each service on each route as could the capacity to be provided for services. 
But this would be ridiculously cumbersome, for each alteration to routes or 
fares could only be effected by statutory amendment or some delegated means 
of legislative amendment. The inefficiency of such an approach dictates against 
the system of direct regulation by statute. Even in the years when British civil 
aviation was dominated by a statutory monopoly in the form of British Overseas 
Airline Corporation, the prescription of routes, fares and capacity was devolved 
to a Board of the Corporation which maintained a constant liaison with the 
government department responsible for civil aviation. In a framework of 
regulated competition, where more than one airline operator exists, and where 
some specification of routes, fares and capacity may be required, then these may 
be communicated to the operators in the form of an air transport licence, 
franchise or other contractual agreements. In the previous chapter, the various 
types of licences used by the CAA including operating licences, route licences 
and air transport licences were considered. 
The system of licensing in British air transport first emerged with the creation of 
the Air Transport Licensing Board in 1960 when the decision was made to 
introduce competition to the industry. 2 Henceforth, the development of the 
licensing system has taken various turns and has been modified to adapt to 
changing circumstances in the industry, not least the changes brought about by 
new EC rules on air transport licensing. Licences of different classes for 
different purposes are now granted. An operating licence, for instance, is a pre- 
requisite for airline operations, without which no operator could provide air 
transport services. This is set out in s. 64 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 which 
makes it an offence for any operator of an aircraft to carry passengers or cargo 
on a flight if the operator has not been licensed according to the Act. Being the 
essential basis for airline operations, an operating licence is usually granted on 
the grounds of managerial competence and financial fitness. Further conditions 
2 Although see ch-3, on the emergence or "associates" of the nationaliscd Air 
Corporations. 
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may also be imposed on operators. and these may be economic or social in 
nature, for example safety and environmental, The former is set out in the Air 
Operator's Certificate which determines the worthiness of an aircraft. 
Environmental regulation may include the control of aircraft noise for instance. 3 
The validity of a licence depends significantly on compliance with the conditions 
of the licence by its holder, the failure of which will render the licence liable to 
revocation. It is by virtue of the imposition of any such conditions and their 
compliance which makes the licence a key instrument in the regulation of civil 
aviation. 
This chapter and the next will consider first, the criteria for air transport 
licensing by the CAA and the body of licensing case-law which has evolved 
over time as changes in the regulatory emphasis were introduced. These will 
provide a basis for assessing the extent to which the CAA has responded to the 
changing economic climate. In particular, as will be considered in depth in the 
next chapter, they will allow for conclusions to be made on the manner in which 
the CAA has developed more specific regulatory responses to persistent barriers 
which impede competition. 
Licensing for Competition: Policy Statement of the CAA eý 
The Bias Towards Competition 
The principal policy document on air transport licensing is the Statement of 
Policies on Route and Air Transport Licensing4 which sets out the philosophy 
and approach of the CAA. CAP 620 is the most recent of a series of policy 
statements on air transport licensing which have gradually emphasised the 
importance of competitive solutions on the allocation of routes, and of 
liberalising regulatory controls over fares and capacity. In comparison to 
previous policy statements, the scope of the current statement has also been 
modified substantially to reflect the requirements of the common licensing 
criteria for European air transport. Licensing of Air Carriers Regulations 
1992,5 which gave effect to Council Regulation 2407/92 on common licensing 
criteria and amended s. 68 of the 1982 Act, removes the licensing jurisdiction of 
the CAA from services provided by EC-based airlines Ný, rithin the Community, 
whilst Access for Community Air Carriers to Intra-Community Air Routes 
Regulations 19926 gave effect to Council Regulation 2408/92 on market access. 
Together with Council Regulation 2409/92 on fares, 7 these EC measures apply 
to intra-Community air transport including British domestic air transport. 
Accordingly, the scope of CAP 620 is effectively restricted to the licensing of 
routes not covered by the Community Regulations. 
3 E. g. see P. Da%ies and J. Goh, "Air Transport and The Environment: Regulating 
AircraftNoise" (1993) ISAIR and Space L4 11'123. 
4 CAP 620 (1993). The prnlous policy statement on licensing was publishcd as CAP 
539(1983). 
5 SI 1992/2992. 
6 SI 1992/2993. 
7 Incorporated by Air Fares Regulations 1992. SI 1992/2994. 
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The Statement sets out the prime concern of the CAA in the performance of its 
economic regulatory functions as "the reasonable interests of users" and it sees 
those interests as best served by an environment of active competition which 
would ensure "the widest possible choice of products, services and 
airports .. quality of service is maintained fares are set at reasonable levels in 
relation to cost". 9 A competitive environment will also provide a strong 
incentive to achieve efficient operations and sound allocation of resources, This 
policy, however, has not been an overnight development It comes in the light 
of increasing, but gradual, exposure of the industry to competition over a period 
of time as legislation are enacted and policies formulated. 
For reasons already identified and which will treated in more detail in 'the 
following chapter, the air transport industry is not readily susceptible to 
competition. A sound approach is therefore required to ensure that not only 
can active competition be introduced, but is capable of being sustained. To that 
end, the CAA sets out its central principle for achieving a competitive air 
transport environment as a multi-airline industry in which, 
the interests of users are best met by the existence of a number 
of efficient and profitable British airlines strong enough to 
compete with each other and with foreign airlines, directly or 
indirectly, where the opportunity arises or can usefully be 
created. Thus, it will seek to encourage the development and 
maintenance of an environment in which efficient British airlines 
can operate profitably and in which competition between British 
carriers and with foreign airlines can flourish and user choice is 
enhanced. 10 
This policy statement creates a general presumption that the CAA will license 
air transport services liberally to encourage a competitive environment by 
maintaining a multi-airline industry. Applicants for air transport licences and 
objectors to such applications will therefore have prior knowledge of the 
premise on which the CAA will begin its consideration of these applications. A 
multi-airline policy, however, is not a policy set in stone; nor should it be 
without running the risks of fettering its own discretion. " Indeed, the CAA has 
stated explicitly that it sees competition as no more than a tool for securing the 
interests of users. 
The policies set out in the Statement of Policies do not have a 
life of their own: they exist to achieve the objectives of the Act. 
The multi-airline policy is not an end in itself, as the Statement of 
Policies makes clear, but rather a means to an end. If the 
Authority were persuaded that the multi-airline industry policy 
was no longer in the interests of air transport users, it would 
abandon it. 12 
This approach is evident in the interpretations which the CAA has adopted in 
respect of its policy when adjudicating air transport licensing cases in which it I 
8 CAP 620. para. 3. 
9 Ibid. para. 4. 
10 Ibid 
II See e. g. Lmvnder vAlinisterfor Housing anti Local Governinew 119701 WLR 123 1. 
12 Decision 7/90. 
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has demonstrated that it is more concerned with licensing competing rather than 
replacement services. Thus, in rejecting BA's application following its merger 
with B. Cal to operate on the London(Gatwick)-Paris route in competition with 
the incumbents Air Europe and Dan-Air. the CA-A reasoned that. 
BA did not propose any new products or lower fares beyond 
those already offered from Heathrow Nor. given its cost 
structure, could it expect to develop the low fare market any 
more actively than the incumbents. Additional flights would of 
course widen choice, but only if they did indeed supplement 
rather replace those already on offer. 13 
Similarly, in the first case under the new European licensing measures, the CAA 
stated that the application made by Jersey European Air-ways, and objectea to 
by CityFlyer Express, must proceed on the "explicit assumption that it should 
grant a licence" on the London(Gatwick)-Jersey route because of its established 
policies on competition. 14 Since the policy presumption is to satisfy the 
reasonable interests of users, where an application has been made with 
demonstrated benefits for the users, such as a broader range of available 
products in the form of fares or schedule, the CAA would require powerful 
objections before an application on that basis would be refused. Is Where the 
proposed provision of such benefits has been decided as a matter of commercial 
judgment, the CAA would be tended to leave the forces of the market place to 
determine the feasibility of the proposal unless "the need is evident" for 
regulatory intervention. This was so stated in a decision of the CAA on the 
Birmingham-Berlin route in which it took the view that where "there was scope 
for UK airlines to compete effectively on interriational routes, and potential for 
bringing new benefits, operators should be allowed to put their services to the 
test of the market". 16 
A multi-airline policy, however, cannot be pursued in a manner oblivious to 
circumstances which may threaten the realisation of the statutory objectives. It 
is part of a broader system which must be flexible to accommodate the specific 
features of each case in which the policy is to be applied. As a general 
presumption, therefore, this policy approach is of course open to rebuttal. The 
CAA will depart from its normal licensing policy where a strong case has been 
made to persuade it that special circumstances dictate such departure. 
Accordingly, in considering the application of its policy, the CAA would analyse 
the benefits which the proposed service would entail. In Decision 6/91, for 
example, it examined the density of the routes in question and the availability of 
slots at particular timings to enable the provision of a competitive and viable 
service. To that end also, it may decide to refuse an application of, say, BA, to 
operate competing services from London(Gatwick) while also operating from 
London (Heathrow) on the basis that its dominance over London routes, as a 
result of historical endowment, would lead to unfair competition and thus 
threaten the realisation of the statutory objectives. This approach was 
13 Decision 3/90. 
14 Decision 1/93. para. 12. 
15 See e. g. Decision S, *9 1. 
16 Decision 3/9 1. 
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particularly evident in the applications following the BA-B Cal merger where 
BA had been required to surrender a substantial number of slots at Gatwick. In 
one of the applications. the CAA noted that "Wiile Heathrow continues to enjoy 
its present advantage over Gatwick and other airports, airlines which do not 
operate there or cannot get into it will be at a permanent disadvantage and all 
applications for Gatwick services by airlines already established at Heathrow 
must be seen in that light. "17 The relevance of this line of argument would be 
exceptionally acute if the application involved services to the same destination 
so that it would, 
give it [BA] unassailable advantages over airlines who, de jure or 
de facto, can operate only from Gatwick. Thus, where BA 
applies to begin a new route from Gat%, Yick in addition to a 
Heathrow service and against the objections of airlines . vWch have established successful and valuable services there, it will 
need to demonstrate convincingly that it has a reasonable 
prospect of doing so profitably and, more importantly, that the 
overall impact of its serving that destination from Gatwick in 
addition to Heathrow is more likely to bring some notable 
additional benefits to users than to jeopardise existing benefits. II 
In such instances its multi-airline industry commitment will have to be departed 
from, though this does not detract from the notable shift in the onus of arguing 
for an air transport licence to a general policy of liberal licensing. So long as 
the generality of policy remains open to change or persuasion, the regulatory 
framework will continue to offer the flexibility to pursue the statutory 
objectives. As Lord Reid has espoused in British Oxygell Co Lid v Board of 
Trade, 
The general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a statutory 
discretion must not "shut his ears to an application". I do not 
think there is any difference between a policy and a rule. There 
may be cases where an officer or authority ought to listen to a 
substantial argument reasonably presented urging a change of 
policy. What the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at 
all. But a NEnistry or large authority may have had to deal 
already with a multitude of sinfflar applications and then they will 
almost certainly have evolved a policy so precise that it could 
well be called a rule. There can be no objection to that, provided 
the authority is always willing to listen to anyone with something 
new to say .... 
19 
Air Transport Deregulation in the UK 
In the years when liberalisation or deregulation was unheard of, command-and- 
control regulation was the norm. Air transport licences were allocated subject 
17 Decision 3/90. 
is Ibid. See also Decisions 7/88 and 7/90, 
19 [ 197 11 AC 6 10. at p. 625. See also Rv Port of London .4 uthority ex p Kvnoch 
Lid 
[19191 KB 176. 
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to hiQhly prescriptive conditions dealing v. -ith routes, fares, capacity and the 
like When the ATLB was responsible for licensing air carriers, it sat on an 
avera e of 142 days each year This contrasts very sharply "ith the average of 9 
40 hearings by the CAA in the years leading up to 1994 and perhaps more 
significantly with the year of 1994 in which no more than two hearings were 
held, both of which were in fact dealing %Nith the same case, and with 1996 in 
which no hearings were held. In an interview with the author, a member of the 
Authority, who postulated a number of explanations for the decline in the 
frequency of hearings, advised that "whenever an opportunity to attend a 
hearing arises, seize it". '-O This decline, however, is not illustrative of a decline 
in the number of applications for air transport licences, rather, it is instructivo of 
the changing nature of civil aviation regulation including the libcralisation of 
Community air transport and hence the need for conducting a hearing for the 
purposes of allocating the licence. Hearings are now virtually dependent on an 
instruction from the Secretary of State, for example, to allocate scarce capacity 
under a bilateral agreement. 
The contrast between the ATLB and the CAA lies very much in their 
philosophy of regulation. The former regulated not only the scheduled 
passenger market but also the charter market, and the majority of its licensing 
hearings was to deal with applications for the provision of charter services. 
When the CAA was established in 1972 to replace the ATLB, amongst its first 
initiatives was the study into the possibility of deregulating the charter market. 
It sought to determine whether it was necessary for charter operators to submit 
themselves to the formal process of a hearing for, say, a proposal to lower fares 
or a decision to increase capacity. It concluded that control of fares would be 
abandoned from 1973, but to ensure that charter operators did not disappear 
from the market to the detriment of the users, the CAA required additional 
bonding under its new system of Air Transport Organiser Licence (ATOL). 
Both of these conclusions were consistent with the recommendations in the 
Edwards Report, 21 that is, to experiment with deregulation of charter fares but 
to provide at the same time further safeguards. The significance of deregulating 
charter fares was to remove the opportunity for other operators, in particular 
scheduled operators, to object to a proposal on fares in a public hearing since 
these scheduled operators were anxious to preserve their share of the market on 
package holidays and the like. Charter fares would quite simply be decided on a 
commercial basis of demand and supply although operators continued to be 
required to file the fares with the CAA. This is also in accordance with s. 6S(4) of 
the 19S2 Act which requires the CAA "to impose on the civil air transport 
industry of the United Kingdom and on the services it provides for users of air 
transport services the minimum restrictions". 
20 Intcr%icw with the author. 8 November 1994. It is interesting that four hearings were 
held in 1993. one of which. ho%ic, %-cr. was a re-hearing ordercd by the Secretary of 
State on the London-Moscow route. 
21 Op. cit.. paras. 704-719. A rmicw %%zs initiated in 1994 to recommend changes to a 
*-stem introduced since 1972 to rcflect a more complex tra-s-cl mironment and these 
came into cffcct in 1993: Civil Aviation (Air Transport Organisers Licensing) 
Regulations 1995. SI 1995/1054. 
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Thus, although the deregulation of air transport is widely deemed to have been 
pioneered by the US 
Jmost two decades ago, any analysis of dercgulatory 
policies must begin with the assumption that economic regulation and 
deregulation differs only in degree. The model of deregulation in the US was 
the complete abandonment of any economic regulatory control, and this VAII 
differ from a model of partial deregulation, which also may be described as 
liberalisation. This is consistent with a key theme of the thesis, that is the 
models of 'monopoly' and 'perfect competition' are two extremes on the same 
spectrum of economic models. This implies that intermediate points exist to 
provide the possibility of combining the need for regulation to the extent 
necessary and a measure of freedom at the same time. The intermediate model 
adopted in this thesis is known as regulated competition. If this latter model is 
accepted as providing for some form of deregulation, then whether airline 
deregulation, as a principle, was pioneered by the US must be considered in this 
wider context. Chapter 8 has been devoted to examining the system of 
deregulation in the US and to argue further that whatever the degree of 
economic regulation needs to be adopted must depend on a number of 
important factors, the most significant of which is the structural balance of the 
industry. For now, more needs to be said of this point by reference to the CANs 
(de)regulatory policies on route entry, fares and capacity. 
Regulated route entry 
The deregulation of entry, that is route licensing, does not necessarily enjoy the 
ease which goes 'with fares or capacity deregulation. The major obstacle to a 
successful deregulation of route entry is undoubtedly the restrictions brought 
about by both natural and artificial constraints on competition. Where, 
however, opportunities exist, the CAA has attempted to extend its liberal 
licensing policy to route entry. In most cases, this would assume a certain pre- 
existing degree of parity in terms of market access-, that is to say, for instance, 
B1\4A switching its use of a slot for destination X at a congested airport such as 
Heathrow to destination Y so as to compete with, say, BA. If entry 
competition was simply deregulated, an industrial structure characterised by a 
dominant airline is likely to lead to the fortification of the dominance by reason 
of its size, scope and strength. Those airlines which do not enjoy such qualities 
will be perpetually disadvantaged and possibly out-performed. Regulated entry, 
although it does not entail the diminution of that dominance by positive action, 
enables the CAA to harness equal opportunities for competition between 
airlines, both large and small alike. The aims of entry deregulation are 
consequently capable of being achieved to an equivalent extent N"ithin a 
structure of regulated entry, provided of course the aims remain constant and 
regulatory actions are taken in accordance with these aims. Under CANs 
policy of liberal route licensing, the effects have been significant in two 
particular respects. First, a new entrant has often provided the stimulus for 
price competition and this is evident in the remarks of the CAA when it 
examined the trends of competition in relation to Community air transport. For 
instance, it noted that the "most significant developments in the realm of fares 
have been those provoked by BTNIA on its international routes from Heathrow. " 
Secondly, it noted further that in cases where price competition has traditionally 
been less elastic such as business fares, competing services have entailed new 
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products for users including. for example. 13MA's separate business class cabin, 
Diamond EuroClass, for passengers travelling either on the Eurobudget, three- 
day Executive return or Executive fares. 2.2 
In 1987, the CAA carried out a study of competition on the main domestic 
trunk routes" and concluded in respect of route entry that competition from a 
second entrant against BA resulted not only in a new product being introduced 
by the incumbent, but led to greater frequencies and improved in-flight service 
at a reduced average cost. Prior to 1982, competition on these trunk routes 
were limited to those between BA's Heathrow services, and B. Cal's services 
from Gatwick to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, and BNIxs services 
from Gatwick to Belfast. Any direct competition for services ofiginating 6r 
terminating at Heathrow was therefore conspicuously absent, principally for 
historical reasons. In 1981, however, BMA applied to the CAA in the very first 
case under the terms of the new Civil Aviation Act 1980 to operate the 
Heathrow-Glasgow and Heathrow-Edinburgh routes. The application was 
initially rejected on the grounds that the recession and losses of both airlines did 
not justify the licensing of competing services on those routeS. 24 On appeal, 
however, the Secretary of State overturned the CAA's decision'-5 and BINIA was 
eventually licensed to operate on the Heathrow-Glasgow route in 1982, and 
subsequently on the Heathrow-Edinburgh in 19S3. This was followed by 
another application in 1983 to serve the Heathrow-Belfast route on the back of 
its success on the Scottish trunk routes. 26 BA objected strongly to this 
application. Its main objection was that the proposed conventional service by 
BMA, if licensed, would lead to a diversion of traffic, which could lead to its 
decision to withdraw the shuttle services it was already providing. This would 
ultimately have an effect on its network of services. 
Although the policy of the CAA had changed little since its decision on the 
Glasgow and Edinburgh routes, the reasoning behind that decision was central 
to the Heathrow-Belfast application. The CA. -k noted first of all that the 
Heathrow-Belfast application differed from the Glasgow and Edinburgh routes 
in a number of respects. First, when the CAA refused BNIA's application on the 
Scottish trunk routes, it did so because the economic conditions then did not 
justify two carriers. The economic climate was now much improved, and both 
BA and BMA had returned to profitability. Secondly, the CAA observed that 
the benefit of user choice was more important on the Belfast route than the 
Scottish routes because of the relatively poor surface alternatives from London. 
In the absence of competition, BA would be operating in a near monopoly 
position. The CAA also pointed out that the other user benefit in the context of 
the Scottish routes was the decision of BA to introduce a much improved 
Shuttle product (Supershuttle) in response to the competition from BIMA. It 
could not therefore deny that BNMA's proposed services to Belfast would play 
22 CAA. Airline Competition in the Single EuropeonAfarket. CAP 623 (1993). para. 44. 
23 These were London to Glas- w. Edinbur tit 'o gh. Manchester and Belfast: Compe ion on 
theAlain Domestic Trunk Routes. CAA Paper 37005 (1987). 
24 Decision 19/81. 
25 Official Record Series 2.529 (3 August 1982). 
26 Decision 7/83. 
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no part in the improvement of services In particular, the CAA was also not 
convinced by BA's argument that there was little or no demand for a 
conventional scheduled service on that route On the contrary, the CAA 
accepted the claim by BNIA that "a substantial minority of passengers preferred 
a conventional service and that there was a benefit to users in having a choice. " 
Accordingly, BINIA was granted the licence for the Heathrow-Belfast route, An 
important reasoning behind the CAA's decision was the new emphasis on 
competing services in the 1980 Act and its benefits to users and the sound 
development of the industry. Undoubtedly, these benefits "would carry a price 
in terms of loss of economies of scale and the less efficient use of resources". but 
the policy objectives of the 1980 Act was that the benefits of competition could 
outweigh this price and should therefore be positively promoted where it was 
practicable to do so. Consequently it did not accept that short-term loss 
profitability on the part of BA was a sufficient justification to refuse licensing 
BINIA. It said, 
The introduction of a competing service on a route must almost 
always take traffic and revenue away from the incumbent 
operator and affect that operator's profit. It must be presumed 
therefore that the Act requires that these effects on wasting 
services do not constitute in themselves a reason for denying a 
licence to a competing service where the particular benefits of 
competition are likely to be substantial and there is no 
international obstacle to the introduction of the competing 
service. 27 
BA applied for a judicial review of the decision although the application was 
ultimately refused on the ground that the CAA had not misinterpreted its duties 
nor rnýisapphed its discretion. ' .3 
With the exception of the Heathrow-Manchester services, on which Dan-Air 
was licensed in April 1985 to compete with BA, the introduction of a second 
carrier at Heathrow led to a significant reduction in BA! s market share and its 
passenger load factor (calculated as a percentage of passengers carried against 
the number of seats available). On the Glasgow route, for example, BA carried 
just in excess of 650,000 passengers and achieved a market share of 78.901/0 in 
1982. This was more or less consistent for the levels of 1980-1981. B. Cal, 
which operated from Gatwick, maintained a steady share of the passenger 
number and thus its market share of 17"0.29 In 1983, when BINIM services 
could be assessed over a period of 12 months, BA carried 530,000 passengers 
and had a reduced market share of 60.2%, while B. Cal's market share fell to 
14.7%. In that year, RIMA carried 221,000 passengers and managed to secure a 
market share of 25.1%. Although total passenger number grew by 52,000, it 
would be misleading to attribute this development solely to the competitive 
stimulus provided by BININs entry; some would have been due to natural 
27 Ibid., para. 77. 
28 RvC. 4.4 ex p British Airwqvs Board CO/943/83, Transcript of 21 December 19S3. 
See infra. 
29 The remaining share of 4.1 % of the market share %vas achicvcd by BNIA although 
this vvas only for the period of October-Deccnibcr 1982. 
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growth in traffic and in particular the series of railway services disruptions in 
1982 and 1983. Nevertheless, BA responded to the competition and revised its 
SuperShuttle product in September 1983 As a result, its traffic level was 
improved in 1984 and its market share increased to 65,4%, while BMA's share 
of the latter was reduced to 21. Mo. The conclusion that may be drawn on the 
Glasgow route is similarly possible in respect of the Edinburgh and Belfast 
routes. In contrast, the Manchester route received little in the way of 
competitive stimulus for BA to respond by introducing a new product, or 
sustain a reduced market share. When Dan-Air was licensed in April 19S5, it 
operated three daily services on the basis of an aim to fill in certain Saps left by 
BA's schedule. Thus, it proceeded to offer an early morning service in advance 
of BA! s first service by 20 minutes. In response, BA re-scheduled its first 
service so as to be available 10 minutes before Dan-Aies. This had a severe 
impact on Dan-Air's market share and ability to sustain the competition not least 
in the fight of BA! s eight daily services on the route. By the autumn of 1985, 
Dan-Air was forced to reduce two of its services including the early morning 
service, and subsequently withdrew the remaining service in October 1986. On 
these route by route comparisons alone, the CAA noted that frequency was an 
important strategy of competition. 30 
Tnhip 
-4; - 
1 I. nndnn-r. l. qscnw 
British British Caledonian British Midland 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share (%) 
Passengers 
(00 S) 
Market 
Share (1/6) 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share (%) 
1980 664.7 80.4 162.4 19.6 
1981 614.2 81.3 141.1 18.7 
1982 654.6 78.9 140.7 17.0 34.311 4.1 
1983 530.6 60.2 129.4 14.7 221.5 25.1 
1984 660.8 65A 136.2 13.5 213.7 21.1 
1985 706.8 65.4 147.2 13.6 226.7 21.0 
30 Para. 14.3. 
31 For period October-December 1982. 
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Table 5.2 London-Edinbumh 
Bntish Airwavs British Caledonian British Nlidland 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share 00 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share (00) 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share (O'o) 
1980 564.8 778 1608 2 22.2 
1981 540.3 79.9 136.1 20.1 
1982 6136 81. () 
-1 
') 5.3 18 1 
198") 501.3 63.0 124,1 156 16()S 21.4 
1984 615.8 65.0 1 1' )0.2 13 7 201 7 21.3 
, 1985 , 661.9 1 64.0 
1 140.4 13-6 -7 2' ) 1.6 22.4 
Table 5.3 London-Belfast 
British Airwavs British Caledonian British Midland 
Passengers 
000s) 
Market 
Share (%) 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Shar 
Passengers Market 
Share VI/o) 
1980 602.3 84.5 110.5 15.5 
19SI 568.0 S4.4 105.2 15.6 
1982 585.1 88.0 79.8 12.0 
1983 636.6 91.0 62.8 9.0 
1984 633.2 71.9 98.1 11.1 150.0 17.0 
1985 549.6 61.4 109.4 12.2 236.2 26.4 
Table 5.4 London-Nitanch ester 
British Airwavs British Caledonian Dan-Air 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share (0/6) 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share 
Passengers 
(000s) 
Market 
Share ('Vo) 
1980 493.6 S2.7 103.6 17.3 
1981 458.5 81.0 107.7 19.0 
1982 539.7 81.1 125.5 18.9 
1981) 526.7 80.6 127.1 19.4 
1984 615.0 80.4 149.6 196 
1985 681.9 78.5 168.8 19.4 18.4 2.1 
Source: CAA Airline Statistics and CAA Paper 87005. 
Competition on these domestic trunk routes was the result of the decision to 
license liberally and to foster greater freedom in decision-making by airline 
operators, so that the incentive to succeed would be driven by the need to 
provide a wider choice of products for users, whether in the form of fares, in- 
flight service or schedule, rather than the imperfect estimates of the regulatory 
agency. In this way also, for airline operators to meet the challenges of 
competition, for example by offering lower fares, efficiency gains have to be 
made to meet the short-fall in revenue. An interesting analysis of this point was 
made by the CAA in its study of competition on the four trunk routes. 
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Table 5.5 Index of Costs 
Costs per Seat Costs per 
Passenger 
Revenue per Retail Price 
Passenger Index 
Glas, gow 
1980 100.0 100.0 1000 1000 
1981 114.4 107.8 112,4 1119 
1982 112.7 112.3 117.0 1,21.5 
1983 101.1 112.6 1105 127 1 
1984 1087 115.2 118 7 I3 3). 4 
1985 116.1 118.6 127.3 _ 141.5 
Edinburgh 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 113.0 110.2 114.6 111.9 
1982 111.1 105.4 1 1Q. 9 121.5 
1933 107.1 
. 
118.9 123.1 117.1 
1984 115.4 125.0 123.2 133.4 
19S5 122.5 124.4 13 0.4 141.5 
Newcastle/ 
Teeside 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 
19s], 123.1 109.4 105.9 111,9 
1982 126.9 114.0 119.7 1.5 
1983 130.4 119.7 138.0 
1984 127.2 I 23.7 I37.5 I' ) 3.4 
1985 136.3 _ 132.7 _ 138.4 _ 
_ 
141.5 
Source: CAA Paper 87005 
I Assuming a base index of 100.0, it was evident on the Glasgow route that the 
costs of providing one seat were reduced by 10.3% on 1982 levels although unit 
costs for passengers remained at around 112 Mowing the introduction in late 
1982 of BMA services from Heathrow. This was also evident on the Edinburgh 
route. In contrast, the Newcastle/Teeside route which had no direct 
competition recorded an increase in unit costs for passenger seats from 126.9 to 
130.4 for 1982 to 1983, and to 136.3 in 1985, while unit costs for passengers 
increased two-fold in percentage terms over the same periods of comparison. 
The regulatory rationale for competing services came in the light of the CAM 
proposal in 1984 to deregulate route entry and to issue instead an "area 
operating facility" on an experimental basis, which was subsequently accepted 
by the Government. This would enable airlines to add to their existing licences 
for domestic services those routes between two points which have not been 
excluded &om the designated area. 32 
In many respects, therefore, the advent of Council Regulation 240S/92 to 
provide EC-based airlines the freedom of entry to intra-Community routes is a 
policy that mirrors CAM liberal route licensing policy; that is, the decision as 
to which route to provide air transport services would rest with the operator to 
be decided according to its commercial judgment. The crucial difference 
32 CAA. lirline Competition Polh; v. CAP 500 (19S4). paras. 91-93. 
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between CAA policy and Council Regulation 2408,02 lies in the much more 
"deregulated" nature of the latter Casting aside the catalogue of exemptions 
permitting derogation from the general principle of freedom of entry. the 
Regulation grants unlimited access to intra-Community routes regardless of 
size, market position, or existing network of routes of an airline Competition is 
consequently presumed to be equal. In practice, this is unlikely to be always 
true, for a variety of reasons stated in the previous and following chapters. 
Some airlines will have a better starting position than others either by reason of 
historical endowment if they have been transferred into the private sector (e. g. 
BA) or by reason of public policy if they are publicly owned (e. g. Air France). 
This structural imbalance will clearly preclude equal opportunity of competition 
between an incumbent airline and a new or smaller airline. No measure of 
preference for new or smaller airfines would be possible, if for example this was 
deemed to be an appropriate way of redressing the imbalance unless it was 
disguised under one or more of the exemptions permýitted under the Regulation. 
Deregulation of fares 
In respect of scheduled fares for domestic services, the CAA made a 
recommendation to the Government in 1984 that it no longer saw the need for 
their detailed regulation, but would nevertheless retain the powers to deal with 
anti-competitive behaviour. 33 The proposal came in the light of the 
Government's request to the CAA to review the airline competition policy and 
the effects of privatising BA on UK airline competition. The response of the 
Government to this proposal was favourable and it stated in its White Paper that 
the deregulation was welcomed to the extent that it would foster greater price 
competition between airlines. 34 The effect of this deregulation has not been 
remarkably different from that on charter services. In terms of licensing and 
hearings, it has removed the necessity for the specific approval of the CAA for 
each change in fares and consequently eliminated the opportunities for 
objections against such changes. There is consequently a greater degree of 
freedom for air transport operators to set fares which they judge as acceptable 
by users, although the CAA continues to require the filing of fares to monitor 
any anti-competitive or predatory practices. In terms of user benefit, price 
competition has no doubt entailed lower air fares although this is more apparent 
at the lower end of the market, principally the flexible and leisure travel market. 
Business fares are generally inelastic since demand are less susceptible to 
change although BNINs challenge to business class pricing on European routes 
is a notable exception. 35 Nevertheless, competition in quality or product variety 
can still be intense even within the constraints of demand inelasticity. More 
recently, however, the EC Commission has published a report on the progress 
of liberalisation and noted that all categories of fares except promotional fares 
had risen in spite of the liberalisation measures intended to increase the 
competitiveness of the industry. 36 
33 Ibid.. paras. 94-95. 
34 Airline Competition Polic 
,v 
(Cmnd9366.1984), para. 26. 
35 CAýkAirline Competition in the Single EuropeanA lark-el. CAP 623 (1993). 
36 Impact of the Third Package o ! fAir Transport Liberalimijon Measures CONI(96) 
5 14. 
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Althouuh the direct effect of competition on the le-., el of fares or the ranize of 
products is seldom determinable with any d", ree of accuracv, an inference can 
nevertheless be drawn. For instance. when competition was first introduced on 
the Heathrow-Glasgow route in 19821, BNIA priced a one-way Economy fare at 
f49.50, providing around a 10% reduction of BA's Economy fare which itself 
had been reduced from 157 to L55 just prior to BMA's entry. However, by 
1985, the 100/'ý differential had disappeared following a series of increases by 
BNIA which were faster than BA's rate of increase, and by the end of 1986, the 
one-way Economy fare was E72 for both BA and BMA. Whilst it is true that 
the fare reduction had only been temporary, the stimulus to introduce product 
variety within the confines of price inelasticity was evident in BA's decision to 
"recapture" its market share by introducing the SuperShuttle fare wlýich 
guaranteed seats for all passengers, including a back-up service if necessary, and 
provided a normal refreshments service. This was in response to BMA! s 
normal catering service of hot meals and snacks including a full bar service. A 
significant product change or addition as a result of competition on these routes 
was the introduction of the promotional Advanced Purchase Excursion (APEX) 
return fare in 1984 which undercut the comparable Excursion return fare by 
almost 30%. At the end of 1984, BA was offering an APEX return fare of E68 
compared to its Excursion return of 196. This 30% differential was broadly 
similar to BNIA's fares which charged 167 and 196 respectively. Although the 
one-way Economy fare had increased in real terms, the APEX return fare 
remained broadly similar in 1986 to the level when it was first introduced in 
1984. BTNIA, for instance, was charging 171 for the APEX, which represents 
approximately 37% reduction of the El 14 Excursion return fare. BA, however, 
had withdrawn the Excursion return fare but offered the APEX return at 174. 
These changes represented a substantial savings for the users in real terms for 
fares at the lowest end of the market and "will almost certainly have stimulated 
some traffic growth. "37 The CAA concluded, 
This, together with a high level of satisfaction indicated for other 
services suggests that the presence of a second Heathrow 
operator has improved directly or indirectly the quality of the air 
product offered on these routes. 39 
Recent developments have also provided a clearer relationship between the 
effect of competition and fares. EasyJet, a low-cost carrier, operating out of 
Luton Airport has introduced a 129 one-way fare as its lowest applicable fare 
for services to Scotland including Glasgow, Although this is in no-way an 
airport-airport competition, but as a city-pair service between London and 
Glasgow or Aberdeen, it has pioneered low-cost ser-vices in competition with 
BA and BNIA. Much of this can be attributed to the freedom to set fares and 
Community legislation. New carriers including Go and others have also seized 
on this freedom to enter the market and to set competitive fares against the 
incumbents. 
Fares deregulation for intra-Community air transport was introduced in 1993 in 
accordance with Council Regulation 2409/92, though the removal of 
37 Para. 3.14. 
38 CAA Paper 87005. para. 14.9. 
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restrictions on fares under this Regulation is no more than a confirmation of the 
CAM regulatory policy since 1984 The Regulation, ho%%ever. consists of a 
number of exemptions which permit the control of fares. These are considered 
in chapter seven. Notwithstanding that fares are to be determined "freely by 
market forces" under this Regulation, routes which fall outside this Regulation, 
that is international routes between the UK and a non-member country. will 
continue to be subject to the CAM liberal regulatory policy on fares. In this 
regard, regulatory intervention would be minimal. and limited to instances when 
it is required to act in accordance with an international agreement or anti- 
competitive allegation. 
Deregulation of capacity 
Likewise, the CAA has abandoned the regulation of capacity because it believes 
that decisions on how frequent services should be scheduled or the size of 
aircraft to use are those which need to be left to the operators rather than 
second-guessed by the regulator. For instance, in its decision on Jersey 
European Airways' application to operate on the London(Gatwick)-Jersey 
route, the CAA stated in response to a capacity objection that it was not 
persuaded of the need to impose any capacity restriction, a practice which it has 
not adopted for some years. Capacity would only be restricted in cases where 
there are constraints on competition. 
Its policy of not restricting ficences except in these 
circumstances is based on a view that airlines should be free to 
respond to changes in demand and to market conditions 
generally and it would need compelling reasons to depart from 
this policy in the absence of any external constraints. 39 
Freedom to decide on frequency or capacity levels has, with hindsight, become 
a key strategy for securing or maintaining market share in the face of increasing 
competition. In the absence of such freedom, operators would be constrained to 
a much wider extent including decisions on the types of product which they may 
wish to introduce. For instance, in its analysis of competition on the domestic 
trunk routes, the CAA noted that the freedom to set frequency and capacity 
levels enabled airlines "to restrict or control capacity made available for 
promotional traffic and the market expansion which occurred may have resulted 
from an increase in capacity made available at the lower fare levels. "40 
Consequently, the deregulation of capacity has not only provided the freedom 
to decide, but has enabled airlines to focus more sharply on particular sections 
of the market through the highly effective tool of yield management, and the 
evidence accumulated by the CAA in its study points to the increasing 
significance placed by airfines on frequency as a key competitive service feature. 
This was apparent in the competition between BA and Dan-Air on the London- 
Manchester sector. Of course, the effect of increased frequency may lead to a 
fall in the "passenger load factor" initially, but if growth in traffic can be 
stimulated by the combination of frequency choice and product variety, the load 
factor may recover to previous levels. The decision of the CAA to deregulate 
capacity has now been underlined by Article 10 of Council Regulation 240S/92 
39 Decision 1/93. para 12, 
40 CAA Paper 87005. para. 3.14. 
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which prohibits capacltv restrictions on intra-ComnILinit% routes. thus providing 
freedom of decision to operators This, however. is subject to a number of 
exemptions which are considered in a subsequent chapter 
General Observations 
The essence of deregulation is to remove the regulatory constraints imposed on 
airlines on matters such as route, fares, capacity and frequency of services. This 
is premised on the belief that forces of the market place would ensure that air 
transport operators act sensibly so as not to drive themselves to the brink of 
collapse. A competitive, multi-airline industry is, however, not conditional upon 
total deregulation. On the contrary, the effect of deregulation may be exaqtly 
the opposite if the structural problems of the industry were not addressed in the 
first instance. It would have been impossible in the case of British air transport 
to achieve any substantial degree of contestability if the conditions for 
sustainable competition were not procured through the positive regulatory 
actions of the CAA. It is therefore arguable that the aims of total deregulation 
are just as attainable under a system of regulated competition, where the 
regulatory policy is to bring about more competition, rather than restricting it. 
Fares and capacity no longer require the approval of the CAA, and routes no 
longer have to be allocated by a regulatory body subject to legalistic contests. 
A principal force behind the US deregulation movement in air transport was the 
very rigidity of such a system which impeded innovation and destroyed 
incentives. An industry in which there is a high rate of change simply has no 
room for such constraints. A regulator or a regulatory agency cannot always be 
the best judge of what are the appropriate fares to charge nor the route to 
operate without creating a degree of artificiality in the operations of an air 
transport operator. On the contrary, these are matters which ought to be 
decided by the operator as pan of its daily commercial decisions. 41 Disciplining 
commercial decisions of air transport operators by reference to market forces is 
essentially a system of "regulation by incentives". By this, it is meant that a 
carrier will make a decision on the basis of whether it will provide an adequate 
level of return, without direct regulation or coercive direction from the 
government or its agency. If a particular decision, whether on fares, capacity or 
routes to operate, is not likely to produce such a return simply because there is 
a lack of demand, there will be neither commercial rationality nor incentive to 
implement the decision. 4. 
While there is little doubt that the CAA would not subscribe to the deregulation 
model in the US in introducing unregulated competition, where necessary it 
would seek to reduce the prescriptive regulation of airlines and their commercial 
decisions so as to enable the forces of the market system to act as a discipline 
for their behaviour and decisions. The view of the CAA on necessary 
41 Of course. exceptions %%ill have to be made. say. in a case %%Iicrc a public scn-ice 
obligation exists to ensure regularity of sen-iccs is maintained c, %-cn if those scr%iccs 
arc not profitable. 
42 On inccntiN-c regulation. see the efforts of James Landis at the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. an administrativc agency often cited as "the most successful 
of all federal regulatory agencies": T. K. McCraw. Prophets of Regulation (Belknap 
Press. Han-ard: 1984), ch. 5. 
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regulation is in accordance with its belief in a minimalist philosophy on 
res., ulation as weil as the statutory duty to minimise regulatory burdens imposed 
on the industry Nevertheless, regulation will continue to be appropriate in 
instances where competition is lacking to satisfy the interests of users or where 
it may be open to abuse. The question is not one of regulation or deregulation 
for the CAA. It is a question of more or less regulation. The body of case-law 
which the CAA has developed through its licensing function since 1972 amply 
demonstrates that while it has adopted a more liberal licensing approach, 
needing compelling evidence to be persuaded against the grant of a particular 
licence, it continues to maintain regulatory oversight of fares through the fares 
filing system and through the monitoring of market developments to ensure, that 
a competitive, multi-airline industry is maintained and, if so required, to exercise 
its regulatory powers to that end. Likewise continuous regulatory oversight is 
required on route licensing so that restrictions on competition such as bilateral 
conditions stemming from an air service agreement with another country and 
access to congested airports can be duly considered. 43 
It should be added that the early years of licensing competition by the CAA 
were not without difficulties. Indeed, with hindsight, the CAA accepts with 
much regret that certain of its decisions were not what they should have been. A 
good case was its refusal to license BNIA on the Scottish trunk routes, that is 
London-Glasgow and London-Edinburgh, because it regarded that the time was 
not appropriate, "but which was subsequently overturned by the Secretary of 
State on an appeal. 45When, however, it did decide to license BMA on the 
London-Belfast route, BA applied for judicial review against that decision on 
the ground that the CAA had departed from the requirements of the Act and the 
CAA's own policy on competition. In particular, it argued that the CAA had 
placed an undue emphasis on competition when it remarked that "competition 
should therefore be allowed where it is practicable to introduce it" contrary to 
the terms of s-68(2) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. Furthermore, BA claimed 
that if there had been such a policy change, they were not consulted so as to 
enable them to make the appropriate subrnissions. 46 
The basis of the CAA's decision was that BA was then operating a shuttle 
service from Heathrow to Belfast. It was therefore beyond dispute that a 
conventional scheduled service operated by BMA alongside BA's shuttle 
service would be a benefit to users. The question remaining was whether BA 
might discontinue its shuttle service in the face of the competition from BNIA. 
On this point, the CAA concluded that the risk of BA withdrawing its service 
was small and "certainly not sufficient to justify refusing" BMA's application. It 
added that, 
It is hardly credible that no profitable way can be found to cater 
for this traffic volume, particularly in the light of British 
Ainvay's own improvements in its costs levels ... 
Whilst therefore 
43 See ch. 6, infra. 
44 Decision 17/81. 
45 Oflicial Record Series 2.529 (3 August 19S2). 
46 Rv C4A ex p Billish . -Iinvqvs Board (1983) C01943/83. Transcript of 21 Septembcr 
1983. 
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it is quite possible that British Air%vavs mav incur some losses in 
the short term on the Belfast route and possibiv. in %-ic%v or tile 
integration of the shuttle network, on that network as a whole, it 
is to be expected that in the longer term it will not be beyond the 
ability of British Airways to restore both the route and the 
shuttle network as a whole to proritability, so long of course as 
the market continues to require the shuttle product. 4" 
The CAA reasoned further that it was almost always the case that an 
incumbent's profit would be affected with the introduction of a competing 
service. Nevertheless, under the terms of the Act it could not be taken that 1his 
was itself sufficient to deny a licence for a competing service where the benefits 
are likely to be substantial. 48 This interpretation of its duties was simply stating 
the obvious. If the loss of profit of an incumbent was regarded as the overriding 
consideration against licensing a competing service, then the benefits of 
competition would never be realised. Even so, the question remained as to 
whether the CAA had placed an undue emphasis on competition and in doing so 
failed to have sufficient regard to other effects that "any newly licensed air 
transport services may have on existing services" in accordance with s. 68(2) of 
the Act. (sic) Woolf J, as he then was, was emphatic in his judgment that the 
statement cited by BA must not be taken out of context, but be read as part of 
the entire decision, especially in respect of administrative decisions where 
eceffors, of expression can occur which do not necessarily mean that proper 
consideration has not been duly given to the decision. " Accordingly, Woolf J 
rejected the subn-dssion of BA that the CAA had not taken into account the 
short term loss of profitability as a factor among others, except in the context of 
whether it was a matter to be considered as a total bar to the grant of a licence. 
He said that it was clear from the decision as a whole that the CAA appreciated 
that there were broader issues involved, and that there were circumstances 
where consideration of short term profitability together with others might 
constitute a reason refusing a licence. 
This decision was important in a number of important respects. First of all, it 
reaffirmed the discretion of the CAA, and the interpretation it had adopted as 
appropriate under the terms of the Act, that is to license liberally for 
competition. Secondly, it was also avindication of the overall approach by the 
Government in respect airline competition in the form of the earlier appeal 
decisions of the Secretary of State concerning the Scottish truck routes. 
Dereoulation and Antitrust Safeguards eý. 
Since the consequence of economic deregulation is to expose the economic 
operations of an airline to the forces of the market place and to remove 
regulatory intervention in the decisions of airlines, there is nevertheless a 
continuing need to ensure that this freedom is not abused or exploited beyond 
47 Decision 7/83. para. 76. 
48 ]bid.. para. 77. 
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the norms of accepted practices Both theory and practical experience suggest 
that dere, -, ulation precipitates the tendency in airlines to rnerize or consolidate 
their resources. Whilst mergers or cartelisation may often be aimed at the 
rationalisation of resources, they may also have the efTect of creating a 
dominant position that leads to the elimination of competitors. 4" However, the 
existence of a dominant position per se is not unlawful. Indeed. as the CAA 
recognises, some mergers "may have neutral or beneficial efTects in terms of the 
objectives of the Act-1150 Others, however, may lead to market abuses which are 
not compatible with the public interest. It is in respect of the latter which has 
required certain regulatory safeguards. However. enacting regulatory measures 
on their own against abuses of dominant positions is insufficient. They need to 
be enforced vigorously. It was the failure to adopt this attitude which led to the 
criticisms against the Department of Justice of the US Government for waving 
past post-deregulation mergers when it took over the antitrust enforcement 
responsibility of the CAB. Equally, removing economic regulatory oversight 
enables airlines to set fares or capacity according to their commercial judgment, 
though some regulatory intervention remains necessary to reflect the disparities 
in the economic strength of the participating airlines. Some airlines will be 
bigger and economically stronger than others, and this clearly creates a non- 
level playing field. Stronger airlines may be able to set fares which are below 
the costs of operations more readily and for a much longer period than a smaller 
competing airline since it would be more able to absorb the losses. A smaller 
airline which pursues a similar line of competition for the same period of time is 
likely to be driven to the brink of bankruptcy. TWs is generally regarded as an 
unfair or anti-competitive practice against which there has to be regulatory 
safeguards either to prevent such practices or to provide remedies for any 
damage caused by such practices. 
It is a key contention of this thesis that where critical market contestability has 
been achieved, that is sustainable conditions of competition, the liberalisation or 
removal of economic regulatory controls must be accompanied by a system of 
antitrust regulation. In most cases, economic regulation and antitrust regulation 
are required to operate side by side particularly where the need for competition 
regulation arises in the first place as a result of some structural barriers. The 
task of antitrust regulation may be conferred on the same economic regulatory 
agency or a different agency. Accordingly, the remaining the part of this chapter 
is divided into two sections, in which the first will examine the role of the CAA 
in antitrust regulation through the economic regulatory machinery and the use 
of licensing conditions. The second will look at the general antitrust laws as 
they apply to air transport. 
Licensing Against Anti-Competitive Practices 
The antitrust enforcement responsibility in the UK is two-fold, although it is 
primarily the responsibility of the competition authorities, namely, the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (NINC), 
now the Competition Comn-dssion. The role of the CAA is limited though by 
49 A don-tinant position is usually characterised b%- a market share in excess of 25%. 
50 CAP 620. para. 10. 
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no means insignificant For a number of years. the CAA has represented to the 
Government of the need to confer on it formal competition enforcement 
powers, but which the Government has flatly refused on the basis that the 
"existing powers are adequate to maintain and promote competition in the 
airline industry including action against anti-competitive and predatory 
behaviour. "51 The Government recognised in its White Paper that regulatory 
actions against anti-competitive behaviour may be taken by the CAA indirectly 
by virtue of its licensing powers by, for instance. attaching conditions to an air 
transport licence, refusing to lower fares which are predatory or enforcing 
capacity or frequency reduction. To that end, the CAA has included in its 
Statemem of Policies oti Route and Air Traiisport Liceiishig when and how it 
intends to intervene against mergers, abuses of dominant positions and anti. 
competitive behaviour. 
Mergers 
While the CAA recognises that certain mergers or acquisitions may have effects 
beneficial to user interests, it has explicitly stated in its policy statement that 
acquisitions, particularly of routes, does not generate any preference on the part 
of the acquirer. 
Where ... the acquisition 
by one airline of another together with its 
routes could lead to a reduction in competition the Authority will 
give no preference simply on the grounds of incumbency on the 
route in question. In reaching its decisions, the Authority will 
have regard in particular to the maintenance of a competitive 
environment. 52 
This is a striking illustration of how the CAA will exercise its regulatory powers 
of licensing air transport to deal with merger cases, in relation to which it lacks 
direct enforcement powers. A useful case in point is the merger of BA and 
B. Cal. which happened soon after the privatisation of BA. In accordance with 
the under-taldngs given to theNIMC, 53 BA surrendered the licences of B. Cal 
which the CAA had recommended in its submission during the inquiry. These 
licences would then be opened to application by other airlines. While the 
applications which ensued were unique in the sense that they followed the first 
ever merger reference between two UK airlines to theTNINIC to which also the 
CAA had submitted its views, the CAA refused BXs applications for a re- 
allocation of the surrendered licences on the strength of its long-term policy to 
achieve a competitive environment between UK airlines. In doing so, it made 
the following observations. 
If licensed on Gatwick-Brussels, BA would have the ability to 
operate as many services as they thought appropriate from either 
Gatwick or Heathrow, limited only by their slot access at each 
airport. Given their control of nearly 401/, ý of the slots at 
Heathrow, and 25% at Gatwick, the limiting factor for BA 
51 Airline Competition Policy (Cmnd. 93 )66.1984). para. 28. 
52 CAP 620. para. 10 - 53 British AirwaYs p1c and British Caledonian Group pIcAletlyer (Cni. 247.1987), 
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would be the opportunity cost of those slots rather than their 
availability as such. '4 
Specifically. it noted that it was improbable that Air Europe could succeed in 
their plans if their policy was simply emulation of BA's activities. According to 
the CAA, BA's history, expertise and market power would threaten to condemn 
Air Europe "to being but a pale shadow of the major UK airline. " 55 Hence. if 
Air Europe were to succeed, they would be able to do so only if they had the 
ability to offer a product which was potentially and significantly different from 
that offered by BA. The CAA added that this difference was likely to evince 
itself mainly in the lower-cost, lower-price but nonetheless Vood quality product 
features. In the final analysis, the CAA did not believe that there was any real 
likelihood that Air Europe was able to act in this way if BA had a substantial 
presence on the route in question from both Heathrow and Gatwick. 
1kirke IAbi ises 
Abuses of dominant positions, or the exploitation of market power as the CAA 
calls it, would trigger the regulatory intervention of the CAA if to do so would 
be acting in the interests of users. The intervention would take the form of a 
change to the conditions of the air transport licence. The CAA accepts that 
competition cannot be possible in every situation to realise of the objectives of 
the Act for a number of reasons. But where the realisation of these objectives 
was threatened by an exploitation of market power, it would act promptly to 
investigate and to ensure appropriate remedies. In particular, it would 
intervene, 
where, after taking into account the relevant market, the 
availability of different fare products and other factors including 
route profitability, it concludes that airlines possess and exploit 
market power to the disadvantage of users. 56 
But it is not likely to invoke its regulatory powers for this purpose if the 
overcharging or conditions of travel such as in-flight facilities could be 
demonstrated as reasonably related to the costs of provision. Regulatory 
intervention under the market exploitation concept appears to focus primarily 
on the issue of fares and their effect on users, and less so on the effect of the 
exploitation on competitors even though damaging competitors is likely to have 
the effect of threatening the realisation of the statutory objectives. Such cases, 
however, may be more appropriately exan-dned as one of anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
Anti-compefifive behaviour 
As regards the regulation of anti-competitive behaviour then, the policy 
statement indicates the willingness of the CAA to intervene in a broader range 
of cases. 
The Authority will use its regulatory powers where the 
realisation of the objectives laid down in the Act is threatened by 
anti-competitive behaviour including but not limited to: 
54 Decision 7/88. para. 61. 
55 Ibid, para. 63. 
56 CAP 620. para. 15. 
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(a) the charging of fares and rates at levels which are 
insufficient to cover costs of providing the services or 
facilities to which they relate or which are otherwise 
unreasonably, 
(b) the payment of commissions at rates . vhich are higher 
than the airline otherwise pays; 
(c) the addition of excessive capacity or frequency of 
service, 
where such behaviour would have or would be likely to have or 
is explicitly intended to have the effect of crippling, excluding or 
driving off a competitor. 57 
Athough the CAA does not possess the enforcement powers against such 
behaviour or practices nor powers to award damages, the use of its regulatory 
powers against them is equally, if not more, effective. How its regulatory 
powers are to be exercised must clearly vary according to the circumstances of 
each case. In one instance, it may be that the charging of fares at an 
unreasonably low level is not compatible with the statutory objective of 
furthering the reasonable interests of users since the effect of an anti- 
competitive behaviour may be to cripple, exclude or drive off a competitor, thus 
eliminating active competition and threatening the multi-airline policy conceived 
under the Act. Variation of the licence, whether the revocation of a particular 
route authorisation or indeed substitution by another airline, may ensue. A 
similar situation in which there has been an addition of excessive capacity may 
also be conceived. No air transport licence holder would cherish the prospects 
of having its licence varied, nor in an increasingly liberal and competitive 
environment, would it wish to see the return of more interventionist economic 
regulation. However, before a regulatory remedy is handed-out the CAA will 
need to be convinced that the anti-competitive behaviour complained of would 
have "a serious effect on the complaining airline". And if it did, whether also 
there would be an offsetting user benefit which otherwise may render the 
remedy disproportionate to the perceived ill. 58 
In 1990, BMA applied to the CAA asking it to vary the licence held by BA on a 
number routes originating from Heathrow on the ground that the latter had 
introduced excessive capacity or frequency of service, thereby threatening the 
objectives pursued by the CAA_ The application represented one of the most 
difficult cases which the CAA had been invited to adjudicate, principally 
because it was being asked to restrain BA! s actions "even though there was 
nothing inherently improper about them and they could not be characterised as 
, anti-competitive' in the sense that they were actuated by malice. "59 It was 
therefore being asked to decide the difference between legitimate competitive 
behaviour and anti-competitive behaviour, which difference at any rate would 
only be a matter of degree. In this context, the CAA noted that the application 
went to the heart of its regulatory policy. It explained that the regulatory policy 
in respect of anti-competitive behaviour was designed to eliminate "behaviour 
57 lbid., para. 12. 
58 ibid.. para. 13. 
59 Decision 7/90. 
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whose ultimate effect may be to undermine or destroy competition. irrespective 
of motive. " It accepted that this conferred a considerable wide maruin for the 
interpretation of its powers although it pointed to the need for such anti- 
competitive behaviour to threaten the realisation of the statutory ob ' 
iectives as a 
means of structuring its discretionary powers The anti-competitive behaviour 
complained of does not, therefore, have to have repercussions on the operations 
of competitors so long as intervention can be justified either on the ground that 
the multi-airline policy or the statutory objectives were being threatened. 
The determination of an anti-competitive behaviour is dependent on three basic 
tests. 60 According to the CAA, it would have to ask itself first, whether. the 
actions complained of have a serious effect on the complaining airline. 
Secondly and if so, whether there is an offsetting benefit for the users. Thirdly 
and perhaps more significantly, the remedy sought must be proportionate to the 
perceived ill. In disposing of the first question, the CAA began with the 
proposition that neither BNIA nor any other airline can hope to be immunised 
against competition under the regulatory policy. An argument to the contrary 
"would be to deny the very benefits the Authority's policies are intended to 
achieve". While it accepted that the prospects of BNIA would be affected to 
some extent by BNs actions, the former had not indicated that its presence on 
the routes concerned would be eliminated by those actions. On the contrary, 
the CAA reasoned that, 
If two airlines are in nose-to-nose competition at the same 
airport, the suggestion that the larger cannot increase frequency 
unless the smaller is both able and willing to do so as well would 
put shackles on one of the most effective competitive weapons in 
an airline's armoury. It cannot be right that an airline's freedom 
to meet what it perceives as a passenger demand can be 
fiustrated in so arbitrary a way. 61 
In respect of the second question, the CAA decided that the additional 
frequencies at more attractive times and the different quality of service by BA 
were evidence of improved user benefit. Finally, the CAA was not persuaded 
that by putting the actions of BA into reverse was an appropriate remedy in the 
light of the benefits countenanced. An aggrieved airline must, at any rate, be 
able to demonstrate convincingly that detriments outweighed the benefits such 
that the remedy sought would not be disproportionate to the perceived n-dscffief 
of the anti-competitive action. 
The role of the CAA, however, in enforcing is regulatory powers is reaclAv 
rather than proactive since it takes the view that unless an airline has 
complained to it about a particular anti-competitive behaviour, it should not 
busy itself with interfering in a matter of which the airline concerned has not 
seen necessary to complain. It would act only where individual allegations of 
anti-competitive behaviour suggest the existence of a prima facie case. 622 This 
was the view of the Economic Regulation Group Director in an interview when 
60 Jbid, para. 30. 
61 ibid, para. 36. 
62 CAP 620. para. 4. 
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asked about the unprecedented spectacle bet%veen Virgin and BA over the 
latter's alleaed anti-competitive practice Not only did the Chairman of the 
CAA offered its good offices to mediate the allegations, ý*irgin was properly 
advised that it could seek the intervention of the CAA in the matter, 63 Clearly 
though, unless Virgin was interested in the variation of BA's licence and which 
would generate tangible benefits, arguably. the regulatory intervention of the 
CAA will not compare well to the punitive or "triple" damages obtainable under 
the antitrust laws of the US. 64 It must also be said that the advent of 
Community legislation, however, has restricted the role of the CAA in antitrust 
regulation through the use of its economic regulatory powers to those routes or 
services involving a non-Community destination. 65 
General Antitrust Regulation 
As the regulatory powers of the CAA on competition is no more than a matter 
of coincidence arising from its licensing powers, the direct responsibility for 
competition regulation and enforcement is vested in the OFT, the INIINIC and 
ultimately the President of the Board of Trade. Other than subject-specific 
legislation on competition'66 there are three principal legislation governing 
unfair conduct in competition: Fair Trading Act 1973 (FTA), Restrictive Trade 
Practices Acts 1956-1976 (RTPA); Competition Act 1980 (CA). 67 The 
application of these legislation to air transport is ironically limited and less 
rigorous, despite the submission of the Government that antitrust regulation of 
air transport must remain with the national competition authorities. For the 
purposes of the present analysis, it would be convenient to classify air transport 
services as international, domestic, scheduled, and charter. 
Fair Trading Act 19 73: Monopoly References 
The initial authority to investigate a monopoly rests with the Director-General 
of Fair Trading (DGFT). A monopoly situation per se is not prohibited, unless 
it operates against the public interest. To determine whether a monopoly exists 
the DGFT has to consider whether an undertaking or combination of 
undertakings has at least 25% of the market in question. 69 WIlere the monopoly 
in question has been established according to these terms, a reference may be 
made to the NIMC to determine whether the monopoly operates against the 
63 Interview with the author, S November 1994. 
64 This has been documented elsewhere. see J. Goh. "Fear and Loathing in the Air" 
119921142 .. 'Veiv Lmv Journal 822.868. 65 See ch-7, infta. 
66 E. g. legislation for the utilities sector. Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992. 
67 At the time of writing this thesis. the Government had just cnacted the Competition 
Act 1998 to make a comprehensive amcndmcnt to the competition law by 
introducing a prohibition approach to anti-compctitivc agreements and abuse of 
dominant position. consistent with Cornmunity competition law. In addition. the 
NLMC would be replaced týy a Competition Commission which will have an appellate 
function from the decisions of the DGFT and a rcporting function. Ho%%cvcr. the 
legislation will not come into force before 2000. The proposals do not include any 
plan to change the powers of the CAA in rcspcct of airline competition: Department 
of Trade and Industry. .4 prohibition approach to anti-competilive agreements and 
abuse ofdonzinant position: drq/1 Bill (August 1997) and the Competition Act 199S. 
68 Ss. 6-8. Fair Trading Act 1973. 
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public interest.,, " S 50 and Schedule 7 to the Act. hot-vever. exclude frorn the 
scope of monopoly references certain provision of goods and smices one of 
which is the carriage of passengers and goods by air The position has since 
been amended by the WMqpo4v Rekreiice. y (elliet-unott q/ 1%. rchimons) Orckr 
19, ý4711 which brings within the jurisdiction of the DGFT and the Secretary of 
State to make monopoly references in respect of international charter flights, It 
provides that the exclusion continues to apply only to "international carriage by 
air, otherwise than on a charter flight". Since monopoly references for domestic 
flights were already within the jurisdiction of the DGFT and the Secretary of 
State, the effect of this order was, therefore, to enable monopoly references to 
be made in respect of all domestic and international charter services. This 
arrangement is a logical complement to the liberalisation of the air transport 
sector since it would seek to ensure that freedom from economic regulatory 
controls did not lead to monopoly situations. This is especially true of domestic 
and all charter flights where a substantial degree of liberalisation has been 
introduced. International scheduled flights, however, are complicated by the use 
of bilateral agreements between the two countries and it seems appropriate that 
monopoly or antitrust issues are resolved within the bilateral framework. 
Be that as it may, the economic theory of competition would seem to suggest 
that monopoly references are likely to be rare. This would be so as long as the 
contestability of the relevant market is ensured so that where a monopoly 
situation does arise it would be because of market efficiency gains including 
mergers. This factor alone cannot justi4, regulatory intervention unless it is 
convincingly demonstrated that the monopoly would operate against the public 
interest or that competition would be adversely affected. To put it another way, 
the presumption must be to let the forces of the market place to operate. Thus, 
a very hard look at the case must be taken. This argument would seem to 
accord with the approach envisaged under Community antitrust laws, where the 
provisions of Article 86 are concerned with only abuses of a don-dnant position. 
The presumption would be that monopolies or dominant market positions as a 
result of efficiency gains are not prohibited unless it can be shown that their 
practices are anti-competitive or amount to an abuse by virtue of that market 
power. Under UK competition law, the jurisdictional test of whether to 
intervene is not an economic one but rather a question of whether the 
undertaking dominates at least 25% of the relevant market. Having established 
the existence of this dominance, the substantive test of intervention becomes 
whether the dominant undertaking would operate against the public interest. 
Fair Trading Act 19 73: Aferger References 
Merger references to the NMIC are made if the proposed merger qualifies for 
investigation because it results in two or more undertakings ceasing to be 
distinct enterprises and that the merger prwides for a market share of more 
69 Under the planned changes. the DGIFT uill also be gi%cn the po%%cr to require 
information to decide %Octher to recommend that the Secretary of State should 
accept the enforceable undertakings in lieu of a monopoly reference. The power to 
seek enforceable undcrtakings was introduccd bN the Deregulation and Contracting 
Act 1994: passim. para. 11.17. 
70 Sl 1984/1887. 
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than 25"o in the UK or a substantial part of it or the value of assets to be taken 
over exceeds L70 million. " A merger. however. would only be prohibited if it 
was expected to operate against the public interest, Nlerger references in air 
transport have not been subýject to exclusionary measures, but they have instead 
been exposed to political considerations much more conspicuously. Two 
merger cases are worthy of note here. In 1988, when the "second force" airline, 
B. Cal., had demonstrably failed to achieve the aims set for it and subsequently 
failed to compete successfully with the newly privatiscd BA. the latter proposed 
a bid for the take-over of B. Cal. Since both BA and B. Cal. together dominated 
the services from London(Heathrow) and London(Gatwick), the consolidation 
readily satisfied the thresholds as a qualifying reference to the ININIC. In the 
first ever airline merger reference. the M1\IC findings confirmed the fears ihat 
many shared of the possible elimination of active competition with the take-over 
against which a number of remedial steps were required including highly 
significant undertakings from BA to surrender all the licences of B. Cal on 
domestic routes, certain licences on European routes and to surrender a 
minimum of 5,000 slots at Gatwick. 72 The NLNIC concluded that in the light of 
this, the merger would "make the market power of the merged airline in relation 
to other British airlines smaller than we originally thought it was likely to be. "73 
More significant, however, was the intervention of the European Commission to 
investigate the merger on which it concluded that the proposal on its original 
terms would substantially reduce airline competition within the Community. 
The result of the investigation led to further and considerably more substantial 
undertakings from BA, in addition to those already given to the MMC, to foster 
the emergence of new competitors. 74 
Whether this merger was the consequence of BA's privatisation is clearly 
arguable. 75 In one respect, it may be argued that B. Cal's position would 
eventually have become untenable even if BA had stayed under public 
ownership. The difficulties which it was then experiencing, namely the lost of 
profitability on key routes to Tripoli after the US bombing of Libya, to the 
recession struck Middle East, and to Western African countries which were 
facing currency problems, would have remained regardless of whether BA was 
under private or public ownership. In the end, the Government would either 
have to intervene directly to disband B. Cal as the 'second force' airline or at 
least to require BA to take-over B. Cal's routes. Privatisation of BA in a sense 
simply made it easier for B. Cal to survive. 
71 Ss. 64-75. as amended by theAlerger References (Increase in I alue ofAssets) Order 
1994. Sl 1994/72. 
72 it %vas noted that the surrender of these licences %%hich were not subsequently re- 
issued to BA by virtue of a renewed application would involve tile return of 
approximately 20.000 slots of the total 33,500 available at Gatwick British Ainvqvs 
pic and British Caledonian Group plc. lfe? ýzer (Cm. 247.1987). 
73 ibid.. para. 8.80. 
74 See Press Release ISEC/7/88 (10 March 193S). 
75 See R. Baldwin. -Privatisation and Regulation: The Case of British Ainvays" in 
J. J. Richardson (ed. ). Privatisation and Deriýizidatinn in Canada (Dartmouth 
Publishing. Darmouth: 1990). V 
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A second and more recent merger case is the take-over of Dan-Air by BA. 
After an initial consideration. the Secretary of State in a. greement with tile OFT 
refused to refer the merger to the NINIC on the basis that "the public interest 
would be better served by not referring". 76 This decision subsequentiv became 
the subject of a judicial review application by BA's competitors, namely. BMA 
who were particularly concerned with the competition implications of the 
merger on its services, but more generally with the policy implications of such a 
merger. If BA, a dominant airline, . vas permitted to take-over financially 
troubled airlines. serious doubts would be raised as to the integrity of UK airline 
competition policy. The European Commission had refused to intervene in the 
matter on the ground that the merger did not have a "Community dimension" 
under the Merger Control Regulation 4064/39.77 In the High Court, Schiemýnn 
J. refused to grant the leave sought by BNIA, Virgin and others. An appeal was 
subsequently disn-dssed by the Court of Appeal. 71 The refusal to grant leave in 
this case seems consistent with a fashion that has perhaps gradually become 
predictable in comparable cases where the courts have been reluctant to 
intervene even at the substantive stage of the proceedings. 79 
if any particular aspect of antitrust regulation was to be singled out as especially 
important, it would be the regulation of airline mergers. This is because the 
airline business is capital intensive and depends substantially on the economies 
of scale and scope. Given this, there is a great propensity to consolidate 
resources, either for greater access to a particular market or access to more 
airport slots. Liberalisation has given airlines more freedom to decide on 
matters such as markets and routes. A large airline, for example, may not 
consider penetrating a particular market as viable because its fleet of aircraft is 
not suited to the nature of the market in question. Merging with another airline 
may therefore give access to the 'feed traffic' of the market. In addition, 
national laws may prevent or limit the acquisition of a local airline by a foreign- 
owned airline. This has seen a variety of responses ranging from code-sharing 
agreements to franchise agreements. Not all mergers are detrimental to 
competition and user interests. But where these are threatened, to maintain 
cri , 
tical market contestability demands an austere antitrust policy in the first 
instance and a searching approach to each individual case. 
76 Financial Tintes (4 November 1992). Among the dominant issues %%as that of 
employment and the impact that the merger or non-merger %%ould have on Ole 
employees of Dan-Air. 
77 The "Community dimension" threshold is (i) an aggrcgate world-%vidc turnover of all 
undertakings concerned in excess of ECU 50001M and (ii) an aggregate Community- 
wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned in excess of ECU 
25OM: see Council Regulation 4064/39, OJ [ 19891 L395/ 1. 
78 Rv Secretaýv ofStatefor Trade and Indusny ex p. 4irlines of Britain, Prgin . 111antic 
Airwa 
' vs and 
Others. The Independent (8 December 1992). 
79 See e. g. R v. 1L11C ex p South Yorkshire Transport 1199311 All ER 23, Lonrho p1c v 
Secretaty of State for Trade and Industrv [19S91 2 All ER 609-. Rv Secretaq of 
or Trade and lndust. ýv ex pAnderson Stratliclille plc j 198312 All ER 233. It State fi 
is interesting to note that under the proposed changes to the competition law. the 
Govcrnment intends to improve the transparency of competition decisions by, 
providing greater reasoning %Nherc the minister disagrees %%ith the recommendations 
of the NUvIC: passi in. para. 11.12. 
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Restrictive Practices il?. 4ir /ýansport 
When the FTA 197' ) was enacted, a provision was inserted to extend the RTPA 
1956 to include restrictive agreements relating to services. "' The effect 
therefore was to bring restrictive agreements relating to both goods and services 
within the ambit of the restrictive practices legislation. Agreements relating air 
transport as a whole were and continued to be excluded by the Resiriclive 
Trade Pracfices (Services) Order 1976.81 
Compelitiott Act 1980: Anti-Competitive Practices 
The chief purpose of the CA 1980 is to control anti-competitive practýces 
pursued in a course of conduct which has or is intended to have or is likely to 
have the effect of restricting, distorting or preventing competition. 82 A 
preliminary investigation into a course of conduct may be carried out by the 
DGFT where an anti-competitive practice has been alleged which may lead 
either to undertakings being given if an anti-competitive practice is established, 
or to a MMC reference. As regards anti-competitive practices in air transport, 
the Secretary of State invoked his powers under s. 2(3) of the CA to make 
exemptions by enacting the Atiti-Competitive Practices (Exchisiolls) Order 
1980 wh&h provides, inter alia, 
a course of conduct is excluded from constituting an anti- 
competitive practice if it is (1)(a) a course of conduct described 
in Schedule I to this Order. 83 
Paragraph 4 of that Schedule provides further, 
I Any course of conduct pursued by an air transport 
undertaking solely in respect of international carriage by air 
[otherwise than on a charter flight]; 
2 Any course of conduct required or envisaged by a restriction 
accepted under an agreement described in paragraph 3(2) of the 
Schedule to the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order 
1976, being a course of conduct pursued solely in respect of 
international carriage by air [othenvise than on a charter 
84 flight]. 
The effect of the Orders is to exclude from he scope of the CA 1980 
international scheduled services, but to make competition references in respect 
of all domestic services and international charter services possible. This is 
important because international scheduled services are still widely regulated by 
bilateral agreements, while domestic and international charter services have 
virtually been deregulated. Since liberalisation means airlines are able to make 
their own decisions and govern their own behaviour, it becomes important to 
ensure that decisions or behaviour which threaten competition are promptly 
80 FrA 1973, s. 107. 
81 S198/1976. 
82 S. 2(0. 
83 SI 1980/979, s. 2. as amended 1: ý%- Anti-Competitive Practices (Exclusions) 
(Amendment) Order 1994. SI 1994/1557, 
84 The i-vords in parentheses were inserted byAnti-rompetitive Practices (Exclusions) 
(Amendment) Order 19S4. ST 1984/1919. 
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checked. A common example is the 'dLIMpinL, ' of capacitv bv which it is meant 
that airline decides to increase excessively the capacity which it ot'llers on a 
particular route which the intention of eliminating its competitors 
Sorne Observations 
Whilst a much thorough consideration of the detailed provisions of the 
competition legislation would undeniably have been more informing, it is 
sufficient to draw the observation that the competition framework in general is 
highly politicised, and more specifically in respect of air transport is 
unfortunately narrow. The take-over of Dan-Air by BA amply illustrates the 
point. The reluctance to vest in the CAA the antitrust enforcement powerý is 
precisely related to the nature and characteristics of such cases. The CAA is a 
statutory corporation and an independent regulatory agency operating at arm's 
length from the ministers and Government Departments. Ministerial directions 
to the CAA are governed by statutory procedures and limited to statutorily 
specified circumstances which would not have envisaged directions relating to 
competition cases. And the system of written policy guidance which may have 
afforded the opportunity to communicate the intentions of the Government no 
longer exists. 
Moreover, a strong and effective air transport competition policy cannot be 
developed through the adversarial processes of the courtroom. Judges are not 
equipped to do so nor do they necessarily have the specialist knowledge 
required to regulate air transport competition, although the intervention by the 
ECJ in similar cases may seem to suggest otherwise. 85 At any rate, the courts 
have shown a supreme reluctance to interfere in the exercise of discretionary 
enforcement powers. The combination of these barriers and reluctance to 
entrust the antitrust responsibility to the CAA has required the latter to harness 
fair competition through the use of its regulatory powers, namely by its system 
of licensing airlines, though the changes brought about by Community 
liberalisation measures have affected the extent to which the CAA is able to flex 
its regulatory muscle against practices which constitute either an exploitation of 
market power or an anti-competitive behaviour. 86 
In any event, it should also be added that the antitrust provisions under EC law 
now applies to British air transport within the wider context of the Single 
European Air Transport Market. Of particular relevance are Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome which deal with anti-competitive practices and abuses of 
a dominant position respectively. Mergers are dealt with under Council 
Regulation 4064/89 which stipulates a number of thresholds before a merger 
has "a Community dimension7' and thus qualifies for investigation by the 
European Commission. 87 These issues are considered in more detail in a 
85 See ch. 7, infra. 
86 In so far as the proposed changes to the competition law materiallý . affect the CAA. 
the Government will consider whether the CAA should be. given concurrent powers 
to prohibit anti-competitivc agreements and abuse of dominant position in respect of 
airports. Any conflict over jurisdiction betN%ccn the CAA and the DGFT %iould be 
resolved within the terms of a non-statutory concordat: passim, paras. 9.1-9,2. 
87 (1989) OJ L395/1 as amended b%- (199o) 
6J L257/14. 
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subsequent chapter dealing with Community competition la" and the 
liberalisation programme for air transport 
Consistency in Policy Application and Standard 
The change in the regulatory emphasis of the CAA from the need for an air 
transport licence applicant to establish its case to the general presumption that 
licences will be granted liberally is perhaps the most significant, yet subtle, 
change in the regulation of civil aviation since competition was first introduced. 
Over the years of its existence, the CAA has exposed UK airlines to increasing 
competition, and this is well reflected in its body of licensing case-law and its 
successive policy statements. Where possible, the CAA has sought to 
deregulate subject to regulatory safeguards against anti-competitive practices. 
Where there are difficulties in doing so, the CAA has continued to regulate but 
within a liberal policy framework. For instance, entry into those routes failing 
outside Council Regulation 2408/92 is still regulated by the CAA although 
within a policy framework of liberal licensing which aims to create through 
competition equality of opportunities rather than equality of strength between 
airlines. Under this policy, applications for route licences will be granted unless 
otherwise shown to be inappropriate. Such a licensing framework providing for 
general statements of policy and exceptions to be made is what Galligan has 
called the principle of individuation which involves a "process of adopting or 
developing guides by generalising policies to give content to discretionary 
power". 88 Exceptions to the policy may be necessitated in a number of 
instances particularly those in which competition is likely to be absent or 
distorted. In spite of such exceptions to the general policy, the manner in which 
the policy of air transport licensing has evolved to create predictability and 
consistency of standard has also enabled future applicants for air transport 
licences to establish a reasonable idea of the prospects of its case. 
Consistency in policy application, however, has also affected the long-standing 
system of public hearings of the CAA, though this can only be an inevitable 
consequence of policy clarity and coherence. A system of public hearings in 
which policy development has, in the past, taken place and from which a 
transparent, yet coherent, policy on econon-dc regulation has gradually emerged, 
will inevitably lose its significance in so far as the latter is capable of informing 
air transport operators in advance of the approach to be taken by the CAA. 
Weak applications and undue objections, for instance, will be deterred. 
Furthermore, the use of a systematic policy on consultation and research 
knowledge from independent studies, thus avoiding the adversarial trappings of 
a quasi-judicial tribunal, has shifted the emphasis from hearings which 
characterised the ATLB in its days. Likewise, the deregulation of entry into 
intra-Community routes, of fares and of capacity have diminished the 
importance of hearings as a forum for policy development. 
88 DJ Galligan. "The Nature and Function of Policies %ýithin Discretionarv Po%%cr" 
(1939) Public Lms, 3321. See also. L. L. Fuller. The Aforah1v of Lins, (Yale Uni%'Crsity 
Press, New Haven: 1969). 
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The importance of regulated airline competition should be apparent from this 
chapter. In the main, if deregulation aims to procure more competition, then it is 
also true to say that a system of regulated competition can equally attain the 
same aim, and at the same time enjoy the benefit of being able to intervene to 
correct failures in the market place. These failures may be caused either by 
infrastructural limitations, or protectionist policies in international air transport, 
or restrictions from past practices. Accordingly, regulatory rcsponses to these 
policies become important. 
Even so, it is clear that the need for positive economic regulatory intervent i 
ions 
have and will become less frequent; their importance will diminish as the ills of 
the structural imbalance are gradually eliminated, and the discipline of 
sustainable competition begins to play a more instrumental role. The 
deregulation initiatives on fares and capacity and their effects are a strong 
testimony to the argument that the approach to economic regulation may be 
minimal or liberalised where the structure of the industry is naturally 
competitive. Although certain constraints will prevent the fall effect of 
competition to operate, such as the scarcity of airport slots, it is nevertheless 
possible to procure the aims of competition in areas where the structural 
barriers are no longer present, that is to say, a competitor who has the necessary 
capital equipment, resources and airport slots to begin a service. The freedom 
of the incumbent and the new operator to compete to meet the demands of the 
users has been described as critical market contestability. 
However, to ensure that this contestability can be sustained, it is important at 
the same time as economic regulatory controls are relaxed or abandoned to put 
in place a framework of antitrust regulation that can and will be rigorously 
enforced. This may be the job of the same economic regulatory agency or that 
of another separate agency. To that end, this chapter charted the role of the 
CAA in using the conditions of licensing as a means for enforcing the objectives 
of antitrust regulation. The jurisdiction for general antitrust regulation even as 
they apply to air transport rests with a separate corpus of competition agencies 
including the European Comn-dssion in so far as an antitrust case falls within the 
scope of Community law. 
130 
CHAPTER SIX BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 
AND THE REGULATORY 
RESPONSE 
Under conditions of perfect competition, the theory of contestability would 
apply to its fullest extent free from the need to make any assumptions. 
Economic regulation would not be needed. For reasons that are classified into 
three general headings, institutional, infrastructural and market-based, this 
chapter will set out the issues to assess the extent to which the theory is 
applicable to air transport in the light of those considerations and thus to 
question the validity of the assumption that the air transport industry is naturally 
competitive. For these reasons too, it %ill become apparent that where the 
conditions of natural competition can be secured, economic regulation may be 
liberalised or abandoned, and leaving the task of competition regulation to the 
antitrust laws. But where competition is not natural to the sector, economic 
regulation will play an important part to prevent, where possible, distortions or 
to elin-driate restrictions in competition so that equality of opportunities can be 
brought about. These distortions may have been artificially created either as a 
deliberate public policy or through historical privilege, some, however, may 
have arisen over time as a consequence of industrial expansion and growth 
though this would not be sufficient to justify any regulatory intervention. To 
these issues we now turn. 
Institutional Barriers: International Civil Aviation and Bilateral 
Agreements 
Chicago Convention 
The instrument central to international air transport is the International Civil 
Aviation Convention of 1944 concluded in Chicago (ICAO Convention) and 
which brought about a new, post-war system of regulation for international air 
transport. Part I of the Convention lays dowm the general legal principles of 
international civil aviation while Part II creates the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) charged, inter alia, with the tasks of developing the 
principles and techniques of international air navigation and fostering the 
planning and development of international air transport to ensure safe, regular, 
efficient and economical travel. ' The plenary body is the Assembly while the 
Council acts as the governing body entrusted with the tripartite functions of 
legislating by formulating Standards and Recommended Practices for 
international air transport, adjudicating over disputes, and supervising the 
implementation of international air service agreements. 
Article 44. 
The pivotal point of international civil aviation. ho%kever. is set out in Article I 
of the Convention. 
The contracting States recognise that every State has complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. 
This sovereignty is further re-inforced in respect scheduled international air 
services by Article 6. 
No scheduled international air services may be operated over or 
into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special 
permission or other authorisation of that State. and in 
accordance with the terms of such permission or authorisation. 
A different treatment, however, is accorded to non-scheduled international air 
services, and this is recognised in Article 5 of the Convention. 
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of other 
contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled 
international air services shall have the right, subject to the 
observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into 
or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for 
non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior 
permýission, and subject to the right of the State flowri over to 
require landing ... 
Such aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of 
passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire other than 
scheduled international air services, shall also, subject to the 
provisions of [cabotage], have the privilege of taking on or 
discharging passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right of any 
State where such embarkation or discharge takes place to 
impose such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may 
consider desirable. 
This latter provision is decidedly more liberal than those governing scheduled 
services, where the rights recoosed under it are positively expressed. 
Competition is consequently more apparent in, say, charter services. 
Equally restrictive is the provision on so-called cabotage services in Article 7 of 
the ICAO Convention. Cabotage in air transport is a highly sensitive issue, and 
many a time has hindered the successful conclusion of air service agreements. 
Cabotage, which essentially means the provision of services between two points 
in the same Contracting State by a carrier which registered in another State, 
(that is, domestic services) is defined by the Convention as "the right to refuse 
permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to take on in its territory 
passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for 
another point within its territory". Furthermore, and implicit Article 7 of the 
Convention, a contracting State which chooses to permit the airlines of one 
country to exercise cabotage rights is also obliged by the Convention to make 0 
that right available to all other signatories to the Convention. 
Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any 
arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an 
exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, 
and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other 
State. 
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. Uthough the 
Chicago Conference was convened to organise a system of 
regulation where international air transport would be provided in a safe and 
orderly manner within an environment of fairness and equality, it also attempted 
to secure a multilateral agreement on the commercial rights of scheduled 
international air services, perhaps ambitiously. This attempt failed. but two 
supplementary agreements to the eventual ICAO Convention which went some 
way in that direction were nevertheless adopted though not by all of the 
signatories to the Convention itself They are the 1wenianotyal Air Services 
Tratisit Agreement (IASTA) and the Imeniational Air Transport Ap-eelnelll 
(IATAg). '- Both of these agreements provide for what is commonly known 
today as thefreedonis of the air. The IASTA enables airlines of signatoriqs to 
the agreement to exercise non-commercial fights, namely the right to fly over 
the territory of the State concerned without stopping and the right to land for 
non-traffic purposes such as, for instance, refuelling and repairs. The IATAg, 3 
on the other hand, provides for flights with traffic purposes. 
(i) The privilege to fly across the territory of a contracting State. 
(ii) The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. 
(iii) The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the 
territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses. 
(iv) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the 
territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses. 
(v) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the 
territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to put down 
passengers, mail and cargo from any such territory, 
In addition to these five freedoms, a range of other freedoms have also emerged 
as result of progressive development. The sixth freedom, for example, is a 
species of the fifth freedom which enables a carrier to carry traffic between two 
different countries with an intermediate stop in the country of its registration, 
but which permission is not contained in a single air services agreement. As an 
illustration, take a UK carrier operating between TMexico and Russia with a stop 
in the UK. The carriage of passenger traffic between the two countries is 
dependent on two air services agreements, that is a Nlexico-UK agreement and a 
UK-Russia agreement. The seventh freedom, a much more radical air traffic 
right, entails the right of an airline to operate free-standing services between 
two different countries without any stop in the territory of the State in which it 
is registered. An example of this right may be a BA flight originating in the US 
and terminating in New Zealand, although the consent of these two countries 
will still be required. This seventh freedom is new and will undoubtedly emerge 
as a highly controversial issue. Whether or not it will be widely embraced is a 
matter surrounded by some degree of uncertainty. 4An eighth freedom has also 
been created and this is commonly known as cabotage. This is a concept 
2 As at 30 June 1998. there were 185 signatories to the Convention- (1998) 53 IC. 40 
Journal (no. 6) p. 30. Bý . contrast. there were 115 signatories to the 1ASTA and only 
12 signatories to the IATAg. 
3 This is not to be confused with the International Air Transport Association (infra). 
and hence is abbreNiated as IATAg. 
4 J. Fox, The Regulation qj' International Commercial Aviation: The International 
Regulatory Structure (Oceana. New York: 1994) is a useful handbook on the 
frecdoms of the air. 
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borrowed from. maritime practices and denotes the right of a foreign airline to 7 
provide domestic services within the territory of a country in which it is not 
registered. The highly contested issue between the governments of the UK and 
USA over the right of BA to provide cabotasze services. sav. from New York to 
Los Angeles, is a good example. The cabotage right is highly protected and 
jealously guarded for the exclusive use of the national rather than foreign 
carfiers. Indeed, the restrictive practices which have evolved in international 
civil aviation creates a certain sense of irony: that is to say. %%hat have been 
described as freedoms of the air are, in essence, restrictions. 
These traffic rights or privileges are clearly more extensive than those embraced 
by the IASTA and they have a much more obvious bearing on the commercial 
aspects of international air transport services. The IATAg also requires its 
signatories to renounce "all obligations and understandius between them which 
are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such 
obligations and understandings. "5 It is therefore of no surprise that, at the 
conclusion of the agreement, no more than a handful of signatories to the ICAO 
Convention were also signatories to the IATA9. As at 31 October 1997, there 
were II signatories to it, while IASTA had 112.6 The lack of interest for 
multilateralism. in the commercial rights of international civil aviation explains 
the great number of bilateral agreements that exists today, which in most cases 
would also include the provisions of the IATAg. Bilateral agreements have 
evolved simply by virtue of "the special permission or other authorisation" 
required by Article 6 of the ICAO Convention, but they have also provided the 
forum for the contracting parties to extract valuable traffic rights as a condition 
to certain other traffic rights being given up. They provide to the parties 
concerned the "contracting freedom", such as it is, to decide whether and which 
of the traffic rights to include in the agreement, thus providing them with a 
strategic regulatory instrument to exercise control over the conduct of the 
services in question. Until more recently when the concept of privatisation 
began to dominate political agenda, most airlines were State-owned and were 
used as an instrument of public policy. This is true whether in the context of 
international or domestic air transport. Countries which are dependent on the 
international airline industry to make a significant contribution to their national 
income would seek to ensure that this interest was not prejudiced, and State 
ownership would provide the necessary tool for intervention so that, for 
instance, the industry may be protected from any undue or unforeseen economic 
difficulties and any social or political obligations could be upheld. The rationale 
for this approach is that "increased [international economic dependence] erodes 
the effectiveness of national economic policies and hence threatens national 
autonomy in the determination and pursuit of economic objectives. 117 One 
commentator has suggested that, 
Governments use a variety of policy instruments to shelter their 
economies from the competition risks of the international 
Article 11. s. 1. 
6 (1997) 52 IC. 40 Journal (no. 8) p. 23. 
7 R. N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the SeN-critics" 
(1972) 24 World Politics 15 9. at p. 164. 
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economy Some states adopt explicitly neo-mercantilist policies, 
others favour certain enterprises, whether in the private or public 
sector, as "national champions", still others adopt a variety of 
industry-specific protectionist measures. 8 
Every country will always feel the need for an airline of its own. A national 
carrier flying in the international skies will convey a sense of national prestige 
and international recognition. In spite of greater globalisation and multi-national 
ownership of airlines, there is still a large degree of protection given to the 
national carriers. However liberal the policy on airline competition, much of this 
can be readily compromised. This can be seen in the proposed take-over of 
B. Cal in 1987 by the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS) which was rejected in 
favour of a BA-B. Cal merger. A study into the SAS in 1938 noted that political 
considerations surrounding the possibility of B. Cal, which at that time was the 
losecond force" airline, falling into foreign ownership were always going to lead 
to the proposal being rejected. 
A major issue during the takeover battle was the implication of 
SAS gaining control of a British airline. The question of national 
control was important .... 
9 
Likewise in the US, where, until more recent recommendations, foreign 
ownership in an US-based airline was restricted. 10 
However, it is also true that airlines have always been regarded as a vital 
military asset and this is evident throughout the history of aviation. Indeed, the 
impetus behind the Chicago Conference was the consequences and experiences 
arising from the inter-War years. The guarded agreement reflects the belief of 
many countries that commercial aviation becomes a useful means of 
transportation, "providing the benefits of swift travel to diplomats, soldiers and 
administrators, besides carrying vital supplies of lightweight goods" in times of 
hostilities. " In the UK, s. 62 of the 1982 Act allows the Secretary of State to 
issue an order to regulate the navigation of air services over the UK airspace or 
an order to take possession of aerodromes or aircraft for military purposes in 
times of war or emergency. 
Mercantilist Attitude 
The system which the ICAO Convention has created and the practice which has 
since evolved holds out little in the way of competition in international air 
8 D. R. Cameron. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis" 
(1978) 72 American Political Science Review 1243. at p. 1260. See also 
G. Lehmbruch. "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government" (1977) 10 Comparative 
Political Studies 9 1. 
9 S. Ghoshal, Scandinewian Airline ývstein in 1988 (INSEAD-CEDEP discussion 
paper. 1988). p. 14. 
10 49 U. S. C. sec. 1378(a)(4) states. "Except as pro-tided in subsection (b) of this section. 
it shall be unlawful ... for any foreign carrier or person controlling a foreign air carrier 
to acquire control in any manner NNhatsocN-cr of any citizen of the United Statcs 
substantially engaged in the business of aeronautics. - Subsection (b) pro, %idcs that an 
application may be made to the Attorricy-General and the Secretary of 
Transportation who will consider the application primarily on the grounds of public 
interest and fair competition. See n. 15. infira. 
R. E. G. Davies. .4 History of The Morld's. -lirlines (OUP. London: 1964). p. 225. 
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transport unless the significant step is taken to depart from the original 
philosophy of protection. Although there is already evidence that testifies to the 
benefits of increasing competition, for instance in some areas of Community air 
transport as a result of the liberalisation programme, much is still to be desired 
in the way in which and the extent to which the principle of fair competition is 
applied. This is true even between two countries purported to have a liberal air 
transport policy. Illustrative in this respect is the bilateral agreement between 
the UK and the US on which the most recent efforts to conclude a new 
agreement have come to a complete halt as both parties refuse to reciprocate on 
the demand for new air traffic rights. While the US on the one hand wishes to 
have greater access to London(Heathrow), the UK has consistently maintained 
that such a concession could only be granted if it was reciprocated by the night 
to provide cabotage services in the US by UK airlines. Access to Heathrow 
Airport is a prized commodity as much as the US domestic traffic is lucrative 
section of the market. Since much of the debate on the provision of cabotage 
services centres on the US market because of its value, the US Government is 
naturally cautious and hesitant to accede to this request. "- The ratio of 
domestic-international operations for UK and US airlines is significantly 
different and clearly indicates that UK airlines were more dependent on 
international services while US airlines derived a substantial part of its revenue 
from domestic services. While there would be gains, both would also emerge as 
losers from the bargain. This contrasts remarkably with the "open-skies" 
agreement between the US and the Netherlands, an agreement which effectively 
provides for unlimited access. In that case, however, the Netherlands stood to 
lose virtually nothing, and indeed would benefit from greater access to the US 
market, and vice versa. The whole process of negotiating for a new UK-US air 
service agreement has now been complicated by the proposed alliance between 
BA-Arnerican Airlines where the quid pro quo for their approval by the US 
antitrust authorities is an open-skies agreements which gives US airlines greater 
access to Heathrow Airport. 
Perhaps more interesting in this regard has been the decision of the French 
authorities to refuse BA and other European carriers to exercise their right of 
access to Paris(Orly) airport under the Council Regulation 2408/92 which 
eventually led to a number of Commission decisions that held the French 
authorities had acted in breach of Community obligations. These are explored in 
detail in the following chapter. 
Bilateral agreements are also highly prescriptive, from detailing the designated 
carrier permitted to operate on a certain route, to the level of fares that may be 
charged and to the frequency and density of capacity to be provided by that 
carrier per period of time. 
12 The US domestic market provides for 70% of the total of operations of its airlines. 
European airlines. on the other hand. are more dependent on international seniccs 
which accounts for approximately 50% of total operations. compared to a much 
smaller margin of domestic operations of less than 30%: CONI(92) 434. 
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Probably no other world-wide economic activity of comparable 
magnitude is more thorouGhly regulated, less free of official C 
restraint and guidance, than is world air transport 13 
The bilateral agreement between the UK and Japan for air transport services 
between London and Tokyo(Narita), for instance, restricts the number of 
frequencies operated by British carriers to 38 round-trips per week, divided 
between Polar and Siberian routes, and imposes a minimum fare level. These are 
clear limitations to the licensing policy of the CAA on a competitive. multi- 
airline industry and a significant deprivation of the full effect of Government 
policies. On routes where no more than two airlines operate, usually by the 
national carriers, there is little incentive to compete and be efficient, and haýdly 
an economic manner of allocating resources. The inefficiency and the resulting 
distortion in the proportionality of fares in relation to costs will not benefit 
users. 
Such restrictions as are used in bilateral agreements do not foster growth nor 
innovation. A poignant remark to a similar effect was made by the US National 
Commission to Ensure A Strong Competitive Airline Industry in its report to 
the President and Congress. 
The Commission believes the current bilateral system is no 
longer sound or sufficiently growth-oriented in the global trade 
environment.. -efforts to create a more open, competitive 
international aviation environment have been stymied repeatedly 
by nations [and thereby] suspend growth in international 
markets ... The 
increasingly contentious bilateral relationships 
already mentioned are resulting in agreements or de facto 
relationships either markedly more rigid and protectionist than 
before, or seriously out of balance. 14 
Whether it is the restriction on fares or the number of designated carriers, or 
indeed the number of total seats permitted for sale to the public, these are 
constraints which have been artificially imposed for whatever reasons, legitimate 
or irrational. Although negotiations on international services are inter- 
governmental, the role of the CAA in regulating for competition is by no means 
insignificant. Bilateral agreements which provide a general framework without, 
for example, naming a particular airline or airlines, will mean that the rights 
resulting from the agreement will have to be allocated to a UK airline. Where 
the rights are less than what the UK airlines require, the shortfall in supply will 
make it necessary for the CAA to allocate those rights on a competitive basis 
following a public hearing. Since competition is likely to be limited, especially 
so where only one airline is permitted to serve on the route, regulatory 
measures will have to be adopted to ensure that the airline granted with the 
rights is not unduly protected from the forces of competition. If, therefore, the 
airline in question fails to provide services to the standard which meets the 
interests of users, those rights will be withdrawn from it and a competitor with 
13 O. J. Lissitz)m. "Freedom of the Air: Scheduled and Non-scheduled Air Services" in 
E. McWhinney and M. A. Bradley (eds. ). The Freedom of the Air (Sijtboff. Leiden: 
1968). 
14 The National Commission to Ensure A Strong Competitive Airline Industry. 
Change, Challei7ge and Conipetition (1993). pp. 20-2 1. 
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promises to deliver user benefits will be substituted in its place These issues are 
taken up in detail in the section 
International Air Transport Association 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is a non-governmental 
organisation established in 1919 as the International Air Tr !f . 
Tic Association, the C) 
year when the first recorded international scheduled air service was operated. 
The modern IATA today is a by-product of the international system of civil 
aviation which grew out of the 1944 Chicago Convention. The aims of the 
Association are many-fold: 
(i) to promote safe, regular and economical air transport, 
(ii) to foster air commerce, including the study and solving of related 
problems; 
(iii) to provide a forum for discussion and consultation on the problems of 
the air transport industry, including the provision of centralised services 
and research; 
(iv) to co-operate with the ICAO and other organisations; 
(v) to represent an association of airlines committed to competition and free 
trade. 15 
membership of the Association is voluntary and is automatically open to any 
airline engaged in international services, whose government is also eligible for 
membership of the ICAO. The functions of IATA include tariff co-ordination 
and scheduling services although the emphasis of its work is now on the setting 
and co-ordination of tariffs, a task which otherwise would have to be devolved 
to the often protracted bilateral negotiations. Now bilateral agreements 
commonly refer the setting of fares for international scheduled services to the 
IATA system. Its other efforts are by no means unimportant. It simplifies the 
travelling experience by facilitating through-ticketing, even between different 
airlines, so that air travel reservations can be made through one telephone call 
and paid in one currency. However, it is an institutional system perpetuating 
the tradition of collusion in air transport. The nature of its principal function in 
fare-setting runs the risk of being declared as contrary to the principles of fair 
and equal competition. Indeed in 1978, the CAB in the US issued a "show- 
cause" letter to IATA for the anti-competitive nature of its fare-fixing system 
although this was eventually withdrawn on the basis that the benefits derived 
from the IATA system outweighed any of its anti-competitive effects. 16 
Similarly, it is open to question under the competition laws of the EC laid down 
in Article 85 although in respect of certain functions, exemptions have been 
granted. 17 
15 See IATA- L4TA: Ahns and Objectives (1991). For a more exhaustive consideration 
of the role of IATA. see J. W. S. Brancker. L4T4 and [Piat It Does (Sijthoff, Lciden: 
1977). 
16 C4B Order 76-6-78 (12 June 1973). 
17 Commission Decision 91/480, [199 11 OJ L25S/18 and Commission Decision 91/43 1, 
[19911 OJ L258/29. See generally J. Goh. European Air Transport Law and 
Competition (John Wiley. Cl-dchcster: 1997). ch. 3 and A. E, Salznian. "IATk Airline 
Rate-Fixing and the EEC Compctition Rules" (1977) Ettropean Lms- Review 409. 
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Market barriers 
In any given airline industry, homogeneity in the size. economics and politics of 
the airlines is never possible. Thus, how a market position is to be assessed 
depends on how the size of the airline is to be measured. This may be the size of 
aircraft fleet, or the network of routes served, or output measures such as the 
total number of passengers carried or the revenue earned from passengers for 
the total number of kilometres flown, otherwise known as revenue passenger 
kilometres (RPK). " Whichever factor is chosen for measuring airline size in 
order to determine its market strength, the results can be significantly different. 
For instance, an airline with a large fleet, but carries significantly less passengers 
than a smaller fleet-size airline on the same route will have a lower RPK thai) 
the latter. If measured in RPK, then the latter will have significantly greater 
market dominance than the former. More straightforwardly, a larger fleet-size 
airline which carries significantly more passengers than a smaller 11cet-size 
airline on the same route will assume a greater degree of dominance in the 
market. 
Market dominance, of course, has a direct bearing on the conditions of 
competition. If market don-dnance was measured in RPK terms, then any 
diminution of the dominance through competitive solutions must mean a 
competitor successfully attracting passengers away from the incumbent. How 
the incumbency is derived may be explained in two ways. First, an airline may 
secure a greater share of the market through 'internal' attributions by making 
efficiency gains, by aggressive marketing or by offering innovative products. 
Second, the incumbency may be derived from historical endowment or 
deliberate public policy. For example, in explaining the structure of EC air 
transport industry, the CAA remarked, 
What the national airlines of the Member States each have in 
common is dominance of their home markets ... This dominance has often been built up over many years during which national 
airlines enjoyed positions of near or actual monopoly as a matter 
of government policy ... Even in the UK, despite its having the 
largest and most diverse airline industry in Europe, BA still 
accounted for 83% of the total scheduled rpks in 1992.19 
Although the British air transport industry has been privatised since 19S7, and 
competition in place since before then, BA continues to enjoy a stable RPK 
output relative to other British operators by virtue of its network of routes, size 
of fleet, publicity and, take-off and landing slots in one of Europe's most 
congested airports, most of which stem from its previous monopoly as a 
publicly owned corporation. The ability of a competitor to reduce that 
dominance must accordingly depend on other factors such as its o%m economics 
of scale and scope as well as its pattern of routes. In its analysis of the structure 
of industry in the EC, the CAA referr ed to the emergence of BMA and Air UK 
to compete with BA on domestic and international scheduled services as a result 
18 RPK is computed by multiplying the munbcr of paying passengers by the number of 
kilometres flown for a given sector. 
19 Airline Competition in the Single European Alarket. CAP 623 (1993). para. 7. 
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of its multi-airline policy. although it concluded that "they accounted for only 
I oqo and 5P 0 of total UK scheduled passengers and only 211 o and I*o or rpks in 
1992. "211 This is still the case in the EC where the intervention of the 
Commission has been necessary in a number of instances 21 
Such imbalance in the industry structure, where an airline enjoys a dominant 
position by virtue of either a law-monopoly or market -monopoly, is liable to 
create high barriers of entry for competitors and consequently efrective 
competition. Indeed, in the case of a law-monopoly, competition is likely to be 
expressly prohibited on the grounds of public policy. Nevertheless. if 
government or regulatory policies are aimed at protecting such dominance 
rather than creating equality of opportunities for competition. then little in the 
way of incentives will exist for competitors to compete %ith the incumbent. A 
tendency to form alliances of some kind with the latter is more likely to emerge. 
The economies of scale, of scope or of network in air transport is considerably 
higher than other industries such as the bus or haulage industries. Likewise, the 
capital costs of running an airline business is considerably in excess as is access 
to the infrastructure such as air space and airports. Whilst economic 
deregulation in the US may have provided the opportunities for more airlines to 
compete, more recent evidence suggests that these high barriers have had the 
effect of either preventing a new operator from entering the market to provide 
competing services, or forcing an operator to cease its services, or to merge 
with a larger and more dominant airline operator. 22 For less dominant or smaller 
carriers, the temptation of forming an a1liance or merging with larger carriers 
either to gain access to a wrider geographical area or to important air service 
routes is seemingly overwhelming. Rather than compete against the might of 
large carriers, and eventually losing out, more could be gained by co-operating. 
One notable exception is the "largest and most long-standing challenge" by 
BNIA against BA initially in the latter's most densest domestic routes, namely 
the London(Heathrow)-Glasgow route. 23 
One of the most pressing barriers to competition in modem air transport is 
access into a congested airport whether in securing air space to approach the 
airport, or in securing an airport slot for taking-off or landing, or in securing a 
legate" for the embarkation or disembarkation of passengers, all of which are 
treated further below. A dominant carrier which is likely to also have 
dominance at the airport in question will offer attractive incentives to another 
operator which is prevented by these barriers to form an alliance whether by 
merging operations or co-operating in one way or another. Unless an 
alternative neighbouring airport to the one in question exists to provide the Z. 
opportunities for a competitor to offer competing services, for example the 
London airports of Heathrow and Gatvvick, such barriers have the effect of 
preserving or re-asserting the dominance of the incumbent. 
20 Ibid. para. S. 
21 See ch. 7, infra. 
11 See ch. 8. infra. 
23 CAA. The Shkgle European Aviation Alarker: Progress 36 Far. CAP 654 (1995). 
para. 226. 
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, A, resulting question in the formulation of air transport competition policies 
arising from such developments is whether a policy of competition between a 
few airlines is more likely to produce the intended benefits. or whether such 
benefits could be better achieved by competition between a greater number of 
airlines. The policy of multi-airline industry in the UK subscribes to the former. 
The CAA recognises that to achieve an environment in which a large number of 
airlines would compete with each other is not only impossible but need not 
necessarily produce the benefits envisaged for the users under a competitive 
industry. The real difference is therefore between an industry comprising of a 
few but competitive airlines, and one of many but charactefised by relative 
weakness. In its memorandum to the Transport Select Committee, the CAA 
made an observation along the similar line in that, 
... even 
if current trends lead to an industry dominated by a small 
number of very large airlines, competition between these 
remaining "mega-airlines" should still be workable and deliver 
benefits to passengers (although] in practice much will depend 
on whether the existing pattern of operation, whereby typically 
no more than two of the major... airlines operate alongside each 
other on any one route, is likely to break down substantially.... ' .4 
The barriers created by such dominance flowing from either a deliberate public 
policy, or historical endowment, or 'internal' attributions, is applicable to both 
domestic and international air transport. Of course, the latter is complicated by 
the fact of government intervention in their negotiations for air service 
agreements. Nevertheless, global alliances have not been uncommon either as an 
effort to rationalise, resources or simply to avoid competition. Indeed, there is 
ample evidence pointing to a trend which suggests greater consolidation rather 
than competition. BA and American Airlines, for example, are spearheading the 
OneWorld global alliance, which includes Qantas, Cathay Pacific, Iberia and 
others, although this has been challenged by the Star Alliance consisting of 
between Lufthansa, United Airlines, SAS, Thai International Airways, Ansett 
Australia and others. 
Within British air transport markets, BA acquired Dan-Air in 1992 as the latter 
failed to sustain the intense, low-cost competition in charter services, in addition 
to its earlier acquisitions of the Plymouth-based Brymon Airways and GB 
Airways. Within the EC too, since the gradual process of liberalisation was 
introduced in 1987, mergers in the form of acquisition by Air France of the 
French airlines UTA and Air Inter, and the acquisition by BA of 49% stake in 
the German Deutsche BA and the French TAT, are two of many instances 
which typify the continuing dominance of a number of European airlines. Whilst 
the CAA has acknowledged the certain degree of inevitability of consolidation 
as the different national markets merge into one, and has indeed suggested that 
there can be no presumption in EC mergers policy against mergers between 
dominant carriers, it advocates the need to treat with caution the argument that 
the Community's largest airlines can only hope to compete with the biggest 
24 Transport Select Committee. Developinents in European Connnunitv Air Transport 
PolicY, HC147-11(1991-92). paras. 20-21. 
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airlines from the US and the Far East if thev were permitted to grow through 
mergers or acquisitions between themselves Neither should the approach be to 
soften substantially the requirements of competition law to allow for such an 
airline to emerge. 25 This degree of inevitability has emerged as a consequence of 
carriers recognising that they are not suitable to all markets. Thus, by forging an 
alliance, less profitable or less important routes in strategic terms could be 
abandoned. Such market barriers then become fortified. for new entrants 
seeking to challenge the increased dominance would need to commit themselves 
to long-term investments and to offer much more attractive products against the 
backdrop of the incumbents' identity and ability to respond by virtue of their 
larger resources. 
Infrastructural Barricrs 
Runway Capacity and Slot Allocation 
However well-intended the practice of liberal licensing may be, there will always 
exist significant barriers to be overcome to achieve a competitive environment. 
A number of these barriers may not necessarily be broken down by a multi. 
airline licensing policy. These are worthy of further consideration here as they 
pose not merely a significant impediment to competition unique to air transport 
in the UK, but also across the air transport world. Perhaps the most signifi=t 
barrier acknowledged by the industry and regulatory bodies across the world is 
the lack of infrastructural capacity. The problem of congestion and the lack of 
slots for take-off and landing, most acute at popular airports, prevent competing 
airlines from introducing services. Likewise, fin-dted airport terminal capacity or 
apron capacity at an airport or air space surrounding an airport would hinder 
the introduction of additional or competing services whether by incumbents or 
new entrants. While an air transport licence may be an authorisation to operate 
aircraft and provide air transport services, it does not guarantee the availability 
of infrastructural resources nor capacity to enable the authorisation to be put 
into use. Yet capacity constraints and slots allocation is a pre-requisite of air 
transport safety. Overloading the available air space and airport capacity is a 
potent disaster. At the present time, there is a maximum of 81 aircraft 
movements per hour during peak times at London(Heathrow) airport providing 
an average of one and one-third movements (or aircraft) in any one minute on 
the runway. This represents a 17% increase in runway capacity over the 1978 
level of 69 movements-26 This increase has been possible for a number of 
reasons including technical improvements and greater willingness on the part of 
airlines to accept delay. Nevertheless, Heathrow remains one of the most 
congested airports with the highest number of slots in the EC. 
25 CAP 623. paras. 231 et. seq. 
26 CAP 623 and CAA, Slot . -Illocation: .4 Proposal for Europe's . 1irports. CAP 644 
(1995). 
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Table 6.1 Declared Camicities - Parallel Runways 
Airport Summer 1993 Summer 1995 
Heatlirow 77-70 77-81 
_ Pans (CDG) 76 76 
_ Copenhagen 74 76 
Paris (Orly) 70 70 
Nfunich 68 70 
_ Frankfurt 68 70 
_ Brussels 
_5" 
3 60 
Rome 50 56 
_ 
_Nfilan 
(Nialpensa) 1 30 10 
Source: CAA, Slot Allocation: A Proposalfor Eltrope'v Airports (CAP 644) 
The allocation of these scarce slots at UK airports is co-ordinated by 
Scheduling Committees, specifically Airport Co-ordination Limited. These 
Committees are comprised of representatives from the airlines, the airports and 
the CAA. The detailed procedures by which slots are allocated are complex 
depending on such variables as peak or off-peak times, the size of aircraft used 
which bears on the time per aircraft movement (e. g. the bigger the aircraft, the 
more time it will need for taking-off), and others. These are based on the IATA 
Scheduling Procedures Guide which incorporates a number of principles 
including historical precedence, new entrants, and emergencies. Slots held by an 
airline need not be used. This may be due to the lack of demand for services at 
that particular time or to other extraneous circumstances such as international 
embargoes, hostilities or industrial actions at the airport of destination. Slots 
may also be traded between airlines, or indeed by the airline itself witWn its pool 
of slots to achieve a better allocation of resource. For instance, a BMA service 
on the London-Paris at an 0930 slot may be switched for the use of a London- 
Brussels service to meet demand. The CAA, however, has stated in its policy 
statement that it would be prepared to exercise its regulatory powers indirectly 
to ensure that allocated slots would be maximised. 
The possession of a route licence by an airline which does not 
itself serve the route will confer no preference on the holder in 
the event of an application from another airline. If the holder 
starts or proposes to use the licence after such an application has 
been made, the Authority will need to be convinced that this was 
not merely pre-emptive. 27 
Slot allocation at EC airports are now governed by Council Regulation 95/93 
which essentially preserves the current practice under the IATA guidelineS. 28 
The important difference is that the Regulation creates rights which may 
ultimately be enforceable by the courts. Equally important, is the system of 'slot 
pool' established under the Regulation where a designated percentage of slots 
ending up in the pool must be allocated only to new entrants who are defined in 
27 CAP 620, para. 11. See Decision 1194 relating to the bilateral restrictions on the 
London-Bcirut route. requiring the CAA to make a choice bctN%ccn BA and British 
Mediterranean AinNays. 
28 (1993) OJ L14/1- 
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the Regulation. The application of this Regulation and its impact on competition 
is considered more fully below 
While in general the system of slots allocation lacks any legal sanction exccpt in 
the case of Community airports, and indeed comprises of anti-compoitive 
overtones. it is generally accepted as the best available method of distributing 
airport slots. Other methods of slot allocation exist including slots trading and 
peak pricing of slots. The latter involves a premium being placed on peak 
period slots, and airlines wfll have to weigh the higher cost of operation against 
a service in which there is a lack of demand. and therefore consider the 
possibility of operating the service using an off-peak slot. Indexing demano to 
slot prices, however, requires a high probability of change in demand. But 
where demand for peak slots is generally inelastic, change would only take place 
when there is a drastic change in demand for that service or in circumstances 
when the likely loss in operations could not be rationally subsidised from gains 
in other operations. A system of slot trading, on the other hand, involves the 
buying and selling of slots between airlines, although a possible consequence of 
this system would be higher fares and the strengthening of the position of 
dominant airlines which are more capable of outbidding smaller airlines. This is 
a common practice in the United States except at the four slot-controlled 
airports, namely New York(Kennedy), New York(La Guardia), 
Chicago(O'Hare) and Washington(National). The allocation of slots at these 
high density airports are regulated by legislation on the number of movements 
per hour. This slot rule was the subject of the most comprehensive review in 
1994 since its adoption 26 years ago to deal with the problem of airport 
congestion which included delays that eventually led to the cancellation of 
flights. However, the review recommended no substantive changes to the 
existing systeM. 29 For the CAA, slot trading as a penpheral mechanism to 
achieve effective slot allocation and usage is inevitable, but "these exchanges 
should be transparent. It30 These alterriative methods of allocating slots are by no 
means without their faults and perhaps are no better that the scheduling system 
internationally accepted. This view was implicit in a response from a member of 
the CAA to the author; 31 a view also echoed in the evidence given to the House 
of Commons Transport Select Committee. 
The difficulty in intervening in slot allocation, NIr Chairman, is 
that one has to find a system better than that which now 
exists ... We are unhappy with the present system of slot 
allocation and we cannot think of anything better. 32 
Yet the restrictive effect of limýited runway capacity on competition is not only 
real, but severe. If the present system of slot allocation is based on historical 
29 Department of Transportation. Report to Cons', ress: .4 Studv of the 11ýgh DensitV Rule 
(1995). 
30 CAP 644. para. 123. The EC Commission is now considering the option of lcgalising 
slot trading: Financial Thnes. 4 October t996. 
31 Interview with the author. 8 November 1994. 
32 Director of Economic Regulation Group. Transport Select Committee. Developments 
in European CommunitvAir Tran. sport Policv (First Report). HC 147-11 (1991-92). 
p. 40. 
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precedence, then the obvious implication of this constraint must be to preserve 
the dominance of existing airlines %, vho have slots at such airports. Although the 
dominance of BA at Heathrow airport is apparent, its share of tile total slots 
allocated is no comparison to those held by other State-airlines in the EC who 
have virtual control of slots at principal airports. 33 When BA was privatiscd, 
the slots which it then had at Heathrow and Gatwick airports were not removed 
but were instead endowed in the newly privatiscd carrier. The result of this 
historical endowment clearly reduces the ability of new competing services 
being introduced. Of course, this system of "grandfather" fights where slots 
used for one traffic season can be used in the same traffic season the following 
year, is not without its merits, and is indeed universally accepted, since it pvc 
proper recognition and security to the investments incurred or to be incurred for 
developing new services. Nevertheless, in the case of BA! s market share, it has 
been greatly eroded on those routes which BINIA has managed to secure the 
slots to offer competing services. The following table illustrates the division of 
departing flights from Heathrow and the frequency share of the major airlines 
on the densest routes in the EC on which BINIA operates, 
Tahlp 67 Denarting Flis! hts from Heathrow in 1993 
Paris 
Airline Departing Flights Frequency Share 
BA 3,489 3291, o 
BIMA 2,934 
_27_0,, o _ Air France 4,32A 40% 
lotal 10,745 
Amsterdam 
Airline Departing Flights Frequency Share 
BA 2,380 29% 
BTNIA 2,805 35% 
_ KLM 21,9 20 36% 
Total 8,105 
Brussels 
Airline Departing Flights FrequencyShare 
BA 2,266 32% 
BNIA 2,239 31% 
_ Sabena 21,612 37% 
_ Total 117 
_ Frankfurt 
Airline Departing Flights Frequency Share 
BA 1,398 '33% 
_ BINIA 1,042 25 ONO 
Lufthansa 1,762 42% 
Total 4.202 
Source: CAA, Slot Allocation: A Proposalfor Europe's Airports (CAP 644) 
33 See submission of the CAA to the Commons Transport Select Committee. ibid. 
para. S. 
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AJthouL, h the overall departing slots for UK carriers from Heathrow is between 
5S*/o-4%, these slots are shared by two carriers each with no more than a 10% 
differential. It is also clear from this that the success of effective competition 
depends on a comparable number of slots or frequencies held by the competitor 
as against those of the incumbents. Thus, unless such comparable number of 
slots are held, operators seeking to enter the relevant market are not likely to 
achieve the minimum service levels so as to offer attractive schedules This is 
most acute in the case of short-haul services. To maximise the utilisation of an 
aircraft and to achieve minimum traffic threshold, an operator is assumed to 
need to make a sufficient number of rotations per day, This in turn depends on 
the number of available slots and the timing of the slots. The latter is 
particularly significant where the passengers are primarily intra-lining traýffic, 
either bound for a connecting service or derived from a connecting service, so 
as to maximise route and fleet synergies. The problem is less pressing in the 
case of long-haul flights in that the number of required rotations decreases as 
the length of the flight increases and given this lower frequency, they are 
consequently less dependent on slots at particular times of the day. 34 
Undoubtedly, it is open for argument that the simple solution to the 
infrastructural constraints would be the creation of additional capacity such as 
the construction of new airports or additional runways as in the case of 
Manchester Airport. But these are developments which will impact other sets 
of interests within the regulatory complex, most acutely, environmental interests 
and are likely to attract severe objections. 35 
Terminal CaPaCitY 
Terminal capacity relates to the capacity of an airport to accommodate aircraft 
and traffic for embarkation or disembarkation. It bears a direct relationship with 
the permissible number of airport slots and aircraft movements at any one time, 
so that any limiting effects will also have a consequence on airline competition. 
For instance, at Berlin(Tegel), the limited number of terminal gates restricted 
the number of hourly runway movements to a maximum of 34 in 1994.36 Any 
expansion of terminal capacity to alleviate this barrier is not without its 
difficulties, whether of a political or environmental nature as is evident in the 
inquiry relating to the proposed Terminal 5 at Heathrow. 
Air Space Capacity 
Air space capacity is much more technical and sophisticated, and so are its 
control and problems. The concern of the economic regulatory functions of the 
CAA, with the increasing congestion of air space is minimal, but the effect of air 
space congestion on airline competition is nevertheless critical. At Barcelona 
airport, for example, air space restrictions have meant the limiting of aircraft 
34 See generally CAA. Airline Competition on European Long-Haul Routes. CAP 639 
(1994). 
35 The emiroruncrital issues of air transport havc been considercd clsc%Nhere. See 
P. Dmics and J. Goh. "Air Transport and the Environment: Regulating Aircraft 
Noise" (1993) ISAIR and Space LI 11' 123. 
36 CAP 654. para. 219. 
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movements to 30 an hour. " Like surface expansion. air space expansion to 
accommodate a greater number of aircraft at any one time is limited Thus, the 
need to look towards more efficient and effective svstems of air trallic 
management, a task which has led to combined international Olorts such tile 
construction of various navigational systems including the Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) and the Communications. Navigation and 
Surveillance/Air Traffic I'vlanagement Systems (CNS/AT\I). 
Regulatory Response t5 
These institutional, market and inftastructural constraints are real impediments 
to dynamic airline competition. At the same time, however, the CAA has had to 
secure the reasonable interests of users, lest it fails to fulfil its statutory duty. In 
some instances, the remedy may be provided by regulatory means, but in some 
others regulatory remedies may be inappropriate or undesirable. Where 
regulatory remedies are possible, this has frequently entailed the CAA making a 
choice between airlines and services, if not to prescribe detailed conditions in 
the licences. This was witnessed in its recent decision on the application by 
both BA and British Mediterranean to operate the London-Beirut route. The 
bilateral agreement between the UK and Lebanon, however, restricted the 
number of weekly frequencies to five. British Mediterranean had applied to 
operate seven weekly flights while BA applied to operate two weekly services. 
The CAA! s role in that case was to reconcile the applications and the bilateral 
restrictions having regard at all times to its statutory duty of furthering the 
interests of users. BA contended that the British Mediterranean weekly services 
should be cut back to three so that the remaining two frequencies could be 
allocated to it. Although the CAA was at pains to meet the objectives of its 
policy such that BA could also provide the services in competition, it 
nevertheless allowed British Mediterranean to continue to operate its five 
weekly services. In reaching that conclusion, it reasoned that, 
As a new airline its financial position is inevitably far less secure 
than that of an established carrier. If the Authority wishes to 
pursue a long term multi-airline policy it cannot ignore the 
differences in size and resources between British Mediterranean 
and BA. Restricting British Mediterranean to three services per 
week as suggested by BA would substantially reduce the chances 
of the airline's survival .... the Authority must try to ensure that 
British Mediterranean receives a sufficient allocation of the 
available frequencies to stand a reasonable chance of operating a 
viable service. 18 
The CAA was clear in its reasoning, however, that the decision did not entail a 
policy which would give a measure of preference to smaller airlines, although it 
would always be minded of the background of the statutory objectives and its 
37 ibid.. para. 22 1. 
38 Decision 2/94. 
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own policy that significant inequalities in size and economics of scale exist 
between the airlines. 11 
Prominent also amongst its regulatory responses to ensure that tile ciTcct of 
these constraints on competition is minimal is the provision 11or artificial 
contestability which requires an incumbent airline to operate efficiently This is 
the policy of substinitioti. 
In a limited number of cases competition may be precluded, or 
unattainable on acceptable terms, because of international 
constraints. In these circumstances, tile Authority will be ready 
to consider substituting another carrier for an incumbent so as to 
safeguard or further the interests of users. 40 
The incentive to be efficient is the stalits quo. Air transport operators are 
expected to provide services of the level envisaged in the statute and policy 
statement such that the reasonable interests of users are satisfied, and where this 
is so, they will continue to provide those services. But where they fall short of 
the requirements, for example by failing to compete effectively or by providing 
inferior and non-competitive services, the sanctions of this policy may be 
invoked. An operator will have its licence withdrawn and therefore lose the 
right to provide the services. In deciding whether to invoke this sanction, the 
CAA will take into account the length of time the incumbent has taken to 
establish itself on that route and the degree of commitment displayed in 
providing the said services. Substitution, however, will be applied sparingly, 
and only in circumstances "when to do so would maififestly eithimce the 
achievement of the objectives of the Act. "41 Indeed, the CAA has never 
exercised this authority despite its long-standing existence, 4' The one occasion 
when it came closest to using the policy of substitution was in respect of 
services between London and Tokyo-Narita. The CAA was called upon to 
decide how frequency restrictions of 38 round-trips per week arising from the 
UK-Japan bilateral agreement had to be shared between BA and Virgin, a 
decision which, if the policy of multi-airline competition was to be maintained, 
involved the substitution of BA by Virgin on certain routes and services. Of the 
38 slots available, BA had 30 and Virgin eight; Virgin operated four 
"terminating" services to Narita while BA operated a number of "transit" 
services to Narita with onward services to other points such as Osaka. A 
London-Narita-Osaka round-trip service would therefore use a total of four 
slots at Narita instead of two if they were terminating services: London-Narita-, 
Narita-Osaka; Osaka-Narita; Narita-London. BA claimed that it was 
commercially irrational to operate direct London-Osaka services since there was 
no sufficient demand for them. In its application, Virgin had asked for a total of 
16 slots enabling it to operate 8 weekly round-trips and leaving BA with 221. 
The case was unique in two respects. First, it was the first occasion when the 
CAA had been called to amend the licence of an airline by reducing the number 
of runway slots at a foreign airport against its will. Second, it was the first time 
39 See generally Decision 7/90. 
40 CAP 620. para. 9. 
41 Ibid 
4'. Decision 1/91 
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that it had itself proposed to vary the licence in that manner Both of these 
combined to make the decision a significantly difficult one -rhe CAA reasoned 
that in the application of its licensing policy to secure a multi-airline industry. it 
did not imply that smaller airlines would be given an automatic prcrerence ovcr 
BA. However, 
if the Authority's and the Government's multi-airline policy is to 
have its desired effect of creating and maintaining an 
environment in which efficient British airlines other than BA can 
operate profitably and in which competition between British 
carriers and with foreign airlines can flourish, it must mean that 
where a carrier such as Virgin is operating successfully and to 
the obvious benefit of users the Authority will do all that it 
reasonably can to allow the airline the opporturuty to grow and 
compete. 43 
The CAA in making that statement noted also that, in spite of the restrictions on 
the London-Narita route, Virgin was providing travellers with the choice of 
flying on an airline with a very different style from others serving the route as 
well as offering business travellers a high quality product while charging only 
the same fares as other airlines' more conventional business class products. 
BA! s licence was eventually varied to limit its number of round-trip senices to 
Narita to 26 and Virgin's limited to 12. Although this decision represents a 
direct regulatory intervention by the CAA, it had the characteristics which 
would deprive the users on such services of the benefits of competition since 
Virgin would not have had the opportunity to enter the market given the 
frequency restrictions. Such cases are rare and certainly lack precedents. The 
intervention of the CAA was therefore necessitated by the "highly unusual 
circumstances" of the case and was by no means "some sort of 'open season! on 
the route rights and slots" of any airline. 44 
Whatever may be the flaws of administrative regulation, the theory of 
substitutability represents a highly important regulatory policy within a 
framework in which market forces are permitted to operate. It is clearly an 
important alternative to unregulated competition, which by virtue of certain 
structural constraints cannot be possible in any event if the interests of users are 
to be protected. More significantly, the threat of substitution has never needed 
to be invoked frequently to introduce greater competitiveness in circumstances 
in which competition has been artificially depressed by institutional, market or 
infrastructural limitations; much of this can be attributed to the liberal air 
transport licensing policy of the CAA. But where the liberal licensing policy 
cannot be applied satisfactorily, as in international air transport, the policy of 
substitution is a strategic instrument for inducing competition. 
But since the invocation of the substitution policy essentially amounts to a 
direct regulatory intervention which the CAA has sought for many years to 
avoid, the aim of the policy is to enable the CAA! s liberal licensing policy for a 
multi-airline industry to be applied to the fullest extent possible. Thus, in 
43 Ibid. para. 30. 
44 Jbicl.. para. 5 1. 
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circumstances where competition under a bilateral agreement bem-ccri UK 
airlines are possible, though largely restricted. the CAA would seek to license 
liberally to achieve maximum competition if this was likely to benclit users 
Accordingly, in an application to provide a competing service which is expccted 
to result in benefits to the users and which are likely to outweigh the detriment 
to the existing British operator or operators, the CAA may "require an enforced 
reduction in the capacity or frequency" of the incumbent -15 
The bench-mark, therefore, will be the likelihood of benefit to users. But 
whether or not any such benefits are likely to arise. and if so. whether they 
outweighed the detrimental effects to existing operators is a matter of value 
judgment which the CAA has to make. On the means and ends of this thougl%, 
it took the opportunity in a 1991 licensing decision to explain that, 
it regards the encouragement of a competitive multi-airline 
industry as a major means of securing its statutory objectives, 
but the fact that the competitive balance between a large and 
small airline has been shifted cannot of itself justify intervention 
to try to restore the status quo ante. Simple transfer of profit 
cannot be an objective. Establishing greater opportunity for 
smaller airlines by cutting back the opportunity available to 
larger ones is justified only where there is a clear case that users 
would benefit thereby and where there is no effective alternative. 
Such a decision must ultimately be a matter of judgement rather 
than of faCt. 46 
Administrative Law and Substitution 
it is obvious from the outset that variations of licence conditions are possible, 
and indeed recognised by s. 66 of the Civil Aviation Act 19S2. Be that as it may, 
the legal implications of a substitution policy are many. It raises questions as to 
whether its application may be contrary to principles of due process particularly 
on the issue of adequate representations prior to the invocation of the sanction. 
It also raises a further, but related, question of whether the legitimate 
expectations of the incumbent operator may have been adversely prejudiced. 
The process of regulating and licensing air transport competition is 
characterised by a system of public hearings. Typically, an application would be 
made to the CAA for the grant of an air transport licence, against which 
objections may be raised. Similarly, an air transport licence holder may apply to 
the CAA to have its licence varied, as may an application to vary the licence of 
another. Variations may also be proposed by the CAA in circumstances in 
which it is required to intervene. In such instances, objections may again be 
submitted. Applications may also be proposed to revoke an air transport 
licence. In all such cases, a public hearing is held to determine the application. 
An air transport licensing case is usually heard by a panel of three consisting of 
two members of the CAA and an official of the CAA who may be able to advise 
on technical issues such as market forecasts or fares statistics unless, for 
45 CAP 620. Para-7. 
46 Decision 10/91. para. 21. 
150 
instance, the persons having the right to be heard have consented to the quorum 
of one CAA member 4" These officials, however. cannot make the decision 
The panel acts as a quasi-judicial body and is subject to the supmisory 
jurisdiction of the Council of Tribunals which members may attend such a 
hearing. 48 
The detailed procedural requirements for a licensing hearing is presently 
contained in the Civil Aviation Authority Regulations 1991 411 In an application 
for an air transport licence the applicant is vested with a right to be heard by 
virtue of Reg. 25, as is the holder of any air transport licence, in particular the 
holder whose licence may be the subject of an application by another licepce 
holder to be varied. The CAA, however, has a measure of discretion to refuse a 
hearing to a licence holder if the licence holder has not served its objection or 
representation to application in accordance with Reg. 20.30 Neither will the 
CAA require a hearing in cases where no objections have been submitted nor in 
cases where the licence holder concerned has chosen to exercise its right not to 
be heard. Essentially, a system of public hearing is designed to enable parties 
whose interests are affected to make representations on the case. But clearly, 
and more importantly, the CAA is a quasi-judicial body which procedures are 
subject to the principle of natural justice, specifically that of audi alterain 
partem. 
Where an application proposes to invoke the policy of substitution, both the 
applicant and the affected licence holder will have the right to be heard. 
Substitution is a species of revocation which would seem to fall within the 
categorisations by Megarry V-C in McInnes v Onslow-FanO I as requiring the 
affected party to be given the opportunity to represent its case. At any rate, a 
licence holder from whom a certain benefit or advantage is to be withdrawn is 
entitled to expect to continue to enjoy it "until there has been communicated to 
him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an 
opportunity to comment". 52 Public hearings, therefore, represent an important 
and open procedural safeguard against the unNr treatment of an incumbent's 
rights. 
The Special Case of Slots and Airport Capacity 
47 See Civil Aviation. 4 uthorhýv Regulations 1991, SI 1991/1672. rcg. 15(2). 
48 See s. I and Sch. I of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. See also D. Foulkcs. 'The 
Council on Tribunals: Visits Policy and Practice" (1994) Public Lms, 564 
49 SI 1991/1672. 
50 See e. g. Decision ýNTU/94. 
51 [197811 WLR 1520. 
51. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Sen-ice 119341 3 All ER 
935. at p, 949. The breadth of Lord Diplock! s formulation has arguably been 
qualified in a number of cases such that legitimate expectation is confined Only to a 
procedural right, not a substanth-c right: see Rv Secretarv of State for Tran. ")rr ex 
p Richinond-upon-Thaines LBC [ 1994) 1 All ER 377 and Rv Secretarv o State for 
Health exp US International Tobacco [199211 All ER 212, 
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Although restrictions on airline competition stemming from international 
agreements or market dominance can be met by certain regulatory response 
either by a substitution measure or enforced conditioning of air transport 
licences subject to appropriate procedural safeguards. regulatory intem-crition in 
the allocation of airport slots or the difficulties of other infrastructural 
constraints is less straightforward ard, at any rate, not a direct function of the 
CAA. Nevertheless, the fact that the way they are allocated aiYects or can affect 
competition significantly, merits a more detailed treatment. On the allocation of 
slots, the views of the Ckk on the difficulties of regulatory intervention are set 
out in a number of its publications resulting from extensive studies and in which 
it explained that there would be more harm than benefit if the system of slot 
allocation was subject to official intervention. 13 Although it has consistently 
adhered to this view that its regulatory role was not about slot allocation at 
airports, it cannot turn a blind eye to this real difficulty. It stated in Decision 
7/88 relating to the re-allocation of route rights following the merger of BA and 
B. Cal during which inquiry the CAA had recommended the surrender of slots, 
that it "would be irresponsible of the Authority having made that 
recommendation, then to try to avoid the consequences, de facto, of that advice 
being taken. " The view that it must not become involved in the problems of slot 
aflocation were, however, restated forcefully in its decision distributing the 
frequencies on the London-Tokyo(Narita) route between BA and Virgin. There 
it stated that official intervention in the slot allocation process was counter- 
productive and "would risk seriously undermining the existing system unless 
and until it has been clearly demonstrated that there is a genuinely practical and 
superior altemative which would better meet the objectives which the Authority 
seeks to secure. H54 This, however, did not preclude the CAA from expressing a 
view on the allocation of slots particularly in cases where it was required to 
make choices. 
The Commission shares the same view. When assessing alternative systems on 
slot allocation in order to formulate recommendations for a Council Regulation, 
it noted that, 
[T]he scheduling procedures as developed among airlines 
provide for a reasonable system of schedule co-ordination. It is 
widely accepted among airlines as the best possible way to deal 
with the difficult issue of co-ordination in a non-political and 
reasonably neutral way. 51 
But there were also system difficulties which affect competition between the 
airlines since as a set of guidelines, "the procedures are not always applied" in 
particular the guarantee of neutrality and transparency. 56 These required a 
Community response. 
53 Air Traffic Distribution in the London. -Irea. CAP 522 (1986) and CAP 644. See 
also its submission in Developments in European Communitv Air Transport Policy 
(First Report). HC 147-11 (1991-92). 
54 Dccision 1/9 1. para. 27. See also Decision 5138. 
55 CON, 1(90) 576. para. g. 
56 Ibid. 
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Accordingly. Council Regulation 95/93 has now been adopted to provide 
common rules for the allocation slots at Community airports. tvpiR-ing the US 
approach of designating slot-controlled airports and others In esscnce, the 
Regulation gives its blessing to the existing slot allocation and scheduling 
procedures, provided that the airlines involved are entitled to participate and 
that the agreement has regard to the traffic distribution rules set by national and 
international authorities. " It is, however. based on a number of fundamental 
principles: expansion of capacity; transparency, neutrality and non- 
discrimination; forfeiture of unused slots-. establishment of a slots pool with a 
measure of preference to new entrants at the airport. 58 Its objectives are to 
foster airline competition and encourage new entry to routes. The CAA has 
since conducted a review into the operation of the Regulation against the 
background of these principles and aims, and published its findings in Slot 
Allocation: A Proposalfor Europe's Airporu. Its opening remark stated that, 
at least in the case of London especially Heathrow, the Regulation "has fallen a 
long way short of achieving this [aims] ... In no case has the Regulation resulted 
in effective new competition from an additional carrier on an intra-EC 
monopoly or duopoly from Heathrow. "59 It noted further that the lack of 
defined priorities led to the ineffective allocation of scarce "pool slots" in that 
little distinction was made between short- and long-haul services proposed by 
new entrants. 10 In particular, it stated in respect of the summer season slots in 
1994, 
There were 24 incumbent airlines eligible for pool slots because 
they were already operating at most a daily service at Heathrow 
and they applied for a total of 69 new departing slots per week. 
By the start of the summer season [1994] 20 airlines were 
holding 40 new departure slots and these were used to increase 
frequency on existing routes rather than to introduce new ones. 
The airlines concerned were almost exclusively those serving 
destinations in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Far East 
and Africa. 61 
57 in respect of the UK, the air traffic distribution rules for the London airports were 
abolished in 1991 %Nhen the CAA recommended to the Secretary of State that 
operators should be free to choose between Gatv. ick and Heathrow %% here conditions 
permitted since the combination of passenger volume at Heathrow with the same 
level of air transport movements was "a rational use of scarce capacity": CAA. Vic 
Needfor Traffic Distribution Rules, CAP 578 (199 1). para. 4.5. 
58 A new entrant is defined by the Regulation as: "an air carrier requesting slots at an 
airport on any day and holding or having been allocated fewer than four slots at that 
airport on that day. or. an air carrier requesting slots for a non-stop service bctv%ccn 
two Community airport where at most two other air carriers operate a direct scr%icc 
between these airports or airport systems on that day and holding or having bccn 
allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day for that non-stop servicc". 
provided the holding does not represent more than Plo or 2% respectively of the total 
available slots. 
59 CAP 644. p. v. 
60 A "slot pool" is a repository into -*%hich nc%%Iv created slots. slots returned 
voluntarily. slots withdrawn 
& non-usage. or slots unclaimed under grandfather 
rights arc placed. Of these pool slots. 50% must be designated for new entrants. 
61 CAP 644. para. 16. 
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This contrasts significantly with the slots which were secured and Put to use by 
ne%v entrants At the time of applications for new slots. ten new entrants were 
granted slots but which did not necessarily accord with the number of slots nor 
the timing of slots applied for. As a consequence of this mismatch whether for 
reasons of viability or otherwise, a number of airlines subsequently returned the 
slots to the pool leaving five wholly new entrants who eventually took up the 
slots to commence services- AJyemda, Canadian International. Shorouk Air, 
TAT and South East European. Two explanations were identified in the CANs 
analysis. First, the number of slots granted amounted merely to one-third of 
those sought and second, the majority of these were outside the peak periods of 
0700-130b and 1600-1900. Of the slots sought within the peak periods only 
13% were granted, while up to 68% of those allocated were outside tfiose 
times. If most of these were for short-haul services, the lack of peak period 
slots to achieve minimum traffic threshold will affect the viability of these 
services and inevitably the effectiveness of competition from new entrants. The 
effect would be to preserve the dominance of incumbents. In one of its 
deductions, the CAA noted that, 
The concept of the 'S' curve, which suggests that to be 
successful a new entrant will normally need a frequency close to 
that of the incumbents, appears to be borne out in practice. The 
evidence is that, on routes with a substantial volume of business 
traffic, the greater a new entrant's frequency, the more effective 
a competitor it is likely to be., 62 
Its proposal was to distinguish between allocation of slots on a'routes' basis and 
an 'airlines' basis. That is to say, routes which have the densest traffic and 
airfines which are proposing to offer competing services on a monopoly (second 
carrier) or duopoly (third carrier) route should be given priority in the allocation 
of new slots. Importantly, the CAA proposed that all pool slots should "remain 
earmarked indefinitely for second or third carrier new entry so that over time 
sufficient slots could be accumulated to enable new entry on all routes on which 
it was commercially viable. "63 Of course, the notion of a second or third carrier 
implies a competitive approach, an objective not necessarily subscribed to by all 
Member States, an issue which is considered in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to chart the substantial barriers to 
effective air transport competition and the ways in which the CAA has 
responded to them. While it may be argued that liberalisation or deregulation 
can work to bring about greater competition as a means for meeting the 
reasonable demands of users, this cannot be so if the conditions for effective 
and sustainable competition do not exist a priori. This may either be the result 
of protectionist policies, or historical endowment. This still obvious in the case 
62' Jbid.. para. 50. The 'S' cun-c. howcvcr. assunics that the competition %%ill stimulate 
traffic groNN-th so that the additional capacity will not lead to a detcrioration or 
profitability for the carriers involved in the long-term. 
63 Jbid- para 112. 
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of several Community airlines which are State-o%ýned %Nhere the disparity in 
strength and size between competing airlines and the national carriers leavcs 
much to desired. 
AJthou, lh it should be clear by now that certain features of air transport do not 
tend themselves readily to the argument that the air transport industry is 
naturally competitive. it is by no means the case that competition cannot be 
secured. What is required is a system of economic regulation which can create 
the conditions for competition and supported by an antitrust framework that 
safeguards against anti-competitive practices. Even in the case of international 
air transport, where competition is limited, the CAA has shown that a 
competitive approach to the allocation of traffic rights between the airlines 'cap 
bring about the necessary degree of contestability to ensure sustainable 
competition. Even more so, where the bilateral agreement allows for only one 
airline from each country to be designated, the CAA has responded by imposing 
conditions on the incumbent that its standard of service meets the expectations 
of users. Failing this, the CAA would apply the policy of substitution, 
Competition in this respect is potent, in the sense that the 4artificial' effect of 
contestability seeks also to realise the aims of competition so that the reasonable 
interests of users can be met. It is therefore a policy which accords %vith the 
theory of critical market contestability where the mutual interests of airlines and 
users meet substantially, but a regulatory measure which force has been under- 
rated. 
While the considerations in this chapter provide a cogent case for economic 
regulation, nothing in it has suggested that antitrust regulation has no role to 
play. On the contrary, the restrictions under the bilateral agreements in 
international air transport, the unbalanced structure of the industry and the 
difficulties of access to infrastructural facilities, suggest that competition is 
always vulnerable to the anti-competitive behaviour of the incumbents. While it 
is true that some of these anti-competitive behaviour can be dealt with more 
effectively through the conditioning of the respective licences, this may not be 
the case where broader issues concerning competition policy are involved. 
Indeed, where there has been substantial liberalisation, as is true in British air 
transport, it becomes difficult to reverse a policy decision for the sake of one 
particular case unless the circumstances of the case were shown to be highly 
exceptional. Thus, for instance, a sole airline operating on a particular route, 
which may have a low traffic density, may choose to exploit its monopoly 
position by raising the fares substantially in the knowledge that the lack of 
airport slots will prevent competitors from entering that market. Unless this can 
be regarded as a highly exceptional case, antitrust control would seem to be 
more appropriate. 
More specifically, the liberalisation of air transport in the EC which has 
removed the jurisdiction of the CAA in respect of Community routes without 
substituting an equivalent form of economic regulation must mean that the 
antitrust laws will have a very significant role to play if the conditions of 
sustainable competition supposedly attained are to be preserved. It should be 
added that in any event the CAA itself has adopted a policy where interventions 
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would only be made if the need was evident. Economic regulation was at its 
minimum. International air transport is unique in the sense that it continues to 
be largely regulated bilateral agreements and infrastructural problems. although 
they are taken into account, are not part of the direct regulatory function of tile 
CAA. In so far as market barriers are an impediment to competition, these have 
been substantially reduced as a consequence of regulatory policies which give 
priority to user interests and presume in favour of market solutions to serve 
these interests. This manner of approach has brought about a substantial 
mutuality between airline and user interests to ensure that the conditions of 
sustainable competition would allow for a greater liberalisation of economic 
regulatory controls. The point is therefore clear that the more emphasis is 
placed on market forces, the less important will be the econornic regulaiory 
process to provide competitive solutions. Accordingly, antitrust regulation 
begins to assume a more critical role to safeguard the conditions of competition. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN AN OLD SYSTEN-M. A NEW 
BEGINNING: THE EUROPEAN 
FRAINIENVORK 
Geograpltv has ah-cady made the dectmon. for us 
(Christopher Chataway, ( licunnan (? f ( *A, 11) 
The study of air transport regulation resembles a shooting game that is aimed at 
a constantly shifting target. This is particularly true with the rapid cha6gqs 
which have taken place since the single European market for air transport began 
to take shape. While consistency and predictability has been a familiar theme of 
the CAA regulatory process for many years, the introduction of the 
liberalisation measures designed to secure competitiveness in Community air 
transport has yet to earn a similar distinction. The single air transport market is 
only four years old, even though the first measures were adopted in 19S7, by 
contrast, the CAA and its policies have been established since 1972. 
Accordingly, any comments or analyses must be made in this perspective. Even 
so, these measures have brought about a whole new era and have made 
significant in-roads into the established structures of civil aviation regulation not 
merely in respect of the UK, but of other Member States. The penetration of 
Community air transport law and policies, and more generally of Community 
law, into the legal system of Member States has been succinctly put by Lord 
Denning in 1974 as "an incoming tide [that] flows into the estuaries and up the 
rivers. it cannot be held back. "' More eminently, the effect of these 
liberalisation measures, which have necessitated a re-shaping of policy content 
and direction, may be seen in a number of licensing decisions handed down by 
the CAA. 
The issue of air transport, and indeed transport as a whole, in the Community 
has been and will no doubt continue to be fraught with difficulties and 
controversies. No where has this- been more apparent than in the progress 
towards a Common Transport Policy as well as a Common Air Transport 
Policy. The former in particular resulted in one of the most important decisions 
of the Court of Justice on judicial review. The difficulties and the delay in 
formulating Community transport policies, however, is not a matter of great 
surprise. The Treaty of Rome itself recognises the "distinctive features" of 
transport which required special treatment to avoid detrimental consequences to 
the efforts of creating a unified Europe. 2 The need for separate treatment stems 
from its embodiment of public service connotations and from its high 
susceptibility to fluctuating economic conditions that is not always consonant 
with the public interest. The founders of the Treaty took stock of the wide 
divergence in the political philosophies and policies of national transport 
industries which inevitably magnified the difficulty of stipulating more precise 
Buhner v Bollinger [ 197412 All ER 1226. at p. 123 1. 
2 See Article 75 
provisions in the Treaty Hence. unlike agriculture, no provision has been made 
to extend the concept of a common market to the transport sector. leaving the 
objectives of the Treaty to be pursued instead "within the firamework of a 
common transport policy. " This meant that the task of adopting a common 
policy and specific measures for transport would be lell to the institutions of the 
Community. This is stated in Article 84(2) of the Treatv which provides that, 
The Council may (acting by a qualified majority] decide whether, 
to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions 
may be laid down for ... air transport 4 
But that was always going to be "a lengthy, labofious and difficult task. Great 
difficulties are bound to be encountered ... It is the duty of the political 
authorities to ensure that solutions are sought on the Community level and 'in ;I 
European spirit. "' 
This chapter has a number of aims. First, it intends to assess the extent to which 
the work and policies of the CAA have been affected by the liberalisation 
programme. It will be seen that an important consequence of the liberalisation 
programme is the removal of the CAA's jurisdiction in a number areas where it 
had previously enjoyed an econornic regulatory role. In accordance with the 
theory of competition regulation in this thesis, the liberalisation or removal of 
economic regulatory controls implies a necessary shift in the regulatory focus to 
antitrust regulation. It considers the extent to which the conditions of 
sustainable competition have been achieved so that this shift to antitrust 
regulation is adequate to ensure the contestability of the air transport market, 
but it will not exan-dne the detailed application of the antitrust laws under the 
Treaty. 
Competition Principles of the European Community 
The basic competition principles of the Community are contained in Article 35 
and Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. The former is in essence concerned with 
agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which affect trade between Member States and have the effect of distorting, 
preventing or restricting competition. Article 86 on the other hand focuses on 
cases relating to abuses of dominant market position. Together they provide a 
powerful weapon against unfair competition of various kinds, including an 
emphasis on the substance rather than simply the form of agreements, decisions 
or concerted practices. 6While Article 86 represents a strict prohibition in the 
sense no exemptions are provided for, Article 85(3) sets out the categories of 
agreements, decisions and practices which may be exempted from the 
prohibition in Article 85(l). A qualifying agreement for the purposes of Article 
85(3) is one which contributes: 
3 Article 74. 
4 Majority voting was introduced by the Single European Act 1985. 
5 Bull EC. 5160. pp. 5-3. 
6 See e. g. Case 41/69. Chendefianna v Commission (Quinine) 119701 ECR 66 1, 
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to improvirg the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, %ý, hile allo%v ing consumers a rair share of the 
resulting benefit. 
However, it must not-, 
impose indispensable restrictions for the attainment of such objectives. nor 
afford the possibility of substantially eliminating competition in the rclevant 
market. 
The powers of the Commission to enforce the rules of competition. however, 
were not established until 1962 when Regulation 17/62 was adopted. 7 The 
scope of the Regulation was amended in the very same year when Regulat. ion 
141/62 was enacted to remove the transport sector from the earlier Regulation 
on the basis that the special features of transport required a separate corpus of 
competition rules. 8 A further Regulation 1017/68 was subsequently adopted to 
amend the scope of Regulation 141/62 by linýiiting it to sea and air transport. 
The consequential effect was to subject rail, road and inland waterway transport 
to the competition rules of the Treaty and Regulation 17/62. Sea and air 
transport remained outside the enforcement powers of the Commission. But 
they were by no means unregulated against unfair competition. Article 88 and 
Article 89, otherwise known as the transitional Articles, empowered 
competition authorities of Member States and the Commission to take 
enforcement actions in the period prior to the adoption of specific measures 
applying Articles 85 and 86. These transitional provisions were originally 
intended to deal with cases which arose in the immediate years after the 
inception of the Treaty. 9 Article 83 provides that until the adoption of specific 
implementing measures, the authorities in Member States shall rule on the 
admissibility of agreements, decisions, practices and abuses market power in 
accordance with their national competition laws and Articles 85 and 36. On the 
other hand, Article 89 empowers the Commission to ensure the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 and to investigate in co-operation with national authorities 
cases of suspected infringement. Where there has been an infringement, "it shall 
propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end. " Thus, in respect of those 
areas which are within the scope of the implementing Regulation 17/62, the 
transitional provisions will cease to be of any cffect. Since air transport was 
excluded from the scope of that Regulation, enforcement of Articles S5 and 36 
continued to be dealt , vith under the transitional Articles until 1987 when 
specific measures applying the competition rules were introduced in respect of 
air transport. 
7 01 (Sp Ed 1959-1962). p. 204. 
8 01 (Sp Ed 1959-1962). p. 275 1. 
9 Case 209-213/84.1 flnist&e Public %,. 4, vies f 198613 CNILR 173. 
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Air Transport Competition in the European Collillitillity 
Although other air transport measures have been adopted in earlier )-cars. for 
instance on aircraft noise"' and inter-regional services, " the delay in adopting 
both a common transport policy and a common air transport policy was far too 
obvious to be justifiable. The European Parliament (EP) in a land-mark 
application to the ECJ for judicial review not only successfully established itself 
as one of "the other institutions of the Community" with 16cus mmidi to 
challenge the failure of the Council and the Commission to act under Anicle 
175, but also extracted a substantive ruling from the Court that the discretion of 
the Council to adopt a common position on transpon was limited by the 
requirement to establisli a common transport market and by the tune per*1GX1 
within which it was required to establish that common position. Its margin of 
discretion was in respect only of the objechi-es and the tneaiLs by which to 
achieve a common transport policy. 12 The significance of this case lics in the 
argument that the reality of political, economic or technical differences could 
not constitute an excuse for inaction nor failure to fulfil a Treaty obligation. 
Nor could the absence of positive action be hidden under the guise of the 
special treatment envisaged by the Treaty. The Court had already ruled in 1974 
in the French Merchant Seamens case that the special treatment accorded to 
sea and air transport was only in respect of the Transport Title in the Treaty and 
not the general rules of the Treaty, of which Articles 85 and 86 are part. It said, 
far from involving a departure from these fundamental rules, 
therefore, the object of the rules relating to the common 
transport policy is to implement and complement them by means 
of common action. Consequently the said general rules must be 
applied insofar as they can achieve these objectives (of Articles 2 
and 3]. 13 
The same point was emphasised by the Court again inAfinisWre Public v Asjes, 
otherwise known as the Notivelles Fronh&es case, that: 
the rules in the Treaty on competition, in particular Article 85 to 
90, are applicable to transport. As regards air transport in 
particular, it should be noted that, as is clear from the actual 
wording of Article 84 and its position in the Treaty, that Article 
is intended merely to define the scope of Article 74 et seq. as 
regards different modes of transport, by distinguishing between 
transport by rail, road, inland waterway, covered by paragraph 
(1), and sea and air transport, covered by paragraph (2) ... It follows that air transport remains, on the same basis as the other 
modes of transport, subject to the general rules of the Treaty, 
including the competition rules. 14 
10 On this. see P. Da%ics and J. Goh. "EC Law on Aircraft Noise: Rcccnt IX-%tlopmcnts" 
(1993) European Environmental Lmv Review 229. 
11 Council Directive 83/416. OJ [ 19831 L237/19. 
12 Case 13/S3, European Parliament v EC Council 1198611 CMLR 13 8, 
13 Case 167/73. Commission v French Republic (19741 ECR 339. at p. 370. See also 
Case 45/85.1 'erbandderSachversichere E1*v Commission (1--sre Insurance) 119871 
ECR 405. 
14 Case 209-213/84.1198613 CNILR 173. at p. 215. 
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The real significance of this case. however, lies in the re-velation by the decision 
that the inadequacies stemming from the absence of specific measures applying 
the competition rules to air transport was so manifest as to jeopardise the 
attainment of objectives laid down by the Treaty. Notivelles Fronuere, v was a 
case referred to the ECJ under Article 177 by the Tribunal de Police de Paris for 
a preliminary ruling on the question of whether certain sections or the Code de 
I'Aviation Civile were compatible with the competition rules of the Treaty and 
whether these rules were applicable to international air transport beyond the 
Community. But the determination of compatibility must be preceded by a 
resolution that the competition rules applied to the air transport seýtor 
regardless of the absence of specific measures of enforcement. That these rules 
applied to air transport was in no doubt as the Freitch Merchatit Seamett's case 
had established. The Court then proceeded to rule that in the absence of such 
measures, Articles 88 and 89 must continue to apply. If such was the case, then 
the question of whether the agreements, decisions, and concerted practices were 
compatible with Community law must fall to be determined first by the 
authorities in Member States under Article 8815 and by the Commission under 
Article 89 either as a result of an application from a Member State or on its 
own initiative. The Court noted that neither the national authorities nor the 
Commission had ruled on the compatibility of the Code with the competition 
rules, and accordingly, Articles 85 and 86 could not extend to the Code so as to 
enable the Tribunal de Police as an ordinary court of law to rule on its 
compatibility with the competition rules. In 1990, the Court was called upon 
yet again to decide on the application of Articles 85 and 86 to air transport, a 
judgement in which it seized the opportunity to reiterate the obvious. 16 The gap 
left by the absence of specific measures and more significantly the likelihood of 
legal uncertainty contrary to the rule of law was well amplified by the Court so 
that both decisions were in more than one sense the real impetus which finally 
propelled the Council into action. A policy was therefore adopted setting out 
the liberalisation measures for the industry in three phases. 17 
15 The Court rc-stated the formulation in Case 127M. B. R. Tv MR-LIt 119741 ECR 51 
that the "authorities in Member States" were either "administrativc authorities 
entrusted. in most Member States. with the task of applying domestic legislation on 
competition subject to the review of legality carried out býy the competent courts. or 
else the courts to which. in other Member States. that task has been especially 
cntrusted. " (ibid.. at p. 217). The UK authorities would therefore include the Office 
of Fair Trading the 'Monopolies and Mergers Conunission and the Restrictivc Trade 
Practices Court. It is less clear. however. whether the CAA %%ould fall %iithin this 
formulation although it is subn-dttcd here that it %%ould not since it requests for 
enforcement powers in air transport competition have been rejected bý- the 
Government. See also J. Bascdow. "National Authorities in European Airline 
Competition Law" (1988) European Competition Law Review 342. 
16 Case 66/S6, . 4hined Sýaeed Flagreisen & Silver Line Reisebaro, %, Zentrale Zur 
BeOmpfung Unlauteren Wenbeiverbs [199014 CNILR 102. ("Ahmed Sued"). 
17 See N. Argyris. "The EEC Rules of Competition and the Air Transport Sector" (1989) 
26 OILRev 5 for a first-hand account of the history of these legislation. 
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First Phase of Liberalisation 
The first phase of liberalisation was marked by the adoption of four legislative 
measures in 1937,30 years after the Treaty was founded. These were 
Council Regulation 3975/37 - procedures for the application of the rules on 
competition to undertakings in the air transport sector-, ", 
Council Regulation 3976/87 - the application of Article 85(3) to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport 
sector; " 
Council Directive 87/601 - fares for scheduled air services betwccn Membcr 
States, A" 
Council Decision 87/602 - sharing of passenger capacity between and access 
for air carriers on scheduled services and route between Mcmber States. 41 
A number of substantive and technical amendments have since been made but 
they need not detain us. 12 
The main purpose of Council Regulation 3975/87, as stated in its preamble, is 
to "provide for appropriate procedures, decision-making powers and penalties 
to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Articles 85(l) and 86", 
but the scope of this Regulation is limited to "international air transport between 
Community airports. "23 The aim of Council Regulation 3976/87, on the other 
hand, is to make provision for the exemptions recognised in Article 85(3) to be 
applied to air transport "to ensure increased competition should be effected 
gradually so as to provide time for the air transport sector to adapt". 24 Both 
Council Directive 87/601 and Council Decision 37/602 have since been replaced 
by measures adopted under the second phase of the liberalisation programme. 
Second Phase of Liberalisation 
The second set of liberalisation measures comprised of the follovAing: 
Council Regulation 2342/90 - fares on scheduled air services; 25 
Council Regulation 2343/90 - access for air carriers to and sharing of 
passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services and routes 
between Member States; 26 
Council Regulation 2344/90 - amending Council Regulation 3976/87 
relating to the powers of the Commission to grant block exemptions. 27 
While also revoking Council Directive 87/601, the basic aim of Council 
Regulation 27342/90 was to introduce greater flexibility in the setting of 
is OJ [19871 L374/1. 
19 Oj [19871 L37419. 
20 Oj [19371 L374/12. 
21 OJ [19871 L374/19. 
22 Council Regulation 3975/87: amended by Council Regulation 1284/91.01 
L 122/2 and Council Regulation 2410/92. OJ It 9921 L240/ I S. 
Council Regulation 3976/87: amended by Council Regulation 2344/90.01 
L217/15 and Council Regulation 2411/92. OJ [ 19921 L240/19. 
23 Article 1(2). 
24 Preamble. 
25 01119901 L217/1. 
26 01 19901 L217/8. 
27 01 19901 L217/15. 
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scheduled fares by airlines with minimal intertlerence from the Govvilment 
This greater freedom, ho%vever, was subject to a number of criteria such as the 
requirement that fares must reasonably related to tile airline's "long-tcrm fully 
allocated relevant costs, while taking into account the need for satisfactory 
return on capital and for an adequate cost margin to ensure a satisfactory sarety 
standard. "" Council Regulation 2343/90, on the other hand, revoked Council 
Decision 87/602 and aimed "to stimulate the development of the Community air 
transport sector" by increased market access througli the liberalisation of 
restrictions on the exercise of traffic rights and the removal of capacity 
restrictions. " In particular, it introduced fifth-freedom rights between Member 
States provided they were exercised as an extension or preliminary to a service 
originating or terminating in the Member State in which the carrier was 
registered; for instance, a UK registered carrier operating a Copenhagen- 
London-Paris service. Hence, in one respect, the Copenhagen-London sector 
rnýight be the preliminary service to the London-Paris senice, while in another, 
the London-Paris sector may be the extension of the Copenhagen-London 
service, Although the measures contain in the second package went some way 
towards a greater liberalisation of Community air transport, they were steeped 
in exemptions and conditions before a particular "liberalising concept" was 
triggered, and fell far short of the slightly more radical proposals put forward by 
the Comn-dssion. 10 
In the intervening period between the first and second phases of the 
liberalisation programme, a judicial development of considerable significance 
took place. The ECJ had been asked by the Bundesgerichtshof for a preliminary 
ruling on the applicability of the competition rules to extra-Community air 
transport, that is to say, air transport beyond the Community. 31 The facts 
concerned airline tickets which were being sold in Germany and which undercut 
(severely in some cases) the tariffs approved by the German authorities usually 
agreed internationally. The circuitous manner by which the purchase and re-sale 
of the tickets were made involved the defendants in the case purchasing such 
tickets outside Germany at a rate locally applicable, which by virtue of the 
differences in foreign currency exchange rendered such a venture attractive. 
This ticket, however, was issued for a fifth-freedom journey via Germany; that 
is, for instance, Turkey-Germany-Canada. The journey of interest was that 
between Germany and Canada. The Court found that since Council Regulation 
3975/87 expressly related to international air transport between Community 
airports, the inference had to be drawn that domestic air transport and air 
transport to and from airports in non-member countries were outside its scope 
but were nevertheless subject to the transitional provisions in Articles 83 and 
89.32 That being the case, agreements, decisions or concerted practices of such 
a nature could only be void under Article 85(2) if either the national authorities 
or the Commission had ruled that the prohibition in Article 85(l) applied. 
28 Article 30). 
29 Preamble. 
30 COM(89) 373. 
31 IhinedSaeed, supra. 
32 See Case 209-213184-Ifinist&e Public %,. Isjes 1198613 CINUýR 173, 
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, Mthough this inference %,, as 
in a sense obvious, the Court ýicnt further by 
drawing the limits of that principle in terms of its territorial application It held 
that only Article 85 was subject to the territorial distinction drawn for the 
application of Article 88. Article 89 and Council Regulation 3975/'87 That is to 
say, where domestic or extra-Community air transport was in question. the 
applicability of Article 85 depended on the exercise of the powers conferred on 
the national authorities and the Commission pursuant to Articles 88 and S9. 
The stmie, hoirever, couldnot be. vaidofArficleS6. Article 86 did not embrace 
the territorial distinction for its application. Therefore, it applied to all forms of 
air transport, whether domestic, intra-Community or ext ra. Community, The 
basis for this distinction, according to the Court, stemmed from the fact that 
Article 85 enabled exemptions to be granted through decisions taken by tht 
relevant authorities or the Commission by virtue of Article 85(3). 
In contrast, no exemption may be granted, in any manner 
whatsoever, in respect of abuse of a dominant position [Article 
86]; such abuse is simply prohibited by the Treaty and it is for 
the competent authorities or the Commission as the case may be. 
to act on that prohibition vrithin the limits of their powers. 33 
Therefore, Article 86 was directly applicable to air transport. 
The resulting complication, backed by the fear that the application of Article S5 
may not be as uniform as it could possibly be in respect of the territorial 
difference in air transport, moved the Commission to propose without success 
an amendment to expand the scope of Council Regulation 3975/87 to include 
domestic and extra-Community air transport together with enabling powers to 
grant exemptions for these services. 34 
Third Phase of Liberalisation 
By far, the third package of measures in 1992 was the most significant as it 
represented the final stage in the process of air transport liberalisation. Its 
significance was also in the manner and extent to which changes have been 
required to align the system of administrative regulation for air transport in the 
UK. While previous liberalisation measures have also required alterations to the 
regulatory policies and practices of the CAA on matters such as fares and 
capacity, these have been minimal since the CAA have for many years 
deregulated fares and capacity subject to the regulatory oversight of anti- 
competitive behaviour. One of the most significant changes have been the re- 
classification of the types of air transport licences granted by the CAA to 
operators. In the past, an air transport licence would usually be issued to cover 
both the authorisation for operating an aircraft and the services on a particular 
route. With the introduction of the common licensing criteria for airlines based 
in the Community, the CAA now grants operating licences, route licences and 
air transport licences. This classification is uniquely required in the case of the 
UK since the CAA has been given the responsibility of licensing airlines based in 
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Nlan, vvhich are not member countries of the 
EC. These will be addressed further in due course. 
33 Ahmed Saeed. p. 13 4. 
34 See COM(89) 417. 
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The measures contained in the third package are comprised of the fbllo%ýing 
" Council Regulation 2407/92 - licensing of air carriersY 
" Council Regulation 2408/92 - access for Community air carriers to intra. 
. 36 Community routes, 
" Council Regulation 2409/92 - fares and rates for air services 17 
Common Licensing Crilerja 
The central aim of Council Regulation 2407/92 is to introduce the right of 
Community undertakings to an operating licence without discrimination on the 
basis of nationality. The grant of an operating licence is dependent on ccýtain 
criteria being satisfied, though if these are so satisfied, there will be no 
discretion for deciding whether it ought to be granted. These criteria are 
namely that the undertaking has: 
" its principal place of business and, if any, its registered office in the Nlcmbcr 
State to which the application has been made; 
" as its main occupation air transport in isolation or in combination with other 
air transport related activities; 
" financial competence; 
" managerial competence in cases where "the competent authorities of a 
Member State require, for the purpose of issuing an operating licence, proof 
that the persons who will continuously and effcctively manage the 
operations of the undertaking are of good repute or that they have not been 
declared bankrupt"; 
"a valid Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) which has been issued to represent 
compliance with safety standards. 
Such an operating licence, however, does not confer any right of access to 
routes nor markets. An operating licence in this sense is only a licence for 
"entry into the profession". A route authorisation, unless automatically granted 
under Council Regulation 2408/92, will continue to be necessary. 
The introduction of a Community Operating Licence without the right of access 
to specific routes implies that an undertaking needs to have in its possession an 
Operating Licence as well as a route authorisation of some form. As both 
authorisations were previously contained in the Air Transport Licence issued by 
the CAA, it now has to differentiate more clearly the operating and the route 
authorisation. Accordingly, the CAA will now grant an Operating Licence to 
an applicant who satisfies the licensing criteria of the Community and a Route 
Licence to an applicant to operate specific routes which are not covered by 
Council Regulation 2408/92 on market access. These are primarily routes 
involving international services beyond the Community since the Regulation has 
created a general right of access to Community routes including domestic 
routes within a Member State since April 1,1997. In essence, an air transport 
service must possess: 
35 OJ 119921 L240/1. 
36 Oj [ 19921 L240/3. 
37 OJ [1992] L240/15. 
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an Operating Licence and a right under Council R", ulation -408,92 
for 
access to specific routes, or, 
an Operating Licence and a Route Licence It matters not that the carrier 
does not or has no intention to operate the routes covered Council 
Regulation 2408/92, but it must still satisfy the licensing criteria for the 
grant of an Operating Licence. 
These authorisations, however, relate to Community carriers Carricrs from the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are not affected, neither are the routes to 
these places. In respect of these carriers and routes, the CAA continues to 
maintain the grant of Air Transport Licences. If, however, the carrier inten4ing 
to serve on such routes is UK-registered, a Route Licence will be issucd 
instead, since by virtue of the UK registration the carrier would have been 
granted an Operating Licence under Council Regulation 2407/92. But given 
that the substance of the economic regulatory policy under the libcralisation 
programme are not radically different from the policies pursued by the CAA for 
many years, and on which Community policy on air transport liberalisation has 
largely been modelled, the impact of these measures on carriers licensed by the 
CAA has therefore not been as significant as one might have imagined. The 
same may not be true of other Community carriers. Indeed, the CAA saw little 
point in maintaining the difference between the airlines it licenses and proposed 
in 1993 that the provisions of the third package of measures should be similarly 
extended to Channel Islands and Isle of Man carriers and to the routes serving 
these destinations. 38 
Ifarke t Access 
The primary aim of Council Regulation 2408/92 is to confer an automatic right 
on Community air carriers who will have been granted an Operating Licence in 
the first instance '39to exercise the traffic rights which they have been granted on 
routes within the Community. A Member States could not, therefore, refuse 
access by a Community carrier onto a route or market which it has been granted 
the necessary traffic rights to operate. This, however, is no more than a general 
principle. Much like previous liberalisation measures, this Regulation is also full 
of exemptions, some of which are transitional in nature, while others are not of 
a permanent nature. These exemptions have given rise to a number of 
important cases where Member States have refused a Community carrier to 
exercise its traffic rights, some of which have shed an important light on the 
progress of securing a truly liberalised air transport market; at the same time 
too, they provide national authorities responsible for route authorisation with 
principles by which the provisions of the Regulation may be applied. 
The exemptions in the Regulation may be conveniently classified into the 
following: transitional exemptions, infrasiructural exemptions, and public 
poliq exemplions. 
38 Decision 3/93. 
39 Article 2(b) defines a "Community air carrier" as: "an air carrier with a N21id 
operating licence granted by a Member State in accordance uith Council Regulation 
2407/92". 
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(a) Transitional Exemptions 
cabotage services - before April 1,1997, a %ilember State need not grant Z) 
cabotage traffic rights within its territory to Community carriers licenscd by 
another Member State unless the cabotage service was an extension or 
preliminary service to the originating or terminating service in its State of 
registration. 
domestic services - before April 1,1997, a Member State may regulate 
access to routes within its territory for carriers licensed by it under Council 
Regulation 2407/92 provided it was free from discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality and carrier identity. 
exclusive concession - in cases where an exclusive concession had been 
granted by law of contract to operate domestic routes and in relation to 
which other forms of transport could not ensure the adequate and 
uninterrupted service, the concession was permitted to continue for a period 
of three years from the time the Regulation entered into force or the expiry 
date of the concession whichever was the earlier. 
it is clear that these exemptions have now expired. The most significant of these 
has been the expiry of the right of Member States to regulate entry into its 
domestic routes by a Community carrier licensed by another Member State in 
accordance with Council Regulation 2407/92. It marks a very significant 
departure from the tradition of protecting domestic markets that has been built 
and practised for so many years, but it is also a reflection of the unique nature 
of the Community legal system. 
(b) Infrastructural Exemptions 
airport systems - Member States are given the discretion to regulate the 
access of Community air carriers on the basis that air traffic needs to be 
distributed between airports in an airport system but without discrimination 
on grounds of nationality nor identity of carrier. 40 The rules relating to such 
distribution must accord with the requirement of transparency, typically 
through their publication. 
environment - Member States retain the discretion to regulate access to 
airports which suffer from congestion or environmental problems by 
imposing conditions limiting the exercise of the traffic rights or indeed 
refusing the exercise of such rights, particularly in circumstances when 
"other modes of transport can provide satisfactory levels of service". 
Regulating access on such a basis requires Member States to observe the 
non-discriminatory rule as well as ensuring that it does not unduly affect the 
objectives of the Regulation nor distort competition. This would ensure a 
degree of proportionality between the means used and the ends. In all 
cases, however, such restrictions cannot exceed a period of three years, 
40 An airport systern consists of "t-wo or more airports grouped together as serving the 
same city or conurbation": Article 2(m). These include. for instance. Londom Paris 
and Rome. 
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(c) Public Policy Exemptions 
public service obligation - this may be imposed in respect of scheduled nir 
services serving peripheral regions or operating on a thin domestic route to 
a regional destination to ensure the "adequate provision of scheduled air 
services satisfying fixed standards of continuity, regularity. capacity and 
pricing, which standards air carriers would not assume if they %wre solely 
considering their commercial interest". These routes, however, need to be 
vital for the economic well-being of the region. An example is the decision 
of the CAA to designate the Glasgow-Tiree, Glasgow-Barra and Glasgow- 
Cambeltown routes as a matter of such obligation. 41 
regional services - Member States may refuse permission to another air 
carrier to operate on a new regional route which a carrier licensed by it has 
started to operate with an aircraft of no more than 80 seats and which 
capacity does not exceed 30,000 seats per annum, unless that other carrier 
proposes to operate using an aircraft of not more than 80 seats or ensuring 
that if a larger aircraft was used, no more than 80 seats are sold for that 
journey. This exemption can be applied only for a maximum period of two 
years. 
The provisions of the Regulation are by no means always free from 
complications; nor indeed, complied with. These are made more acute by the 
availability of a wide range of exemptions that may be called upon to justify 
refusal for the exercise of air traffic rights. In 1994, for instance, the French 
authorities refused permission for TAT European AirlinCS42 to operate into 
Paris(Orly) from London(Gatwick) which TAT claimed it was entitled to under 
Council Regulation 2408/92. Its complaint was made on the basis that the 
restriction of London-Paris services only to Charles de Gaulle airport (CDG) 
had no objective reasons since French domestic services were permitted to 
operate into both Orly and CDG. In addition, TAT argued that Orly was also 
served by international services with fifth-freedom rights, for example, 
London(Heathrow)-Paris(Orly)-Karachi by Pakistan International Airline. It 
claimed that neither the airport distribution rules nor congestion could be 
invoked since TAT already had in its possession the necessary slots to operate 
on that route. The French Government referred to its Decree on the 
distribution of intra-Community air traffic within the Paris airport system and to 
the long-term objectives of its airport policy for establishing CDG as the 
to gateway to Europe" and Orly as the "gateway to Paris". The decision of the 
Commission reasoned that the Decree adopted by the French Government was 
not in accordance with the requirement of non-discrimination. In particular, it 
stated that the Decree "discriminated against Community carriers other than 
those established in France, and, to a lesser extent, other than Greek, 
Portuguese and Spanish carriers as regards the operation of French domestic 
routes". Furthermore, the Commission could not find any justification in the 
allocation of intra-Community traffic solely to CDG since "many extra- 
41 (1996) OJ C387/6 and (1996) 01 C387/7. 42 TAT iS part-o%N-ncd by BA. 
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Community international services. including medium-haul ser-, -i are operated ices. , 
concurrently at Orly and CDG airpor-ts by French or by non-Community 
airlines. "" 
No more than one month later, TAT filed another complaint against the French 
authorities claiming on this occasion that the refusal to license TAT on the 
Paris(Orly)-IN larsei Ile and the Paris(Orly)-Toulouse routes was an infringement 
of Council Regulation 2408/92 and also the 1990 Agreement struck between 
the Commission, the French Government and the Air France Group %Vhcn the 
latter took over UTA, which until then had been an independent long-haul 
carrier. The French authorities justified its decision on the ground that. the 
routes in question were the subject of an exclusive concession granted to Air 
Inter in accordance with Article 5 of the Regulation. The Commission 
eventually upheld the complaint of TAT stating that the decision to refuse a 
licence to TAT was discriminatory, and the concept of discrimination under the 
Regulation had a two-fold meaning, namely, nationality and identity of carrier. 
The Commission referred to the policy reason to distinguish between nationality 
and identity stating that the absence of discrimination on the ground of 
nationality was insufficient to achieve a fully integrated market for air transport 
since the structure of Community air transport does not always allow for 
nationality nor ownership to be identified readily. Hence the need for a 
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of carrier identity which would aim 
to prevent a Member State from withholding the traffic fights granted to "a 
limited number of other carriers who are or can be precisely identified to 
operate the same service on comparable terms". This discrimination may result 
either directly from the measure taken or may be ascertained indirectly from the 
de facto circumstances. In that case, the Commission reasoned that the 
exclusive concession granted to Air Inter in respect of Paris(Orly)-, Nlarseille and 
Paris(Orly)-Toulouse could not come within the scope of Article 5 since Article 
5 was designed to ensure the continued provision of adequate transport services 
and where there was no other way of uninterrupted travelling between two 
points in the same Member State. Where, however, one of these points fell 
within an airport system, the exclusive concession must relate to the entire 
airport system, and not to particular airport within it. Thus, restricting the 
Paris(Orly)-Marseille and Paris(Orly)-Toulouse routes to Air Inter but at the 
same time aflowing TAT to operate Paris(CI)G)-Marseille and Paris(CDG)- 
Toulouse could not mean an exclusive right to Air Inter. And since Article 5 
gave effect to exclusive concessions which were in force only at the time the 
Regulation came into effect (January 1,1993), Air Inter did not have an 
exclusive concession in respect of Paris-Marseille on the ground that an 
Agreement of 1985 gave UTA and Air Afriqud the permission to operate on 
that route, nor in respect of Paris-Toulouse since the Agreement of 1990 
provided for the expiry of its exclusive rights on March 1,1992.44 
43 Case VII/. AMA'11/93. OJ [19941 L127/22. An appeal has been lodged against the 
decision: Case C-203/94, OJ [19941 C254/6. 
44 Case VII/ANIAIIV/93. OJ [19941 L127/32. Both France and Air Inter appealed 
against the decision: Case C-174/94, OJ 119941 C218116 and Case T-260194. OJ 
119941 C275/28. 
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A year earlier. the Commission had handed down a condemnation in respect of 
the refusal by the French authorities to authorise Viva Air's application to 
operate a Paris(CM-Madrid service, prominently against its own airports 
policy to develop and expand CDG airport into a European gateway and hub by 
gradually transferring intra-Community services from Orly airport 15 The 
catalogue of difficulties involving the French authorities under this Regulation 
was further extended with the disputes involving BA46 and Air UK47 who were 
also refused access to Paris(Orly), and again involving Lauda Air (Austria) 
which was considered under the new European Economic Area rules, 4X 
While these cases may have been a minor distraction to the process of 
liberalisation, they are instructive of the difficulties that surround the exposurc 
of a previously protected sector to competition. The ability to enforce strictly 
the regulatory provisions is, therefore, as much a cause for concern as is the 
desire to do so. The disparities in the regulatory policies of Member States are 
ironically too obvious to put a big question mark over the real process of 
liberalisation. Free of bilateral restrictions, the CAA has consistently sought to 
license routes liberally to promote competing services for the benefit of users, 
The same cannot always be said of all other Member States. Although it would 
be stating the obvious that access to routes has and will continue to be 
regulated to some extent even if only by the use of exemptions, the crucial 
difference lies in the disparity between these route licensing policies and their 
underlying pl-fflosophy. A regulatory presumption of liberal licensing contrasts 
markedly to an approach whereby a case has to be argued for a route licence to 
be granted, as was the case with the CAA in its earlier years. 
In the sense that the market access Regulation seeks to liberalise access to intra- 
Community routes, it bears little difference to the long-standing Policy of the 
CAA of liberal access. Indeed, as noted above, the CAA went as far as to 
propose an extension of the liberalisation measures to Channel Islands and Isle 
of Man carriers and routes which were outside their scope of application. Its 
proposal sought, first of all, to abolish the regulatory distinction between 
scheduled and charter services on these routes, and to extend a similar degree of 
freedom to these carriers to serve any UK route as if they were UK-registered 
airlines and also to extend the application of the fares Regulation to such routes, 
Although no serious objections were raised at the hearing, the point was made 
by several airlines that abolisl-dng the scheduled/charter distinction would give 
existing charter operators an advantage by virtue of the fact that new operators 
do not enjoy the benefit of any established standard relative to past 
performance. The CAXs response to this concern indicated that, 
these were unlikely to be of great significance given both the 
way in which it has treated applications for charter services and 
the transparently liberal policies towards Channel Islands 
45 Case VII/AMA/I/93- OJ [1993] L140/51. 
46 See The Times (12 May 1994). 
47 The Times (9 MaY 1994). 
43 Financial Times (14 October 1994). 
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services... Implicit in its proposal therefore %vas the assumption 
that it would grant liberally further applications 
It reasoned further that it "could not ignore the changes %vhich had taken place 
within the EC or the broad sweep, of developing Government policy towards 
airline competition. 1149 
In the procedural sense, the market access measures have isolated rurther tile 
incidence of public hearings in route licensing, at least in respect of intra. 
Community routes. Although consistency in policy application and gradual 
deregulation over the years have contributed to the rarity of licensing hearings, 
it is evident that the liberalisation of access to Community routes %vill reinforce 
that effect. This, as stated earlier, is not necessarily a bad thing since the 
hearings are often dominated by legal representatives who seek not so much as 
to contribute to the wider development of air transport policy, but to exalt the 
art of legal argument and semantical prestidigitation. Indeed, the CAA has no 
particular wish to see the revival of undue hearings for the purposes of route 
licensing. Hearings will of course continue to be essential in cases of alleged 
anti-competitive behaviour in respect of routes not falling within the scope of 
the Regulation. The drawbacks of the lack of hearings for cases of alleged anti- 
competitive behaviour on those routes covered by the Regulation have already 
been referred to earlier and are explored further below. 
Capacity 
While no specific Regulation has been adopted for the liberalisation of capacity, 
Article 10 of Council Regulation 2408/92 removes any capacity limitations on 
routes covered by the Regulation. A remedial power is, however, vested in the 
Commission to impose limitations to stabilise capacity where there has been a 
"serious financial damage". The regulation of capacity has not been actively 
pursued by the CAA for some years although there may be occasions when the 
enforced reduction of capacity has been necessary, in particular where there are 
bilateral restrictions or where there has been a significant change in the traffic 
density of the route. For example, the restrictions in the bilateral agreement 
between the UK and Japan required the CAA to condition the licence of BA so 
that it had to operate a prescribed number of frequencies, 50 as %vas the case 
relating to the London(Heathrow)-Beirut services in which capacity had to be 
distributed between BA and British Mediterranean Airways. " The general 
policy, however, remains one in which the decisions of airlines in respect of 
capacity ought to be shaped by market forces, not regulatory prescription, 
The remedial power of the Commission is more of a protective measure rather 
than an anti-competitive instrument with which it could be used to prevent 
excess capacity with predatory characteristics. While anti-competitive 
behaviour may be dealt with under Article 85 and Article 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome, the remedial power is all but a covert expression of the protectionist 
tendency in respect of airline interests, though not necessarily, rather than user 
49 Decision 3/93. 
50 Decision 1/9 1. 
51 Decision 2/94. 
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interests. Financial damage envisaged by the provision may arise in two 
circumstances: excess capacity with predatory or anti-competitive intent or 
excess capacity as a result of significant changes in market conditions, In a case 
where an anti-competitive behaviour has been alleged. powers of the 
Commission under Council Regulation 3975/87 to apply Article 35 and Article 
86 can be invoked and if necessary dealt with under the expedited procedure 5: 
This is an antitrust rather than an economic regulatory intervention Where 
financial damage is imminent or has been caused by a significant reduction in 
demand, the interplay of demand and supply of the market system will 
accordingly inform, or indeed should have informed, the airline concerned to 
either withdraw the service or reduce the capacity or frequency to meet * 
the 
lower level of demand in accordance with its commercial judgement. Of 
course, an exception must be made in respect of services which are operated as 
part of a public service obligation, although this argument pales into 
insignificance if the central tenet of a public service obligation, duly 
compensated for, is taken into account. Further, an exception to this argument 
can also be made of unforeseen circumstances such as war or emergencies, 
Unless these limýited conditions exist, serious financial damage is prinia facie 
insufficient to justify economic regulatory intervention. Although libcralisation 
is far from deregulation, it is a contradiction of the liberalisation policy to enable 
intervention on the basis of, inter alia, the "capacity utilization achieved" by the 
airlines. 
Fares 
The regulation of fares have not been actively pursued by the CAA for over a 
decade. Its recommendation to the Government for the deregulation of 
domestic fares was duly endorsed in 1984.53 Filing of fares continue to be 
necessary, however, if only to maintain regulatory oversight against anti- 
competitive behaviour. Fares on international routes are largely prescribed by 
bilateral agreements unless a mutual agreement to allow competition in fares has 
been achieved. In these respects, Council Regulation 2409/92 which seeks to 
facilitate the determination of fares "freely by market forces" is little more than a 
formality for UK domestic air transport. 
The fares Regulation makes provision for Member States to regulate fares in 
two circumstances. First, where a fare is "excessively high to the disadvantage 
of users in relation to the long term fully-allocated relevant costs of the air 
carrier including a satisfactory return on capital", the Member State concerned 
may withdraw that fare. Secondly, a Member State has the discretion to 
prevent further fare decreases "when market forces have led to sustained 
downward development of air fares deviating significantly from ordinary 
seasonal pricing movements and resulting in widespread losses among all air 
carriers concerneld" but only as regards the services in question. Regulatory 
intervention on the basis of excessively high fares in the light of the fares 
structure for the route concerned resembles the policy of the CAA to intervene 
where these amounted to an exploitation of market power, and in any event, it 
52 Commission Regulation 4261/88, OJ [ 19881 L376/1 0. 
53 Airline Conipetition Policy (Cmnd. 9366.1934). 
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is specifically justified on the ground that they disadvantaize the users The 
intervention provided in the Regulation when fares are decreasing is a less 
straightforward issue. It resembles to a limited extent the policy of the CAA on 
predatory practices by lowering fares so significantly. although this is clearly an 
antitrust response to the behaviour. It would therefore appear that such cases 
are more appropriately dealt with under the antitrust provisions of Articles 85 
and 86. Preventing further downward spiral of fares, which all the more so has 
not been directly justified by user interests, is an economic regulatory action to 
adjust the appropriate level of fares against the flow of market forces, and is not 
a sufficient justification. 
Community Policy on Air Transport Competition: A Critique 
The liberalisation measures have, in no small way, heralded a new and arguably 
challenging era for Community air transport. The changes they have introduced 
are by no means familiar to many Member States who have never embraced any 
form of liberal air transport policy prior to the arrival of these measures, For 
the UK, while many aspects of these measures are in essence a confirmation of 
the regulatory policy pursued for many years, others have affected it in more 
fundamental ways both in substantive and procedural terms. Licensing of air 
transport may not be a new means of securing the attainment of a particular 
objective; indeed it stretches back to 1960 when the ATLB was first created. 
But the types of licences have had to be re-classified. Policy review has had to 
be effected to consider the extension of Community policy to Channel Island 
and Isle of Man routes which the CAA cannot be impervious to. Regulatory 
objectives have also assumed a fresh emphasis. Even more significant has been 
the transfer of regulatory responsibility for anti-competitive behaviour to the 
Commission in respect of the routes covered by the market access Regulation. 
The drawback of this development lies in the absence of open, public hearings 
for determining allegations of anti-competitive behaviour. NNThatever may be the 
imperfections of an adversarial hearing, the likelihood of establishing the truth 
or falsity of the anti-competitive behaviour claim is far greater than a closed 
hearing. 54 The trappincls of a court-room and the confrontational characteristic 
of a lis iliterpartes hearing go a long way towards preventing the sort of legal 
vacuum which frequently troubles an ex parle hearing. Although the expertise 
of national competition authorities and the Commission in antitrust policing 
need not be seriously doubted, there remains the question of whether, between 
them, they form the most appropriate institution disposed to air transport 
competition policy development to the exclusion of the regulatory agencies 
entrusted with the task for so many years including the CAA. 55 Opportunities 
54 Interview with the Director of the Economic Regulation Group, CAA. 2 Fcbniar. v 
1995. 
55 The CAA has an agreement with the OFT in airline competition cases to %ork 
together using their differing but complementary knoxviedge and expertise so as to 
handle competition issues in the airline sector in the most cffccti%-c %%ay.., No%v 
however the Authority no longer has the ability to restrict or condition airlines' 
licences on routes %%ithin the Community and thus in practice redress for anti. 
competitive behaviour can be implemented only through the poN%crs of the 
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though these measures may have promised, much is still to be desired Sonle of 
these fundamental policy concerns are explored below 
The Dilemma of Interests: The Means and The Ends 
One of the most fundamental misgivings of Community air transport policy is 
the lack of prioritisation of the stated objectives. This, as it must seem in due 
course, is the root-cause of the difficulties towards a coherent establishment of 
air transport policy. In its first Communication to the Council, the Commission 
spelt out in the Memorandum four objectives of a Community air transport 
policy: 
" users: the availability of a network of efficient services at prices as low as 
possible without discrimination; 
" airlines: financial soundness of airlines, a diminution of costs and higher 
productivity; 
" staff safeguarding interests of airline workers for social progress and 
eliminating barriers to free movement; 
" public: improving the conditions of life. 36 
No measure of preference has been built into the set of objectives. User 
interests are by no means a primary objective as may be contrasted with the 
Statement of Policies on Route and Air Transport Licensing of the CAA. 37 
Other interests are ranked as of equal importance with user interests. Indeed, 
the Communication paid a special regard to the interests of airlines in respect of 
their financial soundness and their workers when it sought to explain the 
objectives further. Community air transport policy in this respect represents a 
stark reversal in policy direction for the UK since for well over a decade 
interests of the users have been given priority over the interests of the other 
participants in the regulatory complex. 58 
Justification of this policy approach by reference to the Treaty, particularly 
Article 2 and Article 3, is not readily supported by the language of the Treaty 
itself The Memorandum of the Commission stated that, 
[T]he general objectives of Article 2 should be applied for air 
transport as an economic sector in itself and result in a 
harmonious development of this activity in the whole of the 
Community, However, since air transport, like other modes of 
transport, falls within Article 3 it is clear that development of an 
air transport policy should take into account also the other aims 
announced in the interest of the Community in general ... such as 
industrial policy... regional policy... energy policy and 
environment .... 
11 
Comm. ission or, as appropriate. the 01717 under national competition law-It is 
important to establish which cases if any would be most appropriately handled at 
national level and which by the Commission": CAA . 4irline Competition in the 
Single European. 1farket. CAP 623 (1993). paras. 296-30 1. 
56 Contribution of the European Communities to the Development of. 4ir Transport 
seroces, Bull. EC Supp. 5/79, para. 15. 
57 CAP 620 (1993). 
53 See Civil Aviation Act 1980. 
59 Bull. EC Supp. 5/79. para. 11. 
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While it would clearly be inappropriate to disregard other policv ainis of tile 
Community, they cannot however override nor fetter the discretion of the 
Community in developing an air transport policy But it is also true that the 
Community institutions have not been expressly mandated by the Treaty to 
accord equal importance to the interests of users. airlines and others Article 2 
does no more than to set out the tasks of the Community to promote a 
harmonious development of economic activities in order to ensure "a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States". 
Article 33 on the other hand sets out the specific tasks of the Community 
including the development of a common transport policy. Both Articles do not 
preclude the prioritisation of air transport policy objectives, and this 'cati 
therefore be achieved over time through the use of its regulatory discretion 
either by publishing policy statements or developing a set of principles from the 
case-1mv. 
As the discussion on state aids and mergers below will indicate, the interests of 
users have not featured as prime concern in the decisions of the Council and the 
Commission. Most illustrative of the actions of the Council for present purposes 
is evident in the liberalisation measures adopted. Although logic dictates that 
the process of liberalisation must be gradual to enable satisfactory adaptation by 
Conu, nunity carriers to competitive forces, this justification cannot be applied 
indiscriminately to all aspects of economic regulation. In particular, the 
commission and Member States have often been conferred with remedial 
powers to ensure the survival of Community carriers, even perhaps in the 
blatant wake of inefficiency or anti-competitiveness. It is a supreme irony for a 
liberalisation policy to protect the inefficient by holding out a stick without the 
carrot. A useful example is the remedial powers of Member States under 
Article 6 of Council Regulation 2409/92 to prohibit further downward spiral of 
air fares in dire market circumstances. The purpose of this provision seems 
two-fold in the most obvious sense: to protect the interests of carrierS60 and the 
interests of users indirectly by ensuring that services continue to be viable. The 
preamble to the Regulation states that, 
it is appropriate to complement price freedom with adequate 
safeguards for the interests of consumers and industry. 
it is clear that the safeguards in this Regulation, specifically under Article 6, 
were not intended to correct anti-competitive practices in fares since such 
practices would be dealt with under Article 85 and Article 86 which 
enforcement the Commission has been authorised by Council Regulation 
3975/87, or by the national authorities according to their national antitrust laws. 
It cannot therefore be argued that the safeguard provided in Article 6 had been 
designed to prevent anti-competitive practices. 
60 IndeecL an answer to a European parliamentary question %%as provided by 
Commissioner Abel Matutes that one aim of the sakguards is "to protect airlines if 
an obvious state of crisis is provoked by a fares war behi ccn all carriers": [ 199414 
CMLR 28. 
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Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to submit the argument that the safeguard 
against the do%vnward spiral of fares is to ensure that airlines are not dri-, -cn to 
the brink of collapse by a "price-war" so that ultimately it is the interests of 
users which will be adversely prejudiced However, the plausibility of this 
argument pales into insignificance if the realities of air transport economics are 
put into perspective. In the first place, the argument assumes the total 
withdrawal of services by all airlines on the route simply on the basis of non- 
profitability. In practice, however, this is unlikely to happen. The point will 
come when one or perhaps even two airlines will be left to operate the services 
without the vigour of the competition ex ante. This absence of competition %0l 
then enable the remaining airline or airlines to raise the fares to their 'normal' 
level to reflect the proper allocation of costs. This latter adjustment cannot be 
regarded as excessive pricing to the disadvantage of users since it is a proper 
allocation of costs with relevant provision for a satisfactory return on capital. It 
can only be regarded as excessive pricing if the fares during the period of 
downward spiral were still priced above costs so that the latter adjustment was 
simply to inflate the margins further, but in which case the regulatory 
intervention to prevent the downward spiral when fares were still above costs 
must amount to an artificial determination of fares contrary to the idea that fares 
should be set freely by market forces, and consequently amounts to the 
protection of possibly inefficient airlines. In any event, excessive pricing can be 
dealt with in two ways. First, if the new pricing was excessive as a result of an 
abuse of a dominant position, that can be dealt with under Article 36 or the 
relevant national antitrust laws. Secondly, barring the constraints on 
competition noted in the previous chapter, excessive pricing by one airline will 
in practice accelerate a lower level of entry barrier so that other airlines will 
begin to introduce competing services vAth differential, often smaller, margins 
between fares and costs: this is the essence of the theory of market 
contestability. At any rate, the difficulties of infrastructural constraints are not 
as significant in such cases since the competition ex ante necessarily implies that 
these lin-dtations did not apply then. Thus, providing that there has not been 
pricing below cost with predatory intent, which at any rate will be considered as 
an antitrust case, the loss arising from the continued pro-vision of the services 
when fares are spiralling downwards must be seen as a voluntary commercial 
decision, albeit an irrational one. Commercial irrationality on its own, however, 
cannot suffice for regulatory intervention. Article 6 safeguard against the 
downward spiral of fares underscores the intent of Community air transport 
policy to further the interests of airlines, possibly at the expense of user 
interests. Indeed, it has been explained elsewhere that this provision was 
inserted specifically to protect the Mediterranean airlines who were vulnerable 
to the low fares of the charter airlines . 61 Although there 
is nothing inherently 
inappropriate about protecting the interests of airlines, the argument is such that 
a competitive system envisaged by the Treaty and the liberalisation measures, 
and which puts airline interests ahead of user 
interests, results in a mismatch of 
means and ends by putting the cart before the 
horse. It distorts the theory of 
critical market contestability which is a precondition of effective competition, 
61 Sce F. de Coninck. European. lir Law- (Institute of Air Transport. Paris. 1992). p. 70. 
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Without a clear prioritisation of the objectives. policy development for 
Community air transport runs the risk of mismatching its objectives and the 
means by which they can be achieved. Community policy, hitherto, assumes 
competition as a means by which the objectives can be furthered6'. It is q however, not clear as to whether competition represents a cast-iron or a flexible 
means which use will be in accordance with the prevailing economic conditions 
While it has identified how airline interests may be promoted. 61 the policy is less 
clear as to how competition as a policy instrument will be applied to secure the 
interests of users. 
State Aids: A Barrier to Competition 
The issue of state aids has persistently plagued the efforts of achievinizz a truly 
single European market for air transport. State aids are not prohibited per se. 
The Treaty of Rome provides in Article 92 and Article 93 that while aids are in 
principle incompatible with the common market, there are circumstances in 
which they may be accepted. Article 92(l) states, 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State through state resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in 
so far as it affects trade between Member States be incompatible 
with the common market. 
This is a provision of considerable width. Aids which are or may be compatible 
with the common market are set out in Article 92(2) and (3) respectively, and 
they include aid with a social character, aid designed to promote or facilitate 
economic development or the execution of an important project of common 
European interest. 
State aids are not confined solely to capital handouts or equity contributions 
which are tangible. The forms of aid which the Commission has recognised 
range from loans to guarantees, subsidies to tax exemptions. The concern %%ith 
state aids in air transport is not so much the principle of aid in itself, but rather 
with the potential distortion of competition intended by the liberalisation 
programme; for it is a policy weakness to put in train a process of liberalisation 
but at the same time permitting unlimited access to financial assistance for some 
but not others. The concern is particularly acute in air transport given the 
virtual dominance of State ownership in all but two national airlines in the EEA. 
Except for BA and Icelandair, all other Member States maintain one or another 
form of financial stake in their national airline. 
62 See Impact oj* the Third Packqize of Air Transport Liberali. -ation Ateasures. 
COM(96) 514. 
63 Contribution oj'the European Communities to the Development of Air Transport 
Semices, Bull. EC Supp. 5/79. 
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TMAP 8.1 OwnershiD of MaL, Carriers as in 1996 
Flag Carrier Country State Ownership 
Aer Lingus Ireland 100% 
Air France France 94.2% 
Alitalia Italv 8 6.4 l, o 
Austrian Airlines Austria 5 1.9ý,, o 
British Airways United Kingdom 
_0010 Finnair Finland 60.701,6 
lbena Spain 99,8% 
Icelandair Iceland 0% 
KLINI Netherlands 38.20,, o 
Lufthansa Gennany_ 35.68% 
Luxair Luxembourg 23.1 1?, o 
OlyTnpic Greece 100% 
_ Sabena Belgium 33.80, /o 
SAS Sweden 
Derunark 
Norway 
50% of 42.85% 
50q/0 of 28.571.6 
50110 of 23.57% 
[-T-AP- Portugal 100 % 
Source: Association ol P-tiropean Airunes rearoooK j Yyov- 
it is therefore reasonable to assume that publicly owned national airlines 
effectively have unlimited access to financial assistance while privately owned 
airlines need to secure the confidence of investors in the market place in order 
to have access to financial assistance. The disparity in access potentially 
prevents fair competition. In the light of this concern and the need to enforce 
the rules on state aids more vigorously, the Commission issued guidelines 
indicating its intended approach with respect to air transport state aids. These 
were first set out in its second Memorandum to the Council in 1984.65 
The language of Article 92 is such that the approach of the Commission is 
limited to one which embraces a presumption that state aids are in general 
prohibited unless they can be properly justified; for otherwise, "any increase in 
competition between airlines could result in the financing of such competition 
out of state aid. "66 Hence, the guidelines 
formulated by the Comn-dssion reflect 
to a large extent this presumption. Stated briefly, the guidelines to be drawn 
upon when assessing state aids are as follows: 
state aids justified on the basis of attaining national objectives will not be 
regarded as sufficient to satisfy the requirement of compatibility in the 
Treaty; 
assessments of state aids will also depend on the economic situation of 
the air transport industry in the Community; 
while recognising that the economic conditions of the industry tend to 
fluctuate, aids may be authorised in cases where an airline is suffering 
"serious financial difficulties", subject to a number of conditions. First, 
64 The ownership share does not take into account those N%hich are held bry public sector 
institutions or airlines of another State. 
65 COM(84) 72. 
66 Ibid.. para. 2. 
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the aid must form part of a rest ructu ri niz programme so that the airline 
can within a reasonably short time begin to operate vvithout further aid 
Secondly, the aid must not result in a transfer of the airline's difliculties 
to other parts of tile Community For example. the aid cannot be used 
to finance a particular route on which there is intense competition, 
Thirdly, there has to be transparency to ensure the proper application of 
the aid; 
where the aid is also designed for regional development. objectives of 
the Community relating to regional development will be referred to 
accordingly; 
state aids intended for the operation of domestic routes will be accepted 
in general since they are not likely to be prohibited by terms of Article 
92; 
state aids will not be assessed in such a manner that will place 
Community carriers at a competitive disadvantage with carriers from 
third countries, who are either subsidised or otherwise benefit from 
67 
preferential treatment". 
Since then, the Commission has published a number of documents consolidating 
its statements of policy on State aidS68 including a comprehensive evaluation 
report. 69 
A central tenet of the Commission's policy to ensure neutrality in the treatment 
of publicly owned and privately owned enterprises when applying the state aids 
rules and its own guidelines, is the Market Econom), Investor Principle (NMEIP) 
designed principally to enable it and Member States to assess whether the aid 
granted would have been secured by a private enterprise from its investors. 
This principle, however, involves a notoriously difficult value judgement. 
Officials would in essence be acting as a surrogate for private investors 
attempting to guess objectively whether the aid was equivalent to an ordinary 
commercial transaction between the owner and the undertaking. In practical 
terms, this cannot be a satisfactory substitute for a true market test; but it is the 
better of two evils. State ownership in Community airlines are not likely to 
disappear altogether in the foreseeable future in spite of the commitment by 
some Member States to privatise their national airline, for instance, Germany, 
France and Portugal. Rules for state aids must therefore continue to be in 
place. Indeed the Commission has implicitly acknowledged that the issue of 
state aids in general is a particularly thorny one, and will persist to be so. 
[I]t is not the aim of the Commission in the future, just as it has 
not been in the past, to replace the investor's judgement. Any 
requests for extra finance naturally calls for public undertakings 
and public authorities, just as it does for private undertakings 
and the private providers of finance, to analyse the risk and the 
likely outcome of the project. In turn, the Commission realises 
that this analysis of risk requires public undertakings, like private 
67 ibid.. Annex IV. para. 52. 
68 E. g.. 4pplication of. 4rticies 92 and 93 to State. 4ids in the. 1viation Sector. (1994) OJ 
C35015. 
69 Report on the Evaluation of. fid Schemes Established in rm-our of Coinmunitv. -ur 
carriers. SEQ92) 43 1. 
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undertakings, to exercise entrepreneurial skills, which bv the 
very nature of the problem implies a wide margin of judgement 
on the part of the investor Within that %,, idc margin the exercise 
of judgement by the investor cannot be regarded as involving 
state aid ... Only where there are no objective grounds to 
reasonably expect that an investment will give an adequate rate 
of return that would be acceptable to a private investor in a 
comparable private undertaking operating under normal market 
conditions, is state aid involved even when this is financed 
wholly or partially by public funds. 70 
Ironically, however, the lack of vigour on the part of the Commission ill 
applying its own guidelines is by no means undetectable. Several cases are 
instructive of this point. 71 In particular, the Commission ruled compatible a 
capital injection of FF20bn into Air France in 1994 on the basis that the latter's 
restructuring plan was aimed to return it to financial and economic -viability. 72 
This decision came following two earlier decisions authorising a FF5.8bn aid to 
Air France in 1991 on the footing that under the NIEIP, it would not have been 
unreasonable for a private investor to make a similar investment. That 
conclusion was based on a number of observations, in particular the 
deterioration of Air France's financial position and global structure principally as 
a result of the Gulf War, but also of the take-over of UTA and of other related 
financial charges. The Commission was also influenced by the Comy-at de plart 
which it felt promised good long-term prospects for its overall structure. 73 This 
proved to be misguided eventually. In spite of that injection, the Commission 
was driven to recognise explicitly in 1994 involving yet another injection, that 
"Air France's situation has continued to worsen". 74 
In 1991, the Commission again authorised the aid granted to Sabena even 
though "in view of the accumulated debts and the costs of the restructuring 
programme, no investor apart from the State would at present be prepared to 
take part in the restructuring programme of Sabena. "75 Nevertheless, it 
authorised the aid on the basis of Article 91(3)(c) to promote the development 
of a certain economic activity subject to several undertakings including the 
abstention from granting further aid, the re-orientation of Sabenaýs operations 
towards greater commercialisation, and the finding of an industrial partner to 
co-operate in the restructuring programme. A similar application of the 
derogation in Article 92(3)(c) from the rules on State aids was made in respect 
of the fIrl 175 million equity injection into Aer Lingus which, according to the 
Commission, no investor would provide. The development of economic 
70 Oj [1991] C273/2. para. 27. in respect of public undertakings in the manufacturing 
sector. 
71 E. g. see Olvinpia. 4irwa. vs. CJ [19941 L273/22. T4P. OJ [ 19941 L279/29, 
72 Oj [19941 L254/73. 
73 See Twcnty-first Competition Policy Report 1991. p. 179 and T%icrity-second 
Competition Policy Report 1992. p. 269. 
74 Oj [19941 C334n and the subsequent ruling against this particular aid: 01119941 
L258/28. 
75 Commission Decision 911555. OJ j 199 11 L300/48. at p. 50, 
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activities in that case took the form of the aid's contribution to the Irish-Ec and 
lrish-US links and a genuine programme of restructuring ", - CC These 
authorisations have not been without difficulties and have led the CAA to make 
the following observation. 
The Commission has set out a list of issues to which it would 
have regard in considering whether injections of equity 
constitute aid. It is however by no means apparent from its 
written decisions that it has applied its own guidelines with equal 
77 rigour. 
More recently, the Commission authorised the capital injection of Ptas 120bn 
into Iberia, on the ground that the injection was not an aid in the sense 
prohibited by the Treaty since the equity contribution would have been made by 
a private investor given the same set of circumstances. Therefore, the question 
of whether the aid should be authorised under one of the exemptions provided 
did not arise . 78 These are 
but a number of key cases in a very controversial area 
of Community law on air transport competition. Though there is yet to emerge 
a clearer set of principles on these cases, it is already evident at the same time 
that State aids in air transport is increasingly becoming juridified as a result of 
the readiness of to seek the sanctions or protection of the law and the courts. 79 
It is equally difficult to rationalise the guideline of the Comn-dssion on state aids 
designed to support the operation of domestic routes. These could only be 
approved if they do not "affect trade between Member States". The claim to 
being "favourably disposed" towards such aids must nevertheless be seen in the 
light of the decisions of the ECJ on the meaning of "trade between Member 
States" as regards Articles 85 and 86. The Court has pronounced that, even in 
circumstances appearing to be limited purely to a domestic setting, their very 
nature could have, 
the effect of reinforcing the compartmentalization of markets on 
a national basis, thereby holding up the economic 
interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about .... 80 The effect on trade between Member States is, however, subject to a de 
minimis rule, that it must affect trade to an appreciable extent. This was first 
enunciated by the ECJ in Volk v Vervaecke. 81 
Community air transport policy cannot develop in a state of delusion. Like it or 
not, State ownersi-dp in national airlines will remain in one form or anothcr. The 
76 Case N557/93. OJ [19931 C291/4 and Commission Decision 94/118,01 [19941 
L54/30. 
77 CAP 623, para. 255. 
78 Commission Decision 96/278.119961 OJ L104/25. 
79 E. g. Case C-174/94. France v Coininission [19941 OJ C227/31-. Case T-394194. 
British Afidland. lirwavs v Connnission [19941 OJ C392/14. Case T-16/96, O(Vflý-Cr 
Express v Conunission [19961 OJ C108/1 1. See also J. Goh. European. 4ir Transport 
Law and Conipetition (John Wiley. Chichester: 1997). chs. I 1- 13. 
80 Case 8/72.1 ereenigiqq van Ceinenthandelaren v Commission [19721 ECR 977. at 
p. 991. See also Case 126/80. Salonia v Poidontan 119811 ECR 1563 and Case 
246/86, Belasco 11 Coininission [19911 4 CNILR 96, and the decision of the 
Commission inMELDOC, OJ 119861 L348/50. 
81 Case 5/69. [19691 ECR 295. 
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poliev on state aids must be cast accordinolyl"- A greater part of the problem 
lies in the way in which objectives of the air transport PoilcY ha%c been 
compromised. Assessments of state aids are usually made in the light of tile 
airline interests, with remote consideration given to user interests. if at all The 
pre-dominance of airline interests readily generates a svmpathetic propensity to 
approve aids which design cannot be clearly distinguished either as a genuine 
commercial transaction between owner and undertaking or aid in tile prohibited 
sense. By contrast, if state aids were examined with the public interest foremost 
in mind, then this objective criterion would dictate the prohibition of aids which 
were either contrary or likely to affect the public interest adversely Tile effect 
of this crucial difference is most conspicuous in a comparison between 
* 
the 
regulatory objective of the CAA which regards user interests as a pfimc conccm 
and the overall Community policy which regards user interests as no more 
important than other objectives. The liberal licensing regime and the multi. 
airline competition policy pursued for so many years by the CAA, and indeed 
the aims of the single European air transport market, will stand precariously 
alongside a less than rigorous structure of state aids enforcement. The 
competitive environment which the privately owned airlines have fostered and 
endured in will lose its equilibrium if other national airlines were better placed 
to receive aid from their national governments, 
Airline Mergers: A Tradition of Collusion 
Much like everything else in air transport, the Treaty has also been silent on 
mergers between airlines. A clear remit to intervene in merger cases did not 
arise until 1989 with the passing of the Merger Control Regulation 4064/89, 
sixteen years after it was first drafted. 83 A number of airline merger cases had 
by then been determined, namely the take-over of B. Cal by BA and of UTA and 
Air Inter by Air France. The regulation of mergers has never been a part of the 
CAA! s responsibility, although clearly it is disposed to use its regulatory powers 
to deal with such cases through the conditioning of the licences it grants. Its 
policy as regards mergers are set out in paragraph 10 of the Statement of 
policies ott Route and Air Transport Licetisitig which states that while an 
acquisition by one airline of another together with its routes mergers may have 
neutral or beneficial effects in terms of the statutory objectives, it could also 
lead to a reduction in competition. Where this was the case, the CAA would 
give no preference simply on the grounds of incumbency on the routes in 
question. In reaching its decisions, the CAA would have regard in particular to 
the maintenance of a competitive environment. 8-1 
The attitude of the CAA towards Community take-overs is stated in Airline 
Competition in the Single European Market. 
82 it is interesting in this regard to note the resolution of the Council in response to the 
Communication from the Commission on the way forward for European civil 
aviation which urges the Commission to adopt a closer scrutiny of State aids cases in 
airtransport. See Council Resolution. OJ [19941 C309/2 and COM(94) 218. 
81 011198911,395/1. See N. Nug , cnt, The Government and Politics of the European 
Communitv (Macmillan. Basingstoke: 2nd. cdn.. 199 1). p. 307, 
84 CAP 620. 
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The mergers most obviously damaging to competition will be 
those %,,, here the airlines concerned operate networks which 
overlap substantially. In such cases any benerits of scope are 
likely to accrue to the airline in terms of increased market power 
and not to users through reduced costs. Given the existing 0 
structure of the air transport industry in the Community, this 
would be most likely to occur where a national carrier acquired a 
smaller competitor based in the same country. In these 
circumstances the airline being acquired is likely to be one of 
only a few able to start or maintain competing operations. Thus 
the result of simply accepting such mergers, or alternatively of 
doing so with only token conditions attached, would normally be 
to reinforce the dominance of the flag carrier concerned in its 
national market and at its major airport or airports. This will be 
especially detrimental to competition where the airport or 
airports concerned are, or are likely to become full. Normally 
therefore such mergers should not be permitted or at least, if 
genuinely unavoidable, they should be conditioned in a way 
which will substantially eradicate the negative impact for 
competition. " 
Both policy statements are a crystal clear reflection of the decision of the CAA 
following the take-over of B. Cal by BA, which resulted, inter alia, in several 
important undertakings given by BA to the ININIC. The decision of the CAA in 
respect of the applications for route licences surrendered by BA after the take- 
over has already been discussed in previous chapters. 86 The real significance of 
this take-over lies also in the additional intervention by the Commission. 
Prior to 1989, Community regulation of airline mergers were dealt with 
principally under Article 85, and Article 86 where the take-over also constitutes 
an abuse of dominant position. 87 The advent of Merger Control Regulation 
4064/89 gave specific powers to the Commission to investigate mergers with a 
Community dimension". 88 Mergers with a Community dimension are 
characterised by the following criteria: 
0 where the aggregate world-wide turnover of all the undertakings concerned 
is in excess of ECU2500 million, 
" where the aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned 
is in excess 
of ECU 100 million in each of at least three Member States, 
pte turnover of each of at least two underta in s " where the aggreIg 
ki g 
concerned is in excess of ECU 25 million 
in each of at least three Nfember 
States, and 
85 CAP 623. para. 243. 
86 See Decision 7/88. 
87 See c, g. Case 43/85. ANCIDES v Commission 119881 ECR 313 1. 
88 Oj [19s9l L395/1. Article 1(2). See J. Goh. European Air Transport Law and 
Competition (John Wiley. Chichester: 1997). ch. 5 and the important contribution or 
the House of Commons Transport Select Committee to the debate on the 
inadequacies of the "Community dimension" concept: Developments in European 
Comillunirv, Air Transport Polic. v (First Report), HC 147 0991-92). 
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where the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least t,, %o of 
the undertakiýgs concerned is in excess of ECU 100 million. "' 
Mergers without a Community dimension will therefore be dealt with by 
national authorities of Member States in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, particularly in respect of cases where "each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State. " 
Ironically, however, the vigour with which the merger control Regulation 
should have been applied has been less apparent than the period prior to its 
enactment. Todate, the most significant intervention is still the first 
investigation in 1988 into the BA-B. Cal merger where a number of substantial 
undertakings were extracted from BA, in addition to those already given to the 
MMC, so as to "create stronger opportunities for new competitors to emerge, 
by improving substantially the prospects for other carriers to be licensed on a 
number of former B. Cal European routes, by limiting the merged airline's share 
of slots at Gatwick airport and by ensuring that the merger does not lead to 
constraints on slots at Heathrow airport, "90 Substantial undertakings were also 
extracted from the Air France Group when it took over tlýe long-haul 
independent airline, UTA, and the domestic airline, Air Inter, in 1990. An 
agreement was struck between the Conunission, the French Government and 
Air France which promised greater market access and competition 'Aith a 
measure of preference given to airlines outside the Air France Group, In spite 
of the substantial undertakings, which included the designation of another 
French airline "to serve eight routes accounting for more than half of domestic 
traffic", the misgivings with this merger eventually became apparent. 91 The 
disputes relating to the constraints at Paris(Orly) and the series of State aids to 
Air France amply testify, not only to the failure to restructure or rationalise, but 
also to the realities of airline mergers between a national carrier and a smaller, 
independent carrier. 
A number of important airline merger cases have now emerged since mergers 
were brought within the scope of the Regulation. The first was the take-over of 
certain Pan Am assets by Delta, specifically the operations of Pan Am at 
London(Heathrow) and Frankfurt where the latter operated a hub. While the 
merger met the threshold laid down in the Regulation and therefore qualified for 
investigation, the Commission concluded that its assessment of the relevant 
market share of Delta was not significant given in particular the strength of 
prevailing competition in the transatlantic sector. This conclusion was reached 
in spite of its finding that the merger would give Delta the largest share of the 
transatlantic traffic. 92 
89 As amended bry Council R eplation 1310/97. OJ 119971 LISO/I.. corrigcndum 119971 
OJ L 199/69. 
90 Press Release ISEC/7/88 (10 March 1988). see also f 198814 CMLR 23 8. 
91 Twentieth Competition Policy Report 1990, pp. 90-9 1. 
92 Case IV/M. 130. [199215 CMLR M56. 
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Likewise, two years later, the Commission approved the joint venture proposal 
between Air France and Sabena. 9-1 Sabena, it will be recalled. had given an 
undertaking in 1991 to the Commission that, as a condition for the provision of 
State aid, it will seek to co-operate with an industrial partner as part of its re- 
structuring programme. Whether, at the end of the day, the proposal was a 
joint venture agreement or effectively a merger, the difTerence would only be a 
matter of degree. In the end, the Commission concluded that the proposal was 
a joint venture through which Air France and Sabena could co-opcratc to utilise 
"all the synergies identified between the two partners" given that Air France 
acquired no more than a joint control with the Belyzian State over Sabena. A 
joint control, according to the Commission, "does not have the object or efyect 
of co-ordinating the competitive behaviour of enterprises wNch remain 
independent" and therefore not a concentration. This conclusion was made in 
the face of the finding that Air France would have a holding of 37.58% in the 
capital Sabena (through a newly formed company, Finacta) and "a certain 
preponderance in such management" through its express consent of tile 
appointment of Sabena's chairman. While the proposal was accompanied by 
some important undertakings, primarily relating to greater access by competing 
airlines, some were subject to a "trigger mechanism" such as when a certain 
threshold has been achieved. For example, the Commission found that the 
merger would give them 81% of the Brussels/Paris-Ankara traffic and 54% of 
the Brussels/Paris-Budapest traffiC. 94 The undertaking was to allow multiple 
designation so that competing services could be provided. The Con-anission 
added, however, that, 
given the relatively small volume of traffic on these routes and 
the need for a minimum number of passengers to ensure 
operation of the connections, multiple designation Nvill be put 
into effect only when a threshold of 100,000 passengers annually 
on each of them is attained. 
It is clear that such a prescription is an affront to the concept of competition 
and the making of decisions according to commercial judgement. NNIether 
there should be the provision of competing ser-vices ought to be a decision 
resting with the competitors in accordance with the level of traffic demand. A 
decision to provide such services with low traffic demand, and which therefore 
runs the risk of making losses, is clearly an irrational commercial decision but 
one which should be sustained by the competing airline. On the other hand, if 
the competing services represent good value for money with a high quality in- 
flight service, users would be provided with a choice of products. A corollary 
of this condition is to support the provision of services which may perhaps be 
inefficient and thus highly unlikely to meet the expectations of users. The fear 
with multiple designation is clearly excess capacity leading probably to lower 
profitability or even losses. Multiple designation, however, particularly in the Co 
immediate aftermath of some liberalisation exercise, Nvill almost always lead to 
excess capacity. This is borne out in the experience of the US deregulation and 
93 Case W/M. 15 7. [199415 CMLR MI. 
94 1990 figures. 
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the observations of the Ck-k in its decisions But inherent in the concept of 
liberalisation is the process of rationalisation. A point -, vill be reached %%here the 
competing airlines will have to re-examine the capacity mounted on the route 
and, if so required, reduce the level of capacity according to the level of trallic 
demand; or a point where the additional capacity will have stimulated sufficicrit 
traffic growth to sustain existing capacity levels in accordance with the 'S' curve 
concept. Clearly though, the argument on multiple designation must also take 
into account the restrictions which often come with bilateral agreements In this 
case, however, their relevance would have been insignificant if an enforced 
reduction in their frequency or capacity was made a condition of the merger, as 
was the approach taken in the BA-B. Cal merger. This would circumvent any 
bilateral restrictions on capacity. To set a threshold (of 100,000 passengers) for 
triggering multiple designation is, as it must clearly seem in this case, an 
artificial, if not arbitrary, prescription amounting to an undue protection of 
national carriers at the expense of user interests. 
This partnership proved later to be less than succ-essful and led to the 
withdrawal of Air France. As a result of this, Swiss Air acquired a 49.5% equity 
holding in Sabena although there serious reservations about the question of 
ownership and effective control. It the final analysis, the Commission decided 
that the structure of the equity participation and senior management did result in 
Swiss Air having a majority or effective control of Sabena, though the 
Commission also accepted that the agreement appeared to be a transitional 
solution until existing ownership and control restrictions were lifted on a 
reciprocal basis by the Community and Switzerland. 96 
Between 1992 and 1993, the Commission also approved expressly or impliedly 
a number of mergers involving BA. The first was the acquisition of the French 
domestic carrier, TAT. 97 This was then followed by a decision of the 
Commission, in the light of the intervention by the Belgian Government under 
Article 22 of the Regulation, to refuse to intervene in the take-over of Dan Air 
by BA in 1992 on the basis that the case did not have a Community 
dimension. 98 This take-over and the decision of the Commission is unique in 
more than one respect. First, a subsequent challenge by Air France against this 
decision was dismissed by the Court of First Instance. 99 Secondly, BINIA and 
Virgin applied for judicial review against the decision of the Secretary of State 
for refusing in the public interest to refer the matter to the NIIMC. This 
application was rejected in due course by the Hgh Court. An appeal against the 
decision was taken to the Court of Appeal which was eventually dismissed on 
the ground that the Secretary of State was under no obligation to consider 
Article S6 in the exercise of his discretion whether or not to refer the matter to 
95 See CAA, Deregulation of. 4ir Transport: .4 Perspective on the Experience In the 
United States. CAA Paper 84009 (1984) and CAX Competition on the Afain 
Domestic Trunk Routes. CAA Paper 87005 (1987). See also Decision 1/94, 
'139/19. 96 Cominission Decision 95/404. [19951 OJ L. 
97 Case IV/M. 259. OJ [19921 C326/16. 
98 Case IV/M. 278. OJ [19931 C68/5. 
99 Case T-3/93. OJ [ 19941 C 132/12. 
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the NX%lC "I" This is odd since the ECJ has said in . IhInect Sczeetl that Article So 
was directly applicable in Member States I'll Thirdly and perhaps more 
strikingly, the take-over and the lack of any invcstigation prompted the 
Chairman of the CAA to remark that "the Government's approval or BA's 
acquisition of Dan Air without an NINIC inquiry into the competition 
consequences will not make it easier for the UK to argue for a strong 
competition policy within the EC. 1112 
it would be an insult to intelligence to rehearse at length the widely accepted 
view that a programme of liberalisation or deregulation will undoubtedly lead to 
a greater consolidation of resources. 103 Whether that takes the form * 
of 
mergers, joint ventures, alliances or code-sharing, it does not matter. The US 
programme of airline deregulation has had its share of the experience, 
Numerous code-sharing agreements and the increasing globalisation of services 
suggest that international air transport has not been spared either. And it must 
come as no surprise that this trend has infiltrated Community air transport 
too. 104 While some mergers will have a beneficial effect, others, however %%ill 
tend to produce anti-competitive effects. It is therefore critical that merger laws 
are applied vigorously if the experience of the US deregulation is anýrthinsz to go 
by, taking into account as a matter of course the difference in market structure 
and the balance of effects. Or else, greater consolidation will lead to greater 
don-driance by the bigger airlines probably at the expense of competing senices. 
Even the "guru" of deregulation, and the architect of the US airline deregulation 
programme, Professor Alfred Kahn, was driven to observe that, 
No one counted on the muscle of the big carriers, which 
protected their own market and devoured most smaller entrants. 
Their biggest weapons were the computerised reservation 
systems, lifeline of travel agents .... 105 
The regulation of mergers in the UK is a highly politicised process; a role which 
the CAA has no more than a limited part to play. Community mergers law, 
however, has provided a fresh opportunity to re-mould the regulatory approach 
towards mergers, and no less in airline mergers, though much must depend on 
the manner in which the mergers law are applied. This would require a re- 
casting of the mergers policy. For instance, the CAA counselled against the 
belief that, 
it is only by further growth through merger or acquisition 
between themselves that the Community's largest national 
airlines can hope to compete with the biggest carriers from the 
US and the Far East, and that only by softening substantially 
normal requirements of competition policy will such airlines 
emerge. The underlying proposition is that the need to facilitate 
the growth through merger and acquisition of the Community's 
100 Rv Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex p . 4irlines of Britain & Orgin 
. 4tlantic. 
4ima 
, vs. 
The Independent. (8 December 1992). 
101 AhinedSaeed. supra. 
102 CAA-4nnual Report 1992-93. 
103 See e. g. CAP 623. paras. 230-250. 
104 E. g. SAS/British NlidlancL KLrvVAir UK. BA/Dcutsche BA. 
105 Independent on Sundav-Business Supplement (13 January 199 1). 
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largest airlines is now so strong as to make it worthwhile 
sacrificing some of the benefits of choice and competition which 
were the object of the liberalisation in the Third Package, 1116 
Fostering competition with large non-Community carriers through tile process 
mergers cannot, therefore, always be the appropriate approach. On the 
contrary, as the success of Virgin competing amongst the biggest carriers in the 
world including BA, American Airlines, United Airlines. Japan Air Lines (JAL) 
and All Nippon Airways (ANA) has shown, a strong Community competition 
policy is a pre-requisite for global competition in air transport. A balanced. 
pragmatic approach to furthering the interests of Community air transport 
should instead be in place. The CAA continued, 
While ensuring that the Community has some airlines capable of 
competing effectively in major international markets is not the 
principal objective of mergers policy, it is reasonable that proper 
regard should be paid to it. The case however will need to be 
made on detail and not simply on broad arguments about size. 107 
In many respects, therefore, the general presumption adopted by the Comitd des 
Sages is ironic for it shifts the onus on the regulatory policy to establish a case 
against the presumed beneficial effects of a merger. In its recommendat ions to 
the Commission, it stated that, 
Recognising the overall potential advantages of alliances and 
mergers for users and operators, and the resulting demise of the 
national flag carrier concept, the European Commission should, 
in principle, look favourably on such arrangements. Competition 
authorities should only object if it can clearly be shown that an 
aim of the arrangement is to create a dominant position within 
the Community or within a significant regional market in the 
context of a merger, or if the resulting outcome is an insufficient 
number of competitors deemed essential to preserve effective 
competition in Europe. 101 
The flaw with such a presumption lies in the failure to recognise the different 
effects as between different forms of mergers. It would be difficult, for 
instance, to see how a merger between two largest Community flag carriers 
could be consistent with an strong competition policy. To shift the balance of 
proof onto the regulatory apparatus to 
disprove the beneficial effects of such 
mergers (if any at all) seems a blatant paddle against the current. Similarly, in a 
case where for instance a major 
flag carrier takes a large shareholding in a 
smaller carrier in the same Member State or country, 
this will very often reduce the prospects for future competition, 
both because of the direct effects where networks overlap and 
because of the negative signals given to actual or prospective 
competitors. 109 
Other cases may, however, have a neutral or beneflcial effect. The regulation of 
mergers must therefore have a proper regard 
for their practical effects and in 
106 CAP 623. para. 234. 
107 ibid.. para. 235. 
108 Expandilig HoriZOns (1994). p. 22- 
109 CAP 623. para. 325. 
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accordance with the interests of users. It is the lack of prioritising the latter as a 
primary concern which will, if it has not already. marked difference from the 
regulatory policy pursued by the CiVN. 
Evaluation of The Liberalisation Programme 
The liberalisation programme for Community air transport began over a decade 
ago, and despite the abolition of the right of Member States to regulate 
domestic and cabotage services in April 1997, there has been no seismic 
changes which were anticipated by some. This was the thrust of the 
Commission's evaluation, Impact of the 7hird Package qf Liberah. -ahotj 
jVfeasures, which was published in 1996.110 Indeed, the explosion which took 
place in the US following its deregulation, in the form of new entrants, did not 
happen in the European market. On the contrary, the gro%Nih of new entrants, 
particularly low-cost carriers, has been gradual; some of course have 
disappeared as a result of the intensity of competition such as World Airlines 
which operated the London(City)-Amsterdam service. The growth of these new 
carriers has also led to an increase in the number of routes served. 
The telling story is revealed by the evaluation on the changes to the fare 
structures as a result of the liberalisation measures; changes in fares are 
generally accepted as the most effective measure of competition. First of all, the 
Commission found that 94% of all Community routes were operated on a 
monopoly or duopoly basis, while only 6% of the routes had three or more 
carriers. On further analysis, fares on the monopoly and duopoly routes had in 
fact risen, while those operated by at least three carriers had fallen. The 
Commission found that the liberalisation programme had not brought about a 
dramatic reduction in fares. Apart from promotional fares on which competition 
has been the fiercest, but which are usually accompanied by numerous 
restrictions, other fare categories have risen in particular the premium fares for 
first and business class. Although the Commission offered no conclusive 
evidence for these developments, it is clear from its report that infrastructural 
limitations were the most formidable barrier for new entrants or established 
carriers to compete with the incumbents. 
Conclusions 
The effect of Community law on the UK since its accession in 1972 has 
unquestionably been significant in many respects. The changes necessitated or 
brought about by the "incoming tide" of Community legislation to bring about 
"an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" have been far-reaching. 
progress in the air transport sector, while largely unaddressed by the Treaty, has 
taken on a new dimension since the first set of liberalisation measures were 
adopted in 1987. This chapter has charted the principal effects of Community 
policy and legislation on the way in which air transport has been regulated under 
Ito COM(96) 514. 
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the auspices of the Ckk While some of the changes ha%e in one sense 
represented a catalyst for a review ofthe regulatory policy pursued by tile CAA. 
others, however, have raised difficult questions The regulatory policy of the 
CAA is not set in stone; nor should it be Policy review. and the subsequent 
change, cannot. therefore, be seen as a bad thing in itself This. as has been 
noted, is the view of the CAA in respect of its competitive multi-airline policy 
to further the interests of users. It has stated in numerous decisions that it 
remains open to persuasion that the competitive multi-airline policy is no longer 
an appropriate means for the attainment of the statutory objective, but until 
such time, it will continue to adopt the view that the interests of users would be 
best served by a number of efficient and profitable airlines competing to provide 
services, Although the liberalisation measures adopted under the third packigi: 
have, for instance, required a technical re-classification of the licences granted 
by the CAA, the more difficult issue, it must seem, lies with the re-oricntation of 
the regulatory policy of the CAA which has been founded on competition and 
user interests. 
The loss of discretion and the consequential demise of hearings for granting 
operating and certain Route licences is of less concern to the CAA than the 
removal of its jurisdiction over anti-competitive practices in a number of 
respects. In particular, the system of public hearings for licensing has largely 
been altered by the policies of the CAA and their application. Its fears arc 
specifically related to the manner in which anti-competitive practices by airlines 
are policed. I-1itherto, the CAA has invoked its regulatory powers (in co- 
operation with the OFT) to determine allegations of anti-competitive behaviour, 
and if so found, to condition the licence held by the airline operator. It views 
the system of hearings for such cases as a highly important and useful way in 
which the truth can be ascertained. Clearly though, Community air transport 
policy has heralded a new era for the skies of Europe in no uncertain terms. 
Few can doubt that; neither does the CAA. The issue is not so much about the 
distribution of powers but the proper regulation air transport competition. 
Success of the policy, therefore, depends quint essentially on a stricter 
enforcement of antitrust laws and regulations than has been the case in the 
aftermath of the deregulation in the US. The value of the lesson from the US, 
while cannot be overrated, is considerable in this regard towards policy 
development in the Community. This is the substance of the theory of regulated 
competition. Where liberalisation takes place, the regulatory emphasis %vill shift 
from econon* regulation to antitrust regulation. But this presumes that the 
conditions of sustainable competition have been attained, that is the relevant 
market may be described as contestable. 
As much as economic regulation requires a certain degree of match between 
means and ends, effective antitrust enforcement depends on a clearly defined set 
of policV objectives to be achieved. In certain instances, that presumes the 
prioritisation of objectives a priori, not least in respect of an industry heavily 
regulated and sheltered from competition in the past. The policy of the 
Community as expressed in the Communications of the Commission sets out the 
interests of the airlines and the users, among other things, as of equal concern. 
it should be clear that from this chapter that competition as an aim of 
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liberalisation cannot be achieved so long as airline interests are paramount Ind 
preferred over user interests, This argument begins on a vcry bimple prenlisc 
airlines exist for users, and not vice ivr. va. Airlincs are service. and almost 
always profit-making, organisations %Nhich existence must depend on the 
demand emanating from users. Users, on the other hand, do not exist for the 
airlines. Dependence on air transport services is no more than a manifestation 
of advancement in technology, their absence would simply drive users to other 
slower forms of travelling. The logic of the argument suggests that airlines must 
accordingly respond to user-demand. Failure to do so is inimical of not only the 
ability to meet satisfactorily the interests of its users, but also of operational and 
structural efficiency which ordinarily cannot be supported. The demise of Pan 
Am in the wake of deregulation in the US is highly instructive in this regard, 
Community air transport policy must consequently be re-written to prioritisc 
user interests as the prime concem. Painful though the exercise may suggest, as 
inefficient airlines will inevitably be dfiven to oblivion if they fail to re-organise, 
the argument does not, however, seek to neglect the interests of airlines nor 
others. These are no more than a function of user interests. Be that as it may, 
regulatory policies must, in some cases, have due regard to the interests of 
airlines in order to ensure that the substantial interests of users are met. It may 
be that opportunities may have to be given to smaller airlines to operate 
competing services at the expense of larger airlines with more extensive 
network so as to provide users with a choice of products whether in the form of 
more attractive schedule or in-flight service. By no means, however, should 
such a measure of preference be an immutable part of the regulatory policy 
since that would amount to disregarding the interests of larger airlines. Where 
such smaHer airlines have no prospect of meeting the interests of the users, logic 
of the policy must dictate that they should not be licensed to operate. Of 
course, the provision of competing services implies a broad policy based on 
active competition. Competition though, is no more than a regulatory 
instrument for attaining the end objective. If conditions were such that a non- 
active competition approach was on balance appropriate to secure the interests 
of users, the change would only be in the means, not the end. 
In the final analysis, therefore, competition is a means for procuring a maximum 
overlap between the interests of airlines and users; this has been described as the 
level of critical market contestability and represents the next best thing to 
perfect competition. This is because the catalogue of limitations in the air 
transport sector means that perfect competition is never possible. And it is only 
when the conditions of sustainable competition has been maxirnised, that 
economic regulatory controls can be liberalised. This is by no means the case 
with the liberalisation of Community air transport. Even if this was true, it is not 
entirely clear that the shift towards antitrust regulation has resulted in a strict 
application of the antitrust rules. As this thesis has argued, the absence of an 
austere framework of antitrust regulation runs the risk of destro)ing the 
conditions of sustainable competition and the aims of liberalisation. The 
experience of the US in the years after the deregulation of the sector offers an 
invaluable test to this claim. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT A COMPARATIVE I)ERSI"E('I'I*v'l. ',: 
DEREGULATION IN THE U. S. 
Ue thought an airplane was nothing but it marizinal Cost vvith ivings 
(A lfred Kahn) 
It should be no radical claim by now to state that a policy of complete 
deregulation often makes a strange bedfellow in air transport, This assumption 
is simply premised on the long-standing practice of heavy regulation id air 
transport. Ifistory has shown that domestic air transport has traditionally bccn'a 
protected sector of the economy. This practice has been reinforced by the 
territorial principle embedded in the International Civil Aviation Convention 
1944, which also lays down the foundation for protectionist practices in the 
case of international air transport. In spite of that, more recent years have seen 
the emergence of air transport deregulation, whether complete or partial, in a 
number of countries other than the US and the UK including Canada, Australia, 
Mexico and India. Deregulation of international air transport, that is the 
elimination of bilateral restrictions, is equally, albeit gradually, notable. The 
Netherlands, Singapore and New Zealand are examples of countries which have 
consistently sought to liberalise international air transport from the restrictions 
prescribed in bilateral agreements. No doubt, there will remain a substantial 
number of countries which are likely to be hostile to the notion of liberalising 
international air transport. Much must depend on the underlying political, 
economic and social assumptions of each country as to which policy means is 
most appropriate for attaining a set of stated objectives. 
A comparative evaluation of air transport deregulation in the US will provide a 
useful basis for considering the regulatory approach in British air transport and 
the liberalisation programme in Community air transport. No doubt, there %Vill 
be material differences in the market structures so that any proper comparison 
must take these into account. The aims of this chapter . Vill take the shape of a 
historical analysis to chart the developments in the period before the US airline 
industry was deregulated, and more importantly, those which eventually fon-ned 
the basis for the reform package. The most significant contribution of the 
lessons of airline deregulation in the US to the contentions of this thesis will 
clearly be the effects of the deregulatory policy and the corresponding responses 
(or the lack of) to deal with the unintended consequences of the reform 
initiative. These issues should provide a basis for drawing several conclusions, 
in particular whether the contention of this thesis that airline deregulation must 
be preceded by the conditions of sustainable competition, and accompanied by 
an effective antitrust framework can be supported. 
it should be clear that the structure of the US airline industry is not similar to 
that of the UK, not least because public ownership of airlines is a concept alien 
to the system of economic organisation in the US, whether a similar claim can 
be made of the structure of Community air transport is an arguable issue, 
though the history of Community air transport is also steeped in the public 
o%vnership tradition. In any event, it is already beyond doubt that Community air 
transport has been substantially liberalised and the lesson remaining from tile US 
is whether a liberalisation policy demands at the same time an strict framework 
of antitrust regulation. 
Pioneers of Air Transport Deregulation 
The advent of air transport deregulation in the US in 1978 signified a very 
significant development not only in respect of the political assumptions and. the 
New Right theory then prevailing, but also of the history of air transport 
regulation since the days of the New Deal instituted by Franklin Roosevelt. 
rviore interestingly, however, the system of air transport regulation was the first 
regulatory arrangement to be dismantled by the Ford Administration, although 
much of that was a matter of accident rather than a systematic policy choice. A 
formal system of air transport regulation in the US was first introduced in 1938 
when the Civil Aeronautics Act was enacted. This took the form of the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority. The establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 
later re-narned the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940, ' was part of the 
wider programme of reform of the 1930s for econornic revival. Accordingly, 
the objectives of the air transport regulatory system were shaped by the national 
objectives that reflected the broader concerns with the state of the economy. It 
was therefore no surprise that the objectives pointed in the direction of 
protection rather than free-market competition. 
The New Deal and Air Transport Regulation 
It was clear from the language of the governing statute that, in performing its 
regulatory functions, the CAB was required to have primary regard to the 
interests of an infant 
i 
airline industry. In essence, it provided that the CAB was 
to have regard to the following matters as in accordance with the public 
interest, as well as the public convenience and necessity: 
0 encouragement and development of the air transport system; 
0 recognise and preserve the 
inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree 
safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, air transport, and to 
improve relations between and co-ordinate air transport by carriers; 
promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at 
fair and reasonable charges; 
assure the sound development of air transport through competition to the 
extent necessary. 2 
The legacy of excessive competition, which not only broke the confidence of 
the public but which also destroyed an air transport structure and profitability, 
brought forth a host of questions on the appropriateness of leaving the air 
transport industry to the forces of the market place. In particular, a number of 
When President Roosevelt reorganiscd the regulatory functions under the 1938 Act: 
Reorganization Plan No. 4 (1940). 
2 S. 102, Federal Aviation Act 1958. The Civil Aeronautics Act 193S %ýas replaced by 
the 1958 Act. 
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developments relating to the carriage of mail by air testified to the destructive 
character of an unregulated regime. For instance, in 1935 tile Interstate 
Commerce Commission was authorised to raise the rates paid to air mail 
carriers if the latter were earning less than a reasonable rate of return under the 
mail contracts It was obvious that this system provided very few incentives for 
the carriers to achieve lower costs since any shortfall in profit will be met by 
public subsidy. Bids for these mail contracts tended naturally to be below cost 
with the erstwhile hope of receiving the subsidy. Absurdity reigned a number or 
years later when the bid of Braniff Airways at $0.000002 per aircraft-mile for 
carriage between Houston and San Antonio in Texas was out-priccd by Eastern 
Airline at $0.000 per aircraft-mile. 3 Reform was therefore wanting, and. the 
New Deal programme provided the opportunity for doing so. In addition, of 
course, the enactment of the legislation in 1938 offered the Roosevelt 
Administration the occasion to consolidate the functions of air transport 
regulation which had prior to that time been divided amongst a variety of 
institutions, namely the Post Office (mail contracts), the Bureau of Air 
Commerce (safety and technical) and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(rates). ' Divorced from the economic reality of the time in which reform was 
only a question of when, the external influence on the legislative proceedings of 
the 1938 Act had a direct bearing on the end product. In particular, the airlines 
ensured that they flexed their congressional sponsorship muscles and in the 
process ensured that, 
there was little that airlines wanted to have in the new legislation 
but did not get. Few interest groups have ever been as overtly 
and uncontestably pre-eminent in legislative proceedings as the 
airline industry was during the congressional deliberations that 
led to passage of the act. ' 
The main ffinctions of the CAB were route or entry licensing and fare 
regulation. Its jurisdiction, however, was limited to inter-State air transport and 
could not therefore regulate entry or rates of carriers providing solely intra- 
State services. On route control, the CAB was required to decide applications 
and to certify a carrier, 
if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform 
such transportation properly. -and that such transportation is 
required by the public convenience and necessity, otherwise such 
application shall be denied. " 
it was the requirement of "public convenience and necessity" under the Act 
which provided the CAB with a considerable scope of interpretation when it 
came to determining whether an application was in accordance with the public 
interest. This discretion provided the leverage for the pursuit of either a 
competitive or anti-competitive policy. More significantly, it provided a virtual 
carte blanche to the CAB to shape the destiny of the US air transport system. 
3 See C. Puffer.. 4ir Transportation (Blakiston Co., Philadelpl-da: 1941). pp. 245-246. 
4 S. Morrison. "US Domestic Aviation" in K. Button and D. Swann (eds. ). 771e. 4ge of 
Regulatojy Refonn (Clarendon, Oxford: 1989). p. 142, 
5 B. Behrman, "Chil Aeronautics Board" in J. Q. Wilson (ed. ). 77le Politics of 
Rqgulation (Basic Books. New York: 1980), p. 84. 
6 S. 401(d)(1), Federal Aviation Act 1958. 
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As the CAB members were political appointees, namely by the President. the 
ways in which the width of the CAB remit could be interpreted depended to a 
very large extent on the temperament of members of the CAB As shall be seen 
in due course, the chairmen in particular played a vital role in shaping tile 
direction of CAB regulatory policies between restrictive, anti-collipetitive 
policies and lais. w---fah-e, free market competition policies. 
In respect of fare regulation, the CAB was required to have regard to the 
following substantive guidelines when deciding whether to approve a proposcd 
fare: 
" the effect of the fares upon the movement of traffic; 
" the need for adequate and efficient transport in the public interest at the 
lowest cost consistent with the provision of the service; 
" standards in relation to the character and quality of service to be provided, 
" the inherent advantages of air transportation; 
" the need of each carrier to earn sufficient revenue, under honest, economical 
and efficient management, to provide adequate and efficient services! 
Likewise, these considerations enabled the CAB to design its regulatory policies 
either on a competitive or anti-competitive foundation, for example, by 
declaring that a proposed fare was unreasonably low that it would divert traffic 
away from an incumbent so that the latter would not be able to earn a sufficient 
return to provide regular and continuous service. In the early years of the new 
regulatory system, and virtually throughout the four decades which followed, 
the CAB opted to pursue the narrower and anti-competitive dimension of its 
legislative mandate. 
CAB Regulatory Policies 
Any analysis of the CAB's early regulatory policies must be seen in the proper 
light of its legislative mandate; so must its criticisms. It is, however, no secret 
that the CAB pursued a highly anti-competitive policy during its life time. The 
most pronounced and one which attracted the severest of criticisms was its 
"route moratorium" policy in 1969. This policy, adn-dnistered under the 
chairmanship of Secor Browne, entailed the disapproval of almost every route 
application and this was achieved by avoiding the system of hearings required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 so that after a period of time the 
CAB was able to claim the application as "stale". An oft-cited case is the 
application of World Airways submitted in 1967 (prior to the official 
moratorium Policy) to operate between the east and west coasts with one-way 
fares of between $75 and $79, this was less than half of the lowest available 
fare. The CAB effectively ignored the application and when it came to consider 
the case in 1973, it declared the application as stale! 
By no means, however, was this case the exception, CAB policies and 
decisions on licensing applications throughout its history had been punctuated 
by refusals where exceptions would only be made in highly exceptional cases. 
Indeed, between 1938 and 1974 after which policies became more competitive, 
7 S. 1002(c), Federal Aviation Act 1958. 
8 CAB Order 73-11-101 (1973). 
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the CAB refused to certify any of the 94 applications from intending-carriers to 
operate domestic services between major city-pairs, " One commentator 
described the crystallisation of this policy as an "unchallenged way of life in the 
agency. "" In all, the protectionist policy and practice gave the air carners. 
particularly incumbents which were certified at the inception of the CAB, a 
large measure of insulation from competition. The justification of the CAB was 
simply grounded in the cross-subsidisation argument that a carrier needed to 
make a sufficient return to ensure the adequacy and regularity of other less 
profitable services so as to promote the development of the air transport 
services network. Unless therefore an applicant could demonstrate that the 
application would not constitute a significant or substantial competition aglinst 
existing carriers, the CAB was not disposed to depart from its established 
precedent. This was evident in its decision concerning an application by four 
carriers to operate the east-west coast service at fares which were substantially 
lower than those offered by the incumbents. The case centred on two crucial 
sets of considerations between, on the one hand, the need to ensure lowest 
possible public subsidy and continuity of services on un-profitable "thin routes", 
and on the other hand, the need of the public to have access to a choice of fare 
products. In the end, the CAB tilted its decision in favour of the former arguing 
simply that the proposed services would constitute substantial competition 
against the incumbents which depended on their profits from "thick routes" to 
subsidise the costs of providing services on less dense routes; lest they called 
upon the government for more subsidy. " 
In many ways the decision in this case characterised the restrictive foundation of 
its policies not only in respect of routes, but also of its philosophy towards 
rates. Clearly, the issue of rates or fares is not one which can be neatly 
separated from the question of entry since the latter must presuppose the need 
for remuneration. Inevitably, therefore, decisions of the CAB often provided a 
double-whammy for air transport competition. Since price is arguably the most 
effective form of competition, a policy of non-price competition provided very 
little incentive for the airlines, particularly incumbents, to offer lower fares by 
achieving greater efficiency and productivity. Users, therefore, had very little to 
gain. The combination of the lack of route competition and consequently price 
competition was perhaps the single most influential factor in the fight for 
deregulation in later years. By a supreme irony, and since the jurisdiction of the 
CAB was restricted to inter-State travel, intra-State services which were largely 
un-regulated provided evidence of low fares and high traffic density from 
competing services. Two of the most important States were Texas and 
California which are considered further below. These were significant to the 
eventual demise of the CAB particularly when they begged the question of 
whether CAB regulation was merely serving the interests of the airlines instead C 
of the users. Such was the basis of the regulatory capture criticism levelled at 
the CAB. 
9 Senate Subconunittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. Hearings on Ovil 
.4 eronautics 
Board Practices and Procedures. 94th Cong.. I st sess. 1975. App: ndix 
p. 334. 
10 Behrman. op. cit., P. 90. 
11 Transcontinental Coach-Tvpe Service Case [1951] 14 CAB Rcports 720. 
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Although its policies leaned towards the anti-competitive, the CAB did. 
however, make exceptions to the general rule. For example. it t, , ranted 
temporary certificates to provide subsidised services to small communities 
which had previously not been served, " and certificates to supplemental carriers 
or charter carriers which did not pose a significant threat to the incumbents " 
Dawn of A New Era 
The restrictive interpretation by the CAB of its statutory remit did , not, however, go un-noticed. Criticisms were rife. Economists, in particular, did 
not believe that regulation was in the interest of efficiency and began to develop 
a case against CAB regulation. " Their arguments provided an important basis 
for the ensuing political debate on airline deregulation. Although the case was 
initially lacking in empirical evidence, this was quickly overcome when it 
gradually emerged that passengers travelling on intra-State services were 
offered lower fares for comparable distances on inter-State routes which the 
CAB regulated. This enabled the economists to build their arguments on the 
significance of price competition which on CAB-regulated routes was . irtually 
absent, And price competition was only possible if entry was open; so the 
argument went. The deregulation of the airline industry was, therefore, not the 
result of a particular cause; indeed, it resulted from the combination of a number 
of factors which, by the stroke of luck, happened almost simultaneously. 
A Fortuitous Co-Incidence 
A central tenet of the arguments put forward by the economists was the 
stultifying effect of CAB restrictions on route and price competition. In doing 
so, the regulatory agency had become the guardian of the interests of the 
airlines at the expense of user interests, and therefore its policies and decisions 
were often captured by those which the agency had been designed to regulate. " 
The most evident empirical support came from the experience of intra-State air 
transport competition, particularly in Texas and California. i luch of these 
economic arguments coincided with the change in 1974 of the Presidency and 
the decision of Senator Edward Kennedy, as chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to 
examine the CAB. 
12 G. Eads. The Local Service Airline Experiment (Brookinwas Institution. Washington 
DC: 1972), pp. 97-104. 
13 J. H. Frederick- Connnercial Air Transportation (Richard Invin. Illinois: 5th edn.. 
196 1). pp. 187-19 1. 
14 See R. Caves. Air Transport and Its Rqzulators (Harvard University Press, Mass,: 
1962y L. S. Keyes, Federal Control of Entýv into Air Transportation (Harvard 
- M. Levine. "Is Regulation Necessar% .? Californian Air University Press. Mass.: 195 1). 
Transportation and National Regulatory Pol icy" [ 1964] 74 YLJ 14 16, 
15 See e. g.. M. Bernstein. Regulating Business 
i. 
v Independent Commission (Princcton 
University Press, Princeton: 1951) and J. Stiglcr. "The Theory of Economic 
Regulation" (1971) 2 Bell J Econ. and. 1 ýzt. 56.3. 0 
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I-Witical Debate 
The political force behind the deregulation debate and movement was two. rJ I od 
President Ford had campaigned on the promise that he would reduce the rate of 
inflation (then running at an annual rate of 1,21116)" and, if equipped with that 
mandate, would seek to identify the tasks which would achieve this goal Chief 
among these was to reduce the burden imposed on business entcrpriscs and 
activities by dismantling regulatory programmes. As Behrman noted. i Partly due to the lack of attractive policy options for righting 
inflation and partly due to the high compatibility between the 
idea of trimming government regulation and Ford's conservative 
dislike of big government, in early October, Ford designated 
regulatory reform as a major element in his anti-inflation 
program. " 
At the time the programme of regulatory reform was conceived, proceedings 
elsewhere were taking place in relation to the CAB, and if nothing else, they 
provided a basis for the Ford Administration to pick on the CAB. 
Senator Kennedy had decided in June of 1974 that the Senate Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure would conduct hearings on the CAB, 
The question then became one of what constituted a suitable topic for inquiry, 
To facilitate this task and to have someone who could direct the proceedings, 
he appointed Stephen Breyer as the new general counsel of the Subcommittee. 
There is, however, no conclusive evidence to suggest any Particular policy or 
rational reason for Kennedy to single out the CAB for exarnination. One 
commentator observed that Kennedy was "more concerned about achieving 
legislative success than getting short-term publicity, "" Perhaps it was also 
important that the CAB was the only agency at that time to have a 
comprehensive record of its regulatory activities including statistical data on 
passengers and the details of their journeys. " Any inquiry into its activities 
would therefore be greatly enhanced by the ready availability of such 
information. 
The CAB inquiry by Kennedy's Subcommittee was unique in more than one 
respect given the eventual outcome of the hearings was the abolition of the 
CAB and a deregulation of the industry. First, it did not have direct jurisdiction 
over the regulatory reform of aviation. By a supreme stroke of good fortune, 
the Kennedy Report and efforts were taken up by the Subcommittee on 
Aviation of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee 
which had the jurisdiction to introduce regulatory reform. The Subcommittee 
was chaired by Senator Howard Cannon who was initially opposed to the 
deregulation of the industry, but became increasingly convinced of its merits of 
over time. The most significant influence came from the testimony of John 
Robson (CAB chairman 1975-1977) who announced that the CAB had 
conducted its own study" and was recommending the reduction of its 
16 "-I-hc Coming of the Tax Revolt" (1978) Public Opinion 30. 
17 op. cit., p. 103. 
Is Behrman. op. cit., p. 100. 
19 Gary Edles formerly of the CAB. interview Nxith the author. 9 June 1994, 
20 Report of CA B Special Stalff on RegtdatoýV Refonn (1975). 
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regulatory poivers to foster increased competition 2' Without any shadow or 
doubt, this represented a profound reversal in CAB regulatory practice and 
shocked all parties concerned. Senator Cannon himself was seemingly taken 
aback to the extent that he was persuaded to embrace the idea of regulatory 
reform and airline competition. The combination of support from Kennedy. 
Cannon and the Ford Administration in endorsing regulatory reform of aviation, 
albeit that they disagreed on the merits of the arguments. was a crucial 
contribution to the eventual freeing of the industry from the regulatory 
constraints imposed under the 1938 Act and CAB policies. 
( ase-Sludies 
None of these efforts, however, would have gone any further if they hadnot 
had the benefit of the empirical confirmation stemming from the results of un. 
regulated intra-State air transport. It was generally agreed before and during 
the hearings that un-regulated intra-State airlines were able to offer fares which 
were considerably lower for comparable distances flown by CAB-regulatcd 
airlines. The most outstanding example was the case of SouthWest Airlines 
(SouthWest) in Texas and, Pacific SouthWest Airlines (PSA) and Air California 
in California. The former, which has been the success story of US deregulation, 
although it existed prior to 1978, provided an instrumental exemplification to 
the advocates of deregulation. In 1975, its one-way fares on the Dallas. 
Houston route were $25.00 and $15.00 respectively. By comparison, CAB- 
regulated carriers charged $32.00 for the same route. " Beyond Texas, CAB- 
regulated carriers charged an average of $29.00 for a comparable distance of 
239 miles (e. g. Los Angeles-Las Vegas). ' Much the same was true with PSA 
where in 1976 a one-way flight of 350 miles between Los Angeles and San 
Francisco cost $11.43 while a comparable Boston-Washington flight (399 
miles) by CAB-regulated carriers cost $24.65. " The difference in fare per mile 
was 3.27 cents for the former and 6.03 cents for the latter -a 45% differential. 
Much of the difference between CAB-regulated and intra-State services was 
attributed to the restrictive policies of the CAB on entry and fares competition. 
The artificiality of the results obtained from such policies - imposed protection - 
meant that there was little in the way of incentive for airlines to reduce costs. 
This protection contributed significantly to the low-load of passengers carried" 
since the inflexibility of the route structure and expensive fares were not 
sufficiently attractive to entice users of other transport modes to transfer to 
flying. By imposing such regulatory constraints, a fundamental character of the 
industry had been missed. Evidence from deregulation suggests that the 
industry is capable of sustaining different carriers which would have a variety of 
management philosophies and practices. Some adopted a niche market 
21 Hearings on Regulatoýv Reform in. 4ir Transportation. 94th Cong.. 2nd Sm. 1976. 
pp. 348 etseq. 
22 Simat. Helliesen and Eichncr Inc.. -In . 4na4VSis of the IntraState fir Carrier 
Regulato, ýv Forum (1976). vol. 1. Appendix I- 
23 Senate Subcommittee on Achninistrative Practice and Procedure. Rearinjqs on Civil 
.4 eronautics 
Board Practices and Procechires, 94th Cong.. I st sess. 1973. p. 4 1. 
24 See UN-ine. op. cit. - p. 1433. 
25 S imat et. al.. vol. 2. pt. V, p. 14. 
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approach. while others had an expansionist attitude, still, some others provided 
a low-cost service while others solely a premium serNice of first or business 
class travel. " Bureaucratic rate regulation which impede management 
initiatives by destroying the incentives to develop philosophies and practices 
aimed at meeting the interests of users breeds inefliciency and overlooks the 
ultimate interests to be served in a service-based industry. Hence, tile argument 
of the deregulation advocates that the airline regulatory regime had failed to 
achieve its intended purpose. '7 
Role of the Courts 
In 1932, Mr Justice Brandeis delivered a strong dissenting judgment in Aress, 
State Ice v Liebman which affirmed the necessity of public economic regulation 
when the relevant circumstances demanded it. 
The need for some remedy for the evil of destructive 
competition, where competition existed [and] where competition 
did not exist, the propriety of public regulation had been 
proven. " 
Although in minority, his opinion characterised the perception then that 
excessive and unregulated competition was economically and socially 
destructive. It was also the time when government regulation to remedy the ills 
of free-for-all competition was a popular idea. That subsequently led to the 
New Deal and the proliferation of government regulatory agencies that would 
"save capitalism from itself'. ' The protective policy of the CAB was thercforc 
not without political and economic justification. Indeed, its anti-competitive 
policy framework was given greater credence with two subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions which effect was to enlarge the procedural discretion of the 
CAB in the application of its policies. In State Airlines v CAB, the Supreme 
Court by a majority handed down a liberal decision in favour of CAB's unusual 
procedures which Reed and Frankfurter JJ. in a dissenting judgment described 
as "administrative absolutism". 
" The case concerned a complaint by State 
Airlines that, in an "area proceeding" where routes were consolidated, the CAB 
had acted unlawfully by awarding to Piedmont Aviation those routes which the 
latter had not in effect applied for. All Piedmont did was to submit a broadly- 
based application without specifying a particular route, leaving the CAB to 
award Piedmont any route which the CAB thought was required by public 
convenience and necessity. A corollary of this approach, according to State 
Airlines, was the manner in which the CAB had come to its decision by failing 
to comply with the notice-and-comment requirements so that State Airlines and 
others might be able to produce evidence that suggested Piedmont was not a fit 
26 Air One, for instance, catered only for business passengers by operating first class 
cabins. 
27 For example. see E, Bailey. D. Graham and D. Kaplan. DerejZulating the Airlines 
(MIT Press, Mass.: 1985). A. Kahn. "Deregulation and Vested Interests: The Case of 
Airlines" in R. Noll and B. Owen (eds. ). The Political Econoln. v of Dereýlzulation: 
Interest Groups in the Rqzulatoýv Process (American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC: 1983). Levine. op. cit. 
28 285 US 262 [19321. at p. 300. 
29 Breyer and Stewart. op. cit., p. 2 1. 
30 338 US 572 [19501. 
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and able carrier, In rejecting the application, the majority stated that judicial 
intervention would be contrary to the intention of Congress which was to leave 
the CAB "free to work out application procedures reasonably adapted to fair 
and orderly administration of its complex responsibilities. "" In a more ironic 
case in which the Supreme Court in fact decided against the CAB, the decision 
nevertheless fostered the CAB's pursuit of protectionist policies " In a contest 
for routes, Delta was eventually awarded a certificate to operate a number or 
routes. Although objections were raised against the breadth of the certificate, a 
final decision on the objections was not issued until after the certificate had 
taken effect. The effect of the final order was to ban Delta from several routes 
which Delta claimed was procedurally improper given that the imposition of the 
restrictions after the certificate had come into force was made without fbirrial 
notice and hearing. The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the 
contention although without prejudice to the authority of the CAB to alter 
certificates. However, in the circumstances of the case, the Court reasoned 
that, 
to the extent there are uncertainties over the Board's power to 
alter effective certificates, there is an identifiable congressional 
intent that these uncertainties be resolved in favor of the 
certificated carrier and that the specific instructions set out in the 
statute should not be modified by resort to such generalities as 
'administrative flexibility' and 'implied powers. ""' 
Anything to the contrary would be paying less than adequate deference to the 
intention of the legislature. Its reasoning which clearly gave support to the 
protective approach of the CAB, also upheld the regulatory priority given to 
route security so as to provide "assurance to the carrier that its itivestmem in 
operations would be protected". " 
Even so, judicial attitude is never static; so that much as perhaps the role of the 
courts had been deeply significant in shaping the regulatory policies of the 
1930s, no less was the case in the lead up to the first comprehensive 
deregulation of a major national industry. The airline deregulation drive was 
not entirely steered by politicians and economists who together created a fertile 
environment for it to happen almost by chance, A number of important judicial 
decisions were also thrown into the centre of the airline deregulation debate in 
the immediate years prior to the Airline Deregulation Act 1978. The most 
illustrative of these was Moss v CAB in 1970 in which Wright I stated that even 
if the Board was statutorily obliged to afford carriers sufficient revenues, 
that obligation cannot become a carte blanche allowing the 
Board to deal only with the carriers and disregard the other 
factors, such as the traveling public's interest in the lowest 
possible fares and high standards of service, which are also 
enumerated in the Act as rate-making criteria. " 
31 At p, 5 76. 
32 Delta Airlines v C4B 367 US 316 [1961]. 
33 At p. 325. 
34 At p. 323 (original emphasis). 
35 430 F. 2d 891 [19701. at p. 900. 
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This decision arose out of a complaint against the informal and oflen e. r Inirte 
meetings between the CAB and the carriers for the setting of fares in 
particular, United Air Lines (United) and others had submitted a proposal to 
increase fares and whilst the decision was still pending an informal meeting was 
held from which the applicant was excluded. Notwithstanding the latter, the 
CAB decided that the proposed fares were not acceptable and proceeded in the 
same order to indicate that it was prepared to allow a limited increase on the 
basis that the increase was vital to the survival of the carriers. And the increase 
would be permitted if it was based on a model formula set out by the CAB. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the carriers withdrew their original submissions and 
resubmitted proposals in accordance with the formula which almost guarant * 
ecd 
approval, The question that arose for a substantive determination was whether 
the fares were effectively agency-made or carrier-made. Where a fare was to be 
determined by the CAB, the Federal Aviation Act 1958 required that the 
proposal be subject to the proper notice-and-comment procedure; "' but not 
otherwise. Since, however, "the Board's order amounted to the prescription of 
rates" because it exerted the pressure to comply, the Court stated that it cannot 
be procedurally proper to fence out the participation of the public nor limit the 
scope ofjudicial review by claiming that the fares were carrier-made. " 
Although the decision was primarily concerned with the procedural obligations 
of the CAB, the substantive issues of rate-making criteria and hence the policy 
on airline competition were inevitably inseparable. By requiring that the CA13 
took a more open process in rate-making so that its consideration of the 
statutory criteria could be assessed, the Court was also fostering greater airline 
competition where this was possible. If, for instance, the evidence leaned 
toward unjustified fare increases or indeed competing services, then a decision 
otherwise would attract judicial condemnation on the basis of lack of substantial 
evidence, This was the case in Continental Air Lines v CAB. 38 The Court of 
Appeals of District of Columbia held in that case that the findings and 
recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in route proceedings 
in favour of greater competition could only be rebutted if the CAB had 
substantial evidence to do so. The ALJ had, at the conclusion of the 
proceedings, recommended that Western Air Lines and Continental be 
certificated to operate non-stop services in the San Diego-Denver market. The 
CAB rejected the recommendation, but instead certified Western, on the 
combined ground that the ALJ's "forecast may be too optimistic [given] the 
recent lag in nation-wide traffic growth. #09 It argued that the proposed service 
by Western would adequately meet the needs of the market so that a competing 
service would not be "consistent with the goal of 
fostering sound economic 
conditions in air transportation. "' The Court was unconvinced that the CAB's 
approach satisfied its general statutory obligation of 
fostering competition "as a 
means of enhancing the development and 
improvement of air transportation 
36 S. 403(a) and (c). 
37 At p. 897. 
38 519 F. 2d 944 [1975]. 
39 Order 70-4-46 (9 April 1970) at pp. 2 and 4. 
40 Ibid. at p. 4, 
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service on routes generating, sufficient traffic to support competing carriers "" 
It refuted the argument of the CAB by remarking that the presence of an C 
adequate service provided by a monopolistic carrier cannot override the 
desirability of competition contemplated by the statute where sufficient traffic 
existed for that would deprive the public interest of the benefits of competition. 
The same Court a year later delivered another judgment which drove the airlinc 
industry towards greater competition and thus giving more support to the 
advocates of airline deregulation. It said in MorhlAi ra v CAB that th CA rV YS e 13 
had acted ullra vires by preventing World Airways (then a "supplemental 
carrier") from applying for a scheduled certificate. Although s. 401(d) of the 
Federal Aviation Act 1958 prohibited a scheduled carrier from holding a 
supplemental authorisation, no limitation to the contrary existed. Accordingly, 
the Court surmised that if a central objective of the statute in promoting 
regulated competition was to be achieved, then "rigid constraints on the Board's 
ability to consider applications on their merits are generally disfavored. ""' 
Even if these latter decisions were not directly responsible for creating the 
climate of airline deregulation, they nevertheless provided an important impetus 
for the CAB to experiment with more liberal policies than had been pursued in 
the past. The most prominent member of the CAB who spearheaded this move 
was its own chairman, Alfred Kahn. Without fear of the legal consequences for 
departing from CAB precedent, "the Kahn-led CAB set out to test thoroughly 
the deregulatory limits of the existing law. "' This contrasted significantly with 
the caution demonstrated by his predecessor, John Robson, who was less 
prepared to depart from precedent. Nonetheless, the CAB under Robson's 
leadership pursued a pro-competitive line by approving a new fare proposed by 
Texas International Airline which undercut existing fares on several routes by 
50%. " Further approval of price competition was also evident in its decision to 
allow American Airlines (American), United and TransWorld Airlines (TWA) to 
41 offer up to 50% discounts on flights between New York and California. When 
Kahn took over the chairmanship of the CAB, he decided that there was no 
turning back for the CAB in its competition policies which subsequently led to a 
new 'multiple permissive entry" policy that would enable any fit, willing and 
able carrier to enter or exit ftom certain routes. 
' Oblivious to the stare of 
precedent and the threat of due process violation, Kahn proceeded further to 
administratively deregulate the industry. The success with price competition 
also led the CAB to adopt a policy that gave general approval to any carrier 
seeking to reduce fares by up to 50% of the standard 
fare . 
4' The momentum for 
deregulation, inevitably, had to gather. And the final destination was the 
enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act 1978 (ADA). I 
41 519 F. 2d 944 [19751. at p. 946. 
42 547 F. 2d 695 [19761. at p. 698. 
43 Behrman. op. cit., p. 116. 
44 CAB Order 77-2-133 (25 February 1977). 
45 CA13 Order 77-3-80 (15 March 1977). 
46 See Oakland ýemice. CAB Order 78-4-121 (19 April 1978) and Chiclýgo-. Ifithsvzy 
Low Fare Case. CAB Order 78-7-40 (12 Julv 1978). 
47 43 FecleralRegister 16503-16512 (19 April 1978). 
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End Product 
In more than one way, the ADA produced hardly any over-night, dramatic 
events. It was by then a well-established policy of the CAB that it preferred 
competitive solutions to regulatory interventions and as such rendered the 
statute no more than a statutory confirmation. The two substantivc effects of 
the 1978 enactment took the form of a change in the declared policy for the 
residual regulation of the industry and a path to the "sunsetting" of tile CAB 
Moving away from the broad brush mandate of fostering sound economic 
conditions in air transportation, the new s. 102(a) specifically required, 
(4) The placement of maximum reliance on competitive market 
forces and on actual and potential competition (A) to provide the 
needed air transportation system, and (13) to encourage efficient 
and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract 
capital .... (9) to provide efficiency, innovation, and low prices, 
and to determine the variety, quality, and price of air 
transportation services. 
In addition, the new provisions required the CAB, in its remaining functions, to 
encourage entry by new carriers as well as market expansion by existing 
carriers. 
A regulatory framework which required a maximurn placement on competitive 
solutions essentially meant that regulatory interventions by the CAB would be 
minimal, and that was the aim of the new policy. By the same token, mandatory 
reduction of regulatory intervention impliedly meant a lesser degree of 
protection for the regulated. Whereas carriers could previously rely on the 
sympathy of the CAB to ensure that their market shares were not eroded, any 
form of protection under the new policy would be possible only if the carriers 
improved and perpetuated their efficiency. Such efficiency, as the new policy 
envisaged, would only be possible if the idea of competitive solutions was also 
accompanied by a policy declaration that promoted the provision of competing 
services. As the new policy moved towards a pro-competitive approach, so too 
must the regulatory criteria applied by the CAB in issuing air transportation 
certificates. Prior to the passing of the ADtN, the CAB was permitted to certify 
a carrier only if it was fit, willing and able and that the service was "required by 
the public convenience and necessity". The latter mandate was necessarily 
narrow and prevented liberal, competitive interpretations. The new s. 401(d)(1) 
required no more than the service having to be "consistent with the public 
convenience and necessity". Effectively, the licensing criteria was confined to 
requirement of a fit, willing and able carrier. 
For all that has been said about the duties of the CAB, they were merely 
temporary arrangements until the abolition of the CAB in 1985, In the lead up 
to that, the functions were either phased out gradually or transfeffed to the 
Department of Transportation or the Department of Justice. In particular, the 
licensing criteria of "consistent with the public convenience and necessity" was 
terminated in 1981. " A saving provision was nevertheless included so that the 
48 S. 160 1, Federal Aviation Act 195 8. 
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CAB had to conduct a comprehensive review of its implementation of tile Act 
and to report and recommend as to "whether the public interest requires 
continuation of the Board and its functions" beyond 1985. " With the benefit of 
history, it is evident now that this option was not exercised although it is 
difficult to avoid the suspicion that the assessment of the public interest would 
have been coloured by the membership of the CAB then. By the time of the 
sunset, almost every member of the CAB, led by Kahn, had been 
overwhelmingly persuaded of the virtues of deregulation so that it was unlikely 
that a conclusion to the contrary would have been reached. Clearly, however, 
its conclusion would have to have substance, and to a very significant extent. 
the immediate effects of deregulation which were largely benefits to 
* 
the 
travelling public had an instrumental role in persuading the discontinuation of 
the CAB. Whether the conclusion on the requirement of the public interest, in 
accordance with the then prevailing and immediate effects of deregulation, was 
a rather short-sighted measure can only be property examined once these 
immediate, and subsequent, effects have been considered in more detail. 
Effects of Deregulation: A Critical Analysis 
Like all new toys, airline deregulation was received with great excitement. 
Although the ADA was very much a statutory confirmation of the policies and 
work of the CAB in the 1970s, the anticipation and the culminating effect of the 
efforts of the deregulation advocates added much force to the coil that was 
already tightly wound up for release. The release brought about an immediate 
explosion in air travel and set the scene for substantial structural changes to the 
industry. 
Initial Proliferation of New Carriers 
The deregulation of entry control promised opportunities for new entrants and 
they were promptly seized upon. The number of new carriers at the onset of 
deregulation increased considerably although collectively they were not part of 
a homogeneous group in terms of the services they provided. Some were 
operating long-haul, inter-continental services, while others operated purely 
domestic services. Still others operated regional or commuter services. Since 
competition between a larger number of carriers potentially meant market 
shares of carriers would be reduced accordingly, airlines were driven to search 
for strategies that would present them with an edge over their competitors. 
Ease of entry per se would not therefore ensure the long-term survival of a new 
entrant since in particular it would be competing with other established carriers 
who had the benefit of scale, network and marketing economies which the new 
entrant did not. 
While the services provided were not homogeneous, neither was the degree of 0 
competition across all the domestic routes. In particular, larger carriers %vith 
larger size aircraft began to abandon routes which were not suited to their 
aircraft, but which they had been required to operate under CAB regulation, 
49 S. 1601(d). Federal Aviation Act 1958. 
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The effect of abandonment was to create more room for smaller and new 
carriers, with more suitable aircraft relative to the density of the market. to 
expand. A study by the CAA into the air services in the New York State 
(essentially, New York City served by JFK, La Guardia and Newark-New 
Jersey) indicated, for example, that American Airlines withdrew from all intra. 
State services by 1982. Other airlines including People Express (Newark. 
Buffalo and Newark- Syracuse) were able to enter and expand their intra-New 
York State markets. " Similarly, markets which could not be developed to their 
advantage were left un-tapped. Reno Air, for instance, began operating a point- 
to-point service between Reno in Nevada and Minneapolis, while the employee. 
owned Kiwi International Airlines seized the opportunity to operate on the New 
York(Newark)-Atlanta and Orlando-San Juan routes. " In these cases, thýerc 
were no established carriers in the same market to stimulate intense competition 
and naturally helped to alleviate the fears of new entrants who did not share the 
sophistication of larger carriers. 
The sudden growth of carriers provided an empirical Support to the theory of 
contestable markets conceived by William Baumol et al which forwards the 
claim that markets served by inefficient providers would precipitate the entry of 
competitors. -" The threat of such entry was therefore sufficient to ensure that 
the incumbent remained efficient and competitive. In the course of the 
Congressional debate, strong evidence was submitted that the airline industry 
was structurally competitive so that administrative regulation of routes and fares 
was an artificial constraint. The competitive structure of the industry was 
premised on the belief that scale economies for a new entrant was either low or 
insignificant so that correspondingly barriers to entry would be low. On the 
basis of this analysis, airline markets were therefore contestable. An incumbent 
or monopoly carrier would be driven to charge fares which are reasonably 
related to the costs of provision, or risk the competition from a new entrant 
willing to undercut the fares. This was very much the underlying claim of the 
airline deregulation advocates. 
Although there is much to commend in the theory, and represents the basis on 
which the model of regulated competition was constructed, 53 the irony of the 
contestable markets theory rests with its ignorance of two fundamental issues. 
The first relates to the distinction between a new entrant seeking to enter the 
airline industry to establish an entirely new service, and an exishiig carrier 
seeking to enter a particular new market or to extend its services in terms of 
frequency. For present purposes, both of course will be seeking to establish 
services in competition with an incumbent. The costs of establishing 
competitive services by an entirely new entrant cannot be regarded as low or 
insignificant by any stretch of the imagination. Fixed costs are likely to be high, 
and these are usually "sunk costs" which are irrecoverable costs in the event of 
50 CAA- Deregulation of air transport: .4 Perspective on the experience ill lite United 
States. CAA Paper 84009 (1984), Table 13. 
51 CAP 623. P. 165. 
52 W. Baumol. I Panzar and R. Willig. Contestable A JhA-ets and the 771coly of Industry 
, structure (Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, New York: IM). 
53 See ch. 2, supra. 
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failure. On the other hand, the costs facing an existing operator seeking to 
enter a new market or to extend an existing service are likely to be marginal at 
worst. In many cases, this may only involve a re-deployment of assets such as 
aircraft utilisation as a result of abandoning another market "' Sunk costs would 
inevitably be lower. 
Secondly, Baumol's theory of contestability does not take into account the 
effects of infrastructural constraints particularly at congested airports (including 
the slot-controlled airports in the US). The evidence in chapter six has already 
shown that these constraints are significant barriers to entry. Even if the analysis 
was limited to a market where no incumbent existed so that the issue of scale 
economies and sunk costs were ignored, a new entrant must be able to gain 
access to the airport and airport facilities at attractive times to secure a 
sustainable share of the market. The degree of difficulty must clearly depend on 
the combination of airports in question. The busier and more concentrated an 
airport, the greater are the limitations of access, and vice versa. A new city-pair 
market which utilises two small or regional airports which are less congested is 
not likely to present difficulties of access which are as acute as a city-pair 
utilising two congested airports. Furthermore, the utility of an airport slot 
depends very much on the ability to match movement at another airport. The 
success of SouthWest is partly attributed to its ability to develop and exploit its 
"mini-hub" at Dallas(Love Field) airport which it now dominates. The 
complication of establishing an entirely new service between two points urith 
less congested airports is, first, the need to have a sufficient threshold demand 
for viable air services to be operated and, secondly, the ability to sustain and 
expand the market share given the likelihood that the population and business 
activities at these airports will be comparatively lower than those surrounding a 
major airport, unless of course it is a secondary airport within a larger city 
conurbation such as Chicago which is served by OHare and Midway airports. 
Thus, while competition may have increased in individual markets, the success 
rate for new entrants has not been as satisfactory as initially envisaged. Indeed, 
an independent study by the CAA into US deregulation concluded that "the 
most notable feature of deregulation has been the failure rate of new entrants. 
The barriers to entry in air transport have proved much higher than had been 
suspected by those who had believed the industry to be contestable. "" These 
believers included those who steered the ADA and who had then remarked that, 
Critics also argue that larger carriers, such as United Airlines and 
TWA, will ... squeeze out smaller competitors 
by virtue of certain 
economies of scale. 77fis claim is simply wrong ... There are few, 
if any, economies of scale of any great importance in the airline 
industry. 56 
54 See e. g., CAA Decision 2/94. 
55 CAP 623. p. 162. 
56 per Senator Howard Cannon, Senate Debate on S. 2493,96th Cong., Ist sess. 1978: 
LegislatiVe HistOýv of the. 4irline DerqgulationAct of 1978, p. 407 (emphasis addcd). 
207 
Indeed, the guru of airline deregulation, Alfred Kahn, admitted tile myopia and 
naivety of advocates of deregulation. He said in a recent testimon%- to the 
Californian Public Utilities Commission that, 
We underestimated the ease of entry on the national level by nem, 
carriers ... We underestimated the 
importance of economics of 
scale and scope. " 
Wisdom of course comes with hindsight. Contrary to the powerful case of tile 
deregulation advocates, air transportation is clearly not an ideal candidate for 
Baumol's version of the theory of contestability nor perfect competition. Be 
that as it may, the number of airlines has increased in relative terms since 1978 
But the fierce competition derived from the abolition of entry control 
disappeared as fast as it came and provided a strong testament to the contention 
that contraction in the number of new entrants would simply lead to a greater 
dominance by the incumbents or the emergence of so-called mega-carriers. 
Inevitably also, freedom of entry would precipitate an increase in frequency 
from carriers who seek to offer maximum opportunities to passengers of the 
choice of flight schedules. An increase in frequency, however, means also an 
increase in capacity on the route in question. If therefore the variation in 
capacity (increase in total aircraft seats) exceeds the variation in passenger 
demand (increase in total passenger volume), then the conclusion must be 
unfilled capacity. Unfilled capacity for any prolonged period will financially 
haemorrhage a carrier. Hence, those carriers which have been able to expand 
and establish a strong competitive force against the larger carriers have 
generally been those with a highly specific strategy. ý' The case of SouthWest is 
instructive of this point. 
SouthWest is a niche carrier which adopts a Policy Of competing in dense 
markets by using a high level of service frequency. For instance, it operates 30 
daily departures in each direction between Dallas and Houston, a case that is 
not likely to be seen in the UK nor the EC. " Its low-cost of operation stems 
from the no-frills service, the absence of interlining costs, the use of a non. 
unionised work force, and the non-dependence on computer reservations 
systems which would only be crucial with an expansive route network. Both its 
simple route and fleet structure ensures a high utilisation of assets and 
employees. While a simple route network enables the carrier to achieve a quick 
turnaround, therefore spending less ground and gate time, a simple fleet 
structure enables employees to be switched between jobs with minimal re- 
training. The latter is most evident in its expansion progranune since 1978 
when it went from 10 Boeing 737s to 142 by the year 1990, An aircraft 
engineer for instance would be able to tend to any of the aircraft, thereby 
contributing to the simplification of the employee structure. The simplicity of 
these enables SouthWest to boast further of its simple fare structure where 
passenger tickets may be obtained ftont vending machines. 
57 Quoted in R. M. Hardaway & P. S. Dempscy. "Airlines. Airports and Antitrust: A 
Proposed Strategy for Enhanced Competition" (1992) 58 Journal of. tir Lms, an(I 
Commerce 455 at p. 456. See also A. Kahn. "Airline Deregulation: A Mixed Bag. But 
a Clear Success Nevertheless" (1988) 16 Transportation Lmv Journal 229 
58 CAA Paper 84009. p. 9. 
59 CAA., -Iirline Conipetition in the Sinýgle European. 1farket. CAP 623 (19933). p. 167. 
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The significance of a low-cost structure is the means whieh it provides for the 
small carrier to compete effectively with major carriers This has been the case 
with SouthWest. By contrast, UltrAir, a product of deregulation, ceased 
operations seven months following the introduction of the Houston-Los 
Angeles and Houston-New York services in 199' 3. Although its philosophy was 
also a high frequency, niche carrier, it competed without the benefit of a low. 
cost structure on a route which had the presence of a major carrier, Continental 
Airlines (Continental) which hubs in Houston. ' Like%ise, People Express 
which, for a number of years was the flagship of airline deregulation, began by 
introducing new and different concepts to airline management including 
purchased meals on board and a job-sharing scheme, but flew into turbulence in 
the mid-1980s when it expanded considerably on its route network at New 
York(Newark). Newark, of course, had the presence of Continental. Instead 
of maintaining the level of service with its expansion, People Express, unlike 
SouthWest, reduced its frequency overall. Furthermore, People Express 
purchased two other airlines (Frontier and Brit Air) in 1985 and inherited a 
much expanded route structure, thereby adding to the complexity of its 
management system. " The competitive edge which SouthNVest has over larger 
carriers is its low-cost structure which the sophisticated yield management 
systems and scale economies of these larger carriers cannot match. People 
Express, unfortunately, did not share that advantage. In addition, achieving a 
low-cost of operation enables the frequent fluctuations in external costs to be 
readily absorbed without necessarily causing a financial haemorrhage (e. g. fuel 
costs and airport charges). 
Hub-and-Spokes Network 
Perhaps the most discussed and documented issue of US airline deregulation 
has been the emergence of the hub-and-spokes system. This system of route 
management and operation is a highly interesting and innovative phenomenon 
that enables a carrier with a large network of routes to exploit and this reflects 
the new philosophy in airline management which seeks to place an emphasis on 
"each airline to develop its own coherent strategy, "' A hub-and-spokcs 
operation is a system by which travel between two points is channelled through 
an intermediate point. Suppose the point-to-point direct travel was between A. 
Y-C. The number of one-way service permutations for the carrier would be 
three: A-Y; Y-C; A-C. Aircraft utilisation would similarly be three if we 
assumed simultaneous departures and the total number of airport slots required 
for take-off and landing would be six. Under the hub-and-spokes system, 
however, direct services between some points would be abandoned; all seniccs 
would be channelled through the hub airport. If we suppose further that point- 
y is the hub airport, the journey pattern between the three points would be the 
following: A-Y-C. Point-to-point direct services of A-Y and Y-C would still be 
maintained but the change would be the abandonment of A-C direct ser%ices 
60 
.4 wation 
Week and Space Technologv (2 August 1993). 
61 people Express was subsequently takcn-oN-er by Texas International Airline %%hich 
once owned Continental: Financial Pines (16 September 1986). 
62 CAA paper 84009. p. 9. 
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since passengers from A would now travel via Y to get to C (Figure 8 1) This 
additional stop may mean a longer travelling distance and time. and indeed 
involve a change of aircraft depending on the densitv of traffic between the 
points. Under this system, aircraft utilisation would be reduced to two while 
the required number of airport slots would be reduced to four The spare 
aircraft and slots could therefore be used to increase frequency or to serve a 
new destination. In addition, by combining passengers who would have travelled 
directly between A-C and passengers already bound between Y-C, an airline is 
able to achieve a higher load factor and consequently lower its unit cost, The 
dominant feature in this system of route operation is point-Y which is also the 
hub airport. Accordingly, the theoretical strength of this system fics in ' 
the 
assumption that access to a hub airport is relatively unimpeded. The success of 
a carrier in exploiting the hub-and-spokes system must therefore mean ready 
access to an established airport, or an airport open to expansion, neither of 
which is necessarily always obtainable. 
Figure 8.1 
AC 
AYC 
So how do passengers benefit? Why should passengers accept the 
inconvenience of changing aircraft and incur the extra risk of missing luggage? 
How can the additional travelling distance and time be justified? The first task 
is to dispel the misleading idea of a homogeneous class of passengers since we 
travel for a variety of purposes. Business passengers travel to conduct business 
activities. They have a less flexible schedule of travel than holiday passengers. 
They pay a premium to travel in comfort by flying in business or first class 
cabin, Leisure passengers, on the other hand, are less concerned with these 
factors. If, therefore, the certainty of deregulation is to benefit passengers, it is 
equally certain that it would not benefit all passengers. The criteria and 
expectations of travel for a business passenger differ considerably from a leisure 
passenger. If time is of essence to the former, then the hub-and-spokes system 
will not benefit the business passenger if the additional stop involved more timc, 
If costs, and not time, is paramount to the holiday passenger, then the hub-and- 
spokes system will in all likelihood produce savings to the holiday budget since 
by routeing passengers through the hub, the carrier will be achieving 
considerable economy of operations that could be passed on to the passengers. 
" 
The reciprocal effect of lower fares is the increase in air travel, afortiori if the 
benefit is aimed at those passengers who had never contemplated travelling by 
air. This is considerably fostered 
by the greater choice of destination as a result 
of routes being channelled into a hub which 
is accessible from as many points as 
63 See further S. Morrison and C. Winston. The Economic Effects of Airline 
Dereglilation (Brookings Institution. Washington DC: 1936). 
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the number of such routes. Each additional route channelled into the hub will 
multiply by as many fold as the number of outward spokes from the hub. thus 
increasing the number of routes permutations and accruing incentives for the 
carrier as well as the passengers. 
While it is possible that the hub-and-spokes operations may result in efficiency 
gains, it is also clear that the need to have access to the hub airport. and a 
complementary network of routes, will favour larger carriers and in particular 
those which have been established at the relevant airport immediately to 
deregulation. A good case in hand is the dominance of American Airlines and 
United at Chicago(O'Hare), a key airport in the US. This dominance which is a 
product of CAB protection over the years means that other carriers %vill 
ihce 
substantial difficulties in gaining access to the airport, much less so to provide 
competing services against the incumbents. In this respect, there is a significant 
degree of similarity with the structural problems in British air transport in that 
BA enjoyed a dominant position at London(Heathrow) %Yhen competition was 
first introduced and when it was privatised in 1987. It should also be added that 
this is true in respect of the national carriers in the EC and their respective 
airports: for example, Lufthansa at Frankfurt; Air France as Paris(Orly), - Iberia 
at Madrid(Barajas). The stranglehold on access to key airports simply fortifies a 
don-dnant position, and is unlikely to foster more competition from new entrants 
unless positive regulatory actions were taken. 
Product Variety: Lower Fares and Service Quality 
The economic volatility of the industry stemming from external circumstances 
and the intense competition from new entrants ensure that carriers are user- 
responsive so that they continue to achieve productivity gains by relating cost to 
the provision of service and passing on the gains to passengers in the form of 
lower fares which will sustain the demand for travel by air, particularly by those 
who put an emphasis on the factor of cost. Demand for business or first class 
travel is, on the other hand, generally inelastic, and any increase in the number 
of travellers as a result of fare variations is unlikely to be significant. indeed, an 
increase in demand would probably justify higher air fares. 
Lower air fares, however, are but one form of product variety, Deregulation 
has also provided the carriers with incentives to offer a variety of products such 
as weekend travel packages, day-return travel, special up-grades to business or 
first class and other promotional fares. Indeed, according to a CAA study, 
Promotional fares, which were discouraged by the CA13 
previously, now account for the majority of travel on US 
domestic airlines. " 
Since CAB regulation provided very little flexibility for manoeuvrability in fares, 
empty seats which could not be filled at the time of 
departure effectively 
constituted wastage. Economic theory states that 
if X-number of passengers 
was required to recover the fixed costs of the service, then every additional 
passenger was a profit to the carrier because the costs of carrying the additional 
passenger would only be marginal; viz., an extra meal. 
Deregulation therefore 
64 [bid.. p. 3. 
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provided carriers with the incentive to innovate on the range of fare products to 
ensure optimum capacity although conditions are often attached For instance. 
special, offer fares often require the passenger to include a Saturday-night stay 
This assumes that inflexible travellers such as business travellers who are 
prepared to pay a premium would not travel during %veekends. Accordingly. tile 
benefits of deregulation are likely to be confined to travellers who would 
otherwise not travel by air. An important by-product of the freedorn to set 
different fares has been the concept of yield management. This highly dynamic 
management tool which enables airlines to monitor demand and to response 
accordingly so as to maximise yield and utilisation of assets, 
The distinction in terms of deregulation benefits between business and leisurc 
travellers is less pronounced in the case of the quality of service provided by 
competing carriers, particularly in-flight service, although competition in service 
quality was already conspicuous prior to the appearance of statutory 
deregulation. Inelastic premium fares paid for business or first class travel differ 
very little from rate regulation since the level of fares would be imposed or 
dictated by the absence of incentives for reduction in fares. Competition for 
market share must therefore turn on service quality. Kahn noted in Me 
Ecollomics ofRegulation that, 
In part because the doors to price competition are closed, airline 
companies compete very strenuously among themselves in the 
quality of service they offer - most notably in adopting the most 
modem and attractive equipment and in the frequency with 
which they schedule flights, but also in providing comfort, 
attractive hostesses, in-flight entertairu-nent, food and drink. " 
Although the advent of deregulation enabled carriers to compete by offering 
different fare products, on routes which are open to substantial demand such as 
New York-Washington, carriers are unlikely to be tempted by the prospects of 
offering different fares which would, if nothing else, complicate the fare 
structure and multiply the sophistication of management. On the other hand, 
providing competitive in-flight service imposes no more than marginal demand 
on resources. 
Even so, the ability to introduce competing services, together vvith fare and 
service variations, is conditional upon infrastructural access %,. ithout which 
effective competition may not be possible. Entry deregulation is only one-half of 
the equation. Access to airport slots either at the same airport or ý,, ithin an 
airport system is the other significant half These infrastructural difficulties arc 
already well established, and are issues of universal concern. 
Consolidation and Market Structure 
Apart from route rationalisation which followed deregulation, the latter also 
provided a fertile ground for other 
forms of economic rationalisation and the 
most profound to have altered the 
face of the industry was the chain of mergers 
between carriers. Much of the underlying cause for the mergers has been the 
consequential effect of the 
hub-and-spokes development. Since, as suggested, 
65 (i g8s). P. 2 11. 
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dependence on the hub-and-spokes system for success requires substantial 
access to an airport to cater for regular departures and arfivals. by the same 
token it requires a certain degree dominance at the airport The reciprocal need 
of the airport proprietor for long-term assurance that the airport would remain 
in demand is often represented by the length of the lease for access to 
(dis)embarkation gates at the airport as well as other airport facilities Ir 
nothing else, the effect of the reciprocal agreement between the airport 
proprietor and the dominant carrier would be to reinforce the presence of the 
carrier at the airport, thereby excluding or limiting the access of other carriers 
to mount competing services. In most cases, the dominant carrier is likely to 
have economy of scales and network that, unless the competing carrier is of 
sufficient size, access to airport slots does not guarantee survival. This is borne 
out by the experience of smaller carriers at multi-airline hubs such as 
Dallas(Fort Worth) where Braniff Airways competed with the might of 
American Airlines and subsequently ceased operations. Similarly. Frontier 
Airlines which hubbed with United and Continental at Denver became a target 
for take-over by People Express. By contrast, competition was more 
sustainable between American Airlines and United at Chicago(O'Hare) which is 
dominated by both. The combination of size and access to infrastructural 
facilities is therefore vital to enable a dominant carrier to increase its frequency 
and capacity beyond the critical level and thereby tightening the squeeze on 
smaller carriers. For the smaller carrier, therefore, the tendency must be to 
merge to consolidate resources so as to achieve equal economy of size and 
access. They could also provide 'feed traffic' to the larger carners, typically 
because of the types of aircraft the use which may be more suited to the nature 
of a particular market. 
The old clich6 of "if you c&t beat them, join them" becomes relevant in the 
strategies of these other carriers. Quite apart from gaining market power by 
combining forces with a dominant carrier, the economic exigencies arising from 
structural limitations are of particular significance since even the best of 
strategies for effective competition will be destroyed without access to 
structural facilities to compete on equal par. Consequently, a merger would 
provide a double-whanu-ny. An exception is of course those carriers which can 
exploit the opportunities offered by less dominated airports by developing them 
as alternative points of (dis)embarkation. SouthNVest chose to develop the 
secondary airport of Dallas(Love Field), and provided the competition against 
the Houston-based Continental, for instance, on the Dallas-Houston route, 
Midway Airlines which developed the dilapidated Chicago(Midway) Airport. 
Much as the CAA has indicated that slot allocation is not part of its direct 
regulatory responsibility, it cannot shrink 
from considering the causes and 
effects of infrastructural limitations 
if its policy of liberal route licensing is to 
produce the benefits it was intended to. 
Residual regulatory intervention 
therefore offers a corrective measure for the inequality of opportunities 
To a certain degree, the consolidation in the aftermath of 
deregulation was to be 
expected. This is already evident even within the 
EC as fifteen national airline 
markets converge into one. Given this similarity, the 
important issue remaining 
must be the way in which these mergers or alliances are 
dealt %, -ith. In the case 
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of tile US. it has already been alleged that the present industrV structure 
consisting of a few inega-carriers Is the consequence of an o-ver-liberal attitude 
towards mergers in the immediate years following deregulation Deinpscv 
claims that the "overriding and unmistakable trend" that cut across all the major 
deregulated sectors, not simply air transport, was "an unambiguous movement 
toward hefty concentration in a remarkably short tim-c", W. Antitrust 
enforcement, a responsibility transferred from the CAB to the Department or 
Justice, was notably absent. Indeed, the empirical evidence gathered by 
Dempsey demonstrated that there was no merger which did not meet the 
approval of the Department . 
67 Although a non-interventionist stance is 
consistent with the fundamental aims of the free-market model where perfect 
competition is obtainable, the absence of a strict framework of antitrust 
regulation would simply precipitate the problems which called for economic 
regulatory intervention in the first place. Beyond a certain point, consolidation 
in the form of mergers takes on an anti-competitive character. Competition 
becomes threatened. It is entirely possible that competition between the few 
rather than the many would prove to be more effective, but history does not 
bear this out. Nowhere is more obvious than international air transport, where 
typically a duopoly exists; one designated carrier from each country under the 
bilateral agreement. By contrast, where the duopoly has been broken, fares 
tended to fall and quality of service tended to improve. "' Products vary and 
choice is enhanced. 
This evidence forms an important foundation for the claim in this thesis that any 
move towards he liberalisation or deregulation of air transport which assumes 
that the conditions of sustainable competition has been achieved, requires at the 
same time an effective system of antitrust regulation to ensure that the forces of 
competition continue and the markets remain contestable. Although the Treaty 
of Rome, in the form of Article 85 and Article 86, and the variety c)f 
competition measures provide the basis for antitrust enforcement, the critical 
issue has to be the way in which these rules are applied to ensure that any 
consolidation is not carried beyond the acceptable threshold of sustainable 
competition. 
Computer Reservations Systems: Technology Gone Too Far? 
The appraisal of the deregulated US airline industry would not be complete 
without considering the impact of computer reservation systems (CRSs) on 
airline competition. This is so because deregulation has required carriers to 
develop sophisticated reservation systems although CRSs were widely used 
prior to the deregulation period. In particular, the complex route structure of 
some carriers as a result of the hub-and-spokes system required a highly capable 
system which could process and store readily accessible information on 
destinations, flight schedules and prices. Under CAB regulation, the route 
structure of most carriers was relatively simple, and choice of fares was virtually 
66 S. Dempscy. '*The Empirical Results of Deregulation: A Decade Later and the Band 
Played On" (1988) 17 Tran. vportation LmvJotirnal 31. pp. 43-44. 
67 ]bid_ pp. 48-55. 
68 See generally CAP 623. but especially pp. I 1- 13. 
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absent The rapid expansion follo%ving deregulation meant that %-, ithout a highly 
developed system, the range of destinations served and fare products available 
could not be easily provided to the benefit of air transport users The innovative 
concept of yield management would be meaningless without the data support 
that CRSs could provide. Consequently, carriers which could not find the 
economies of developing a CRS of their own either because of their size or 
simplicity of route structure have been forced to subscribe to a CRS which is 
typically owned and operated by another carrier. Clearly, this would create the 
danger of anti-competitive practices by the CRS-owninsz, for instance, by 
displaying flight data of its own services before that of the competitor. The real 
likelihood of such practices is even greater in a CRS market that is dominqtcd 
by two carriers, American and United, which systems, SABRE and APOLLO, 
together control about 75% of the market. "' In addition to the anti-competitive 
problem of screen display discrimination, unless effective regulation is in place, 
such market dominance can be readily abused by overcharging subscribers to 
the CRS. Furthermore, systems could be operated so as to delay by a period 
the down-loading of information from competitors and thereby gaining a 
competitive edge with customers who are about to make reservations or 
purchase tickets on the spot. A more acute problem, for its difficulty of 
detection and enforcement, is the temptation by the host-airline to misuse the 
information received from its competitor such as schedules and fare prices. ' 
These difficulties, which culminated in the bitter controversy between Braniff 
Airways and American Airlines led to the enactment of a statutory prohibition 
against misuses arising from the use of CRSs, effectively by creating a 'Chinese 
WaW between airline operations and the reservation system to ensure non- 
discriminatory practices. 71 
Nevertheless, dependence on a CRS is not necessarily a pre-condition for 
success in the post -deregulation era. In fact the success story Of US airline 
deregulation, that is SouthWest Airlines, does not subscribe to any CRS which 
consequently enables it to achieve a lower unit cost so as to be able to expand 
or sustain its market share as a low-cost carrier, aided by a simple route and 
fare structure. 
CRSs are arguably an ancillary sector to the provision of air transport ser%ices. 
As such, the competition issues which they raise are usually outside the 
jurisdiction of the economic regulatory agency responsible for air transport 
competition. However, the competition concerns arising from the use of these 
sophisticated systems are real and serious, and must therefore be properly 
regulated. The purpose of such regulation would be to prevent or to remedy any 
anti-competitive behaviour. Although the CAA has not concerned itself %,, ith the 
competition implications of CRSs, this area is now subject to Council 
Regulation 3089/93.72 The primary aim of the Regulation is to regulate the 
69 CAA Paper 84009. p. 28. 
70 For a further treatment of the anti-competitive problems of CRS. see ibid. pp 29-30. 
71 Carrier-Ou-ned Computer Resen-ations Sývstems 14 CFR §255 (1934) as amended in 
1988. 
72 (1993) OJ L278/1. See J. Goh. European Air Transport Linv and Compention (Jolln 
Wilcy. Chichester: 1997). cli. II for a detailed exan-driation of the Regulation 
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behaviour of CRS owners and operators by imposing on them certain 
obligations It is clear that the combination of potential anti-competitivc 
practices from the use of CRSs and probability of CRSs being owned by a large, 
dominant carrier requires regulatory oversight so that the aims of liberalisation 
or deregulation are not threatened. 
Frequent Flyer Programmes: Fraud by Loyalty? 
Frequent flyer programmes (FFPs) were first introduced by US airlines 
following the deregulation as a form of marketing strategy designed to promote 
customer loyalty. A few words need to be said of this post-deregulation novelty 
FFPs are programmes which simply means the more often a passenger trayýls 
with the carrier, the better the passenger will be rewarded, They are based on a 
points system which increases as more flying miles are recorded by the 
passenger, who may redeem these points for certain rewards. The rewards may 
take the form of free flights, free accommodation at selected hotels, free car 
rental or other leisure offers. Although FFPs are designed to benefit frequent 
travellers, these are invariably passengers travelling for business purposes whose 
travel expenses are usually met by their employers - arguably a form of 
"business fraud". FFPs depend to a large extent on the density of the carrier's 
route network. The more destinations served, the more the carrier %%ill be 
preferred by business passengers primarily for convenience, but secondarily for 
business opportunities if we accept that air transport is a strate c fi gi o rm of 
communication. BY the same token, the larger the number of destinations 
served, the wider will be the choice of "free" destinations for the frequent flyer 
when mileage points are redeemed. By implication, it will be unusual for 
smaller carriers to develop and sustain a FFP without the Support of a dense 
route network. Although it is possible for a group of smaller carriers to 
consolidate their resources and offer similar FFP attractions, it would more 
usual for them to sign up to an existing FFP. While a FFP affiliation falls far 
short of a merger by definition, there is likely to be a substantial degree of 
complement in the services and operations of the carriers involved. As yet, no 
concrete empirical evidence has emerged to suggest that competition has been 
adversely affected by such programmes. Even so, it is clear that they raise 
concerns about the potential effects on airline competition. Indeed, tile 
European Commission has had to intervene in a number of cases to require 
carriers with established FFPs to provide smaller carriers with access to those 
programmes. This was so in its 
decision on the co-operation agreement between 
Lufthansa and SAS. 73 
Some Reflections: Towards Re-regulation? b 
Airline deregulation in the US has been the most rapid and radical shift in 
regulatory policy both by an administrative agency and congressional action; to 0 
that extent, it remains largely unprecedented. The division in opinion as to the 
merits of (deftegulation is as wide today as 
it was when deregulation was first 
0 change in the initiated. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid feeling the slight 
73 Commission Decision 96/180. [19961 OJ L54,128. 
216 
direction of wind-blow, not least when the underlying theorv of airline 
deregulation that contestability will achieve a state of perfect competition has 
been discredited very substantially. Both the benefits of deregulation that werc 
envisaged and experienced have either failed to materialisc or continue The 
lack of foresight as to the might and responses of the carriers was an important 
missing link during the deregulation debate. But no one should be so naive as 
to suggest that the consequences could necessarily have been forecast, that 
ignores the inherent nature of policy formulation. 
The deregulation of entry has been the single most responsible factor for much 
of what has happened. This is readily contrasted with the policy of partial 
deregulation pursued by the CAA. Quite apart from the geographic constraint 
on the UK to deregulate completely, the strategic reasons provide a more 
convincing case. Indeed, it is possible to develop a hub-and-spokes network of 
routes in the UK; the difference would only be a matter of degree. Economic 
rationales, however, dictate otherwise. Geographic size is an important 
component in developing a minimum threshold of scale and network econornies 
before a hub-and-spokes system becomes viable. If an inherent requirement of a 
hub-and-spokes system is a reasonable collection of routes for viable 
operations, then this collection of routes must also depend on the relative size 
of the total geographic area of services provided. It is therefore unlikely that a 
hub-and-spokes system for domestic UK services will be a suitable concept 
given "not only the disparity in size but also the particular characteristics of the 
UK with its many thin routes and the dominance of one city, London, and one 
airline, British Airways"; ' this does not, however, invalidate the possibility of 
developing such a system for international services which to a certain extent has 
been the case with BA at London(Heathrow). Furthermore, the smaller the 
geographic size, the greater is the degree of competition from other modes of 
transportation and which must consequently raise the level of econornies. 
Equally, a given geographic size has a relatively fixed volume of market 
capacity in the sense that the variation in domestic traffic demand between the 
US and the UK will be considerable on the basis of the size of the population. " 
More importantly, the strategic rationale for not deregulating entry is to prevent 
the excesses of a monolithic industry by blatantly ignoring the historical position 
of British air transport. The inequality in size and strength between BA and 
other airlines as a consequence of historical endowment will have little mercy 
for the latter if the control of entry was removed. BXs size of aircraft fleet, 
network of routes and possession of airport slots, all of which were transferred 
to it following its privatisation, would only ensure that services offered in Zý 
competition with BA would achieve insignificant success even if infrastructural 
flexibility was assumed. Such disproportionality did not and does not exist in 
the US because airlines were never publicly-owned. Regulation of entry is 
therefore an important strategic tool for providing, not so much as equality of 
size and strength, but at least equality of opportunities. Unlike fares or 0 
74 Ibid. P. I- 
75 For instance. domestic traffic in the US represents about 70% o, f total traffic %%hilc 
the UK and the EC are both much more dependent on international traffic: sce 
CONI(92) 434, 
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capacity, control of entry cannot be achieved by antitrust regulation nerc is 
nothing anti-competitive about offering a competing service. neither is it an 
abuse of a dominant market position per se. A combination of entry regulation. 
based on a policy that presumes in favour of competition, and antitrust 
regulation of fares and capacity provides for mittaus multindi. y a systcm of 
contestability with appropriate regulatory safeguards aimed at fostcnng route 
expansion and achieving competitive fares that would satisfy a substantial 
category of reasonable public demand. Competition derived from deregulation 
in this sense is still, but only, a means to an end. US policy on airline 
competition, however, is seen as an end in itself In fact, a comment in the same 
vein was made by Dempsey in one of a series of critical review of US airline 
deregulatory policy. He argued, 
In the real world, however, the task is not so much to choose between 
economic abstractions but to fashion an enlightened approach to bring 
about the positive attributes of healthy competition, which include 
productivity, efficiency, and a range of price and service options 
responsive to the demands of consumers. This must be accomplished 
while protecting the public against market failure. " 
It is therefore no surprise that, in just over a decade of deregulation, an agenda 
for regulatory reform has begun to take shape. If reform is to be effected at all, 
then the crucial question of which regulatory style the post-reform period 
should take must be addressed. Three options are possible. First, a move back 
to CAB-style regulation that existed prior to the ADA. Secondly, regulatory 
reform without reform by staying with the deregulated regime. Thirdly. 
regulated competition as a middle ground between CAB regulation and 
deregulation. No doubt, each will arouse passions of its own. CAB. Style 
regulation cannot be an appropriate measure for the simple fact, as Kahn has 
summed up, that deregulation has "scrambled the eggs". " Deregulation, on the 
other hand, has already proven itself to be in excess of the delzree of 
competition that could be regarded as healthy. The choice, it must seem, is 
between that of imperfect regulation and imperfect competition. This, however, 
would require congressional legislation, and a well-developed regulatory policy, 
to ensure that the excesses of bureaucracy associated With CAB-regulation and 
the ills of unregulated competition are avoided to the maximum extent possible. 
Yet, it would provide the solution, albeit imperfect in its own fight, for 
combining the strengths of competition wherever and whenever permitted to 
satisfy the end objective of user interests as well as the need for regulatory 
oversight of anti-competitive practices which are equally destructive as 
excessive competition is from total deregulation. 
To a considerable extent, the review of regulatory options has been supersedcd 
by a presidential commission appointed to investigate and recommend policy 
changes for the airline industry. Although due in part to the effects of global 
76 S. Dempsey. "Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire NýNlhologv: Economic Thcor% 
in Turbulence" (1990) 56 Journal oj'. Air Law and Commerce 305, at p. IS 1. 
77 A. Kahn, "Airlines Invite Talk of Regulation" in Rockv Mountain Neus (July 6. 
1989). 
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recession and in part to the excesses of competition, the urgent rc%-ic,. v was 
largely compelled by the deteriorating financial plight of all carriers This task 
was assigned to the National Commission to Ensure A Strong Cornpctitivc 
Airline Industry which aimed "to question some of the most basic assumptions 
that have formed the foundation of policy toward this industry - and behaviour 
within it - for the past half century. "" It made a number of recommendations 
which were shaped by three basic principles: the need for technological 
superiority so that infrastructural impediments to efficiency can be eliminated, 
the need for financial strength so that the industry can make rapid adjustments. 
and, the need for access to the global market by liberalising dated restrictions- 
On balance, the report suggested a greater interventionist role for the 
government and in particular the FAA, although it flatly rejected the return to 
regulation. 
[We] do not believe the government should attempt to provide a 
cure through re-regulation of routes and fares. The process 
would be slow, cumbersome and mired in litigation and 
challenge, and would lack the flexibility to permit rapid response 
to changing conditions. " 
This reminder was made in the light of the evidence that since deregulation 
greater head-to-head competition on city pairs has been achieved to bring lower 
tariffs in real terms which would be destroyed by returning to agency regulation. 
Almost every recommendation of the Commission was accepted by the 
Goverrimentso except the recommendation to set up an "airline financial 
advisory committee ... to advise the 
Secretary of Transportation when an airline's 
financial condition poses risks to the public or to the industry. "" Such fitness 
regulation, however, will be made more vigorous by positively monitoring the 
financial position of carriers so that it creates "a strong incentive for airlines to 
comply with fitness requirements and to promptly correct deficiencies identified 
by the Department. tM 
Conclusions 
There is much to learn from the deregulatory effects, which to a large measure, 
have begun to emerge in Community air transport. The liberalisation 
programme has witnessed a sudden growth of new, low-cost carriers, although 
some of these have only been able to operate Out of peripheral airports. 
Whether these carriers will have the stamina to expand further remains to be 
78 National Airline Commission to Ensure A Strong Compctiti%-e Airline Industry. 
Change, Challenge and Conipetition (1993). introduction. 
79 Ibid. p. 14. See also Kahn's rejection of the rc-rcgulation idea and critical rc%ic%v of 
the National Airline Commission's Report: "Change. Challenge and Competition* 
(1993) Cato Review ofBusiness & Governinent 55. 
so The Clinton AiMinistration's Initiative to Proniote .4 Strong Competinve Ioafion 
Industrv: Growing ToMeet Global Competition (1994). 
81 Change, Challenge and Conipetition. p. 14. 
82 Clinton AcMinistration's Initiative, p. 10. Thds %vould carried out under the authority 
N-csted by the Federal ANiation Act. s. 40 I (r). 
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seen, though it is clear from the US experience that highly specific gratettics 
will be required if any meaningful competition vvith the incumbents is to be seen 
In a similar way, the liberalisation programme has led to product differcritiation 
within and between carriers, more so at the bottom end of the fare structure. 
that is promotional fares, rather than the top end, that is premium fares 
It is also clear that, as deregulation in the US has encountered, tile liberalisation 
of Community air transport is beginning to see a wave of consolidating activities 
as airlines adjust to the new environment, The US experience has shown that 
antitrust enforcement must be taken seriously when liberalisation or 
deregulation is introduced to ensure that beyond a certain point, these 
consolidation do not isolate the forces of competition and in the process 
threaten the objective of the initiative. This is the challenge for Community air 
transport. 
The caveat of this chapter is that the danger of simply grafting those 
experiences to other air transport markets, including the UK and the EC. must 
not be lost out of sight. The structure of the industry, the geographic size, and 
the historical traditions of these countries vary substantially and must be 
properly accounted for. The unsuitability of total deregulation for British air 
transport, including the removal of entry control, has been argued. US-style 
deregulation has also been rejected by the EC for Community air transport, 
although the practical differences are yet to be seen. Quite apart from the 
exemptions relating to market access, entry control is virtually non-existent, and 
it is not entirely clear from the previous chapter that the European Comrnission 
has been vigorously enforcing the antitrust laws. Be that as it may, an important 
deduction to be made is that any difference between the US-style deregulation, 
Community liberalisation and CAA liberal regulation is only a matter of deszrce. 
None should deny that, as market forces become more important, so does 
antitrust regulation. 
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CHAPTER NINE ADiMINISTRATIVE REGL. 'LATION 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Throughout the preceding chapters, references have been made to the issue of 
agency regulation and accountability. Regulation, as defined in the opening 
chapter, constitutes a form of interference or control in the behaviour or 
activities of private individuals or organisations. Accordingly, the excrcisý Of 
such regulatory interference must at least be rational, procedurally proper and 
lawful in order to justify the interference, or non-interference for that matter, In 
short, there must be accountability for the regulator's decisions. Administrative 
or agency regulation presents particular problems of accountability, ironically 
because of the discretion it requires to maintain its independence and the need 
to check the manner in which the discretion is exercised. 
The solutions to an imperfect industry structure are necessarily imperfect. 
Regulatory policies have had to be shaped according to this structural imbalance 
within the confines of the statutory objectives, and more importantly, consistent 
with the demands of public accountability that are part of the "dialectic 
interplay" between the institutions of power and their legitimation. ' As a 
regulatory agency, the CAA presents the classic problems of accountability in 
modem government seen across the range of non-departmental public bodies 
and beyond. Typically, these are the "smoke-screen" fashion of decision-making 
fortified by the lack of access to official information, and judicial preference for 
legal positivism that fails to adequately recognise the informal methods of 
communication between public authorities. ' 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to chart the public law issues pertaining 
to administrative regulation; indeed, there would be a missing jigsaw piece in 
the puzzle if these broader issues were neglected. It has already been argued 
elsewhere that many of the developments in the modem State, including the rise 
of agency regulation, present a fundamental dilemma. This is because some of 
these are changes with which the traditional constitutional apparatus are ill. 
equipped to cope. ' This being the case, the use of such institutions which %%ield 
enormous amount of power is cause for concern. The question, however, 
should not be whether these institutions should be used at all, for it is already an 
accepted facet of public administration that regulatory agencies are the "fourth 
branch of government", to borrow a phrase from James Landis. They represent 
I R. M. Unger, Lmv in Modern Socieýv (Free Press, New York: 1976). 
2 See T. Prosser. "Towards A Critical Public Law" (1982) 9 Journal ofLinv and. Socierv 
I and gencrallv his Alationalised Industries and Public Control (Blackwell. Oxfbrý- 
1986). 
3 See generally, P. Birkinshaw, Grievances, Remedies and the Law (Swect 
London: 2nd edn.. 1995) and N. D. Le-vvis. Choice and the Legal Order: Rising. 4bove 
politics (Butterworths. London: 1996). 
a form of institutional response to the developments which the tripartite 
framework of government cannot adequately resolve More to the point. it 
should be how, when and where should these institutions account for the 
exercise of the public power conferred upon it. 'Niore significantly, to what 
extent has the statutory objectives with which the agency was charged been 
achieved" Perceived regulatory failures must therefore be properly explained 
To what extent do the criticisms generally levelled at regulatory agencies apply 
to the CAA, and by implication, how relevant to the CAA are the suggestions 
for reform. These are issues which this chapter will take up, particularly in the 
context of the CAA and its work in competition regulation. In assessing the role 
of the CAA and its accountability, it is necessary also to reflect the cha0ges 
brought about by the EC liberalisation measures in air transport. By transferring 
national competence in air transport to Community institutions, the question 
arises as to how accountable are these institutions for their decisions and what 
accountability mechanisms exist. It needs to be asked also whether problems 
exist and, if so, what can be done? 
Accountability and Separation of Powers 
Regulatory agencies, the likes of the CAA, OFTEL, OFGAS, are often vested 
with functions which have traditionally been kept apart in accordance %ith the 
doctrine of separation of powers and often conferred with a wide degree of 
discretion to perform these functions. Although the doctrine is much more 
strictly observed in the US than the UK, it pays to examine it briefly vis-A-%is 
regulatory agencies and the role of law in checking their discretion; if nothing 
else, it is the bedrock of democratic accountability. As John Locke wrote in 
1690, 
It may be too great a temptation to humane frailty, apt to grasp 
at power, for the same persons who have the power of making 
laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, 
whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the 
laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and 
execution, to their own private advantage. ' 
On this basis, the concept of agency regulation which combines the tripartite 
functions of legislative, executive and adjudicative, fits uncomfortably within the 
British democratic and constitutional structure. The exponential growth and use 
of administrative agencies put a strain on the traditional 
institutions of the State 
and the methods of control and accountability. The 
CAA which is statutorily 
required to formulate air transport regulatory policies, applies them 
in the 
licensing of air transport services and adjudicates disputes over licensing matters 
is constitutionally an awkward creature even if these 
functions were performed 
within the boundaries of a broader policy set 
by the government of the day. The 
constitutional difficulty is not simply the 
fusion of these functions which have 
traditionally been kept separate. An administrative agency which regulates the 
J. Lockc, Second Treatise of Civil Government (Black-wc1l. 0. \-flord: 1946). CIL 12. 
para. 143. 
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activities of private sector actors (or a mixture of private and public sector 
actors) represents a "compenetration of the political and societal realms- and 
thus leading to the "progressive displacement of the state/society di%idc*' ' In the 
context of the US, a member of the former CAB, Louis Hector, remarked that 
the combination of these functions within a single body gave rise to tasks which 
were inherently incompatible and difficult to perform 
... my experience on the 
Civil Aeronautics Board has convinced 
me that an independent regulatory commission is not competent 
in these days to regulate a vital national industry in the public 
interest ... The members of the CAB, like those of other 
regulatory commissions, have duties and responsibilities of 
policy-making, adjudication, administration and investigation I 
which are by their very nature incompatible. ' 
No doubt, the US has a very different constitutional tradition where functions of 
Govemment are kept strictly apart. Even so, the fundamental aim remains: to 
keep these functions separate to ensure a satisfactory system of checks and 
balances. In this sense, accountability assumes special prominence. The 
traditional mechanisms of public accountability are typically divided into the 
opofiticall and 'judicial'. In essence, the former means political accountability 
through the institution of Parliament whether directly or indirectly. But the 
diversity in the forms of parliamentary accountability itself means the system of 
select committees, the system of financial control and the system of ministerial. 
agency control which is ultimately subject to the constitutional requirement of 
ministerial responsibi1ity. Judicial accountability is a process expostfacto and is 
potentially rnýisleading to conceive it as a form of accountability since its concem 
fies not with the overall performance of the administrative agency, but the 
legality of the issue in dispute. Political and judicial accountabifity call on those 
institutions which have been part of the constitutional tradition for a long time 
and which may well be ill-suited to the demands for accountability stemming 
from the activities of a modem State. ' 
Parliamentary Accountability 
As a nationalised industry, the CAA has no direct responsibility to Parliament, 
but is nevertheless indirectly accountable through the Secretary of State for 
policy matters. Parliamentary accountability was much more apparent at the 
time when the system of policy guidance was still in place. Under the 1971 Act, 
5 G. Poggi, The Development of the Modem State (Hutchinson, London: 197S). pp. 122 
& 138. 
6 L. J. Hector, "Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions' 
(1960) 69 Yale LJ 93 1. 
7 I. Harden and N. Le%Nis, The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and The Rule of Law 
(Hutchinson, London: 1986). 1 make no attempt to examine the thard form of 
financial and administrative accountability through the offices of the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General (C&AG) and the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (PCA) respectively. %Nhich deserves more detailed consideration than 
has hitherto been the case. Suffice it to say that both the C&AG and the PCA have 
demonstrated the instrumental role that they play in the accountability of non. 
departmental institutions. See generally. P. Birkinshaw, Grievances. Remetfies and 
The State, op. cit. and P. Birkinshaw and N. Le%iis. 117zen Citizens Complain (Open 
University, Buckingham: 1995). 
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which first established the CAA and this system. s, 3(3) required that all draft 
guidances to be "approved by a resolution of each of House of Parliament " 
This is of course provided Parliament with the opportunity to debate publicly 
and scrutinise the details of the communication between the Secretary of State 
and the CAA. The system was seen as a "constitutional innovation"' and an 
effective control over the regulatory functions of the CAA as well as the general 
direction of the industry; an instrument which was capable of "structuring" the 
exercise of discretion by the CAA' although its misguided use led to its 
abandonment subsequently, " The CAA, however, continues to be under a 
statutory duty to submit its annual financial report and accounts to the Secretary 
of State who would then lay them before Parliament. " This requirement of 
laying before Parliament the annual accounts provides an opportunity flor 
parliamentary scrutiny of the financial performance of an administrative agency, 
and possibly provide for a wider parliamentary debate of the air transport 
regulation by the CAA. 
Direct accountability to Parliament, however, takes the form of select 
committee scrutiny. Prior to 1979, the principal jurisdiction for the regulation 
of civil aviation was held by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries. 
With the reforms of 1979, the CAA was brought under the general jurisdiction 
of the Select Committee on Transport (although in some cases, the Trade and 
Industry Select Committee may have the jurisdiction to investigate). The 
Transport Select Committee (TSC), which is now part of the Department of 
Transport, Environment and the Regions Select Committee, has the 
responsibility "to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the 
Department of Transport and associated public bodies". " In carrying out its 
designated role, the TSC is empowered to send for persons, papers and records, 
to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House, to adjourn from place to 
place and to report from time to time; it may also appoint specialist advisers 
either to supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters 
of complexity within the Comn-dttee's order of reference. With these added 
powers, the select committees generally have been able to play a more active 
and improved constitutional role; reports were also markedly 
improved in terms 
of quality. A critical study into the constitutional order noted that, 
Given the general ineffectiveness of our parliamentary 
institutions and the pervading cloak of secrecy which protects 
the workings of the government from scrutiny, the performance 
of the select committee system since 1979 has been a remark-able 
achievement. Ministers are now subject to frequent examination, 
a large amount of information has been placed in the public 
domain, reports critical of government policy and methods of 
8 H. C. Debs. 8 14, col. 1173 (29 March 197 1). 
9 R. BaldiNin, Regulating the Airlines (OUP. Oxford: 1985). pp. 241-243. On the 
structuring of discretion see K. C. Da%is, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquity 
(University of Illinois Press. Chicago: 1977), ch. 4. 
10 Lak-erAirways v Departinent of Trade [1977] 2 All ER I S2, 
IIS. 15, Civil Aviation Act 1982. as modified by Civil Aviation Authority (jutfithkiz of 
Accounts) Order 1984, Sl 65/1984. 
12 Standing Order No. 130. 
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policy-making have been produced and have contributed to 
debate. Furthermore, the existence of the select committees has 
had effects within departments in encouraging greater ritzour in 
policy formulation and justification. " 
A number of the TSC's noteworthy inquiries include airline Competition in 1087 
and the ways that it affected British operators and the impact that it had on air 
services. " The dissolution of Parliament that year meant that the inquiry could 
not be completed, but it stated that "this very important subject" ought to be 
taken up and completed by the successor Committee. " That invitation was 
never taken up. In parliamentary session 1989/90, the TSC conducted one or 
the most comprehensive reviews of airline safety in the history of UK civil 
aviation. 16 Among other things, a number of searching questions were put to the 
officials of the CAA on its policies and policy-making procedures for safety, In 
session 1991/92, it also carried out an inquiry into the development of air 
transport policy in the EC` following a study by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the EC in session 1990/91 into the issue of external relations in 
EC air transport. " Whatever may have been the difficulties which pervaded the 
"old" select committee system, and whatever may still be the difficulties of the 
"new" system, parliamentary accountability remains an important forum of 
public policy debate and scrutiny of administrative activities in constitutional 
terms although for the CAA, this must now properly reflect its limited 
jurisdiction in the light of Community air transport law, 
The Role of Courts and Accountability 
Perhaps the most important issue of regulatory accountability is whether the 
objectives of regulation have been or are being achieved. If, in the first instance, 
regulatory intervention was deemed necessary to correct certain imperfections 
such as market imperfections or to prevent the excesses of a monopoly, then the 
question of whether this has been or is being achieved becomes an inescapable 
one. Defining regulatory success or failure is of course never an easy task. It is 
only natural that there will be supporters and detractors of the decisions of the 
regulator. 
Regulators are often conferred with a wide degree of discretion. This causes 
problems for their accountability, but equally it must be accepted that regulatory 
discretion is a pre-requisite for regulatory independence. The regulator %%ill 
require the independence to form a judgment of whether a particular activity or 
behaviour constitutes an economic regulatory offence, such as predation, and if 
so, whether to intervene, Even so, discretion in this sense is not the same as 
absolute discretion. It is not absolute because in the first instance, the regulatory 
discretion is over matters of fact, and not of law. Thus, its exercise must be 
subject to review by the courts in the case of legal errors, and may be subject to 
an appeal to the Secretary of State on matters of fact where the statute has 
13 Harden and LeNNis, op. cit.. P. 110. 
14 HC 382 (1986-87). 
15 jbid, para. 3. 
16 4ircraft Cabin Safetv, HC 27 (1989-90). 
17 Developments in European Cominuni(vAir Transport Policy, HC 147 (1991.92). 
is Conduct of the Cominuniýv's External Aviation Relations, HL 39 (1990-91), 
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provided for this. The crucial task is therefore to reconcile between the need for 
regulatory discretion and the need to ensure that decisions are not only rational 
and fair, but are arrived at after having adopted fair procedures The aim of this 
brief section is to examine the role of courts in substantive and procedural 
review within the context of air transport policies and decisions. " This should 
provide some understanding of the extent to which the courts have a role to 
play in securing substantive and procedural accountability although they are by 
no means always so neatly separated. 
Substantive accountahility 
This relates to the actual decision of the regulatory agency. It questions. the 
merits of the decision, for example, whether to issue an air transport licence 6r 
whether to commence antitrust proceedings or to make a finding of antitrust 
infiingement. Questioning the merits of a decision naturally borders on 
reviewing the facts of the case, a matter on which the jurisprudence of British 
courts is far from settled. Judicial attitude towards such cases is not entirely 
clear nor satisfactory. ' On the one hand, these cases can be considered as 
appeals since they go to the merits of the case, and cannot therefore be the 
subject of a judicial review application. Unless an appeal procedure has been 
expressly provided by the statute, for example to the Secretary of State, there 
will be no effective redress against the perceived grievance. On the other hand, 
judges have shown themselves to be willing to review such cases primamy 
under the principle of Vednesbury reasonableness., " The distinction between 
an appeal and a review, though a long standing conflict, -" is consequently not as 
clear-cut as desired. 
Even where such cases qualify for review, judges have traditionally been slow to 
intervene on the ground that Parliament intended the agency to exercise the 
discretion given to it, and so would be wrong for the courts to 'substitute' their 
version of the regulatory decision. ' A good illustration is the application BA to 
impugn the decision of the CAA to license BNIA to operate a conventional 
scheduled service between London(Heathrow)-Belfast alongside BA's shuttle 
service. 24 This case established that the CAA had considerable latitude of 
discretion in the performance of its economic regulatory function. The terms of 
the 1982 Act were such that the CAA was able to enjoy a considerable measure 
of independence, and in considering the factors which it deemed as relevant to 
the case in question. Accordingly, the role of the courts in interfering Uith the 
exercise of this regulatory discretion was, and should be, timited. Indeed, Woolf 
J had indicated in that case that the courts should be even slower to intervene 
19 See generally D. J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedure (OUP. 0-4 S. orcL- 1996). 
20 Compare Secretaq of State for Education and Science v Tanzeside AIBC ( 19771 AC 
10 14, Broinle ,v 
LBC v Greater London Council [19831 1 AC 768-. R v. lfiniszýv of 
Defence ex p Sinith [1996] 1 All ER 257-. Rv Lord Chancellor's Deparnnent ex p 
if itham [ 1997] 2 All ER 779. 
2t 4ssociatedProi, incial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 11948) 1 KB 223, 
22 Anisininic v Foreign Conpensation Commission [1968] 2 QB 862. 
23 Rv Cambridge Health Authoriýv exp B [199512 All ER 129. 
24 Rv CA4 ex p British Airways Board CO/943/83, QBD, Transcript of 11 September 
1983. 
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where the appellate procedure to the Secretary of State had not been invoked 
The one exception, he said, was where the application involved an important 
point of law in which case it might be argued that that there would be advantage 
in the matter being considered by the court before going to the Secretary Of 
State so as to enable "the Secretary of State to know what is the correct law to 
apply. - 
An equally relevant illustration is the judgment of Roch J. in dismissing the 
application of Airways International to review the decision of the CAA to 
license Inter European Airways to operate charter flights. He said, 
In my judgment, to overturn this decision would involve a grave 
risk of a substantial public demand for holiday charter services 
going unsatisfied. In addition, it may adversely affect the 
employment of those pilots and cabin staff retained by Inter and 
deprive the airports from which Inter propose to and do now 
operate of revenue. " 
Although there is much to credit for such an analysis, it is equally plausible to 
construct an argument that Parliament never intended the agency to exercise its 
discretion in the way in which it did. A number of extra-judicial commentaries 
have shown that judges will not be slow to adopt an interventionist approach. in 
particular, Justice Laws has reasoned that, 
... save as regards the 
Queen in Parliament, there is in principle 
always jurisdiction in the courts to review the decisions of public 
bodies ... There 
is certainly no judicial self-constraint on the 
ground only that the subject-matter is politically controversial. '126 
Even more telling, Lord Woolf has written that "if Parliament did the 
unthinkable, then I would say that the courts would also be required to act in a 
manner which would be without precedent [because] ultimately there are even 
limits on the supremacy on Parliament. "" 
Procedural Fairness 
Procedural review of administrative discretion tend to be more common and a 
more successful ground of challenge. It has its origin in the principle oi natural 
justice, famously developed by Ridge v Baldwin, 23 although this has now been 
expanded to include the duty to give reasons in a limited number of 
circumstances, " the duty to act fairly" and a legitimate expectation to be 
consulted. " These are collectively referred to as procedural fairness. 
Much of what regulatory agencies do depends on a procedural system that is 
fair and rational. This may be a public hearing to determine whether a licence 
should be issued, varied or revoked, or a consultation exercise to gather 
25 Rv CAA ex p Airwavs International (C: v)nru) CO/839/87. QBD. Transcript of 20 
May 1987. 
26 Sir John Laws. -Law and Democracy" (1995) PL 72 at p, 76, 
27 Lord Woolf, "Droit Public-English Style" (1995) PL 57 at p. 69. 
28 [19641 AC 40. 
29 Rv Secremy ofState for the Home Department ex p Dooýv [ 199313 All ER 92. 
30 Re HK (an infant) [ 1967] 2 QB 617. 
31 Council of the Civil Service Unions vAlinisterfor Civil Service [19851 AC 374. 
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evidence for the formulation of policies The role of courts in ensuring 
procedural propriety for regulatory decisions is therefore an important onc, all 
the more so in the light of criticisms against the lack of transparency in 
regulatory decision-making. ' Although this is an expensive way of ensuring 
regulatory coherence, it remains an important mechanism to check the exercise 
of regulatory discretion. 
Conclusion 
Judicial review cases against the CAA are few and far between There is an 
appellate procedure to the Secretary of State, whose decisions have rarely been 
challenged in the courts. Baldwin's analysis reveals that airlines see little point in 
seeking judicial challenges because the CAA or the Secretary of State would 
still be empowered to make a similar decision afterwards. " This is what may be 
called the beneficial interpretation which refers to the incentives for avoiding a 
litigious attitude. Baldwin observed in his study that in addition to the 
difficulties of checking and balancing the exercise of authority by a multi- 
powered agency, there was a general reluctance in the industry to take the 
complaints against CAA decisions to the courts since a victory at law would 
achieve little if an unwanted decision might well be re-made by the CAA or by 
the Secretary of State. " Where a judicial decision results in the latitude of 
discretion being restricted, the regulator or the relevant minister is always in a 
position to turn to the legislature for more authority. The final result Will be a 
circuitous exercise that is likely to cause undesirable disruptions in the 
regulatory process. Furthermore, the air transport industry is characterised by a 
closely-knitted community where protracted relationships between the parties in 
the industry is the quintessence of an overall efficient system of civil aviation. 
The confrontational requirement of an adversarial system is seen as both 
undesirable and damaging to the interests of the parties. Taking a dispute to 
court causes delay in the decision-making process of the applicant and raises 
uncertainties within the industry. Airline companies in particular are concerned 
not to create excessive publicity via the courts which may have damaging 
consequences such as that evidenced by the so-called "dirty tricks" campaign 
alleged by Virgin against BA. 
" Those that seek to protect the confidentiality of 
their trade secrets would also avoid courtroom litigation since the pre-trial 
proceedings of discovery may require these details to be divulged. 
That said, the CAA adopts a very open procedure in making decisions, from 
extensive consultation on proposed policies to the giving of reasons for 
decisions. Procedurally, it seems difficult to impugn. Such procedural probity 
inevitably lends support to the merits of the substantive decision. Hence, even if 
the conferment of a wide regulatory discretion may have a potential for abuse, 
32 Rv Director General of Gas Supply ex p Sinith CRO/1398/88. QBD. Transcript of 
31 July 1988; Rv Director General of Telecominunications ex p Let's Talk, WK) Lid 
CO/77/92, QBD. Transcript of 6 April 1992. 
33 See R. Balchvin. Tkffl ANiation Regulation: From Tribunal to Regulatory Agcncyý" in 
R. BaIdNvin and C. McCrudden (eds. ). Regulation and Public LMv (%ýcidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London: 1987). 
34 Ibid. 
35 J. Goh. "Fear and Loathing in the Air" (1992) l42XLJ 822- 868 
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these procedural practices provide an important means for Structuring their 
exercise. " 
From a broader perspective, it is arguable that as greater liberalisation or 
deregulation takes place, the role of the courts in public law and in reviewing 
decisions of the regulatory agency becomes correspondingly less important. 
This is so because regulatory interventions become less common and less 
necessary. This is not to say that antitrust interventions are no longer necessary. 
It means direct economic regulation will have evolved into a different form of 
regulation, but which also places a greater responsibility on the airlines to be 
vigilant, so that without complaints from them that their interests have been 
harmed, antitrust interventions become unnecessary. Judicial review of antitrust 
decisions is a complex area. The courts in the UK have shown a supreme 
reluctance to disturb the findings and decisions of the MMC and the President 
of the Board of Trade, " arguably on the ground that it was inappropriate for the 
courts to be involved in reviewing economic regulatory decisions, or that the 
courts lack the appreciation or capacity to construct sophisticated economic and 
social theories for adequate legal analysis. This may be described as the 
systemic-complacent interpretation of the role of courts in regulating public 
economic activities. What it suggests is simply that concentration on the niceties 
ofjurisprudence and precedents pose a difficult barrier for the courts to produce 
a constructive response to the exigencies of the vvider capitalist order. -" The 
regulation of civil aviation is a complex process calling for a specialist body. 
Requiring a judicial institution to second guess the decisions of a specialist 
regulatory body would not only be a futile exercise but would inevitably strike 
at the raison detre of that regulatory institution. More importantly, the 
spasmodic ex post nature of judicial decisions is not an appropriate forum for 
policy development and coherence, Regulatory decisions frequently require the 
regulator to take a future view of things and to forecast future outcomes. By 
contrast, judicial decisions tend to focus on events of the past. However, these 
observations are not necessarily borne out by the experience in Community 
competition enforcement. There is a detectable readiness amongst Community 
airlines to resort to the protection of the law, primarily in judicial review 
proceedings against the Commission for having made a decision which allegedly 
infringed the rights of the litigants. "' One may well argue that there is now an 
apparent juridification of air transport competition within the Community. This 
is so because problems affecting competition between European airlines were 0 
resolved in the past by negotiations and bilateral agreements between national 
governments, rather than judicial settlement; such bilateral or diplomatic 
36 See Davis. OP. Cit. 
37 E. g. Lonrho pic vSecretarvofStatefor Trade and Industrv [1989] 2 AM ER609. Rv 
Secretary ofStatefor Trade and Industry exp Anderson Strathclvdeplc [198312 All 
ER 233. 
38 See e. g. Hammersmith & Fulham LBC v Secretaýv of State for the Environment 
[1990] 3 All ER 589, pp. 635-637, Mottinghamshire CC v Secretary of Statefor the 
Environment [ 19861 1 All ER 199. pp. 202-204; Lonrho plc v Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry [198912 All ER 609. 
39 See generally. J. Goh, European Air Transport Lmv and Competition (John Wiley. 
Chichester: 1997). 
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processes are no longer required nor possible under the common aviation M 
market. Instead. the new legal and economic order for Community air transport 
has created a new set of rights and obligations for the participants and which are 
enforceable in courts of law. As a result, relations within this economic sphere 
which were previously governed by other norms or values become juridified as 
the participants "turn to the legal framework in order to determine their right, 
duties, power and liabilities. "" 
Regulatory Capture and Accountability 
A major and common form of regulatory failure is widelv known as 'regulatory 
capture'. Regulatory capture, according to the Chicago school of thought, is 
where the process of regulation "is acquired by the industry and is designed bý 
and operated primarily for its benefit. "" The phenomenon of agency capture is 
perhaps better developed and better known in the context of administrative 
regulation in the US than in the UK. `- Even so, this is not an issue of minor 
consequence. Although it may be true that historically agency capture has never 
been a problem in the UK, the capture of other public institutions such as 
ministerial departments is not unknown. " As agency regulation become a more 
dominant feature of British public administration, it pays therefore to say a few 
words on the relevance or irrelevance of the capture theory. 
One of the earliest analyses on the work of regulatory agencies in the US was 
conducted by Bernstein in the 1950s. In his analysis, a regulatory agency went 
through a life-cycle so that regulatory capture is the stage when the agency 
becomes "a captive of the regulated groups. "' According to this life-cycle 
theory, an agency undergoes four stages of metamorphosis: gestation, youth, 
maturity and old age. He argues that the gestation stage is the period of 
regulatory reform under critical or near-critical conditions so that the reform 
results in short-term measures. At youth, the agency pursues an aggressive 
policy of protecting the public interest, and consequently provoking an 
organised opposition to its policies. As it struggles to resolve the tensions, it 
sinks into self-realisation that the alternative approach lies in securing the 
support of the regulated groups. This maturity stage is characterised by it 
becoming the protector of the regulated. The final stage of its life span is then 
spent on maintaining the status quo and the regulator becomes insular so that it 0 
no longer responds to wider socio-economic changes. 
40 M. Loughlin, "The Restructuring of Central-Local Government Relations" in J. Jowcll 
and D. Oliver (eds. ), The Changing Constitution (OUP, 0,, Sord: 2nd edn., 1994), 
p. 278. 
41 G. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation" (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics 
andItlanagement Science 3. 
42 See T. Prosser. Aationalised Industries and Public Control (Black,, N-cll. Oxford: 
1986), esp. chs. 8 and 9. 
43 Examples include the relationship between the Nfinistry of Agriculture and farmers, 
and indeed between the Department of Transport and the then publicly-ow-ned, 
British Airways 
44 M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Coininission (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton: 1955). 
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For Posner as well as Stigler, the regulatory machinery was first designed for 
the benefit of the regulated and their interests. Thus, it is more specific than 
Bernstein's life cycle theory in it suggests a more extensive influence by the 
regulated during the gestation stage to design a regulatory system that was 
more suited to their interests. " Both versions explain the suggestion made by 
Vickers and Yarrow in their study of the BA privatisation. They argue that the 
incumbent airline attempted to extract an assurance from the government that 
prior to its sale, the government would take every step to maintain its economic 
strength and dominance in the industry. " For others such as Edelman, the 
process of governmental regulation is a story of symbolic politics. He maintains 
that "administrative acts become symbols both of protection of a wide public 
and of the ability of regulators to see issues from the point of view of the 
regulated. "" 
The theory of regulatory capture is open to criticisms on several grounds. The 
first is the often limited scope of the theory. Stigler and Posner both assume that 
the primary and exclusive concern of the regulator is the user, the consumer or 
the general public: hence, the public interest theory. Once the regulatory agency 
changes its policy emphasis in favour of the regulated, it comes to be seen as 
captured. What the theory does not address is the possibility, deliberate or 
otherwise, of a combination of legislative mandates. Among these mandates 
may be to give a modicum of protection to the regulated groups. A common 
point of reference in their arguments is the protectionist policies of the CAB 
which were undeniably anti-competitilve. The users were losing out from the 
lack of competition because the regulated airlines maintained a significant 
influence on CAB policies. Whether such influence was real or otherwise, 
empirical findings from which to draw a conclusion abound. The argument in 
principle, however, is not whether such influence existed, but the need to lend 
contextual relevance to the analysis so that a protectionist strategy may simply 
be a matter of co-incidence, and not a product of a captured agency, The CAB, 
along with the other regulatory agencies, was a manifestation of the promise to 
induce gradual economic growth, and protectionism ran through the mass of 
legislation consequent on the New Deal programme. The uncertainties and the 
discontent flowing from the Depression of the 1920s and the 1930s left the US 
administration with very little choice but to introduce a new regime of 
administrative regulation. In addition, the presidential election of 1932, 
required a rational political strategy to restore public confidence which had been 
severely damaged by the consequences of the free-market system immediately 
prior to the Depression. The New Deal provided the promise of economic 
restructuring and the regulatory protection of vital industries. In this respect, 
protectionist policies signify an instrument of stability, not a product of 
capture. " Likewise, for the CAA, its statutory responsibilities include "an 
45 R. A. Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation" (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics 
an d, 11anagement Science 335. 
46 J, Vickers & G. Yarrow, Pfivatizzation: An Economic Analysis (MIT Press. Mass.: 
1988), p. 343. 
47 M. Edelman. The Svmbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press. Chicago: 
1964), p. 189. 
48 Ch. 8 discussed further the legislative mandate of the CAB. 
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economic return to efficient operators on the sums invested in providing the 
services". 
The theory of capture and the arguments of Stigler and Posner assume a 
@monolithic' structure of the regulatory complex in which the participants have 
equal strengths, resources and access to information. This may be true, for 
instance, in the context of the US airline industry where there is no history of 
public ownership or monopoly. For a wider application, the theory is liable to 
ignore the possibility of a structurally unbalanced industry where by reason of 
history or legislative diktat one participant enjoys a decidedly dominant position. 
Although BA was privatised in 1987, it was so privatised with its size and assets 
intact which included a wide network of routes, a large fleet of airc*raft 
including the prized Concorde and an important pool of airport slots at the 
popular Heathrow Airport. In this situation, other regulated participants within 
the regulatory complex may require the protection of regulation against market 
abuse, unfair exploitation or barriers to entry. Indeed, it may be necessary to 
give this measure of protection for the maintenance of competition, and the 
enhancement of user choice. In this sense, it cannot be said that tilting the 
balance of the policies in favour of the latter makes the regulator a captive of 
the regulated groups. The flexibility of the regulator in fashioning different 
regulatory strategies for different socio-econornýic climates is a self-proclaiming 
piece of evidence of the rise in the administrative agencies. Its resilience cannot 
be conveniently labelled as capture. 
One of the major difficulties in administrative regulation by agency is the 
temperament of the responsible regulator. Although to a large extent the 
regulator is a political appointee of the government of the day, regulatory 
policies and practices will inevitably be coloured by the beliefs of the regulator. 
The issue is all the more acute as regards regulatory systems which have been 
established in accordance with loosely formulated legislative provisions 
requiring detailed interpretations by the regulatory agency. These concerns are 
not unique to public administration in the US but are equally of vital significance 
to British constitutional and political theory. " Thus, another important 
characteristic of regulation which the capture theory does not adequately 
address is the personnel involved in the regulatory process and their personal 
conviction which so often play an instrumental part in the shaping of regulatory 
strategies. In a collection of analyses on American regulation, James Wilson 
notes that "the movement to deregulate domestic aviation ... arose not because 
the airlines ... 
had changed, but because the beliefs of key political participants 
had changed. 1150 What this observation suggests is that the success rate of 
capturing an agency often depends on the policy-makers within the agency, 
49 See. for instance. the controversies relating to the recent policies and decisions of the 
OfrIcc for Gas Supplv not to cap charges for domestic gas supply: The Guardian, (25 
May 1994) and the Office of Electricity Regulation on price rcNiew immediately 
following the flotation of Government shares in National Power and PowerGen: The 
Times. (9 March 1995). Sce also T. Prosscr, "Privatisation, Regulation and Public 
Services" (1994) Juridical Review 7 and W. Hutton, The State He're In (Vintage, 
London: 1995). p. 291. 
50 J. Q. Wilson W. ). The Politics ofRegulation (Basic Books, New York: 1980). p. 384. 
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This is borne out in the history of CAB chairmanship from 196() to 1977 which 
deserves some detailed treatment. Secor Browne ( 1969) and Robert Timm 
( 1973) were among the staunchest advocate of protectionism who would not 
welcome the challenges of competition. The CAB was steered towards greater 
anti-competitiveness whenever possible including the grant of antitrust immunity 
to anti-competitive agreements. During his term as the chairman, Browne 
imposed what was known as the "moratorium" on licensint.; new services. It 
attracted severe criticisms and he subsequently resigned. 
Timm in many ways was even a stronger supporter of anti-competitiveness and 
his approach "made himself and the CAB an easy target for critics who charged 
that they were protecting the airlines at the expense of the travelling public. "ý' 
At the end of his term, no effort was made to re-appoint him as chairman of the 
CAB. He was replaced by John Robson (1975) who favoured competition and 
who believed that command-and-control regulation of fares could only lead to 
inefficiency and higher fares. He provided every impetus that was necessary to 
turn around the regulatory philosophy of the CAB inherited from Browne and 
Timm. But Robsons mission was greatly helped by the favourable economic 
conditions that were then emerging. Air traffic experienced a significant growth 
as the public began flying again. At the same time, there was a notable decline in 
the operating costs of airline companies which led to more healthy profit and 
loss statements. The developments during Robson's leadership created a 
positive impression so that the politicians, the public and indeed supporters of 
protectionism began to have a more receptive attitude towards the CAB's new 
approach. The appointment of Alfred Kahn (1977) as chairman virtually sealed 
the fate of protectionism in American air transport, and opened a new era of 
experience for the industry. Kahn was in a number of ways a deeper believer 
than Robson in competition, and he engineered a new economic framework for 
the industry by introducing a number of significant reforms, His influence within 
the CAB was considerable. He built a great deal of enthusiasm into the work of 
the CAB and the idea of reducing regulatory controls was well received. But, as 
with Robson, Kahn's efforts were given an enormous lift by incidental 
developments of the time, particularly the Congressional hearing headed by 
Senator Edward Kennedy in the mid-1970s which eventually led to the 
legislative reforms in the air transport sector. Such was the variation in the 
personal conviction of the chairmen that it bore a significant effect on the 
regulatory philosophy of the CAB. 
By contrast, although the CAA has been led by a stream of chairpersons over 
the years, it is not evident that the change in personnel has also led to a 
substantial shift in the policy emphasis. On the contrary, these chairpersons have 
consistently subscribed to the view of less regulation and more competition. 
Such consistency has inevitably led to a process that is less confrontational and 
more pragmatic. In some respects, the policy consistency has also been the 
result of government policy on airline competition, not only within domestic but 
in international air transport as well. The one significant exception was the 
instruction to withdraw the licence of Laker Airways in 1976. Furthermore, the 
51 B. Behrman, "Civil Aeronautics Board" in ibid, p. 99. 
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way in which CAA decisions are taken, especially in licensing cases, would 
seem to make it difficult for any one individual to shape the policies of the 
institution. In the first place, such decisions are taken by a panel, typically 
Comprising of two CAA members and an official who provides technical advice. I? . These decisions may be taken on appeal to the Secretary of State in the light of 
the reasons published by the CAA. Secondly, at the time the CAA was created 
in 1972, there was effectively one dominant carrier in the form of British 
Airways Board; to speak of capture then would seem rather odd. In any event, 
the Civil Aviation Act of 1971 gave explicit protection to producer interests, 
and user interests were only second in order. With the passing of the Civil 
Aviation Act of 1982, there was a decided shift away from this protection of 
producer interests and user interests were given the same order of importance. 
in the absence of overwhelming evidence, to give priority to airline interests 
would be an obvious contradiction of the expressed legislative intent. Equally 
too, the creation of the Single European Aviation Market has removed a 
substantial part of the CAA's discretion in economic licensing cases, and put 
emphasis on promoting competition within the sector, though there are several 
rnisgivings under the arrangements which are explored below. 
Supply of Information and Capture 
Although the general theory of regulatory capture needs to be understood in the 
appropriate context including, it may be added, whether the regulatory official is 52 
an elected or politically-appointed member, one area of the regulatory process 
that is most susceptible to capture is the supply of information. Regulatory 
policies or decisions cannot exist in a vacuum. Information is required to make 
sense of them, and to a large extent this is dependent on the participants of the 
regulatory complex. It is this dependence for the supply information which 
rnakes the regulator vulnerable to capture since the process of supplying and the 
contents of the information may be used as a strategic instrument by the 
suppliers who seek to influence the policies or decisions of the regulator. Only 
information that was likely to be used to their benefit would be given while that 
which is likely to threaten their own interests would be withheld. For most of 
the time, the regulated would have more information than the regulator. Nfitnick 
explains this "partial theory of regulatory capture" by reference to the friendship 
and favours relationship. 
By doing the regulators 'favors' and satisfying everyday job 
performance needs through supplying information, the industry 
can ease regulators' work loads (i. e. increase their level of 
'convenience') and create friendships between industry members 
and agency personnel. Industry control over the information 
needed by regulators can lead to shared regulator-industry 
perceptions of industry problems and appropriate solutions. 
information can, of course, be supplied selectively to the 
52 Elected officials who perform a regulatory function would risk their tenure in office if 
they chose to disregard the public interest. In order to further their political 
ambitions, these officials acting in the capacity of regulators will need to be 
responsive to the demands of the public so as to attract their votes: S. Peltzman, 
"Towards A More General Theory of Regulation" (1976) 19 Journal of Law and 
Econotnics 211. 
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regulators or distorted with an industry bias, Through control of 
information, the industry can succeed in coopting the 
regulators... i. e. in making the regulators perceive the regulatory C. task through an informational network and orientation provided 
by the industry. " 
in Baldwin's study, the independence of agency discretion could be 
compromised by informational capture in cases where agency decisions have to 
be made on the basis on information supplied by the regulated groups. This 
problem was exacerbated by the dominance of certain groups in formal 
proceedings and hence a considerable likelihood that those decisions would 
reflect the interests of only those supplying the information. " It has already be6n 
noted, however, that this difficulty is not insurmountable in the case of an 
agency which adopts a programme of independent research and analysis, and 
consultation procedures which are open and extensive. In the case of the CAA, 
s. 69(3) of the 1982 Act requires it to consult "such persons as appears to it to 
be representative" before any policy statement is published. They include 
representatives of the civil air transport industry of the UK and the users of air 
transport services, organised in the form of the Air Transport Users Council 
(ATUC). The broad term of "representatives of the civil air transport industry" 
allows the CAA the discretion to conduct a wide process of consultation and 
therefore reduces any potential capture by the dominant interests of the 
industry. It would mean that the CAA will be examining information supplied by 
a more diverse group of participants. An effective and broader process of 
consultation is not only desirable to the extent that it removes the likelihood of 
the regulatory agency from being captured by one set of interests, but also re- 
asserts its constitutional legitimacy. 
Decision-making at Community Level 
The foregoing discussion has repeatedly argued that consultation and openness 
in decision-making adds probity to the decisions. However, the preceding 
chapters have also submitted evidence that, as a consequence of its own policies 
and the effects of the third liberalisation package, the number of hearings as well 
as consultations conducted by the CAA has been decreasing. More significantly, 
the effect of the third package has not only been to remove the system of 
hearings for air transport licensing for Community routes by virtue of the 
automatic rights introduced by the measures, but has also been to remove the 
, opportunities for objections to be made against an application for a route 
licence, notwithstanding the fact that the CAA has itself been licensing liberally. 
Although total dependence on such objections is not likely to be always 
53 B. Nfitnick. The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing and 
Renioving Regulato? y Forins (Columbia University Press, Columbia: 1980), p. 21 1. 
54 Baldvvin. op. cit (1985), pp. 219-231. He also suggested that the regulator could be 
captured if officials of the regulatory agency continuously identified themselves with 
the interests of the operators for the purposes of future employment. Further. threats 
which are exerted by the operators could also have a bearing on the policies or 
decisions of the agency. 
235 
adequate as a systematic and open method of public interest representation, in 
one respect, these objections are a means by which the public interest, or more 
specifically user interests, may be represented. 
To the extent that the scope of the CAA's functions has changed, and become a 
matter for Community institutions, particularly the European Comn-dssion, a few 
words must be said of Community decision-making procedures, not so much in 
terms of policy formulation, " but in the context of air transport competition 
decisions, for example, route access, fares, mergers and State aids, 
In terms of broader accountability, the Commission has to provide answers to 
questions from the European Parliament. However, there is little in the way bf 
enforceable sanctions against an unsatisfactory account, The formal powers of 
the EP to dismiss the Commission exist more in theory than practical reality; in 
any event, any motion to dismiss the Comn-dssion must be carried by at least a 
two-thirds majority. The independence which the Comn-dssion enjoys in policy 
and decision-making processes in many ways insulates it against any specific 
instructions from the Council and Member States, although in reality there is a 
substantial degree of co-operation between the two. The absence of any real 
mechanism to enforce the accountability of the Comn-dssion either to the EP or 
the Council is compounded by the reluctance of the courts to intervene either on 
substantive or procedural review. 
A number of Commission decisions relating to air transport have already been 
challenged on the ground that insufficient reasons had been given, as required 
by Article 190 of the Treaty. The first of these involved a judicial review 
application by Air France against the decisions of the Commission allowing the 
BA-TAT merger to proceed. Although the Court of First Instance accepted the 
submission of the applicant that the Commission was obliged to state the 
reasons for its decisions, it was not obliged to provide reasons for rejecting 
arguments Put forward by parties to the administrative proceedings, nor indeed 
by third parties. " Added to this, the CH has also agreed with the Comn-dssion 
that consultation prior to decision-making is not required unless specifically set 
out in legislation. In a case brought by Air France against the decision of the 
Commission not investigate the merger between BA and Dan-Air, and for the 
lack of consultation with affected parties, the CH had stated that 
to require the Commission to go through the formality of 
consultation where ... the provisions applicable to the matter 
under consideration do not impose any such consultation 
obligation on the institution, would oblige it to fulfil unnecessary 
formalities and needlessly delay the procedure. '_ 
The Court went to state that, in the absence of a legislative provision obliging 
the Commission to consult, it would be reluctant to impose such a consultation 
obligation which did not exist as a general principle of 
law. 
55 For more detailed discussion on EC policy formulation procedures, see N. Nugent, 
The Government and Politics of the European Cominuniýy (Macmillan, Basingstoke: 
3rd. edn., 1994). 
56 Case T-2/93. Air France v Commission [ 19941 ECR 11-323. 
57 Case T-3/93, Air France v Commission [19941 ECR 11-12 1. 
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It is not suggested that these decisions were substantively ultra Ores, but that 
procedural propriety either in the form of comprehensive reasoning or 
consultation to make fully informed decisions is an important safeguard against 
the excesses of discretionary powers; as is transparency. But a number of 
Commission decisions which have been impugned in the courts suggest that the 
record for openness is far from strikingly good. " This is in spite of a Council 
Decision and a Commission Decision relating providing access to information 
held by the Council and Commission. " Indeed, in terms of transparency and 
access to competition information, its approach has been described as "overly 
formalistic and insufficiently responsive". " It should also be added that oral 
hearings for competition cases generally and therefore air transport competitidn 
cases are not held in public, a procedure expressly provided for by the relevant 
legislation. " 
The Case for A Counsel on Public Interest Representation 
in the light of these procedural deficits, the implication is that more can still be 
done to create greater openness and accountability for Commission decisions. 
To that end, a case has to be made for a Public Counsel on Civil Aviation 
charged with the responsibility of representing the public interest in air transport 
licensing and enforcement under the new common aviation market. While this 
may have the advantage of transparency on the one hand, it ensures on the other 
hand that all views are considered from all perspectives. But the Public Counsel 
is by no means a re-invention of regulatory intervention. Its role will be 
restricted to public interest representation, for example, in applications for 
operating licences, or complaints against the abuse of the exemptions under the 
market access Regulation, or complaints against excessively low fares or high 
capacity so that a policy of liberal competition can be satisfactorily reconciled 
, with the demands for public interest protection such as exploitation or safety. 
Similarly, such representation should also be present in anti-competitive or 
abuse of a dominant position cases under the first package. This system of 
public interest representation is characteristic of that which obtains in the US in 
the shape of the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings, although it 
should go much further than the role of the latter. 
The Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings operates under the 
auspices of the Department of Transportation (DoT) which has the 
responsibility of deciding applications for operating licences under the 
58 Case T-194/94, Carvel and Guardian v Council [19951 3 CNER 359; Case T- 
105195,97TTv Commission [1997] 2 CMLR 55. 
59 Respectively, Council Decision 93/731, OJ [19931 L340/43 and Commission 
Decision 94/90 OJ [19941 L46/58. 
60 M. Levitt, "Access to the File: The Commission's Administrative Procedures in cases 
under Articles 85 and 86" (1997) 34 C. IfLRev 1413. 
61 Art. 9(3) of Council Regulation 17/62, OJ [1959-1962 Sp. edn. ) p. 204 for general 
competition cases, and Art. 12(3) of Commission Regulation 4261/88, OJ [19881 
L376/10 for air transport competition cases. 
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deregulated regime Despite the overall policy of the US Con ress to reduce 
the regulation of air transport, it retained decidedly the initial and continuing 
requirement of fitness, so that no one may operate as an air carrier unless 
certified and continued to be certified by the DoT under s. 401 of the Federal 
Aviation Act 1958. Specifically, s. 401(d)(1) requires, inter alia, that "the 
applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly and to 
conform to the provisions of this Act. " An application for an operating licence 
may be set for a public hearing, or dismissed on its merits, or decided under 
19simplified procedures" which provide for "adequate notice and opportunity for 
any interested person to file appropriate written evidence and argument but 
need not provide for oral evidentiary hearings", In this respect, therefore, 
hearings to determine an application are discretionary and normally held if itis 
in the public interest to do so and these are presided over by an Administrative 
Law Judge, The CAB remarked in 1979 that a full evidentiary examination is 
generally reserved "for those cases in which oral testimony and cross- 
examination can help resolve open questions of material determinative fact ... Our basic aim is that the public interest in safe air transportation be protected and 
that, consistent with the aim, the method chosen to assess the fitness be tailored 
to the circumstances of each case. "" Where a hearing has been set, the Office 
of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings will then be designated to assist the 
decision-maker in developing as complete an administrative record as possible 
for the application in question and to present "a position it believes serves the 
best interests of the public". In such instances the Office of Aviation 
Enforcement and Proceedings assumes its role as Public Counsel to represent 
the public interest, although public interest representation in the licensing of a 
new carrier has been a long-standing practice dating back to the days of the 
CAB. Then, public interest representation was carried out by the legal division 
of various bureaux within the CAB depending on the nature of the case in 
question. The Public Counsel role was re-organised and consolidated into one 
office under the auspices of the Office of Aviation Enforcement and 
proceedings following the Airline Deregulation Act 1978 at which time also the 
remaining functions of the CAB were transferred to the DoT under the Civil 
Aeronautics Board Sunset Act 1984. The occasion on which the Public 
Counsel has played a significant role in public interest representation is amply 
illustrated in the first refusal of the DoT in the post-deregulation era to issue an 
operating authorisation to one Francisco Lorenzo on the basis that his previous 
experience in Eastern Air Lines and Continental Airlines had failed to 
demonstrate an adequate level of managerial competence and a serious lack of 
compliance disposition with aviation regulations. " A subsequent application for 
judicial review of the decision was dismissed. " 
Other basic areas of the work of the Office of Aviation Enforcement and 
Proceedings extend into enforcement activities, monitoring continuing fitness 
and compliance, and fraud enforcement. For the purposes of its submission, the 
Public Counsel is assisted by a team of experts who will prepare exhibits, 
62 Federal Express et al.,. Midway Service [1979] 82 CAB 980 (original emphasis). 
63 Department of Transportation, .4 TV Inc. Fitness Investigation, Order 94-4-8 (5 April 
1994). 
64 Transcript of the Court of Appeal, District of Columbia: 16 December 1994. 
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analyses and provide oral as well as written testimony. Although the personnel 
of the Public Counsel team are officials of the DoT. a strict separation of 
powers and functions is observed in accordance with the rules of conduct of the 
DoT and the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 when the 63 Public Counsel role is invoked. 
Even though the US has embarked on a system of economic deregulation since 
1978, limited licensing is still in place and hearings may be held to develop as 
comprehensive a record as possible for the purposes of determining applications 
from new carriers for operating licences. It is a system by which a body of case- 
law may be developed to guide future licensing decisions. Hearings may also be 
held for cases of anti-competitive practices, employee protection atid 
enforcement. The case for a public interest representation system in Community 
air transport, however, needs to go beyond applications for operating licences 
to include cases on route access, fares, capacity and the regulation of State aids 
and mergers. US airlines operate in a totally deregulated environment; 
Community airlines do not. Regulatory decisions as much as antitrust 
enforcement continue to be necessary in certain cases including of course State 
aids, and must accordingly have the benefit of public interest representation. 
And logically, representations from the Public Counsel should take place 
towards the close of the proceedings when the representations could also reflect 
the preceding submissions of other parties to the proceedings. 
Representation of user interests in route licensing in the UK, though not 
necessarily the public interest, has often taken the form of submissions from the 
Air Transport Users Council (AUC) and by virtue of the fact that the CAA has a 
statutory obligation to further the reasonable interests of users. Indeed, it was 
this statutory obligation which played a part in leading the CAA to set up the 
AUC (then the Air Transport Users Committee) in the summer of 1973 to assist 
in protecting customers of British airlines. ' Although the AUC was initially 
affiliated to the CAA by virtue of the joint chairmanship of both bodies, the 
process of giving the AUC greater independence began in 1977 with the 
abandonment of the joint chairmanship and culminated in more complete 
independence the following year. The AUC said in response to this development 
that it aimed "to take advantage of its freedom to say and do what it thinks best 
in the interests of the air traveller - including freedom to criticize the CAA. "" 
of course, the downside of such detachment from the CAA was the less ready 
access to information and data held by the CAA, which the AUC had previously 
enjoyed, to formulate comprehensive comments. ' No such provision for 
representation and transparency has been made under the Community 
liberalisation measures. To that extent, it seems appropriate to make the case 
for establishing a Public Counsel on Civil Aviation; afortiori, in the absence of 
opportunities for public hearings and consequently objections. This is not to 
65 1 must register my grateful thanks to Counsel Da)-ton Lehman Jr at the Office of 
Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings for his valuable assistance on these matters. 
66 See Baldvin. op. cit. (1985), pp. 221-225 for the emergence of the AUC and the 
evolution of its functions. 
67 AUC.. 4nnual Report (1977-78), p. 17 
68 See BaIdNvin, op-cit. (1985), pp. 223-224. But see s. 84, Civil Aviation Act 1982. 
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suggest 
. 
that the ALTC should be abandoned; far from it. Quite apart from the 
continuing role it has to play in respect. of air transport matters for which 
Member States still retain exclusive jurisdiction, the AUC is a member of the 
Federation of Air Transport User Representatives in Europe (FATURE) with 
whom the European Commission consults on air transport initiatives. But the 
FATURE is no substitute for a formal and systematic machinery of 
representation. 
An important difference between the Public Counsel and the AUC (and indeed, 
the FATURE) lies in the wider remit which the Public Counsel should have by 
representing the public interest rather than simply user interests. It would differ 
from the AUC to the extent that it will become a formal part of the regulatory 
process to ensure a systematic method of representation in Community air 
transport. More importantly, it would provide for centralised representations 
rather than the fragmented manner in which such representations are made by 
representative institutions of Member States. The Commission would therefore 
have the benefit of expert information and representations in coming to its 
decisions. Although the Commission is advised at present by advisory 
committees in accordance with the terms of the relevant legislation, it is also 
clear that these committees do not have an explicit remit to represent the public 
interest, or user interests for that matter. That being so, it can hardly be called a 
system of public interest representation. At the same time, this should not 
preclude the development of a co-operative framework in particular for the 
exchange of information and opinions between the AUC, perhaps through the 
]FATLTRE, and the Public Counsel. The new horizons brought about by the 
changes under Community law is an opportunity to re-assess the regulatory 
approach to provide for greater coherence and transparency. Such a system of 
representation would accordingly avoid the appearance that all the relevant 
perspectives have not been fully aired, and more particularly perhaps, to dispel 
any claim of "regulatory capture". 
Conclusion 
Time and again, the point has been made in this thesis that regulation is a second 
best enterprise; a species of centralisation and a process that, potentially at least, 
interferes with the autonomous spheres of private individuals. Thus, whether the 
CAA adopts a policy built on competition, or one which is biased towards 
protecting the incumbents, it needs to be able to justify that choice. What 
follows should be reasonably plain sailing; its licensing decisions on routes, on 
fares and on capacity should be broadly consistent with its policy. Exceptions 
rnay have to be made naturally, but only where the circumstances of the case 
overwhelmingly dictate. Overall, the aims of this penultimate chapter have been 
to chart the processes of accountability and the need to have decisions taken in 
the sunlight rather than moonlight. Specifically, it has sought to emphasise the 
paramount importance of transparency in the exercise of agency discretion so 
that allegations of bias, capture and all that can be readily deflected. n 
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Accountability cannot operate in a vacuum. It has to relate to the nature of the 
circumstances, and as these change, so must the nature of accountability. In so 
far as the regulatory responsibility of the CAA is now restricted to cases where 
there are constraints on route entry and antitrust regulation of fares and 
capacity, this is a substantial, though not a complete, shift in the focus of 
accountability. On one level, the CAA must remain responsible for its policies 
including the liberal route licensing policy and the deregulated policy on fares 
and capacity it has adopted. On another level, by removing controls on fares 
and capacity, and liberalising route licensing, the CAA has effectively shifted the 
authority for decisions on route entry, levels of fares to charge and capacity or 
flight schedules to the airlines with the consequence that these airlines Must 
assume the responsibility that comes with such decisional freedom. Ultimately, 
they remain accountable either to their shareholders, creditors or investors for 
that common purpose which they have set out to achieve (maximising 
investment return) and the manner in which they have sought to realise that aim 
(meeting user interests). Of course, the extent of this freedom must be set 
against the background of those difficulties which have a restrictive effect such 
as bilateral and infrastructural constraints. 
Nevertheless, the face of domestic regulation would have changed if not for 
CAM established policy of liberal route licensing or fares and capacity 
deregulation as a result of the three liberalisation packages adopted by the EC. 
To the extent that they mirror the policies of the CAA such as the deregulation 
of fares and capacity, the effect would have been similar in that a substantial 
measure of accountability will be owed by the airlines to their owners. Other 
than the exemptions contained in the market access Regulation, access to routes 
vAthin the EC is now free and thus, in theory at least, goes further than liberal 
licensing. Nevertheless, the liberalisation programme has also brought with it 
several difficulties, some of which were examined in chapter seven. In 
particular, the transfer of competence in air transport competition from the 
CAA to the Commission must mean that any assessment of the CAA's 
regulatory functions and accountability must take this shift in responsibility into 
account. The deficits which this chapter has shown suggest that more can be 
done to enhance the accountability of Commission's decisions. Amongst other 
things, the creation of a Public Counsel for public interest representation would 
ensure a more systematic way of considering the public interest when 
determining competition cases in Community air transport; more to the point, it 
would open up the processes of decision-making to greater scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER TEN CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A 
NEW REGULATORYERA 
The inchistg is, and wi/I continue lo be, highly regulated throughout the vvorU 
Until the passing of the of the Civil Aviation Act 1971 that led to the 
establishment of the CAA, Government oversight of British civil aviation was 
fuelled by economic policies which were largely restrictive and steered by a 
succession of institutions haphazardly organised. Indeed, as Baldwin noted iq 
1985, "few areas of economic activity have been subjected to as many different 
regulatory regimes as the British civil aviation industry. "2 While British and US 
civil aviation may have enjoyed public policy parallels when civil aviation first 
emerged, that is, a privately owned industry left to the initiatives of the 
entrepreneurs, there is a much more chequered history this side of the Atlantic. 
If the Churchillian policy of "fly by themselves" had transcended beyond the 
realm of Politics, the structure of British civil aviation today could have been 
radically different. But history tells a different story. The dominance of politics 
over civil aviation is considerable and real, and will undoubtedly continue to be 
so. The strategic importance of civil aviation and the inherent international 
nature of the industry that impinges on national sovereignty will always be the 
fundamental claims for Governmental intervention. Whatever form that 
intervention takes, whether by the fact of ownership or administrative regulation 
through the offices of a Government-established agency, is a matter of lesser 
import at this stage although the nature of accountability will clearly vary 
according to the institutional choice and design. The history of airline 
regulation bears ample evidence of this point. Of course, this by no means 
ignores the expansion of the administrative process consistent with the growth 
of the modern State. Only that the lack of a coherent strategy for the evolution 
of administrative institutions meant the subjection of British civil aviation to a 
myriad of advisory, regulatory and licensing bodies. By contrast, the CAB 
remained very much the institution it was designed to function until its abolition 
in 1985. In the UK, the task of regulating the airlines is today the responsibility 
of the CAA. 
Nevertheless, the role of the CAA has changed, and changed substantially since 
the third package of Community liberalisation measures came into effect in 
1993. Preceding chapters have shown that these changes have affected the 
substantive policies and procedures of the CAA, although in fairness, it should 
Civil Aviation Policv (Ciund. 4213.1969). para. 12. A number of reasons were 
offered: "First. there is the need for the highest standards of safety and the need to 
control aircraft noise. Secondly. there is the need for stability and regularity of public 
services. Lastly. there is the inescapable fact that international services depend upon 
a network of agreements reached with other countries. defining traffic rights which 
airlines may enjoy. The need. therefore. is to operate within this framework in such a 
jvaýv as to give the industry the biggest possible opportunities in the expanding world 
market. " 
2 R. Baldivin. Regulating the. 4irlines (198-5). p. 14. 
also be said that much of what is contained in the third package is a vindicýation 
of the established policies and practices of the CAA. Even so, the regulatory 
role of the CAA has been curtailed and effectively limited to extra-Community 
markets until such time as a policy on external relations in air transport has been 
developed by the Community. It should be added also that, quite apart from 
safety regulation, the CAA will continue to play an increasingly crucial role in 
the protection of consumers through its established Air Transport Organisers 
Licence (ATOL) system. Since 1973, this has been a source of protection for 
holiday-makers against the vagaries of the cut-throat business, where the profit 
margin can be as low as 15 per person. Its other remaining major task is the 
regulation of airports under the terms of the Airports Act 1986 where it has ' 
the 
role of a quasi-utility regulator, but which is outside the scope of this work. 
Administrative Regulation of Airline Competition 
The aim of this thesis, established at the outset, was to examine the role of an 
administrative agency entrusted with the task of regulating competition. its 
leading contention was to argue that competition regulation in certain economic 
sectors takes two principal forms, economic and antitrust regulation, but that 
the regulatory emphasis shifts from economic to antitrust regulation when it can 
be deemed that the conditions of sustainable competition have been achieved. It 
was submitted that this critical market contestability implies that the economic 
regulatory process becomes less important as market forces are relied upon 
more frequently to provide competitive solutions. Air transport and the CAA 
has been singled out given not only that little work has been done by public 
lawyers on the competition regulation of air transport, in particular on charting 
the changes to the economic regulatory policies and practices of the CAA since 
its inception and since the arrival of EC measures on air transport liberalisation, 
but also because it is an industry that possesses the characteristics to flesh out 
the themes of this thesis. 
Regulation in the broadest sense of the term has been the subject of various 
analyses which were reviewed in the opening chapter including the taxonomy of 
regulation offered by Nlitnick in The Political Econom of Regulation. Given Y 
its breadth, therefore, assumptions had to be made for the concept to have a 
niore specific contextual relevance. A working definition for examining the role 
of the CAA was to assume regulation as a system of control of the behaviour or 
activities of individuals or organisations to achieve a certain end and the non- 
compliance of which can be enforced by way of penalties or exclusion. The 
generality of this formulation allows also for the regulation of non-economic 
behaviour such as those relating to safety or the envirom-nent. The regulation of 
airline competition by the CAA is essentially the 
imposition of a constraint on 
the economic behaviour of the participants in the regulated complex either by 
direct or indirect means. The latter may be characterised by the distinction 
between active and passive regulation, and in the case of the CAA is 
represented by the liberal licensing policy on routes or the 
deregulation of fares 
and capacity where intervention 
is minimal and in any event limited to cases 
when the realisation of the statutory objectives was threatened. 
In the case of 
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anti-competitive practices, economic regulatory interventions have also been 
made to resolve them through the conditioning of air transport licences. The 0 
combination of direct regulatory intervention in circumstances where the need is 
evident and a liberal framework to promote competition and user interests is the 
doctrine of regulated competition. This combines autonomy of decision- 
making on the part of the 'producers' and safeguards for 'purchasers' against 
exploitative actions of the producers. By fostering competition amongst airlines 
to serve the interests of users, the CAA aims to achieve a maximum overlap 
between airline and user interests, so that this mutuality would reduce the 
possibilities for interventions since the producers and purchasers would be 
sharing common objectives. 
This has largely been helped by the elasticity of the statutory duties under the 
Civil Aviation Act 1982 which has provided the CAA with the flexibility to 
shape its regulatory policies and to adopt practices which give more poignancy 
to the doctrine of regulated competition. It has, for example, been able to 
deregulate fares and capacity where this has not been prohibited by bilateral 
agreements or Community measures. Whether competition has been generated 
by administrative liberalisation of route access or administrative deregulation of 
fares and capacity, both have required the CAA to identify the critical level of 
market contestability. This shift in policy emphasis and practice, however, had 
to be consistent with its statutory obligations so that liberalisation or 
deregulation could not be construed as an abdication of those obligations. 
Indeed, over time, Government policies have increasingly stressed the 
importance of competition which eventually led the Government to omit the 
primacy of airline interests when the 1982 legislation was passed. In part, this 
was also the consequence of the influence exerted by the CAA that competition 
would better secure the objectives of efficiency and a strong industry, an 
approach which gradually became apparent in its own regulatory policies and 
licensing case-law, and indeed bome out by the benefits which users have 
enjoyed either on fares, greater choice of schedules, or improved in-flight 
service. The preference for competitive solutions, however, is not and cannot 
be absolute because a competition policy cannot exist in a vacuum. It has to be 
a means for securing a particular end or objective and for the CAA, this has 
been the reasonable interests of users. The combination of competitive solutions 
and the common aim of the airlines and users to be satisfied by each other 
means regulatory interventions could be reduced to the minimurn and would be 
invoked only when there has been a breach of these framework rules. To the 
extent that this is possible, Weber has described this commitment to 
individual 
autonomy and choice in consumption as characteristic of a geselIschaftlich 
model of social organisation. By postulating of user interests as a primary 
concern of its regulatory task, the CAA has sought to turn the private 
incentives 
of the industry into a methodology for securing 
its regulatory objectives. 
Commenting on the success of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in regulating by incentives, McCraw said, 
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The heart of the regulatory system would be a careffil shaping 
and bending of the incenýives structures, so that each of the 
ma . or players would voluntarily carry SEC policies. 3 i 
This was the essence of CAA economic regulatory policy and approach. 
Equality between airlines, however, is not possible for reasons associated with 
the past. BA's historical position and the way in which it was privatised has 
given rise to considerable inequality of strength and opportunity, and a serious 
structural imbalance. Yet, to actively diminish the strength of BA as the 
dominant airline would be tantamount to transferring its profits to its 
competitors and indeed to the detriment of BA's shareholders and. its 
competitiveness in international air transport. Without a legislative mandate, 
this would be constitutionally objectionable. Equality of opportunity rather than 
equality of size and strength would have greater compatibility with the statutory 
language and Government policy, though this policy has essentially required a 
measure of preference for smaller airlines or competitors in some cases. In 
particular, enforced limitations have been necessary where barriers to 
competition have been high either as a product of a deliberate action such as 
bilateral constraints or historical endowment, or market growth leading to 
infrastructural congestion, Much of these relate to market entry or route access 
and less so on fares and capacity for the latter are more amenable to 
deregulation subject only to anti-competitive safeguards. 
Nevertheless, these are the restrictive characteristics of the airline industry 
which would militate against a total reliance on the theory of market 
contestability. They deny that the airline industry is naturally competitive. By 
contrast, Baumol et. aL had assumed in their theory of contestable markets that 
the airline industry was naturally competitive and consequently does not call for 
regulation. The difficulty with this theory for the air transport market is the 
number of assumptions it has to make or the number of fundamental 
characteristics which it has to ignore. First, sunk costs are not insignificant in 
the air transport market. Even if capital costs were to be ignored, the costs of 
wages for crew members, preparation and documentation, conversion of aircraft 
and depreciation in appropriate cases, are by no means negligible even though 
prior market analysis may have indicated that these costs could be set against 
the profits. Such profits, however, is dependent on whether the entry provokes 
a response from the incumbent. If the latter chooses to refrain from taking 
action, then it will either lose its market share and eventually withdraw, or 
remain commercially irrational by incurring loses. If the incumbent retaliates in 
a Competitive manner, then one of three responses is possible. Either they 
remain in competition with each other, or the incumbents subsequently 
withdraws, or the new entrant exits. In both instances, there is an assumed 
period of inimobilisme on the part of the incumbent so that the new entrant 
makes sufficient profits to make its sunk costs negligible. On the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that, rather than compete and risk these sunk costs, airlines 
would develop strategies to forge alliances with others and in doing so 
rationalise, if not minimise, their costs. Secondly, the theory does not address 
3 See T. K. McCra-*N,, Prophets ofRegulation (Belknap Press. Harvard: 1985). p. 187. 
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an industry structure which by reason of history is disproportionately balanced 
in favour of a particular operator such that there is no "symmetric competition". 
Thus, in the case of London(Heathrow) airport, for example, the congestion is 
unlikely to allow for any significant creation of new landing and take-off slots. 
To expand competition, by creating more opportunities for airline operators to 
compete, either new slots are created or existing slots are relinquished by an 
incumbent to the benefit of another in order for freedom of entry to make sense, 
Where an airline enjoys a dominant position, such as BA, it may be extremely 
difficult to secure from it a voluntary surrender of its slots to a competitor. 
A third and related difficulty of the theory vis-6-vis air transport is its neglect of 
the infrastructural limitations such as the lack of runway capacity. Freedom 6f 
entry would be meaningless if the new entrant cannot have access to a take-off 
or landing slot at the airports as much as if it were to be denied the 
opportunities of attractive flight schedules. On the account of these difficulties, 
while deregulation may promise in theory freedom of entry and decision- 
making, its promise of perfect competition is less sound in practice. Market 
contestability would be more achievable under conditions of regulated 
competition in the sense developed here. This means through a process of 
economic regulation in the first place, maximum contestability would be sought 
between the producers. The aim of the process would be to turn these 
competing producers towards the incentives of the sector itself so as to achieve 
a maximum overlap between producer and purchaser interests. Thus, the need 
for regulatory intervention may at time be necessary to bring about this state of 
affairs such as by using the policy of substitution which represents a threat to 
the incumbent airline. 
Theory of Regulated Competition 
In many ways, British air transport has come a long way since air transport was 
first pioneered. Its history from private ownership to nationalisati6n over a 
period of seventy years or so and its return to the private sector in the 1980s 
has been both dynamic and varied. Importantly too, the effect of all of these 
fundamental changes on the regulatory landscape has not been insignificant. 
Over a period of about ninety years since civil aviation began, the regulatory 
environment has oscillated between protectionism through public ownership to 
competition through liberal licensing of airlines. Whether these changes have 
been driven by political dogma or otherwise is a matter for further debate some 
other time elsewhere. For now, the point has to be made that in a substantial 
number of those years, regulatory flexibility has proven invaluable. And, this 
thesis submits, will continue to be crucial. Of course, in any retrospective 
survey, it is always simple to be wise ex post facto in that the benefits derived 
from the deregulatory or liberal measures of the CAA, or indeed US 
deregulation, allows one to presume a certain degree of inevitability of the 
results in the choice of policy; that, for instance, "rolling back the State" 
whether by privatisation or deregulation to provide competition is a good in 
itself relative to nationalisation or command-control regulation. To assume so, 
would be wrong and decidedly misleading, and at the very least unsubstantiated n 
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by the evidence in this study. Even so, the presumption seems clear that 
competition and choice has delivered overall benefits. 
The question as posed in the opening chapters is not about whether regulation is 
needed, but rather one of more or less regulation and the nature of regulation, 
Hence, the notions of "rolling back the State" or "re-Inventing government" 
must necessarily be qualified to the extent that it can be achieved. In the 
regulation of air transport, and specifically in competition, this thesis submits 
that the extent to which such a roll back or deregulation can be achieved must 
depend on a variety of factors including geographic size of the market and 
history. For the UK and indeed the EC, competition regulation of air transport 
continues to be essential regardless of whether the regulatory policy is premis6d 
on a competitive or non-competitive approach, for regulatory powers is a 
condition of the ability to stimulate competition or neutralise decline in 
circumstances when the objectives of a competitive policy are far from being 
achieved, or indeed to take corrective measures in cases when excessive 
competition is deemed as a threat to the objectives of a non-competitive policy. 
In any event, a competitive policy cannot guarantee competition in all cases, nor 
prevent anti-competitive behaviour. The licensing case-law of the CAA as well 
as its policy statements amply testify to this. The evidence in this thesis has 
demonstrated that there are constraints on the UK and the EC to adopt a 
deregulatory policy such as that in the US for a variety of reasons. 
Characteristics of the industry are such that complete economic deregulation 
cannot be an appropriate option. The regulation of route access, for instance, 
continues to be necessary in certain cases. In other areas such as fares and 
capacity, the constraints are less apparent and can therefore be subject to less 
control or regulation. But the combination of a liberal licensing policy and a 
deregulatory policy in limited areas is not the equivalent of complete 
deregulation, but rather regulated competition which seeks to balance the need 
for decisional autonomy and equity. The issue of international or extra- 
Community air transport is, however, different and will no doubt continue to be 
regulated substantially under the terms of bilateral agreements until such time as 
aviation nations recognise in practice the need for greater freedom in airline 
decisions and choice for users. 
Whether there should be more or less regulation depends on the nature of 
regulatory actions in question. If economic regulatory intervention should be the 
exception rather the norm, which it must, the case for a vigorous framework of 
antitrust regulation, however, is far more cogent. For reasons which have 
already been considered, air transport approximates at best an oligopolistic and 
at worst a monopolistic industry. Of course, granted the theoretical 
assumptions of the contestability theory, air transport can be naturally 
competitive by virtue of the ease of entry. But these assumptions have been 
challenged, for they ignore some of the real and fundamental constraints of the 
industry. The trend of alliances between airlines and globalisation of services in 
the absence of international regulation of airline competition have enabled both 
large and small airlines to consolidate their position and to alter the structure of 
the industry in such a way as to potentially reduce competition. Some of these 
have been the consequences of high barriers of entry. This speaks nothing of the I 
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acute infrastructural limitations. Even so, the analysis in this thesis of British air 
transport has shown that in cases where there are no infrastructural limitations, 
market limitations may still exist. Where such limitations exist, however, the 
CAA has shown that contestability can be achieved through the threat of the 
substitution policy. To that end, effective competition may not be conditional 
upon competition between many, but may equally be possible between a few so 
long as safeguards exist against the real risks of anti-competitive behaviour. As 
in the case of economic regulation, the issue is not one of whether there should 
be anti-trust regulation, but since the regulation of anti-competitive behaviour is 
necessarily reactive, then it must surely be one of when and in which cases 
should the authority be invoked. 
Challenges for Community Air Transport 
Re-Writing Policy Objectives 
One of the shortcomings of Community air transport policy, as noted in chapter 
seven, is the lack of a transparent prioritisation of its objectives. Whilst the 
Commission identified in its first memorandum to the Council for the 
development of a common policy in 1979 that competition was only a means for 
certain ends, these ends were a combination of airline, airline employee and 
consumer interests. In very many ways, this reflects the statutory objectives of 
the Civil Aviation Act 1971 in which producer interests were given priority and 
user interests were no more than a set of interests subject to these other 
interests. But the graduation from an emphasis on producer interests to user 
interests in British air transport has been noted, and the rationale considered. 
User interests must precede airline interests for the simple fact that a modem 
liberal economy, or geselIschaftlich as Weber calls it, is conditional on 
autonomy of decision-making and individual choice. Choice is a derivative of 
competition and a vehicle for achieving allocative and productive efficiency. 
Hence, efficiency of operations is no more than either a by-product or pre- 
requisite of this policy orientation. 
This policy orientation by no means represents a total disregard for the other 
interests within the regulatory complex identified by the Commission. In certain 
circumstances, it may be necessary to give a measure of preference to smaller 
airlines either to promote competition with an incumbent or to provide the 
opportunity for them to grow particularly in cases where they face high barriers 
to reach the minimum threshold of viability. Nevertheless, in either of these 
situations, the interests of users should be paramount as an end objective since 
by securing competition or protecting a growth opportunity, the long-term aim Z 
is to ensure choice. In other circumstances, it may be necessary to secure an 
enforced conditioning of a licence either by substitution or reduction of 
capacity. These competitive solution are only a means to an end, the end being 
to promote or protect the interests of users. As such, it is not to be cast in 
stone. No doubt, a large part of the CAM jurisdiction to mete out such 
remedies or to secure these objectives has been removed, and limited to such 
routes not covered by the market access Regulation. But the lessons of over 
two decades are highly instructive and germane to the continuing development 
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of Community air transport policy Although by 1997, Community air transport 
could effiectively be described as deregulated, prioritisation of the policy 
objectives remains necessary and vital for those regulatory actions that may be 
invoked under the measures of the liberalisation programme. Likewise, 
enforcement actions against anti-competitive behaviour or abuse of dominant 
position, and applications for State aids or merger approval will need to be 
assessed in the light of these prioritised objectives. This speaks nothing of the 
emerging forms of 'strategic alliances' in particular code-sharing and 
franchising, all of which demand scrupulous examination of their implications 
for airline competition. Of course, the mere prioritisation of objectives does not 
guarantee the intended end result. This calls for greater transparency and am, ore 
formal and established manner of representation in the process of decisloty-. 
making than is hitherto present in the regulation of Community air transport. To 
this end, the case has been made in the previous chapter for a Counsel on Public 
Interest Representation who, as its title suggests, would represent the public 
interest in economic and antitrust regulation cases. 
Antitrust Regulation and the Market System 
The way in which Community air transport competition has been organised 
under the Common Air Transport Policy is clearly not consistent with a leading 
theme of this thesis. It is a contention of this thesis that liberalisation, or 
deregulation of naturally competitive sectors, should be introduced only when 
the conditions of sustainable competition are deemed to have been achieved. 
Typically, as in the case of British air transport, this requires a process of 
economýic regulation to procure these conditions by creating equality of 
opportunities and greater market contestability. This is especially relevant where 
for reasons of historical endowment or public policy, the industry suffers from 
a structural imbalance. The sort of imbalance, where the national carrier acts as 
a dominant player, is not apparent in the US so that its decision to deregulate 
the industry in 1978 did not present the competition concerns raised in this 
thesis; competition existed ex ante. Even so, it is now becoming evident that the 
deregulation has led, or is leading, to more concentrations and an industry 
organised around a small number of large carriers. 4 
By contrast, British and Community air transport were unfamiliar to the idea of 
competition prior to the initiatives of the CAA and the fiberalisation 
programme. Each Member State had a dominant, national flag-carrier, which 
usually enjoyed an elevated and protected position. The structural imbalance 
affecting competition was acute, some more acute than others. As this thesis has 
argued, to liberalise or deregulate without first removing some of the 
fundamental barriers stemming from such imbalance, would simply precipitate 
further economic regulation or the elimination of competition. It is clear that the 
economies of scope, scale and network enjoyed by these major carriers, whose 
dominance has not necessarily resulted from genuine commercial competition, 
have the strength and resources to out-perform new entrants. Furthermore, the 
question of whether of their responses to the new entrants are predatory or 
4 S, Dempscy. "Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology: Economic Theory 
in Turbulence" (1990) 56 Journal of-lir Lmv and Commerce 305. 
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merely competitive is one which falls within the grey penumbral area. Thus, the 
creation of the single European aviation market without having resolved some 
of these fundamental problems bears precisely the danger of enabling the 
dominant carriers to reinforce their dominance. The liberafisation of Community 
air transport was not preceded by any process of economic regulation. 
Competition regulation immediately took the form of antitrust regulation, It is 
possible to argue, however, that the liberalisation programme consisted of three 
phases which were designed primarily to allow airlines to adapt to the 
conditions of competition. But this begs two related questions. The first is 
whether a time span of ten years was sufficient to have created the conditions 
for sustainable competition given the protectionist practices of the past. More 
importantly, even if that was possible, the second question is whether in 103, 
Community air transport can generally be described as having achieved the 
conditions for sustainable competition. Clearly, these are matters on which 
opinions will differ considerably. 
It is also possible to submit the argument that the concept of liberalisation in 
Community air transport has been conceived differently from the traditional way 
in which it is understood. In the end, it is a matter of semantics. The 
combination of market freedom on the one hand, where airlines can choose the 
markets in which to operate, the fares to charge and the frequency of the 
services, and provisions for intervention on the other hand, is in effect a system 
of economic regulation in a different outfit. We have seen in chapter seven that, 
while competition is presumed, the final package of measures enables Member 
States to regulate the distribution of traffic and any substantial changes in fares 
and capacity which lead to serious financial damage. Quite clearly, these do not 
amount to a full-blown machinery of economic regulation, for they would not 
be adequate to deal with the exigencies of the structural problems, but they 
remain a source for economic regulatory interventions. To the extent that this 
argument is possible, it underlines the contention that economic regulation to 
procure the conditions of sustainable competition is an essential requisite to 
liberalisation and the shift towards antitrust regulation. Be that as it may, 
fiberalising Community air transport without the certainty that these conditions 
of sustainable competition have been achieved to enable airlines to compete 
effectively and to flourish runs the risk of not realising the objectives envisaged 
under the liberalisation programme. Competition regulation is almost wholly 
dependent on the antitrust rules represented by Articles 85 and 86 and the 
implementing measures contained in the first liberalisation package. It is 0 
submitted that the success of the air transport liberalisation programme requires 
an effective and rigorous approach to antitrust regulation. Whatever may be the 
conditions of competition, these must be safeguarded to the maximum extent 
possible. The presumption must be to prohibit all practices or behaviour which 
are or likely to be anti-competitive. This will mean raising the threshold 
for 
approving any practice, behaviour or application between two or more 
undertakings to merge. I'D 
In the lead up to the Amsterdam summit of the European Council in June 1997, 
the Commission published an Action Plan for the 
full functioning, of the single 
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market by I January 1999 ('otnpleftng the Single Aftirket contains four 
strategic targets for action: 
making the rules more effective-, 
dealing with key market distortions; 
removing obstacles to market integration; 
e delivering a single market for the benefit of all citizens. 5 
Under the plan, three categories of measures were identified. The first relates to 
those legislative measures which have been adopted but requires transposition 
or implementation by Member States. The Commission will be aiming to ensure 
that these are properly and promptly carried out. Inter alia, this includes the full 
implementation of liberalisation measures including those for air transport. The 
second set of measures relates to those which have already bee proposed but 
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have not had the 
opportunity to consider or adopt. The third set of measures includes those 
which have yet to be proposed, but for which the areas for action have already 
been identified. 
The thrust of this action plan seems to be arguing strongly for an austere 
approach to the implementation of the liberalisation measures accompanied by a 
rigorous approach to the regulation of competition by prohibiting practices or 
behaviour which distort or are likely to distort the market. This is by no means a 
guarantee, but is the next best thing to ensuring that the objectives of the single 
market are ffilly realised. 
Future Role of Competition Regulation 
The study of regulation and deregulation has gradually emerged as a discipline 
in its own right. This will no doubt continue. Choice and competition are 
associated notions that seem to chime well with modem centrist politics. More 
specifically, the tendency has been to recognise that minimal regulation or 
deregulation as a pre-requisite to economic growth and stability. Only 20 years 
ago, almost every aspect of air transport was tightly regulated. This ranged 
from the IATA system of fixing fares, to pooling agreements for revenues and 
capacity, to the contents of the sandwich for an in-flight meal. Non-compliance 
, with these agreements, for example, the undercutting of fares would attract 
penalties from an IATA tribunal. So would an infringement of the in-flight 
catering agreements which SAS discovered when it bravely 
decided to serve the 
famous Danish salmon and caviar sandwich contrary to the world-wide 
agreement on in-flight catering! How so much of this 
has now changed; the 
charter market is now virtually deregulated, the US 
deregulated its domestic 
industry in 1978, the UK confidently introduced competition into a much 
protected industry since the 1970s, the 
EC now has a fully liberalised single 
aviation market, and Australia and New 
Zealand are now putting together a 
single aviation market between them. 
Indeed under Community antitrust rules, 
fare-fixing, revenue and capacity agreements are expressly prohibited even 
if 
airlines wanted to enter 
into them. This is not to say that the role of law and 
5 See IP/97/478.4 June 1997. 
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regulation has or will be diminished It means there has been a shift in the role 
of law and regulation. It means relationships between individuals, between 
individuals and the State are cast differently. 
Notwithstanding the recent change in Government, the most recent re-statement 
on regulatory politics is contained in several documents published by the 
Deregulation Initiative almost at the same time as the Deregulation and 
Contracting-Out Bill became law in 1994, These were Thinking About 
Regulation: A Good Guide to Regulation and Regulation ity the Balance: A 
Guide to Risk Ass-essment. 6 Although the thrust of these papers were concerned 
with 'social regulation' rather than competition regulation, it goes withput 
saying that there are certain aspects of regulation that cannot be so readily 
classified nor, at least, be considered without having regard to the other. The 
costs of imposing stricter safety or security measures, for instance, will impact 
on the airlines' ability to provide competitive fares. There is no clear cut 
evidence when it comes down to the point, whether passengers are concerned 
with the maximum working hours for pilots or with low, good value fares. 
Be that as it may, in the context of social regulation, the former Prime NEnister 
has written in the Foreword of Thinking A bout Regulation that, 
All regulation imposes costs on business. So there should always 
be a presumption against regulation unless it is strictly necessary 
to protect the interests of the consumer and the wider public. 
But in the past there has been sometimes been a tendency to go 
too far and impose regulatory burdens well in excess of what is 
really required. This damages small business, restricts market 
entry and stifles the innovation and growth our economy needs. 
The temptation to over-regulate must be restricted. 
The document goes on to set out a list of guidelines on 'good' regulation which 
policy-makers should have regard to when considering regulatory initiatives. 
0 Identify the issue and keep any regulation in proportion to the problem in 
question. 
Keep the regulation simple and short, and aim for goal-based regulation. 
Provide flexibility within the regulatory framework by setting out the 
objective rather than the detailed way of ensuring regulatory compliance. 
Try to anticipate the effects on competition or trade. 
Minimise the costs of compliance. 
integrate with any previous regulatory measures. 
Ensure that the regulation can be effectively managed and enforced. 
Ensure that the regulation will work and that its failure can be readily 
detected. 
0 Allow for enough time. 7 0 
6 Deregulation Initiative. Thinking About Regulation: .4 Good 
Guide to Regulation 
(1993) andRegulation in the Balance: A Guide to RiskAssessment (1993). 
7 Thinking. I bout Regulation, pp. 20-2 1. 
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A number of observations are in order. First, these guidelines are an explicit 
affirmation that regulation is a second best enterprise, It underlines the need to 
avoid second guessing the decisions made in the competitive market place, a 
belief no longer underpinned by ideological assumptions in contemporary 
politics. " This approach is consistent with the policies that the CAA has evolved 
over the years and the objectives of the single aviation market for Europe. The 
performance of the CAA can of course be judged retrospectively, but it is a 
more difficult job to pass judgment on the implementation on the single market 
at this stage. Nevertheless, as this thesis has argued throughout, this assertion is 
not the same as claiminct that reaulation is unnecessary. On the contrary, where 
there are public interest justifications for regulating, we cannot shrink away 
from this responsibility. More to the point, regulation should not be seen aSa 
vehicle for preventing competition. It is as much a public policy instrument for 
promoting competition where there may be barriers to competition, as it is a 
leverage for moderating the excesses of competition. 
From the public law perspective, regulation is ultimately a species of 
centralisation. This is not consistent with the notions of choice, autonomy and 
competition. Accordingly, there is much to commend in the presumption against 
regulation except where public policy requires. Even so, the question as to 
whether to regulate in the first place, or indeed to deregulate, cannot be 
determined entirely from the centre. This would fly in the face of the very call to 
deregulate or minimise regulation because regulation itself is regarded as a 
second best enterprise. This being so, the decision whether to regulate or 
deregulate needs a wider input from interested parties backed by transparent 
processes so that any wider participation is not seen as a simple exercise of 
formality. This approach to policy formulation is by no means apparent nor 
uniformly subscribed to by government agencies. 9 In direct contrast, this thesis 
has shown from the work of the CAA that there is much to gain and little to 
lose from a transparent process of policy formulation, particularly in respect of 
its policies towards competition and the decision to deregulate domestic air 
transport. 
Secondly, taken as a whole, these guidelines reaffirm the need to introduce an 
element of cost-benefit analysis into regulatory measures. This is to keep the 
costs of regulation, expressed in terms of compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement costs, in proportion to the benefits which may derived from the 
regulation. This is not a novel approach; indeed, the whole process of re- 
8 Details aside, the current Labour Government has shown no sign of their intention to 
abandon the general thinking behind these papers. Indeed. the setting up of the 
Better Regulation Unit is testimony of the willingness to continue with the 
deregulation initiatives and to modernise GoN-crrunent. Among other things, the Unit 
has published a comparable document setting out the principles for better regulation: 
accountability, relevance, transparency. targeting; consistency and proportionality. 
9 See e. g.. J. Goh and N. D. Leiiis. Private World of Government (Centre for Socio- 
Legal Studies, University of Sheffield. Sheffield: 1999). 
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inventing government and regulatory review in the US is mounted on the cost- 
benefit approach. 10 
The theoretical assumption of the relationship between economic regulation and 
antitrust regulation of airline competition seems to be clear. That is to say, 
economic regulation remains essential where competition cannot be regarded as 
natural, but where it is, economic regulatory controls may liberalised or even 
abandoned. The economic regulatory process should become less important as 
solutions are sought through the market system. At this stage, the nature of 
competition regulation evolves into antitrust regulation. However, it is the 
contention of this thesis that this should be so only when the conditions ' of 
sustainable competition have been established. This is otherwise known as the 
critical level of market contestability. 
10 Report of the National Performance Re, %iew. Creating A Government That Tjorks 
Better and Costs Less (1993) and in particular, Creating. 4 Better Government That 
Morks Better and Costs Less: Improving Regulatory ývstems (1993). 
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